INFLUENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT RETURNEES' AMNESTY PROGRAMME ON TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN KWALE COUNTY, KENYA

PATRICK NAU KUBASU

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES OF AFRICA NAZARENE UNIVERSITY

JULY, 2020

DECLARATION

I declare that this document and the research it describes are my original work and that they have not been presented in any other university for academic work.



07/07/2020

…….. ……

Patrick Nau Kubasu Date

18s03dmgp017

SUPERVISOR'S DECLARATION

This research was conducted under our supervision and is submitted for examination with our approval as the university supervisors.



09.07.2020

……. ……

Dr. Duncan O. Ochieng, PhD Date

07/07/2020 ……

Dr. Sarah Mueni, PhD Date

Africa Nazarene University

Nairobi Kenya

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my late father, John Wekesa Kubasu, my late mother Mary Namutilu Wekesa, my late brothers Stephen Elima Wekesa and Cleophas Wamalwa Kubasu. I am here because you were.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ii
DEDICATION iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
ABSTRACT viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ix
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS x
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS xii
LIST OF FIGURES xiv
LIST OF TABLES xv
CHAPTER ONE 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Background to the study 1
1.3 Statement of the problem 5
1.4 Purpose of the Study 6
1.5 Objectives of the Problem 6
1.5.1 General Objectives 6
1.5.2 Specific Objectives 6
1.6 Research Questions 6
1.7 Significance of the Study 7
1.8 Scope of the Study 8
1.9 Limitations of the Study 9
1.10 Delimitations of the Study 10
1.11 Assumptions of the study 10
1.12 Theoretical framework 10
1.12.1 Social Contract Theory 11
1.13 Conceptual Framework 12
CHAPTER TWO 14
LITERATURE REVIEW 14
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Review of Literature 14
2.2.1 Effects of the amnesty programme on terrorism activities 15

2.2.2 Strategies in the Implementation of the Amnesty Programme 17
2.2.3 Roles Played by Non State Actors 22
2.2.4 Local Community Participation 25
2.3 Summary and Research Gap 28
CHAPTER THREE 31
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 31
3.1 Introduction 31
3.2 Research Design 31
3.3 Research Site and Rationale 31
3.4 Target Population 32
3.5 Determination of the Sample 33
3.5.1 Sampling Procedures 33
3.5.2 Study Sample Size 33
3.6 Data Collection Measures 34
3.6.1 Development of Instruments 34
3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments 35
3.6.3 Instruments Reliability 35
3.6.4 Instruments Validity 36
3.7 Data collection procedures 36
3.8 Data Analysis and presentation 36
3.9 Ethical Considerations 37
CHAPTER FOUR 38
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 38
4.1 Introduction 38
4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 38
4.2.1 Response Rate 39
4.2.2 Gender of the Respondents 39
4.2.3 Age of the Respondents 40
4.2.4 Age of the Respondents per Gender 41
4.2.5 Sub-Counties of Residence of the Respondents 42
4.3 Effects of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme to Terrorism Activities 43
4.3.1 Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities 43
4.3.2 Reasons for Reduced Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya 44

4.3.3 Reasons for Increased Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya 45
4.3.4 Ranking of the Effectiveness of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 47
4.3.5 How to Improve the Returnees' Amnesty Programme in Kwale County 48
4.3.6 General Comments on the Effects of the Programme on Terrorism Activities 49
4.4 Strategies Employed by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees Amnesty 51
4.4.1 Type of Support Provided by the Kenyan Government to the Returnees 51
4.4.2 Government Support per Sub-County 52
4.4.3 Support Preferred by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees' Amnesty 53
4.4.4 Support Preferred by the Returnees in the Amnesty Programme 54
4.4.5 National Government Support to Other Groups in the Amnesty Programme 55
4.4.6 Other Groups Supported by the National Government in the Amnesty programme 56
4.4.7 Nature of Support Given to Other Groups by the National Government 57
4.4.8 General Comments on the National Government Strategies 58
4.5 Role of Non State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 59
4.5.1 Involvement of the Non State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 60
4.5.2 The Non State Actors Involved in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 60
4.5.3 Roles Played by Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 61
4.5.4 Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government 62
4.5.5 Areas of Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 63
4.5.6 General Comments on the Roles of Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 64
4.6 Level of Local Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 66
4.6.1 Community participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 66
4.6.2 Community Participation per Sub-County 67
4.6.3 The Level the Community Likes the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 68
4.6.4 How the Community Participates in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 69
4.6.5 Level of Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 70
4.6.6 Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 71
CHAPTER FIVE 73
DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 73
5.1 Introduction 73
5.2 Discussions 73
5.2.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 73

5.2.2 Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities 74
5.2.3 Strategies Employed by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees Amnesty 76
5.2.4 Role of the Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 79
5.2.5 Level of Local Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme 81
5.3 Summary of the Main Findings 82
5.4 Conclusion 84
5.5 Recommendations 85
5.6 Areas for Further Research 86
REFERENCES 87
APPENDICES 99
Appendix 1: Introduction Letter for Key Informants 99
Appendix 2: Interview Schedule for Heads of Households 100
Appendix 3: Key Informant Interview Guide 107
Appendix 4: ANU Research Data Collection Approval Letter 108
Appendix 5: Research Permit 109
Appendix 6: Map of Kwale County 111

ABSTRACT

The return of former foreign terrorist fighters to Kenya has increased terrorism activities in the country. The National Government had initially employed counter terrorism measures in dealing with the returnees but in 2015, it rolled out the returnees' amnesty programme. However, terrorism activities continued to rock Kwale County, which has the highest number of returnees, even after introduction of the returnees' amnesty programme among other interventions. The study sought to assess the influence of the government returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. The specific objectives of the study were to: establish the effects of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities; examine the strategies employed by the government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme; evaluate the role of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in the returnees' amnesty programme; and assess the level of local community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya. The study was guided by John Locke's Social Contract theory, and employed a descriptive survey research design, combining both qualitative and quantitative survey. The target population of the study was one hundred and seventy three thousand, one hundred and seventy six heads of households in Kwale. An interview schedule was used to collect data from four hundred heads of households who were randomly sampled and key informant interview guide was used to interview sixteen key informants purposively sampled. The return rate was 100% and after analysis, the response rate was 99%. Ethical and legal factors such as consent and confidentiality were observed. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS for descriptive statistics and presented in figures and tables while qualitative data was analyzed thematically and presented in verbatim to corroborate the quantitative data. The study established that the returnees' amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in the county by 81%; the key national government support to returnees are economic support, psychosocial rehabilitation and vocational training rehabilitation and economic support to the affected families; NGOs are the main NSAs involved in the amnesty programme and they mainly assist in rehabilitation of the returnees; and many community members do not participate in the programme due to high societal stigmatization of the returnees, programme participants and the affected families. Based on the study findings, the study concludes that the government returnees' amnesty programme strategies have been effective in reducing terrorism activities in Kwale County. However, the participation of the community in the programme is low due to rampant stigmatization of the programme participants, the returnees and the affected families. The study recommends that the National Government, Kwale County Government and Non-State Actors need to synergize in sensitizing the community in order to improve their participation and assist in mobbing up of the remaining returnees.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge Beverlyne Lukela, my wife, and my kids for allowing me some family time to undertake this research. I also acknowledge Dr. Duncan Ochieng and Dr. Sarah Mueni for their guidance and support in the course of the research. I laud Dr. Fatuma Azmia Badurdeen and Dr. Godffrey Nyongesa Nato of the Technical University of Mombasa and Mombasa County Government respectively for encouraging me to enroll for further studies. I acknowledge the Africa Nazarene fraternity for offering me a chance to undertake the programme and for their continued support.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Amnesty programme: Refers to an official engagement in which the Kenyan government allows returnees, who have been members of Al Shabaab and other terrorist organizations, to own up and surrender to government authorities for disengagement, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration.

Counter Terrorism: These are political and militaristic (hard power) measures intended to thwart terrorism.

Demobilization: Refers to cutting links with a terrorist organization to avoid continued command and control.

Disengagement: Refers to physically delinking oneself from a terrorist organization or changing of roles from violent to non-violent ones in a given terrorist group.

Nyumba Kumi: This is a Kenyan Government programme that seeks to involve members of the public in policing. The programme aims at bridging the gap between the National Police Service and the public to enable seamless flow of information and prioritize the public's security concerns in policing.

Radicalization: Is a process through which people are gradually exposed to radical ideas, beliefs or world views.

Rehabilitation: Is the process of helping those who have been radicalized to revert to normal life after undergoing a de-radicalization. The returnees who have surrendered to the government, the

terrorist convicts and the impacted community are the target of the Kenyan programme.

Reintegration: These are activities, actions, efforts or initiatives that make rehabilitated returnees to return to the society and feel part of the community and avoid feeling like social misfits or outcasts. The scope of reintegration also involves the impacted communities who are expected to accept and reconcile with the returnees when they return to settle back in the society.

Returnees: This refers to former Al Shabaab and other terrorist group fighters who have disengaged from their former terrorist organization. These are the people the Kenyan government amnesty programme targets to disengage, rehabilitate and reintegrate. They are also referred to as defectors or beneficiaries in other amnesty programmes around the world.

Terrorism: This is violence or threat of violence meted against innocent civilians with the aim of pressuring the government to yield to certain political demands.

Terrorism Activities: These are criminal activities conducted by or on behalf of terrorist operatives or a terrorist organization. They include; terrorism attacks, radicalization and recruitment.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB	:	Asian Development Bank
AMISOM	:	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU	:	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CBO	:	Community Based Organization
CT	:	Counter Terrorism
CVE	:	Counter Violence Extremism
FDI	:	Foreign Direct Investment
GWOT	:	Global War on Terrorism
IBRD	:	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
INGO	:	International No-Governmental Organization
IOM	:	International Organization for Migrants
IS	:	Islamic State
JI	:	Jamiyah Islamiyah
KDF	:	Kenya Defence Forces
KIIG	:	Key Informants Interview Guide
LRA	:	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	:	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
NCTC	:	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGAO	:	National Government Administration Officers
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organization
NPS	:	National Police Service

NSA	:	Non State Actors
RRG	:	Religious Rehabilitation Group
UPDF	:	Uganda People's Defence Force
USA	:	United States of America
UNESCO	:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNICEF	:	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	:	World Health Organization

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework…….....13

Figure 4.1: Gender of the Respondents …….40

Figure 4.2: Ages and Genders of the Respondents……42

Figure 4.3: Government Support in the Programme per Sub-County..…….53

Figure 4.4: Support Preferred by the Government of Kenya…..……...……54

Figure 4.5: National Government Support to Other Groups …….56

Figure 4.6: Roles Played by Non-State Actors in the Programme ……..…….62

Figure 4.7: Community Participation in the Programme per Sub-County……67

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Study sample ……..…….34

Table 4.1: Response Rate……...……39

Table 4.2: Age of the Respondents….……41

Table 4.3: Sub-Counties of Residence of the Respondents …….....42

Table 4.4: Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities in Kwale County…….…….....43

Table 4.5: Reasons for Reduced Terrorism Activities in Kwale County ……45

Table 4.6: Reasons for Increased Terrorism Activities in Kwale County……..46

Table 4.7: Ranking of the Effectiveness of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme …….47

Table 4.8: How to Improve the Returnees' Amnesty Programme in Kwale County…….49

Table 4.9: General Comments on the Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities in Kwale County.....……..50

Table 4.10: Type of Support Provided by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Progeamme…….52

Table 4.11: Support Preferred by the Returnees' in the Amnesty Programme...……55

Table 4.12: Other Groups Supported by the Kenyan Government in the Implementation of the Amnesty Programme……....57

Table 4.13: Nature of Support Given to Other Groups by the National Government……58

Table 4.14: General Comments of the National Government Strategies in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme……..59

Table 4.15: Involvement of the Non-State Actors in the Amnesty Programme…….....60

Table 4.16: The Non-State Actors Involved in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme…...61

Table 4.17: Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme …….....63

Table 4.18: Areas of Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme…….64

Table 4.19: General Comments of the Non-State Actors in the Amnesty Programme…..65

Table 4.20: Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme…….....66

Table 4.21: The Level that the Community Likes the Programme ……...68

Table 4.22: How the Community Participates in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme….69

Table 4.23: The Level of Community Participation in the Amnesty Programme……..70

Table 4.24: General Comments on the Community Participation in the Amnesty Programme…….72

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the background to the study, statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research hypotheses, significance of the study, scope of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, assumptions of the study, theoretical framework and the conceptual framework.

1.2 Background to the study

Gunaratna (2017) highlights that, after the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, the United States of America (USA) under George Bush Administration (2001-2009) launched a hard power approach dubbed Global War on Terror (GWOT), which saw the USA troops enter Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 to pursue the terrorists. The USA aimed at mitigating what Patrick (2006), refers to as spillover effects of insecurity experienced in weak and failed states. Taddeo (2010) assessed that the hard power approach by the USA and her allies only yielded short term victory since 8 years on, neither stability nor security had been achieved in Afghanistan. Similarly, Gunaratna (2017) opined that the USA and her allies failed to contain the threat from spreading beyond the conflict zones. Indeed terrorism has spilled over the terrorist organizations' known battlefields.

Styszynski (2015) estimated that by 2015, 20,000 foreign fighters, 2,500 of whom were drawn from Western Countries, had joined Islamic State (IS). Though Styszynski (2015) figure is different from Bell (2015), who estimated that 3,000 IS fighters were drawn from Western Countries, both researchers agree that these foreign terrorist fighters

increased terrorism activities to their home countries upon their return. See (2018) illuminates that the eviction of the IS terrorists, through military means, has driven foreign terrorist fighters back to their home countries thereby increasing terrorist attacks. Styszynski (2015) postulates that the increase in terrorist attacks linked to returning foreign terrorist fighters in Europe has raised concerns about the effectiveness of the hard power approach and attracted a debate on how to complement it with rehabilitation and de-radicalization programmes in order to achieve positive peace. Waxman (2011) highlighted that terrorist attack consequences can be wide-ranging and far-reaching and often go far beyond the deaths, destruction and actual impacts of an attack. Terrorist attacks lead to negative psychological impacts, slow down the economy, wane political legitimacy of leaders and strain diplomatic relations among nations (Momanyi, 2015).

See (2018) postulated that the returning foreign terrorist fighters could become recruiters, propagandists and trainers for future terrorist attacks and therefore serve as a catalyst for recidivism or reactivation of disengaged terrorists. Bell (2015) argues that after realizing that 70 Australians had joined IS, the Australian Government rolled out a disengagement and de-radicalization programme to counter violence extremism and build community cohesion. Gunaratna (2012) indicates that after 37 years of fighting, the Sri Lankan government forces defeated the Tamil Tigers in 2009. To ensure the problem was dealt with completely, the Sri Lankan government launched the amnesty programme that targeted the former Tamil Tigers terrorist fighters (Hettiarachchi, 2013).

In Africa, Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014), Ikoh (2013), Nwankpa (2014) and Osah (2016) agree that amnesty has greatly reduced violence in countries where the programme has been rolled out in Africa. Due to failures of the militaristic approach, the Nigerian

Government launched an unconditional amnesty programme in the volatile Niger Delta, which targeted all ex-combatants (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2014). Uganda's Amnesty Act, 2000 was a conflict resolution tool aimed at encouraging Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels and other rebel groups to lay down their arms for rehabilitation and reintegration (Agger, 2012).

Goldsmith (2018) postulates that the spillover of the Al Shabaab militancy that increased terrorist attacks made the Kenyan Government to unexpectedly send the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to Somalia in October, 2011, to pursue the militants in an operation codenamed *Operation Linda Nchi.* But Goldsmith (2018) assessed that this operations only yielded short term results as was the case of the US and her allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) argued that the increase in terrorist activities in Kenya was in revenge of KDF engagement in Somalia and internal operations by the National Police Service (NPS) specialized Unit, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU).

Ogada (2017) argued that the Kenyan government's enacted legislative frameworks for example: the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012; the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014; and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2017 among others, aimed at stemming terrorism through policing, money laundering controls, intelligence-gathering, and prosecution. But with all these measures in place, attacks were incessant, and according to Akoth (2018), the returnees were responsible. Similarly, Kimari and Ramadhan (2017) argued the threat was homegrown because Al Shabaab has recruited Kenyans to carry out the attacks locally.

Akoth (2018) observed that the Kenyan Government rolled out the returnees' amnesty programme in 2015 after realizing that the (returnees) were driven by an ideology

that the militaristic approaches and the criminal justice system alone cannot defeat. Therefore the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) led returnees' amnesty programme is aimed at demobilization, rehabilitating and reintegration returnees (Al-Bulushi & Daghar, 2018). Ruteere and Mutahi (2018) argued that the terrorists' ideology is rife in the Coastal regions of Kenya (where Kwale County falls) and the North Eastern region due to Al Shabaab presence and influence.

Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) opined that the returnees' amnesty programme offers the government an opportunity for indefinite detention of the terror suspects. Nthamburi (2018) criticized the programme for ignoring women. Ogada (2017) argued that the programme is opaque because it lacks legal and policy framework to explain what the programme is all about, provide linkages for actors' contributions and how the success of the programme can be measured, implying that most actors do not know how they can augment the governments' efforts. Downie (2018) argues that majority of the returnees recognize that the amnesty programme is good for them but the enrollment rate is low.

The NPS Annual Crime Report (2018) highlighted that terrorism activities were mainly experienced along the Kenya-Somalia frontier counties and the South Coast of Kenya, which is Kwale County. The NPS Crime Report (2018) attributed the high terrorism activities in the counties bordering Somalia to their proximity to Somalia, a hideout of Al Shabaab, but failed to account for widespread terrorism activities experienced in Kwale County that is located miles away from the Kenya-Somalia border. Consistent with this findings is a study by Akoth (2018) that established that though Kwale County does not border Somalia, the main hide out of the Al Shabaab, it continues to hit the news due to

terrorism incidents that are mainly attributed to Al Shabaab returnees who have propagated an anti-security drive in Kwale County even in the wake of the amnesty programme.

1.3 Statement of the problem

In October, 2017, 2 Technical University of Mombasa staff working at the Kwale Campus were killed by Al Shabaab suspects (Kimari & Ramadhan, 2017). Pkalya (2016, June 09) cites the killing of *nyumba kumi* initiative elders and returnees who had undergone the rehabilitation in Kwale County as an indicator that the programme may fail because of the many inadequacies in the design.

Ahmed (2018, February 21) reported that Kwale County has the largest number of returnees in Kenya who have been carrying out attacks on police officers and the locals. Kasuku (2019, March 8) reported that the NPS raided an Al Shabaab training centre in Kwale and recovered assorted weapons. Later, Kasuku (2019, August 13) indicated that the Al Shabaab returnees were the main suspects in a murder of 2 Imams in Msambweni, Kwale County. Olingo (2019, August 30) reported that the terror suspect who was killed by the NPS in Ng'ombeni, Matungu Sub-County, Kwale County was linked to the Dusit D2 complex suicide bomber called Mahir Riziki. The above terrorist activities justify Akoth (2018) opinion that there is a strong anti-security movement in Kwale County.

Despite the government intervention by the returnees' amnesty programme that was envisioned to attract the returnees to surrender for disengagement and rehabilitation to reduce terrorism activities, Kwale County still experiences varied terrorism activities 5 years after the launch of the programme. Some of these activities are highlighted in the 2 preceding paragarphs. This is an indication that the programme has not fully realized all its main objective of reducing terrorism activities. This study therefore makes an attempt to

document and highlight the programme's influence on terrorism activities and illuminate the reasons for its inability to completely do away with terrorism activities.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to assess the influence of the government returnees' amnesty programme to terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. The study contributes to understanding the reasons why the returnees' amnesty programme has not fully achieved its intended objectives.

1.5 Objectives of the Problem

1.5.1 General Objectives

The general objective of the study was to assess the influence of the government returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

i. Establish the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya.

ii. Examine the strategies employed by the Government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

iii. Evaluate the role of Non State Actors in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

iv. Assess the level of local community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

1.6 Research Questions

The study was be guided by the following research questions.

i. How has the returnees' amnesty programme affected the terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya?

ii. What are the strategies employed by the government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

iii. Which roles are played by Non-State Actors in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

iv. What is the level of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

1.7 Significance of the Study

Even in the wake of the returnees' amnesty programme, Kwale County still experiences terrorism activities (Kimari & Ramadhan, 2017). This soft approach programme was definitely aimed at winning the hearts and the minds of the returnees and the local communities at large and to help bridge the gap between the security agencies and the local communities for a successful demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of the returnees. This was envisioned to reduce terrorism activities in Kwale County and therefore Kenya at large. The runaway terrorism activities is an indication that the ultimate objective of reducing terrorism activities has not been achieved yet.

This study helps the National Government Officials and Non State Actors (NSAs) engaged in the returnees' amnesty programme to establish whether the programme has reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County and by extension in Kenya. The findings are important in guiding the NCTC, the Kenyan Government's lead agency of the returnees' amnesty programme, in formulating policies that have linkages for participation of the

NSAs and provide for areas of collaboration in order to boost the pogramme uptake and make it successful.

The study is important in helping the implementers of the programme to take deliberate measures to bring onboard the community to participate in the programme in order to build trust and collaborate in the implementation process. The study also contributes to the improvement of the general security of Kwale County and Kenya at large. An improved security portrays the image of the county and country in good light internationally and mitigate the travel advisories that have had a negative effect on tourism, a leading economic activity of the Kwale County and Kenya. Improved security also goes a long way in providing an enabling environment that revitalizes the struggling tourism sector, a leading foreign exchange earner, and attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) that would offer employment opportunities to the Kenyans. The study also contributes to the body of knowledge in amnesty and rehabilitation of former terrorism combatants.

1.8 Scope of the Study

Scope of the study is defined by Simon & Goes (2013) as the parameter under which the study would be operating. The study was carried out in all the 4 sub-counties of Kwale County, Kenya. The heads of households, the National Government and NSAs officials involved in the programme were the target. The study focused on establishing the influence of the returnees' amnesty programme that was rolled out by the Government of Kenya to mitigate terrorism activities with a particular focus on the effects of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities, the strategies employed by the government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme, the roles of the NSAs in the

returnees' amnesty programme and the level of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

Simon (2011) defines limitations as potential weaknesses in the study and that are out of the researcher's control. While Simon & Goes (2013) define limitations as matters and occurrences that arise in a study which are out of the researcher's control and therefore limit the extensity to which a study can go, and sometimes affect the end result and conclusion that can be drawn. The study was done when the spread of Corona Virus in Kenya was picking. This posed a risk of infection to the researcher, research assistants and the respondents. It also led to curfew and travel restrictions. Adherence to the government directives and the use of Personal Protective Equipment, enabled the researcher to successfully complete the research. As a result of the pandemic, some key informants were unwilling to hold physical meetings while others were involved in operations to mitigate the spread of the virus. Some key informant interviews were carried out over phone calls as opposed to physical meetings as earlier planned. Alternative key informants like chiefs and sub chiefs in places of county commissioners were used in cases where the targeted key informants could not be reached.

The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) Report, (2019) indicated that Kwale County has a surface area of 8, 270.2 square kilometers making it one of the top 20 most expansive counties in Kenya. To mitigate this, a sample population, which was representative of the target population, was used to carry out the study. The choice of key informants from the entire county helped generate information that helped corroborate data collected through the study questionnaire. The topic of study was also very sensitive. An

assurance of anonymity of the respondents and the use of research assistants drawn from the local community was used to mitigate the suspicion emanating from the topic.

1.10 Delimitations of the Study

Simon (2011) defines delimitations as those characteristics that limit the scope and define the boundaries of your study and are within the researcher's control. Delimitations of a study are those characteristics that from limitations in the scope of the study (defining boundaries) and by the conscious exclusionary and inclusionary decisions made during the development of the study plan that is they are specific choices of the researcher (Simon & Goes, 2013). There are many influences related to the returnees' amnesty programme, this study only focused on the influence of the returnees' amnesty programme to terrorism activities in Kwale County. The returnees' amnesty programme is also being implemented in other counties like, Mombasa, Kilifi and Lamu Counties, but this study focused on Kwale County alone. Equally, the Kenyan National Government and the county governments have initiated many other programmes in an effort to stem terrorism activities but this study focused on Kenya Government returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County.

1.11 Assumptions of the study

Assumptions are things that are somewhat out of your control, but if they disappear your study would become irrelevant (Simon, 2011). The assumptions of the study were: the respondents would be willing to participate in the study and would give truthful responses; the returnees' amnesty programme has played some role in reduction of terrorism cases; and the sample chosen was representative of the whole population.

1.12 Theoretical framework

The study was guided by the social contract theory.

1.12.1 Social Contract Theory

Laskar, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the proponents of the Social Contract Theory, hold divergent arguments about the theory. Laskar (2013) argued that citizens surrender some rights to the government in order to preserve/maintain law and order and enforce the law of nature for the general good of all the people but when the government fails in its duties, the citizens have the right and sometimes the duty to withdraw their support and even rebel. Laskar (2013) argues that human beings are inherently good and come together to form a government for liberty and for equality in sharing common rights. The theory assumes that governments are formed by the people and the people have absolute rights. Sparks (2018) highlights the key arguments of Hume criticism of the Social Contract theory by arguing that all states were formed through violence; conquest, revolution; and coup among others, within or against other pre-existing states. Sparks (2018) also pointed that other than the theory not having historical background and experience, citizens cannot be claimed to have given consent to the government when there is no option to decline in the first place.

Joining Al Shabaab and other terrorist organizations is a form of withdrawing support and rebelling against the government as a result of its (government's) failures. Social contract theory is important in understanding why and how the state apparatus can justify exerting law enforcement power over the whole population to attain national security. However, the social contract theory may be problematic when the law enforcement power exceeds what is expected by society under contract. Hence the social contract theory is important in understanding the use of the amnesty programme by the government in an effort to achieve national security.

The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, preserves the security of the Republic of Kenya to the National Government. This has made the Kenyan Government to undertake many interventions like Counter Terrorism, National CVE strategy and the returnees' amnesty programme that are aimed at dealing with the terrorism menace in Kenya. The government has also ceded some of its preserved security responsibilities by allowing the county governments to develop and implement their CVE strategies aimed at reducing terrorism. All these efforts by the Kenyan Government are aimed at reducing discontent amongst the Al Shabaab returnees and the at-risk youths to avoid rebellion.

1.13 Conceptual Framework

The study assessed how the returnees' amnesty programme (independent variable) implemented by the Kenyan Government using different strategies (independent variable) has affected terrorism activities (dependent variable) in Kwale County, Kenya (Figure 1.1). The study also assessed the roles played by other NSAs (independent variable), and how community participation in the programme (independent variable), has influenced terrorism activities (dependent variable), in Kwale County, Kenya. Good Government Strategies attract many local community members and many NSAs to participate in the programme thereby reducing the terrorism activities. Also, involving many NSAs increases the outreach to many community members and complements the government's strategies thereby increasing the uptake of the programme that reduce the terrorism activities.

A high level of local community participation increases local ownership, attracts more returnees participate in the programme, brings onboard more NSAs, helps to give feedback on government strategies and therefore reduce the terrorism activities in Kwale County. On the other hand, the threats by the Al Shabaab operatives and sympathizers

reduces the involvement of both NSAs and local communities and hampers the government strategies resulting to increased terrorism activities. The programme uptake is also handicapped greatly by these threats since the returnees fear that they would be targeted and killed by the Al Shabaab operatives and/ or sympathizers.




Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework. **Source:** Researcher (2020).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter reviews interrelated literature on the impact of the government returnee amnesty programmes on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. The chapter begins with a review of literature based on each specific objective from the global, regional, national and local perspective and present a summary and research gap realized.

2.2 Review of Literature

Ezzargui (2010) posited that the realization that hard power approaches only yield negative peace made countries around the world to initiate amnesty/rehabilitation programmes to achieve positive peace. Amnesty/rehabilitation efforts are in line with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2178, which requires Member States to, prevent the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts (Kam, 2015).

Thalpawila (2015) argues that rehabilitation is mainly about changing the thinking and behaviour of offenders. Amnesty programmes mark the beginning of a multi-spectral approach that brings onboard local communities, government agencies local and international agencies with the aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate terrorists (Ezzargui, 2010). Terrorist convicts are also rehabilitated because upon expiry of their custodial sentence, they have to be reintegrated back into the society (Vakilpour & Rastegeri, 2018). Also, Gunaratna (2013) argues that without rehabilitation in prisons or in amnesty rehabilitation centers, hard core terrorists may radicalize other detainees who would be

released back into the society more radicalized than at the time of detention. This finding is consistent with Vakilpour & Rastegeri (2018) who established that failure to rehabilitate former terrorists increases recidivism chances.

This chapter reviews different models of terrorist amnesty and rehabilitation programmes from a global, regional and national perspective. The literature review is presented under the following subheadings that are the specific study objectives; strategies employed by governments in the implementation of the amnesty programme, the role of other non-state actors in the amnesty programme and the level of participation of the local community in the amnesty programme. The Sri Lankan, Singaporean, Nigerian, Ugandan and Kenyan models are reviewed.

2.2.1 Effects of the amnesty programme on terrorism activities

Hettiarachchi (2013) assess that the Sri Lankan amnesty programme was very successful since the recidivism rate is negligible and no single attack has happened in Sri Lanka since its launch in 2009. Gunaratna (2012) equally argues that the programme has been a success since it enabled the Northern part of Sri-Lanka that was worst hit by terrorism to achieve an annual economic growth of 22% compared to 7% in the rest of the country. However, this argument was watered down by a terrorist attack carried out in Sri Lanka on 21st April, 2019. Sirisena (2013) accounts that by 2013, the Sri Lankan Government had rehabilitated rehabilitation of the 10,800 former LTTE cadres. In addition, a terrorist attack means many other terrorism activities like recruitment and radicalization had been on going way before the attack.

Hassan (2007) observed that the Singaporean programme was rolled out in 2003 and has been successful in dealing with terrorism in the country. The programme's main

focus was to prevent the population from being recruited into joining Al Qaeda and Jamiyah Islamiyah (Vakilpour & Rastegeri, 2018).

A research by Ikoh (2013), Nwankpa (2014) and Osah (2016) established that though the amnesty programmes in Nigeria had issues, the programme reduced armed conflicts to a greater extent. The findings are consistent with Felbab-Brown (2018) who highlights that both Nigerian amnesty programmes, targeting Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram greatly reduced militant attacks in the country. However, the researchers fail to account the extent to which the programmes had reduced armed fighting. Abatneh (2006) highlighted how Rwanda used the traditional *gacaca* courts to process the fighters and rehabilitate 36,000 genocide perpetrators of the 1994 genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis.

Agger (2012) notes that as of May 2012, a total of 26,288 rebels from different rebel groups, 12,971 of whom were drawn from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), had received amnesty. Hovil & Lomo (2005) argues that the amnesty programme, a restorative process, reduced armed fighting because it was embraced mainly by the people of the Northern part of the Uganda where children were abducted and forced into fighting along with LRA. Ekayu (2015) highlighted that the Ugandan programme was able to provide livelihood to the poor and established peace clubs in the Northern Uganda that prevented people from joining the LRA among other armed groups in the country. Though Agger (2012), Hovil & Lomo (2005) and Ekayu (2015) agree that the amnesty programme reduced armed fighting, they all fail to indicate the level.

Downie (2018) argues that the government of Kenya failed to take advantage of the returnees' amnesty programme to solve the rampant problem because of; lack of legal

framework to operationalize it, poor or incomplete execution, eligibility questions, uncooperative government forces and weak monitoring systems that has kept uptake of the programme very low. Akoth (2018) argues that there are very many unsurrendered returnees in Kwale County driving an anti-security narrative even after the roll out of the returnees amnesty programme. Downie (2018) postulated that while there are no reliable figures on the number of returnees, the government estimated that 1,500 former al-Shabaab members had already surrendered to the authorities by February 2016. The effects of the programme on terrorism activities is a knowledge gap that the study undertakes to find out.

2.2.2 Strategies in the Implementation of the Amnesty Programme

Gunaratna (2015) notes that countries such Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia and Oman have built their terrorist amnesty/rehabilitation programmes that are either continuous or *ad hoc* depending on their local dynamics. A study by Nahdohdin, et al. (2019) established that countries affected by terrorism in the South Asia had disparate models of amnesty and rehabilitation aimed at addressing their specific local issues that drive citizenry into terrorism.

After 37 years of fighting for independence of the North and East of Sri Lanka, the terrorist group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was defeated by the Sri Lankan Army in 2009 and thereafter the Sri Lankan Government rolled out the amnesty programme targeting former terrorism fighters (Gunaratna, 2013). Silke & Veldhuis (2017) established that the authorities did not refer to the LTTE members as “prisoners” or “detainees” but “beneficiaries” in order to help foster better relations with staff, and create a different and more positive self-image for the “beneficiaries” themselves. The beneficiaries were first

subjected to psycho-social and socio-economic profiling and categorized them into “low”, “medium”, or “high” risk groups, according to the depth, period, and activities of involvement within the LTTE organization and referred to different custodial rehabilitation centres (Dharmawardhane, 2013).

Those beneficiaries who were categorized as high risk were imprisoned and rehabilitated while in custody (Ezzargui, 2010). Thalpawila (2015) postulates that the key government strategies, 6+1 key components are; the religious and spiritual rehabilitation, the educational rehabilitation, the vocational rehabilitation, the social and family rehabilitation, the recreational rehabilitation, the psychological rehabilitation and community rehabilitation.

Singapore was among the first countries in the World to initiate terrorist rehabilitation programme (Ezzargui, 2014). Kam (2015) notes that Singapore adopted a five-pronged approach to its defence, conceptualized in its Total Defence Strategy encompassing the military, civil, economic, social and psychological defence. Established in 2003, the ideologically driven Singaporean programme was aimed at protecting her Muslim population from radical ideologies of the Jamiyah Islamiyah (JI) members (Ezzargui, 2010). The strategy called upon all Singaporeans to individually and collectively, build a strong, secure and cohesive nation prepared and able to deal with any crisis like terrorism (Kam, 2015).

Hassan (2015) established that religious counselling formed the key government strategy in rehabilitating the ideological drift towards extremism and violence embraced by the Al Qaeda-linked JI members who had been arrested. Vakilpour & Rastegeri (2018) highlights that religious counselling by the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) also

involved case officers, psychologists and religious counsellors who only release a detainee after assessing that full rehabilitation has taken place. Upon release of the detainees, the case officers, psychologists and religious counsellors continued with aftercare of the released detainees to ensure reintegration back into society is done well (Hassan, 2015). Vakilpour & Rastegeri (2018) established that the government strategy also included offering economic support to the affected family members.

The Nigerian government rolled out the amnesty programme in 2009 targeting the Niger Delta armed group agitating for a fair share of the oil proceeds (Ogbogu, 2016). In 2013, the government rolled out another amnesty programme targeting Boko Haram terrorists (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Osah (2016) posits that the Niger Delta amnesty programme had 3 components namely; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), while Felbab-Brown (2018) notes that the programme targeting Boko Haram terrorists involved de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration for individual defectors. Ogbogu (2016) highlights that the government amnesty strategies includes; education, vocational training, psychological and religious, while a study by Felbab-Brown (2018) indicated that the programme involved vocational training, basic education, psycho-social therapy, sport and recreation and religious re-education.

Nkwankpa (2014) criticizes the programme for over concentrating on education, vocational training and financial support at the expense of ideological rehabilitation, which is considered the most important component. Felbab-Brown (2018) illuminates that the Boko Haram programme categorizes them into low-risk, medium-risk, and the high-risk defectors. The low and medium risk are taken to respective rehabilitation camps while the high risk are subjected to court trials but with some leniency. Those captured in active

combat would, unlike defectors, not be eligible for the amnesty leniency, and would face regular trials and imprisonment (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

As noted by Ogbogu (2016), the Niger Delta rehabilitees were given money for reintegration but Felbab-Brown (2018) argued that the Boko Haram defectors do not receive extensive and long-lasting financial payments. Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014) argued that the programme ignored women and other impacted communities. However, Felbab-Brown (2018) argues that the programme has been reviewed to include separate custodial rehabilitation centres for both women and children and downsized categorization of the beneficiaries to high- and low-risk only.

In Uganda, Agger (2012) highlights that the amnesty programme was implemented through an enactment of the Amnesty Act, 2000, to provide amnesty to reporters from different groups who renounced rebellion against the Ugandan Government since 1986 and gave up arms for an institutionalized resettlement and repatriation process, and for reintegration support. Hovil & Lomo (2005) notes that the pardon targeted 22 known groups that had taken up arms to fight the government since President Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) came into power in 1986. The Ugandan Amnesty Act, 2000, also established an Amnesty Commission and Demobilization and Resettlement Team (DRT) that was tasked with implementing the act, issuing certificates of amnesty to reporters and disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating them in 6 DRT centres across the country (Agger, 2012).

Agger (2012) accounts that as of May 2012, a total of 26,288 rebels from different rebel groups, 12,971 of whom from the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), had received amnesty. Muramuzi, Mawa & Ngabiran (2019) argued that many ex-soldiers are

self-reintegrating themselves into the society for lack of trust in the government and failure of the government to properly support those who have already surrendered.

Rose (2008) argued that the main strategy was economic rehabilitation though different reporters were treated disparately with only a few receiving government's packages and support raising suspicion amongst them. Agger (2012) highlights that the government strategies involved a combination of increased CT operations by the military and heightened advocacy through radio programs and leaflets that made many LRA soldiers to surrender to the government. However, McManara (2013) argues that unequal treatment of the reporters, where some recommended for the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution impacted the programme negatively.

Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) argued that the KDF operation in Somalia and the ATPU, a specialized unit of the NPS responsible for Counter Terrorism (CT) operations in Kenya, led to revenge terrorist attacks on the Kenyan soil. The government launched the amnesty programme in 2015 targeting the returnees who are Al Shabaab ex-combatants (Akoth, 2018). Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) highlights that the programme which targets returnees from Kwale, Kilifi, Mombasa, Lamu, Nairobi and central Kenya graduated 48 returnees in 2016. Nthamburi (2018) argues that the Kenyan rehabilitation efforts only target men at the expense of women whose roles in Violence Extremism (VE) cannot be ignored.

The research by Downie (2018) discovered that 80% of the returnees thought the amnesty programme was the best strategy to for them to leave Al Shabaab but only a few surrendered themselves to the government. Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) indicated that the Kenyan government amnesty programme lacks legal framework to guide the rehabilitation

and fails to indicate who qualifies to be rehabilitated. But a research by Akoth (2018) highlights that the Kenyan government targets returnees who have come back home from terrorist organizations like Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda. Downie (2018) notes that not much is known about the influence of the amnesty programme on terrorism, a knowledge gap the study sought to fill.

2.2.3 Roles Played by Non State Actors

Cox, Orsborn & Sisk (2014) posits that the private sector, community organizations, the international organizations, NGOs and the government collaborated in the funding and rehabilitation of former LTTE militants. Hettiarachchi (2013) notes that NSAs financed the terrorists rehabilitation and that 42 vocational training programs were conducted within rehabilitation centers and externally by NGOs, International NGOs (INGOs), private businesses, Girl Guide and Boy Scouts, state ministries, and volunteer organizations who also offered job opportunities for the rehabilitees. In addition, different religious organizations, including leaders from the Hindu, Satya Sai, and Christian traditions, also conducted religious ceremonies, rites, and rituals based on each person's faith (Hettiarachchi, 2013).

Kam (2015) illuminates that in Singapore, the RRG, which was established by the Muslim Community, and Inter Agency Aftercare Group, pioneered rehabilitation efforts and introduced a helpline for clarification of religious concepts and community counter-radicalization. Hassan (2007) argued that after realizing that majority of the rehabilitees were the sole bread winners of their families, several local Muslim groups provided psychological, emotional, and financial support to their families so that children's education and lives in general were not seriously disrupted.

Ogbogu (2016) highlights that Nigeria received financial support from both nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Red Cross. A study by Felbab-Brown (2018) established that the Nigerian and international support partners stressed that involving traditional community elders and leaders, local imams and Christian priests was crucial in persuading communities to accept back defectors.

Ogbogu (2016) argued that the use of traditional media outlets to propagate key themes and messages to counter terrorist ideologies and preach moderation is very important. Partnering among the trade unions, professional associations, faith-based groups, media organizations, community-based groups and other forms of NGOs need to partner for a successful rehabilitation and reintegration programme in Nigeria (Ogbogu, 2016).

Agger (2012) notes that civil society and other community organizations support the Ugandan amnesty programme but failed to specify the specific roles played by these NSAs. McManara (2013) evaluates that the Amnesty Act of 2000 was the result of pressure from religious and cultural leaders within Uganda to end the LRA's rebellion in the country through peaceful, rather than militaristic, means. Equally, Rose (2008) indicates that the Catholic leaders in Northern Uganda have successfully promoted the idea of forgiveness through NGOs and the local council system and have thereby played a significant role in pressuring the Ugandan government to pass and implement the Amnesty Act, 2000 that

made many defectors to surrender to the government thereby reducing armed fighting in Uganda.

Ekayu (2015) established that the NSAs in Uganda took part in providing alternative narratives of the conflict, took part in peacebuilding initiatives by building cultures of peace, promoting reconciliation efforts and sustaining livelihoods at the local level. Similarly, Rose (2008) established that the Amnesty Commission fulfills its mandate through implementing partners, which include national and international NSAs.

Feldman (2007) argued that the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) fosters long lasting peace by doing away with the culture of impunity. Consistent with this argument is Agger (2012) who highlights that the ICC helps reduce the danger of encouraging the culture of impunity as a justification to launch investigations and later charge Joseph Kony, the LRA leader. But Hovil & Lomo (2005) argues that the ICC negates the fruits of the Ugandan amnesty because of the failure to understand the local context within which the amnesty is being implemented and lauds the programme for being effective in ending fighting and reconciling ex-combatants with local communities.

In the Kenyan returnees' amnesty programme, the NCTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IOM to help demobilize and reintegrate the returnees (Al-Bulushi & Daghar, 2018). The IOM and the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance disagreed on how to carry out the programme hence only the IOM and some local civil servants are involved in the programme (Akoth, 2018). Ogada (2017) argues that there is no clear indication on which NSAs would be involved, and how success of the programme would be measured.

Downie (2018) criticizes the programme for not sufficiently engaging with local NGOs and for creating dangerous rivalries between returnees who have surrendered and those who have not. Similarly, Ramadhan (2018) notes that other than the NCTC, there is no framework to show how other entities that would be involved in the amnesty programme making the returnees suspicious and therefore keep off. The prevailing view among civil society groups working on CVE, religious leaders, host communities, and returnees is that the government has failed to follow through with what could have been an innovative solution to the problem of rehabilitating former violent extremists (Downie, 2018). Other than the IOM's involvement as highlighted by Akoth (2018) and Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018), there exists a knowledge gap on other NSAs involved and their roles that the study sought to fill.

2.2.4 Local Community Participation

Felbab-Brown (2018) argues that the community must also be considered because after rehabilitation, the rehabilitees have to be reconciled with their communities. Gunaratna (2013) highlights custodial rehabilitation is followed by community rehabilitation initiatives to prepare the community for successful reintegration of the rehabilitated beneficiaries. The good cooperation between the government and the local communities in the amnesty programme enabled the local communities to volunteer information to the government officials and in the long run, the responsibility for guiding, mentoring, and mainstreaming former cadres was gradually transferred to their local communities (Hettiarachchi, 2013).

Thalpawila (2015) indicates that the government organized visits of rehabilitees to affected communities for reconciliation that made the reintegration phase smooth. Cox,

Orsborn & Sisk (2014) said that the organized interpersonal, interreligious and intercommunity forums helped build cohesion and reconciliation in the Sri Lanka society. The role models from the beneficiaries' own ethnic and religious background working in government, private sector, recreational sector and business people among others addressed the beneficiaries to mentor them to become peace lovers and successful members of the society (Thalpawila, 2015).

Vakilpour & Rastegreri (2018) postulates that since the discovery of JI terrorist plot in Singapore, the security authorities worked with local Muslim scholars to establish the Muslim community RRG who wrote a rehabilitation manual and assisted in rehabilitating the terrorist. Additionally, Hassan (2007) says that religious and community leaders played an important role in countering JI ideologies. Kam (2015) argues that for Singapore to win the war against terrorism, the country will need to rely on a whole-of-society approach, with efforts involving family members, friends, colleagues and members of the public. This seems to be the case since Hassan (2007) attributes the success in the fight against terrorism in Singapore to the cooperation between the government and the local Muslim community based initiatives.

Ogbogu (2016) opines that to effectively defeat terrorism and violent extremism, Nigeria needs a robust community engagement and rehabilitation programme to ensure that when terrorists are released from custody, they do not pose a security threat to the community. Leaving out the local community in the Nigerian amnesty programme has in many occasions led to the postponement of the graduation of 96 male defectors at the Gombe camp due to hostile local communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) that have threatened to kill them (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Additionally, Dode (2015) indicates

that failure of the amnesty programme to consider part of the community that restrained from participating in the hostilities has made them to turn against the programme for rewarding criminals. A study by Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014) established that the Nigerian amnesty programme leaves out women and other impacted communities and therefore is not comprehensive.

Hovil & Lomo (2005) and Feldman (2007) established that the Ugandan amnesty had a lot of community support in the Northern Uganda because the residents have lived under brutal murders and mistreatment of both the LRA and even the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) for a long time. Similarly, Agger (2012) established that the widespread support for amnesty among local communities in northern Uganda is based on the fact that court system is insufficient because almost everyone has committed crimes and most of the returnees were abducted by the LRA at a very young age. Rose (2008) highlights that some local community members were not happy that the government was rewarding criminals suggesting that the Ugandan Government's amnesty was not all inclusive to bring onboard the locals for rehabilitation and reintegration. Though the locals supported the amnesty act as highlighted by Agger (2012) assess that the failure to involve the local communities in the amnesty act makes them unable to live together harmoniously since the atrocities were committed by the very people who now live amongst them.

Contrary to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 that seeks to ensure women inclusion in peace and conflict management processes, the Kenyan Government's peace building efforts do not fully involve women and therefore fail to build local resilience to stem terrorism activities (Nthamburi, 2018). Akoth (2018) notes that returnees who would wish to surrender to the government for rehabilitation fear that they

will be killed by other Al Shabaab returnees and local terrorist sympathizers who live among the local communities. As highlighted by Daghar and Al-Bulushi (2018), the Kenyan model only targets to rehabilitate returnees only. The Kenyan model has been largely seen to be an alien programme lamped on returnees by the government with little involvement of the local communities (Akoth, 2018).

Downie (2018) illuminates that 3 years after its roll out, few details are publicly known about the amnesty programme and there has been no attempt to measure either its take-up or effectiveness. Not all returnees have undergone the programme, those who received assistance were a source of resentment in their home communities, where people were questioning why the returnees' illegal activities were being rewarded by the government (Downie, 2018). Ogada (2017) recommends that NCTC should partner with other security agencies and devise community level security mechanisms in CT work. The level of community participation as indicated by Akoth (2018) and Downie (2018) is low. However, the two researchers fail to highlight the reasons and specific recommendations to boost community participation. This is a gap the study sought fill.

2.3 Summary and Research Gap

Amnesty and rehabilitation programmes should aim at winning the hearts and the minds of the target groups before, during and even after rehabilitation. Though the target groups vary from country to country, the best models target to rehabilitate both the former fighters and local communities affected directly by the militancy or are at at-risk of attack, radicalization and/ or recruitment. The target group that undergoes a rehabilitation programme should be referred to as a beneficiary, or defector and not as a terrorist or an ex-terrorist. Kenya refers to their rehabilitees as returnees, a term some researchers like

Akoth (2018) are opposed to. Referring to them with proper words makes them feel comfortable to volunteer themselves for the programme without suspicion.

Amnesty programmes, when well implemented, have the ability to reduce or even completely do away with terrorist activities in the society. The most salient strategies employed by governments across the world include; religious ideological rehabilitation, psychosocial rehabilitation, economic support, formal education support, vocational training community rehabilitation, and sports and recreation. Comprehensive amnesty and rehabilitation programmes are very expensive and therefore governments must seek financial and non-financial support from the NSAs and even private individuals.

Involving local communities plays an important role in the success of any amnesty programme. Their involvement increases uptake and cooperation, builds reconciliation, makes the local communities to volunteer information to the government agents and prepares the local communities reintegration of the rehabilitees and/or convicts upon full rehabilitation or expiry of their jail terms. Like the Singaporean model, successful amnesty programmes are multi-faceted and community led. It is however difficult to assess the successful rehabilitation of rehabilitees since some may fake full rehabilitation to secure a release back into the society on to relapse back into criminality. Though amnesty programme reduces recidivism rate, modalities of measuring this vary and are contested.

The Kenyan amnesty programme is shrouded with secrecy, lacks a legal framework and fails to provide linkages for local community participation (Ogada, 2017). Kwale County still experiences terrorism activities even after the roll out of the returnees' amnesty programme (Downie, 2018). There are cases of self-reintegration and hatred between the surrendered returnees and those who have not heeded to the government's calls. Akoth

(2018) argues that the returnees who have not surrendered pose life threats to those who have surrendered.

Ways of assessing successful rehabilitation of the rehabilitees are unknown across the world. In reference to the returnees' amnesty programme in Kenya, Downie (2018) highlights that other than the failure to take account of the uptake and effectiveness of the programme, it is the view of many host communities, civil society groups, religious leaders, and the returnees that the government has failed to follow through with what could have been an innovative solution to the terrorism menace. The study therefore, served as a follow up to the implementation of the government returnees' amnesty programme to fill this glaring knowledge gap by; assessing the influence of the government returnees' amnesty programme to terrorist activities in Kwale County, Kenya.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by setting out the research methodology central to the theme of this research proposal. The chapter presents the research design, the research site and rationale, target population, sampling procedures, sample size, data collection, research instruments, data analysis and presentation and legal and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design

Akhtar (2016) defines research design as a plan of the proposed research work. This research employed a descriptive survey involving both quantitative and qualitative approach in data collection. This approach helped collect data to the satisfaction of all the 4 research objectives. The research involved gathering of both primary and secondary data from respondents through field survey. Interview schedules were used to collect data from sampled respondents while Key Informant Interview Guide (KIIG) was used to interview key informants to corroborate the information obtained from the respondents.

3.3 Research Site and Rationale

The research was conducted in Kwale County. Kwale County is located along the South-Eastern part of the Kenyan Coastal Region (Appendix 6) where the Kenyan Government rolled out the returnees' amnesty programme due to rampant terrorism. The County has 4 sub-counties; Msambweni, Lunga Lunga, Matuga and Kinango, and borders the Republic of Tanzania to the South West, Taita Taveta to the West and North West, Kilifi to the North and North East, Mombasa to the East and the Indian Ocean to the East and South East (Shauri, 2017). The County has a population of eight hundred and sixty six

thousand, eight hundred and twenty, in an area of 8, 270.2 square kilometers with one hundred and seventy three thousand, one hundred and seventy six households (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, (KNBS) Report, 2019).

Kinsbergen (2019) assessed that with the beautiful white sandy beaches, Diani within Kwale County, has been ranked as the Africa's leading beach destination for the past 5 years making the hospitality sector a number 1 provider of paid jobs the county. Despite being a top tourist destination of the 47 Kenyan Counties, Kwale County is 1 of the 5 poorest counties in Kenya with 71% of the population living below the poverty line compared to Kenya's average of 45.9% (Kinsbergen, 2019). The effects of protracted terrorism activities, as highlighted by Momanyi (2015), have further impoverished the residents.

Kwale County has the highest number of returnees that have spearheaded the terrorism activities in the county (Akoth, 2018). Despite its intervention, the returnees' amnesty programme has not brought out the desired outcome in the county due to the dearth of knowledge on the effects of the programme, the government strategies, involvement of NSAs and community participation from their respective localities. This shapes the contour of unexplained sustained terrorism activities in the county. Hence, this county was purposively selected to give a better understanding of: the effects of the returnees' amnesty programme on the terrorist activities; the government strategies in the returnees' amnesty programme; roles played by NSAs; and community participation in the programme.

3.4 Target Population

Mohsin (2016) defines target population as all the members who meet the particular criterion specified for a research investigation. Ali (2014) refers to target population as the

collection of all individuals, families, groups, organizations or events that the researcher is interested in finding out about and to which/whom the researcher would like to generalize the results. The target population of the study was the one hundred and seventy three thousand, one hundred and seventy six heads of households residing in Kwale County, Kenya (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, (KNBS) Report, 2019). These residents have been affected by the terrorism activities even after the introduction of the returnees' amnesty programme among other interventions.

3.5 Determination of the Sample

This section entails sampling procedures and the study sample size used in the research.

3.5.1 Sampling Procedures

The respondents were sampled using a simple random sampling procedure that gave an equal chance to all the heads of households in the county. Purposive sampling of key informants who included: the National Government Administration Officers (NGAOs); the NPS officers; the Kwale County Government's ward administrators; and the NSAs officials operating in Kwale County was done. These key informants were selected due to their deep knowledge and experience relevant to the field of study and therefore helped deepen the understanding of the study findings.

3.5.2 Study Sample Size

Ali (2014) defines a sample size as some part of a larger body specially selected to represent the whole. Since the target population was large, the study used the below formula by Israel (1992) by to determine the sample size.

$n=\frac{N}{1+Ne^2}$ Where n is the sample size, N is the target population size, and e is the level of precision.

$n=\frac{173,176}{1+173,176\ (0.05)^2}$ =400

For the key informants; 4 NPS officers, the 4 chiefs, 4 NSAs officials and the 4 Kwale County Government Sub-County Administrators who were purposively sampled were interviewed.

Table 3.1: Study sample size

Type of Respondent	**Number of Respondents**	**%**
Heads of households	400	95.24
Key Informants		
NPS officers	4	0.96
NGAO officials	4	0.96
Kwale County Sub-County administrators	4	0.96
NSAs officials	4	0.96
Total	**416**	**100**

Source: Researcher (2020).

3.6 Data Collection Measures

This section entails development of instruments, pilot testing of research instruments, instrument reliability and instrument validity.

3.6.1 Development of Instruments

Interview Schedule (Appendix 2) was used to obtain information from the respondents who are heads of households residing in Kwale County. Key Informants Interview Guide (KIIG) (Appendix 3), guided interview sessions with the key informants purposively sampled. The KIIG was used in order to get a deeper understanding of the

study topic. Both the interview schedule and the KIIG were developed to address the specific objectives of the study. In both, the first main question addressed the effect of the amnesty programme, as per objective 1, the second main question addressed government strategies in the amnesty programme, as per objective 2; the third main question addressed the roles played by the NSAs, as per objective 3; and the last, fourth question, addressed the community participation, as per objective 4. Both the interview schedule and the KIIG were framed in English and Swahili for ease of understanding by the respondents. In very few cases, where some questions were not well understood by the respondents, the research assistants, who were drawn from the local community, helped interpret the questions using the local language.

3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments

Pilot testing of the research instruments was done in Kisauni Sub County, Mombasa County by the researcher together with 4 research assistants. Kisauni Sub-County has also been experiencing terrorism activities. The Kenyan Government also rolled out the returnees' amnesty programme in Kisauni Sub-County, Mombasa County to stem the terrorism activities. During the pilot testing, the interview schedule was used to interview 10% (40) of the sample size, four hundred. The pilot testing ensured a thorough understanding of the variables, tested the validity and reliability of the instruments used in the research and trained the research assistants.

3.6.3 Instruments Reliability

Instrument reliability is the degree to which an assessment tool produces stable (free from errors) and consistent results; the observed score of a measure reflects the true score of that measure (Mohajan, 2017). Sufficient time, about an hour, was be allocated for

filling of each interview schedule and answering of the KIIG. Clarification of any gray areas was done in order to capture all the important information. The Cronbach Alpha Coefficient reliability of the test instruments was used to test for the internal consistency. A reliability co-efficient of 0.712 was obtained which is above the recommended 0.7 and therefore, the questionnaire was adapted.

3.6.4 Instruments Validity

Drost (2011) argues that validity is concerned with the meaningfulness of research components while Mohajan (2017) refers to validity of the research instrument as the degree to which the results are truthful. Piloting helped the researcher to eliminate some ambiguity in the research instruments and train the research assistants to correctly capture collected data. The use of trained community mobilizers as research assistants gave the respondents confidence to give truthful responses without fear. A representative sample that was randomly sampled ensured that the results are valid.

3.7 Data collection procedures

The interview schedule was used to interview the randomly sampled respondents, heads of households, physically by the help of trained research assistants. Interviews with key informants were conducted by the researcher using KIIG. Each session lasted about 1 hour. Both the interview schedule and the KIIG aimed at addressing the 4 study objectives.

3.8 Data Analysis and presentation

Both primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data was collected and analyzed. Qualitative data was thematically analyzed and presented in verbatim while quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented using figures and

tables. Both qualitative and quantitative data was presented according to the research objectives.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Ethical issues were addressed at each phase of the study. An approval for research was obtained from the Africa Nazarene University (ANU) Post Graduate School, The National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) and the Kwale County Commissioner. All the approvals were given to all the respondents for them to know that the research acquired requisite approvals from relevant authorities and was for academic purposes only. The respondents were assured of confidentiality of the information volunteered in the course of the research. The respondents were also assured that their true identities will remain confidential.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results and findings of the study analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25.0 data analysis software. Included in the chapter are the descriptive and thematic analysis of the results based on the interview schedule and KIIG administered to the heads of households and key informants respectively. Quantitative and qualitative data is presented according to the study objectives using tables, figures and in verbatim. This introduction is preceded by the response rate, demographic characteristics of the respondents, effects of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, strategies employed by the government in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, role of NSA in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County; and level of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Sufficient personal information of respondents was necessary to understand the kind of respondents from which primary data was collected and the basis under which the interpretations are made. The background information is important to the study because it helps the researcher to understand some issues that are important in the analysis. The demographic characteristics regarding the respondents presented in this section include response rate, gender of the respondents, age categories of the respondents and sub-counties of residence of the respondents.

4.2.1 Response Rate

After executing the survey, it was highly essential to review the answers of the respondents provided in the interview schedule from the angle of legibility, completeness, consistency and homogeneity. As presented in Table 4.1, out of 400 who responded in the study, 397 responded to all the questions with completeness and were thus eligible for analysis giving an overall 99% valid response rate. This response rate was acceptable for analysis since, the whole point of conducting a survey is to obtain useful, reliable, and valid data in a format that makes it possible to analyze and draw significant conclusions about the target population. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) guided that 50% response rate is adequate, 60% is good and above 70% is very good for analysis. The return rate was also very high (100%) because the researcher ensured the respondents were sensitized prior to the interview sessions due to the busy schedule of the respondents.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Responses	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Valid responses	397	99.2
Invalid responses	3	0.8
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Field Data (2020).

4.2.2 Gender of the Respondents

The study assessed the gender of the respondents and the findings as presented in Figure 4.1 reveals that 59% of the respondents are female while 41% are male. This implies that majority (59%) of the respondents are female.




Figure 4.1: Gender of the Respondents, n = 397. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …though majority of terrorism perpetrators are men, women are the most affected and are therefore more willing to take steps to end terrorism in Kwale County. (ATPU Officer)

This, and the sensitivity of the topic of study, explains the higher number of women respondents because some men fear being profiled in the name of research.

4.2.3 Age of the Respondents

The study sought to assess the ages of the respondents and the findings in Table 4.2 depict; 11.1% of the respondents are in the age category of 18-35, 57.4% are in the age category of 36-50, 23.7% are in the age category of 51-65, while 7.8% are in the age category of 65 years and above. The study findings imply that majority (57.4%) of the respondents are between 36 and 50 years.

Table 4.2: Age of the Respondents

Age Category	Frequency	Percentage
18-35	44	11.1
36-50	228	57.4
51-65	94	23.7
Above 65	31	7.8
Total	**397**	**100**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … the age category of majority of the returnees is between 18 and 35 years. People within the age category 36-50, like majority of the respondents, are heads of households and act responsibly in the society and also actively participate in societal activities like a study. (NPS Officer)

4.2.4 Age of the Respondents per Gender

The study further aimed to establish the ages of the respondents per gender and the findings as shown in Figure 4.2 indicate that for male respondents, 8.5% are in the age category 18-35, 58.5% are in the age category 36-50, 17.2% are in the age category 50-65, and 15.8% are in the age category of above 65.

As for female respondents, 12.8% are in the age category of 18-35, 56.4% are in the age category 36-50, 28.4% are in the age category 51-65, and 2.4% are in the age category of above 65.




Figure 4.2: Ages and Genders of the Respondents, n; male = 163, female = 234. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

These findings imply that for both genders, majority of the respondents are in the age category 36-50, the same age category as the aggregate age category displayed in Table 4.2 above.

4.2.5 Sub-Counties of Residence of the Respondents

The study sought to establish the sub-county of residence of the respondents and the findings as represented in Table 4.3 reveal that 25% of the respondents were drawn from each of the 4 sub-counties of Kwale County; Lunga Lunga Msambweni, Kinango and Matuga.

Table 4.3: Sub-Counties of Residence of the Respondents

Sub-County	Frequency	Percentage
Lunga Lunga	100	25
Msambweni	99	25
Kinango	99	25
Matuga	99	25
Total	**397**	**100**

Source: Field Data (2020).

This was meant to give an equal chance to the residents of the 4 sub-counties in order to mitigate biasness in the study findings. However, as indicated in Table 4.3 above, errors in 3 interview schedules meant that 99 responses for the respondents from Msambweni, Kinango and Matuga were analyzed.

4.3 Effects of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme to Terrorism Activities

This section presents findings in respect to the first specific objective of the study, which aimed to establish the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. Analyzed in this section are the effect of the amnesty programme on terrorism activities, the reasons for each effect, ranking of the effectiveness of the amnesty programme in reducing terrorism activities, recommendations to improve the programme and the general comments on the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme.

4.3.1 Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities

The research sought to find out whether the returnees' amnesty programme has reduced or increased terrorism activities in Kwale County and the findings shown in Table 4.4 indicate that 81.4% of the respondents said the amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities while 18.6%, said the programme has increased terrorism activities. The study findings imply that majority (81.4%) of the respondents, indicated that the amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County.

Table 4.4: Effects of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities

Effect	Frequency	Percentage
Reduced	323	81.4
Increased	74	18.6
Total	**397**	**100**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the amnesty programme has greatly reduced terrorism activities in the Kwale County. (NGO official).

This means that the programme has to a great extend achieved the objective of reducing terrorism activities in Kwale County.

4.3.2 Reasons for Reduced Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya

The study further sought to determine from the respondents who indicated the amnesty programme has reduced terrorist activities in Kwale county why they, the respondents, thought that the amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in the county and the findings in Table 4.5 depict that 38.1% of the respondents opined that the returnees realized that they had erred in joining terrorism and therefore wanted to change, 11.1% attributed the reduction in terrorism activities to pressure from the community, family and friends, 10.8% said they are driven by the hope to have jobs and seek for employment. The above top 3 findings account for 60% of the respondents.

3.1% of the respondents argued that the reduction in terrorism activities is due to psychosocial support programmes in the society, 1.5% of the respondents argued that the returnees are driven by the hope to turn away from poverty while 0.3%, opined that the returnees wanted to lead a free life in the society. These account for the least 3, 4.9%, of the respondents.

The findings imply that majority of the respondents (38.1%), opined that the returnees realized that they had erred in joining terrorism and wanted to change and lead a normal life in the society.

Table 4.5: Reasons for Reduced Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya

Reasons	Frequency	Percentage
Returnees realized they erred by joining terrorism	123	38.1
Pressure from the community, family and friends to change	36	11.1
Hope to have jobs and seek for employment	35	10.8
Returnees realized that they were misinformed to join terrorism	30	9.3
Returnees fear losing their loves ones to terrorism	28	8.7
Hope for education and vocational training	21	6.5
Hope for economic and other livelihood support	19	5.9
Increased counter messaging and awareness	15	4.7
Psychosocial support programmes	10	3.1
Hope to turn away from poverty	5	1.5
Hope to lead a free life in the society	1	0.3
Total	**323**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … terrorism activities have reduced greatly because the returnees' amnesty programme has improved the lives of the returnees and affected families. (NGAO official).

This is an indicator that most of the returnees were fooled into joining terrorist organizations.

4.3.3 Reasons for Increased Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya

The research aimed to establish the main reasons why some respondents thought that the returnees' amnesty programme had increased terrorism activities and the findings in Table 4.6 show that 21.6% attribute this to high rate of school drop outs, 18.9% attributed this to pressure from other returnees and terrorism operatives who have not surrendered and want to sustain terror activities, 14.8% attributed it to high risk of surrendered being

killed while 13.5% pointed at high levels of poverty. These accounts for 4 major causes of increased terrorism activities after the launch of the amnesty programme.

4 respondents, each representing 1.4%, attributed the increase in terrorism activities to: some of the surrendered returnees regretting ever surrendering; lack of rehabilitated returnees to act as role models; drug and substance abuse; and early marriages and high rates of divorce.

Table 4.6: Reasons for Increased Terrorism Activities

Reasons	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
High rate of school drop outs in the county	16	21.6
Pressure from other returnees and terror operatives who have not surrendered and want to sustain terror activities	14	18.9
High risk of surrendered returnees being killed	11	14.8
High levels of poverty in the county	10	13.5
Poor parenting in the county	8	10.8
Little hope for job opportunities after surrendering	7	9.4
Stigmatization and discrimination of returnees	2	2.7
Lack of awareness on the negative effects of terrorism	2	2.7
Some surrendered returnees are regretting surrendering	1	1.4
High rates of drug and substance abuse in the county	1	1.4
Early marriages and high rates of divorces in the county	1	1.4
Lack of rehabilitated returnees to act as role models	1	1.4
Total	**74**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … there are underlying factors called drivers that drive these young people into joining terrorist groups. (ATPU officer).

This means that all the drivers that propel the residents to join terrorist groups have not been addressed fully yet.

4.3.4 Ranking of the Effectiveness of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to assess the effectiveness of the amnesty programme in reducing terrorism activities in Kwale County and the findings as presented in Table 4.7 show that no respondent ranked the programme at levels 0 and or level 9, 0.5% of the respondents ranked the it at level 1, 12.6% ranked it at level 2, 32% ranked it at level 3, 25.4% ranked it at level 4, 6.8% ranked it at level 5, 8.8% ranked it at level 6, 10.6% ranked it at level 7, 3% ranked it at level eight while 0.3% of the respondents ranked the programme at level 10. The study findings imply that majority of the respondents, 32%, ranked the programme at level 3.

Table 4.7: Ranking of the Effectiveness of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Ranking	Percentage of effectiveness	Frequency	Percentage
0	0	0	0
1	10	2	0.5
2	20	50	12.6
3	30	127	32.0
4	40	101	25.4
5	50	27	6.8
6	60	35	8.8
7	70	42	10.6
8	80	12	3.0
9	90	0	0.0
10	100	1	0.3
Total	**-**	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …. on a scale of 0-10, I can rank the programme at level 8 mainly for reducing terrorism activities. (NGO official).

This implies that though the programme is ranked low by majority of the respondents, the NGOs rank it high because they appreciate its effect on terrorism activities. However, it also means that more needs to be done to make it more effective.

4.3.5 How to Improve the Returnees' Amnesty Programme in Kwale County

The study further sought to find out the main interventions that would improve the returnees' amnesty programme to make it more effective and the findings as depicted in Table 4.8 show that 29% of the respondents suggested heightening sensitization in the county, 21.4% suggested offering jobs to youths, returnees and affected families, 17.9% suggested psychosocial support for the returnees and the affected families. These responses accounted for the top 3 recommendations, which translates to 68.3% of the respondents.

Each of the 1.5% of the respondents suggested the need to; a multifaceted approach, stop harassment of the terrorism suspects and engage youths in dialogue sessions through family setups while each of the 0.3% of the respondents recommends that the NSAs and the National Government need to collaborate, and engage the returnees and youths in sporting activities. These accounts for the least 5 of the respondents' recommendations on how to improve the amnesty programme.

Table 4.8: How to Improve the Returnees' Amnesty Programme in Kwale County

How to Improve the Programme	Frequency	Percentage
Increase sensitization in the county	115	29.0
Offer jobs to youths, returnees and affected families	85	21.4
Give returnees and affected families psychosocial support	71	17.9
Equip returnees and youths with livelihood skills	29	7.3
Offer economic support to returnees and affected families	25	6.3
Provide vocational training to returnees and youths	15	3.7
Enroll returnees and school dropouts in schools	14	3.5
Provide religious rehabilitation to returnees	11	2.7
Stop stigmatization, discrimination and mob-justice	10	2.5
Offer jobs to jobless youths	7	1.7
Help returnees meet basic needs	5	1.2
Role models to offer mentorship to the youths	3	0.7
There is need for a multifaceted approach	2	0.5
Stop harassment of the terrorism suspects	2	0.5
Engage youths in dialogue sessions through families	2	0.5
NSAs and National government need to collaborate	1	0.3
Engage returnees and youths in sporting activities	1	0.3
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … there is need to reduce the rampant stigmatization of the returnees, programme participants and the affected families in order to build trust and increase its uptake. (NGO official).

This denotes that involving all stakeholders in a multipronged approach to heighten sensitization of the programme would reduce stigmatization and make it more effective.

4.3.6 General Comments on the Effects of the Programme on Terrorism Activities

The research sought to find out the general comments on the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities and the findings presented in Table 4.9 show

that 20.4% of the respondents think that there is need to educate the returnees to know their human rights, 18.1% suggested psychosocial support for the returnees and the affected families need to while 14.4% suggested economic support for the returnees and affected families. These accounts for the top 3, 52.8%, of the respondents' general comments.

Each of the 0.5% of the respondents suggested that there is need to; sensitize the society on the effects of terrorism, monitor the returnees during the rehabilitation process, provide vocational training to school drop outs, and stop harassment of the returnees. These 4 represent the least 4 suggestions that represent 2.0% of the respondents.

Table 4.9: General Comments on the Effects of the Programme on Terrorism Activities

General Comments on the Programme	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Educate the returnees to know their human rights	81	20.4
Give returnees and affected families psychosocial support	72	18.1
Provide economic support to returnees and affected families	57	14.4
Sensitize the public on the returnees' amnesty programme	31	7.8
Stop stigmatization, discrimination and mob justice	26	6.5
Help returnees meet their basic needs	25	6.3
There is need for concerted effort in the amnesty programme	24	6.0
Provide religious rehabilitation to the returnees	24	6.0
Offer jobs to returnees, youths and affected families	18	4.5
Protect surrendered returnees in the county	12	3.0
Families and society to help the returnees change behavior	11	3.0
Reduce poverty in the county	8	2.0
Sensitize the society on the effects of terrorism	2	0.5
Monitor the returnees behaviour during their rehabilitation	2	0.5
Provide vocational training to school dropouts in the county	2	0.5
Stop harassment of returnees	2	0.5
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … the programme has reduced terrorism activities like attacks, recruitment and radicalization. (Sub-County Administrator).

This is a pointer that the programme has been successful in reducing terrorism activities thus far, but there is a lot more that can be done to make it more effective.

4.4 Strategies Employed by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees Amnesty

This section presents findings in respect to the second specific objective of the study which sought to find out the strategies employed by the government in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

In this section, the type of support the Kenyan Government has offered the surrendered returnees, the support preferred by the Kenyan Government, the support most preferred by the returnees, National Government support to other groups, other groups supported by the National Government, the kind of help given to other groups and the general comments on the returnees' amnesty programme strategies are presented.

4.4.1 Type of Support Provided by the Kenyan Government to the Returnees

The research sought to assess the type of support provided by the Kenyan Government to returnees and the findings in Table 4.10 show that 34.8% of the respondents indicated that the government mainly provides psychosocial support, 31.2% said the government provides vocational training, 20.1% said economic support, 9.1 said formal education while 4.8%, intimated that the government provides religious rehabilitation. This implies that majority (34.8%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that the government prioritizes psychosocial support.

Table 4.10: Type of Support Provided by the Kenyan Government to the Returnees

Type of Support Provided	Frequency	Percentage
Religious education	19	4.8
Formal education support	36	9.1
Vocational training support	124	31.2
Psychosocial support	138	34.8
Economic support	80	20.1
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

4.4.2 Government Support per Sub-County

The study also wanted to establish the type of support provided by the government in every sub-county and the findings as displayed in Figure 4.3, 33.3% of the respondents from Msambweni and 33.3% from Kinango indicated that economic support is the main support provided by the Kenyan Government, 35% respondents from Lunga Lunga said Vocational training while 45.5% from Matuga said psychosocial support.

In all the sub-counties, majority of the respondents think that psychosocial support, vocational training and economic support are the 3 main supports the government offers to the returnees. In all the sub-counties, fewer respondents, 7% - Lunga Lunga, 3% - Msambwweni, 5% - Kinango and 4% - Matuga, indicated religious rehabilitation.

The findings, just like in Table 4.10 above, imply that in all the 4 sub-counties, the National Government offers mainly psychosocial rehabilitation, vocational training rehabilitation and economic support to the returnees.




Figure 4.3: Government Support to Returnees per Sub-County, n; Lunga Lunga = 100, Msambweni = 99, Kinango = 99, Matuga = 99. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … the government mainly provides economic support and in some occasions psychosocial support is provided. (NGAO official).

This means the national government offers mainly psychosocial rehabilitation, vocational training rehabilitation and economic support.

4.4.3 Support Preferred by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees' Amnesty

The study sought to determine the support preferred by the Kenyan Government in the returnees' amnesty programme and findings presented in Figure 4.4, depict that 37% of the respondents opined that the government prefers vocational training, 27% indicated psychosocial support, 23% indicated economic support, 6% said religious rehabilitation, 5% indicated formal education while 2% opined that the government prefers all supports. This implies that majority of the respondents, 37% think that the government prefers vocational training.




Figure 4.4: Support Preferred by the Government of Kenya in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme, n = 397. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the National Government prefers to support the returnees with economic support to the returnees. (NGAO official).

This implies that the though the majority of the respondents think that the National Government prefers vocational training rehabilitation, the government actually prefers economic support.

4.4.4 Support Preferred by the Returnees in the Amnesty Programme

The study also sought to establish the type of support preferred by the returnees and the findings shown in Table 4.11, 35.3% of the respondents opined that the returnees prefer all the support, 27.5 opined that the returnees prefer psychosocial support, 17.6% indicated vocational training, 9.1% intimated economic support, 7.1% indicated religious rehabilitation while 3.5% said that the returnees prefer formal education. This suggests that

majority of the respondents, 35.3% are of the opinion that the returnees prefer all the supports provided by the government.

Table 4.11: Type of Support Preferred by the Returnees

Type of Support Preferred by the Returnees	Frequency	Percentage
Religious Education	28	7.1
Formal Education	14	3.5
Vocational Training	70	17.6
Psychosocial Support	109	27.5
Economic Support	36	9.1
All the Supports	140	35.3
Total	**397**	**100**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the returnees appreciate all forms of support because they actually need all the supports that come their way. (NGO official).

This indicates that a multifaceted support is needed to rehabilitate the returnees and address all the underlying issues that drove them into joining terrorist organizations.

4.4.5 National Government Support to Other Groups in the Amnesty Programme

The study sought to establish whether the National Government provides support to any other group in Kwale County in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme and the findings presented in Figure 4.5 shows that 93% of the respondents indicated the government provides support to other groups while 7% indicated the government does not support any other group. This implies that majority of the respondents, 93%, agree that the government supports other groups.




Figure 4.5: National Government Support to Other Groups, n = 397. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …yes the government offers support to other groups other than the returnees. (Sub-county administrator).

This implies that the returnees' amnesty programme does not only target to rehabilitate the returnees but also targets other groups in the society.

4.4.6 Other Groups Supported by the National Government in the Amnesty programme

The research further sought to determine the other groups supported by the government from the respondents who had indicated that the government supports other groups in the amnesty programme and the findings presented in Table 4.12 reveal that 84.9% of the respondents indicated the affected families, 9% indicated school dropouts, 5.1% indicated widows and widowers to the dead terrorists, 0.5% indicated they do not know while 0.3% indicated spouses of the returnees. This implies that majority (84.9%) of the respondents, suggested that the National Government offers support to the affected families.

Table 4.12: Other Groups Supported by the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Other Groups Supported	Frequency	Percentage
Affected families	315	84.9
Widows and widowers to the dead terrorists	19	5.1
Spouses of the returnees	1	0.3
School dropouts	35	9.3
Don't know	2	0.5
Total	**371**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …other than the returnees, the National Government also supports affected families. (NGAO official).

This means that the returnees' amnesty programme also supports the affected families in addition to the surrendered returnees.

4.4.7 Nature of Support Given to Other Groups by the National Government

The study sought to establish the nature of support the National Government provides other groups in the returnees' amnesty programme and findings depicted in Table 4.13 shows that 75.7% of the respondents opined that the government provides them with economic support, 14% indicated psychosocial support, 8.6% indicated vocational training, and 1.4% indicated religious support while 0.3% said formal education. This implies that majority of the respondents, 75.7% alluded that the government provides economic support to other groups.

Table 4.13: Nature of Support Given to Other Groups by the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Nature of support	Frequency	Percentage
Economic support	281	75.7
Psychosocial support	52	14.0
Vocational training	32	8.6
Religious support	5	1.4
Formal education	1	0.3
TOTAL	**371**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … to other groups, the National Government mainly supports them economically, but psychosocial supports have been given in some cases. (NGAO official).

This means that the main focus on the government is to address the poverty and the psychological health of the affected families.

4.4.8 General Comments on the National Government Strategies

The study further sought to obtain the general comments of the respondents on the National Government strategies in the returnees' amnesty programme and the finding presented in Table 4.14 reveal that 23.6% of the respondents think that there is need to provide the returnees with religious rehabilitation, 21% suggest psychosocial support, while 16% suggest economic support to both the returnees and the affected families. These accounts for the top 3, translating to 60.6% of the respondents' general comments. The bottom 4 of the respondents, representing 0.5% each suggested that role models in the county should be used to mentor returnees, that the amnesty programme should be multi-faceted, ensure surrendered returnees are protected and that the government interventions should target both the returnees and the affected families.

Table 4.14: General Comments on the Government Strategies in the Amnesty Programme

General Comments on the Strategies	Frequency	Percentage
Provide religious rehabilitation to returnees	94	23.6
Provide psychosocial Rehabilitation to returnees	84	21.0
Provide economic support to returnees and affected families	64	16.0
Stop stigmatization and harassment of the returnees	34	8.6
Help returnees and affected families meet their basic needs	24	6.1
Sensitize the society through dialogue sessions	23	5.9
Offer job opportunities to youths in the county	23	5.9
Provide vocational training to school drop outs in the county	22	5.6
Increase school enrollment and reduce school dropouts	7	1.8
Unsure access to justice in the county	6	1.5
The returnees' amnesty programme is good for returnees	5	1.3
Use rehabilitated returnees as mentors to rehabilitees	3	0.7
Use role models in the county to mentor returnees and youths	2	0.5
The programme should be multifaceted in approach	2	0.5
Ensure surrendered returnees are protected	2	0.5
Government interventions should target both returnees and the affected families	2	0.5
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the strategies are good but there is need for a concerted effort amongst the law enforcement agencies, NGAO, NCTC and all the NSAs for the programme to realize its full potential. (NGO official).

This means that the returnees' amnesty programme strategies and the approach may be good but requires to be well coordinated.

4.5 Role of Non State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

This section presents an analysis of the third specific objective of the study which sought to evaluate the role of Non State Actors in the returnees' amnesty programme in

Kwale County, Kenya. This section presents an analyses of whether the NSAs are involved in the returnees' amnesty programme or not, those NSAs involved, the roles they play by the NSAs, areas of collaboration between the NSAs' and the national government and the general comments on the NSAs involvement in the returnees' amnesty programme.

4.5.1 Involvement of the Non State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study further sought to assess whether the NSAs are involved in the returnees' amnesty program and the findings presented in Table 4.15 show that 99.5% of the respondents indicated that the NSAs are involved, while 0.5% of the respondents indicated that the NSAs are not involved in the returnees' amnesty programme. This implies that majority (99.5%) of the respondents, think that the NSAs are involved in the returnees' amnesty programme.

Table 4.15: Involvement of the Non State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

NSAs Involvement	Frequency	Percentage
Involved	395	99.5
Not Involved	2	0.5
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said;

> …yes the National Government involves us in the amnesty programme. (NGO official).

This implies that the National Government appreciates that the NSAs contributions are key to the success of the programme.

4.5.2 The Non State Actors Involved in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The sought to determine the main NSA involved in the returnees' amnesty programme and the findings presented in Table 4.16 show that 58% of the respondents

indicated NGOs are involved in the programme, 16.2% indicated religious based organizations, 13.2% indicated community based organizations, 12.6% indicated women groups. None of the respondents indicated youth groups and private individuals. This implies that majority (58%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that NGOs form the largest number of NSAs involved in the returnees' amnesty programme.

Table 4.16: Non State Actors Involved in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

NSAs Involved	Frequency	Percentage
Non-Governmental Organizations	229	58.0
Community Based Organizations	52	13.2
Religious Based Organizations	64	16.2
Women Groups	50	12.6
Total	**395**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> … other than NGOs, CBOs, religious leaders and women groups, youth peace groups especially in schools are also involved but no private individuals have so far been involved. (NGO official).

This is an indication that the programme has brought onboard all the NSAs with the exception of private individuals.

4.5.3 Roles Played by Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to find out the main role played by the NSAs involved in the returnees' amnesty programme from the respondents who indicated that NSAs are involved and the findings presented in Figure 4.6, depict 43% of the respondents indicated that the NSAs are involved in supporting rehabilitation programme, 21% indicated that they provide economic support, 20% said they provide mentorship programmes respectively while 16% intimated that the NSAs provide psychosocial support. This implies that

majority (43%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that the NSAs support rehabilitation programme.




Figure 4.6: Roles played by Non State Actors in the Amnesty, n = 395. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the NSAs provide rehabilitation support, identifying the at-risk community and provide them with psychosocial support and build their resilience to mitigate radicalization and recruitment into terror groups. (NGO official).

This implies that the NSAs provides a spectra of supports to the returnees in the amnesty programme.

4.5.4 Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government

The study investigated whether the NSAs and the National Government collaborate in the returnees' amnesty programme and the findings presented in Table 4.17 depict that 96.5% of the respondents intimated that the NSAs and the National Government collaborate, 3.5% said they do no collaborate while 0.3% said they don't know. This

implies that majority (96.5%) of the respondents, agree that the government and the NSAs collaborate in implementing the amnesty programme.

Table 4.17: Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government

Collaboration between NSAs and the National Government	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
They Collaborate	384	96.7
They do not Collaborate	12	3.0
I don't Know	1	0.3
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

Two of the key informants said:

> … there is collaboration. However, there is no legal and policy framework outlining how to do this. (NGO official).
> ….. the bill is at the committee stage. (NCTC official).

This means that the existing collaboration is not hinged on a legal and/ or policy framework but the bill, upon enactment, will cure this.

4.5.5 Areas of Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to find out the main area of collaboration between the National Government and the NSAs and the findings presented in Table 4.18 shows that 21.4% of the respondents indicated they collaborate in sensitization and counter messaging, 19.6% indicated they collaborate in promoting unity in the society while 9.4% indicated the collaborate in offering psychosocial support. These are the top 3 areas of collaboration.

2.1% of the respondents indicated they collaborate in offering vocational training, 1% said religious rehabilitation while 0.3% indicated building society resilience against terrorism. These are the least 3 areas of collaboration.

Table 4.18: Areas of Collaboration between the Non-State Actors and the National Government in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Areas of Collaboration	Frequency	Percentage
Sensitization and counter messaging	82	21.4
Promoting unity in the society	75	19.6
Providing economic support	36	9.4
Offering psychosocial support	35	9.1
Providing economic support	32	8.4
Mentorship programmes using role models in the society	31	8.1
Protection of returnees' rights	28	7.3
Heighten enrollment of youths in schools and supporting them	23	6.0
Rehabilitation of returnees	18	4.7
Development	10	2.6
Offering vocational training	8	2.1
Religious rehabilitation	4	1.0
Building society resilience against terrorism	1	0.3
Total	**383**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data. (2020)

One of the key informant said:

> …IOM has been at the fore front in identifying returnees and collaborating with the government in rehabilitating them. In addition to this, the other NSAs help in building societal resilience against terrorism activities in the county. (NGO official).

This signifies the existence of many areas of collaboration between the National Government and the NSAs.

4.5.6 General Comments on the Roles of Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study examined the respondents' general comments on the roles played by the NSAs and the findings presented in Table 4.19 indicate 32.5% of the respondents are of

the view that the NSAs ought to also provide economic support to returnees and affected families, 23.3% opined that the NSAs should offer psychosocial support to the returnees and the affected families while 14.6% opined that the NSAs also ought to assist in awareness creation. These are the top 3 general comments translating to 70.4% of the respondents. While the least 2 of the respondents, representing 0.3% each, are of the opinion that the NSAs may help in providing formal education and ensuring social justice in the society.

Table 4.19: General Comments on the Roles of Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

General Comments	Frequency	Percentage
Provide economic support to returnees and affected families	129	32.5
Offer psychosocial support to returnees and affected families	94	23.7
The NSAs need to assist in awareness creation	58	14.6
Assist returnees and affected families meet their basic needs	49	12.3
They need to help in mentoring the returnees	35	8.8
Assist in religious rehabilitation	15	3.8
Offer vocational training to returnees and school dropouts	6	1.4
Offer jobs to the returnees and the affected families	4	1.0
Help end stigmatization, discrimination and harassment of suspects	3	0.8
Help rehabilitate the returnees	2	0.5
Support formal education in the Community	1	0.3
Ensure social justice in the society	1	0.3
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the NSAs contributions are important in the successful implementation of the amnesty programme. However, there is need

for all the NSAs to coordinate and avoid duplication of work and therefore wastage of resources. (NGO official).

This implies that the NSAs may be offering some support but not in coordinated manner and therefore insufficient.

4.6 Level of Local Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

This section sought to address the fourth specific objective of the study, which was to assess the level of local community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya. This section presents analysis of; whether the community participates in the programme or not, the level that the community likes the amnesty programme, how the community participates in the amnesty programme, the level of participation and general comments of the local community participation in the amnesty programme.

4.6.1 Community participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to determine whether the community participates in the returnees' amnesty programme or not and the findings presented in Table 4.20 indicate 21.7% of the respondents said the community participates while 78.3% said the community does not participate in the returnees' amnesty programme. This implies that majority (78.3%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that the community does not participate in the programme.

Table 4.20: Community participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Community Participation	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Participates	86	21.7
Does not participate	311	78.3
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …… the community participation is not sufficient due rampant societal stigmatization of the returnees, programme participants and the affected families for lack of knowledge on the importance of the amnesty programme. (NSA Participant).

This means that the low level of participation in the programme is because the community does not understand the benefits of the programme and this is likely to hamper the programme uptake and therefore its effectiveness in reducing terrorism activities in the Kwale County.

4.6.2 Community Participation per Sub-County

The study also wanted to establish the community participation per sub-county and the findings in Figure 4.7 show that 82% respondents from Lunga Lunga, 80.8% from Msambweni, 77.8% from Kinango and 72.7% from Matuga indicated they do not participate while 18%, 19.2%, 22.2% and 27.3% respectively, participate. This implies that many community members in all the 4 sub-counties do not participate in the programme.




Figure 4.7: Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme per Sub-County, n; Lunga Lunga = 100, Msambweni = 99, Kinango = 99, Matuga = 99. **Source:** Field Data (2020).

4.6.3 The Level the Community Likes the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The research in a quest to assess the level the community likes the programme found out as presented in Table 4.21 that 36.3% of the respondents ranked the level at the which the community likes the programme at level 2, 31% ranked it at level 3, 16.4%ranked it at level 1, 6.3% ranked it at level 5, 4.2% ranked it at level 0, 3.5% ranked it at level 7, 1.5% ranked it at level 4, 0.5% ranked it at level 6, 0.3% ranked it at level 8 while no respondent ranked it at levels 9 and 10. This implies that majority (36.2%) of the respondents, ranked the community liking of the programme at level 2.

Table 4.21: The Level that the Community Likes the Returnees' amnesty Programme

Ranking	Percentage of Liking	Frequency	Percentage
0	0	17	4.2
1	10	65	16.4
2	20	144	36.3
3	30	123	31.0
4	40	6	1.5
5	50	25	6.3
6	60	2	0.5
7	70	14	3.5
8	80	1	0.3
9	90	0	0.0
10	100	0	0.0
Total	**-**	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …one would not like such a programme because of lack of knowledge. Sometimes this maybe because some community members incite others against it. (Sub-county administrator).

This denotes that though the community likes the programme, the level is low because of lack of knowledge on the importance of the programme. This reduces the amnesty programme uptake and therefore its effectiveness.

4.6.4 How the Community Participates in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to establish the how those community members who are involved in the programme participate and the findings as presented in Table 4.22 indicate 49.6% of the respondents said the community participates by providing counseling to the returnees and the affected families, 24.9% said they provide mentorship assistance, 20.9% said they report terrorism activities, while 4.5% said that the community provides financial assistance to the returnees and affected families. This implies that majority (49.6%) of the respondents, provide counseling assistance.

Table 4.22: How the Community Participates in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

How the Community Participates	Frequency	Percentage
Reporting terrorist activities	83	20.9
Providing mentorship assistance	99	24.9
Providing financial support to returnees and affected families	18	4.5
Providing counseling assistance	197	49.6
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the community has been assisting in counseling the returnees and affected families and reporting new returnees the IOM and sometimes to the government officials. (NGO official).

This signifies that though the community liking of the programme is low, some community members have been collaborating with the National Government and NSAs in counselling and affected families and reporting terrorism activities.

4.6.5 Level of Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The research sought to establish the levels of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme and the findings presented in Table 4.23 show 28.2% of the respondents ranked the community participation at level 3, 23.2% at level 2, 16.4% at level 4, 14.4% at level 1, 9.3% at level 5, 6.8% at level 6, 1.5% at level 0, 0.3% at level 10 while no respondent ranked the programme at levels 7, 8 and 9. This implies that majority (28.2%) of the respondents, ranked the level of community participation at level 3.

Table 4.23: Level of Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

Level	Percentage of Participation	Frequency	Percentage
0	0	6	1.5
1	10	57	14.4
2	20	92	23.2
3	30	112	28.2
4	40	65	16.4
5	50	37	9.3
6	60	27	6.8
7	70	0	0
8	80	0	0
9	90	0	0
10	100	1	0.3
Total	**-**	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …the level of community participation is low because of rampant stigmatization of the returnees, affected families and participants in the society. (NGO official).

This means that the level of awareness of the importance of the programme is still low affecting participation and stigmatizing not only the returnees and the affected families but also those who participate in the programme.

4.6.6 Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

The study sought to assess the general comments of the respondents and the findings presented in Table 4.24 indicate 33.6% of the respondents were of the view that the community should help the returnees and the affected families with psychosocial support, 30.4% opined that the community should accept the returnees back and assist them in reintegration, 14.6% indicated the community should collaborate with law enforcement and report terrorism activities, 12.8% indicated the community should offer economic support to returnees affected families, 4.3% indicated that the community needs to understand and help returnees meet specials and basic needs, 4.1% indicated that role models in the community ought to mentor returnees and youths while 0.2% indicated the community should educate their youths in the society.

This implies that majority (33.5%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that the community needs to assist returnees and affected families with psychosocial support. In addition, an equally large number of the respondents, 30.5%, opined that the community should accept returnees back into the society and assist them in reintegration.

Table 4.24: General Comments on the Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

General Comments	Frequency	Percentage
Community to assist returnees and affected families with psychosocial support	133	33.5%
Community should accept returnees back into the society and assist them in reintegration	121	30.5%
Community should collaborate with law enforcement and report terrorism activities	58	14.6%
Community should offer economic support to returnees affected families	51	12.8%
Community to understand and help returnees meet specials and basic needs	17	4.3%
Role models in the community to mentor returnees and youths	16	4.1%
The community should educate their youths	1	0.2%
Total	**397**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2020).

One of the key informant said:

> …bringing onboard the community is the main missing link in the returnees' amnesty programme. (NGO official).

This means that though some community members participate, more sensitization should be done to bring them onboard in order to support the amnesty programme.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents discussions, summary of main findings, conclusions, recommendations and areas of further research. Discussions, summary of main findings and conclusions are presented according to the 4 study objectives.

5.2 Discussions

5.2.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This section discusses the gender of the respondents, the age of the respondents and the residential sub-counties of the respondents.

The respondents, heads of households, were asked to indicate their gender in order to determine whether their responses to the study was gender inclined and the findings imply that majority of the respondents, 59% were female. This imply that women are responsible for 59% of the respondents and these findings are consistent with the study by Nyongesa (2019) which established that whereas men are majority of the perpetrators, women bear the biggest brunt and are therefore more willing to participate in the search for peace.

The respondents were asked to indicate their age category and the findings show that majority of the respondents, 57.4%, are of the age category between 36 and 50 years. This implies that the age category between 36 and 50 is responsible for 57.4% of the respondents and these findings are consistent with a study by Nyongesa (2019) which established that an age category between 32-40 are the most affected by terrorism activities and therefore participate in the search for peace in order to mitigate their losses.

The study sought to establish if there are significant differences in the topic of study per sub-county. The research covered all the 4 sub-counties of Kwale County; Lunga Lunga, Msambweni, Kinango and Matuga. Each sub-county was allowed 25%, of the total respondents. This was meant to ensure that the research findings are attributable to each of the sub-counties of Kwale County. In addition to this, key informants drawn from the NGAO, NSAs, NPS and the Kwale County Sub-County Administrators were interviewed to corroborate the information from the respondents. The findings indicate similar trends in every sub-county. These findings are consistent with a study by Momanyi (2015) who established that terrorism had reduced tourism in the entire Kwale, County, and Patrick (2006) who argues that terrorism activities and their effects always have spillover effect from their initial theatre of fighting.

5.2.2 Effect of the Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities

This section addresses the discussion based on the first specific objective of the study which sought to establish the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya, including the reasons for the reduced terrorism activities, the reasons for increased terrorism activities, the ranking on the effectiveness of the amnesty programme in reducing terrorism activities, recommendations to improve the programme and the general comments on the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether the returnees' amnesty programme has increased or reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County and majority (81.4%) of the respondents, indicated that the returnees' amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. These findings are consistent with the NPS Annual

Crime Report (2018), which highlighted that terrorism incidents in Kenya reduced by 40% in 2018 compared to the previous year. Ikoh (2013), Nwankpa (2014) and Osah (2016) who argued that despite the many shortcoming in the Nigerian amnesty programme, the programme reduced armed conflicts to a greater extend, also support the study findings.

The respondents who opined that the amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities were asked to give reasons as to why they think the programme has managed to reduce terrorism activities and majority (38.1%) of the respondents, attributed the reduction in terrorism activities to the realization by the returnees that they erred in joining terror groups and wanted to change. This imply that 38.1% of the respondents think that the returnees were misinformed into joining the terrorist groups, findings that are consistent with a study by Dharmawardhane (2013), in which the terrorist recruitments are based on a false ideology aimed at deceiving the vulnerable into joining their groups.

The respondents who indicated that the amnesty programme had increased terrorism activities in the county were asked to give their justification and majority (21.6%) of the respondents, attributed the increase to high rates of school drop outs in the county. These findings are consistent with a study by Mutahi (2016), who found out that some of the drivers to joining terrorism in Kenya are socio-economic.

The respondents were asked to rank the effectiveness of returnees' amnesty programme in reducing terrorism activities and majority (32%) of the respondents, ranked the programme at level 3 on a scale of 0-10. These findings are consistent with a study by Nkwankpa (2014) who observed that the Nigerian programme has reduced terrorism activities but it is not entirely effective due to over concentrating on educational, vocational

and economic rehabilitation at the expense of a very important component; ideological rehabilitation.

The respondents were asked to suggest how the programme can be improved and majority (29%) of the respondents, indicated that there is need to heighten sensitization of the public on the amnesty rehabilitation programme. These findings are consistent with a study by Muramuzi, Mawa and Ngabirano (2019) in which it was argued that majority of the Ugandans and former LRA fighters were ignorant about the Ugandan Amnesty Act leading to low uptake of the amnesty programme. Also corresponding to these findings is a study by Hovil & Lomo (2005) in which sensitization and counter messaging helps to build trust in the amnesty programme thereby increasing its uptake.

Asked to give their general comments on the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities, majority (20.5%) of the respondents, opined that there is need to educate the returnees to know their rights. These findings are consistent with a study by Al-Bulushi and Daghar (2018) who established that the returnees don't know what to expect and their entitlement since the amnesty programme lacks a legal framework.

5.2.3 Strategies Employed by the Kenyan Government in the Returnees Amnesty

This section addresses the discussion on the second specific objective of the study which sought to find out the strategies employed by the government in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya, including the type of support provided by the national government in the returnees' amnesty programme, the type of support preferred by the national government, the type of support preferred by the returnees, whether the government provides support to other groups other than the returnees', the groups supported, the nature of support given to other groups and the general comments

on the National Government strategies in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya.

The respondents were asked to indicate the type of support the National Government has given to returnees and the findings show that 34.8% of the respondents indicated psychosocial support, 31.2% indicated vocational training while 20.2% alluded that the government provides economic support. These study findings are consistent with a study by Ogbogu (2016) who established that other than educational rehabilitation, the Nigerian government mainly offered the defectors vocational training, psychosocial support.

Asked to indicate the type of support preferred by the National Government in the returnees' amnesty programme, majority (37%) of the respondents, indicated the government prefers vocational training, 27% indicated psychosocial support, while 23% indicated economic support. This is partly consistent with a study by Nkwankpa (2014) who observed that the Nigerian Government Amnesty Programme concentrated on educational, vocational and economic rehabilitation but left out ideological rehabilitation. However, Ogbogu (2016) established that in addition to educational and vocational training rehabilitation, the Nigerian Government also offered the defectors with psychological and religious support.

The respondents were asked to indicate the type of support preferred by the returnees and majority (35.3% of the respondents, indicated the returnees prefer all the types of support provided by the National Government. A study by Thalpawila (2015) mentions that the Sri-Lankan Government offered 7 types of support that were all liked by the beneficiaries, which are educational rehabilitation; vocational training rehabilitation;

psychosocial and creative therapies rehabilitation; social, cultural and family rehabilitation; spiritual and religious rehabilitation; recreational rehabilitation; and community rehabilitation.

Asked whether the National Government provides support to other groups, majority (93%) of the respondents, indicated the government supports other groups. This study finding is consistent with a study by Thalpawila (2015) in which the government also provided rehabilitation support to the local communities in Sri-Lankan amnesty programme.

The study aimed to establish other groups supported by the National Government in the returnees amnesty programme and majority (84.9%) of the respondents, indicated the affected families have been receiving some support. These findings are consistent with a study by Dharmawardhane (2013), which underscored the importance of supporting the affected families since they not only bear the brunt of the attacks but are the recipients of the beneficiaries upon completion of their rehabilitation.

The respondents were asked to indicate the type of support given to these other groups and 75.7% of the respondents indicated that the government provides them with economic support. These findings are consistent with a study by Hettiarachchi (2013) in which the economic support, in addition to psychosocial support of the affected communities was found to be important.

Asked to give their general comments on the government strategies in the returnees' amnesty programme, majority (23.6%) of the respondents, indicated the government should also consider religious rehabilitation of the returnees. These findings are consistent

with the study by Hassan (2015) which established that the Singaporean amnesty programme, conducted by the RRG, prioritized religious rehabilitation.

5.2.4 Role of the Non-State Actors in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

This part addresses the discussion based on the third specific objective of the study which sought to evaluate the role of Non State Actors in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya, including the involvement of NSAs in the returnees' amnesty programme, the various NSAs involved in the amnesty programme, the roles played by the NSAs, whether the NSAs collaborate with the national government or not, areas of collaboration between the NSAs' and the national government and the general comments on the NSAs involvement in the returnees' amnesty programme.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether the NSAs are involved in the returnees' amnesty programme and majority (99.5%) of the respondents, indicated they are involved. These findings are consistent with a study by Cox, Orsborn & Silk (2014) who argued that many NSAs were involved in the amnesty programme in Sri-Lanka.

Asked to name the NSAs involved in the programme, majority (58%) of the respondents, mentioned NGOs. This is a similar finding to a study by Al-Bulushi & Daghar (2018) who mentioned that IOM, a UN agency is involved in the amnesty programme. Similarly a study by Akoth (2018) mentions that the Muslim Youth Alliance and the IOM are involved in the programme.

Asked to mention the role played by the NSAs in the returnees' amnesty programme, majority (43%) of the respondents, indicated rehabilitation support of the returnees. These findings are similar to a study by Kam (2015) whose findings established that the RRG pioneered rehabilitation efforts. A similar study by Hovil & Lomo (2005)

established that the amnesty programme was established because of pressure from religious leaders from Northern Uganda who, after its actualization, were at the fore front of its implementation.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether the NSAs and the National Government collaborate in the amnesty programme and majority (96.7%) of the respondents, mentioned that they collaborate. Consistent with these findings is a study by Gunaratna (2012) that established that the Sri-Lankan programme involved collaboration amongst the private sector, community organizations, NGOs and the National Government in rehabilitating beneficiaries of the amnesty programme. The findings imply that other than being involved, the NSAs also collaborate in rehabilitating returnees.

The respondents were asked to mention the areas of collaboration between the NSAs and the National Government and majority (21.4%) of the respondents mentioned that they collaborate in sensitization and counter messaging support. These findings are consistent with a study by Ekayu (2015) who observed that the NSAs and the national government in Uganda collaborated in sensitization and counter messaging and funding the amnesty programme.

Asked to give their general comments on the role of the NSAs in the returnees' amnesty programme, majority (32.5%) of the respondents indicated that the NSAs ought to also provide economic support to returnees and affected families. This is consistent with a study by Goodnews (2016) in which the Nigerian NSAs also provided the defectors with economic support.

5.2.5 Level of Local Community Participation in the Returnees' Amnesty Programme

This section addresses the discussion based on the fourth specific objective of the study which sought to assess the level of local community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya, including whether the community participates in the amnesty programme or not, the ranking of how the community likes the programme, how the community participates in the programme, the level of community participation and the general comments of the respondents on the level of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme.

Asked to indicate whether the community participates in the returnees' amnesty programme or not, majority (78.3%) of the respondents, indicated the community does not participate in the programme. The findings are consistent with the study Felbab-Brown (2018) who observed that the Nigerian community did not participate well in the amnesty programme resulting to the postponement of graduation of some defectors because the community was not ready to receive them. A similar study by Hovil & Lomo (2005) also established that stigmatization of the defectors hampered the reintegration programme.

The respondents were asked to rank the community liking of the returnees' amnesty programme and majority (36.3%) of the respondents, ranked the programme at level 2 on a scale of 0-10. the study findings are consistent with a study by Akoth (2018) who observed that the programme is seen as a National Government Programme and not the locals' programme.

The respondents were asked to mention how the community participates in the returnees' amnesty programme and majority (49.6%) of the respondents, mentioned counselling assistance. These findings are similar to a study findings by Hassan (2007)

who established that the Singaporean RRG, a community initiative, provided psychological and emotional support to the rehabilitees.

The respondents were asked to rank the level to which the community participates in the returnees' amnesty programme and majority (28.2%) of the respondents, ranked the programme at level 3 on a scale of 0-10. These findings are consistent with a study by Downie (2018) in which the Kenya's amnesty was found to have a low uptake due to low level of community participation. Similar findings were highlighted in a study by Rose (2008) illuminated that some resistance to the Ugandan programme by some community members was attributed to the fact that the government was rewarding criminals at the expense of peace loving citizens. A similar study by Dode (2015) further established that some of the youths who restrained to join Boko Haram shunned the programme for the government's failure to consider them during the amnesty programme but rewarded criminals.

Asked to give their general comments, 33.5% of the respondents said the community needs to assist returnees and affected families with psychosocial support. The study findings are consistent with a study by Hassan (2007) in which it was established that the local community in Singapore provided psychosocial support to both the affected families and the beneficiaries of the amnesty programme.

5.3 Summary of the Main Findings

The study aimed at establishing the effect of the returnees' amnesty programme and the findings imply that the returnees' amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya by 81.4%. In addition, the effectiveness of the programme in reducing terrorism activities is ranked low, 30% effective, but the percentage

reduction in terrorism activities is quite remarkable. The reduction was attributed to the realization by the returnees that they were fooled into joining terrorism. Sensitization and counter messaging is suggested as the key initiative that should be considered to make the programme more effective in dealing with terrorism activities by improving uptake and participation.

The study further sought to find out the strategies employed by the National Government in the amnesty programme and the findings shows that the National Government supports to the returnees are mainly psychosocial rehabilitation, 34.8%, vocational training rehabilitation, 31.2%, and economic support, 20.1%. The findings also established that the returnees prefer all possible support that can be offered by both the National Government, NSAs and the local community members. The study also established that in addition to the returnees, the National Government offers economic support to the affected families in the returnees' amnesty programme. It was also established that majority of the respondents suggest that religious rehabilitation support should be considered by the government in an effort de-radicalize and rehabilitate the returnees.

The study sought to establish the role of NSAs and the findings shows that NGOs are the main participants, as indicated by 58% of the respondents, who provide rehabilitation support to the returnees and the affected families. In addition to this, it was also established that the NSAs collaborate with the National Government in mainly sensitization and counter messaging against the terrorism ideology. However, majority (32.5%) of the respondents, are of the opinion that the NSAs need to provide economic support to the returnees and the affected families.

The research also determined that the local community's liking of the returnees' amnesty programme and participation is low. This was attributed to rampant stigmatization of the programme participants, the returnees and the affected families. The community members who participate in the programme mainly provide psychosocial support to the returnees and the affected families.

5.4 Conclusion

Based on the study findings and the discussion presented, the study concludes that the returnees' amnesty programme has reduced terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya by making the returnees realize that they were fooled into joining terrorist organizations. The study also concludes that the National Government strategies mainly include economic, psychosocial and vocational training rehabilitation to the returnees and economic support to the affected families in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme. Further, the study concludes that NGOs are the main NSAs involved and that collaborate with the National Government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County. These NGOs mainly involved in rehabilitation support of the returnees and collaborate with the National Government in the sensitization and counter messaging. In addition, the study also concludes that the community liking of the returnees' amnesty programme and participation is low due to rampant stigmatization in the community insufficient local ownership of the programme. Part of the community that participates in the amnesty programme mainly provide psychosocial support to the returnees and affected families.

In addition, the study concludes that the social contract theory was relevant and sufficiently guided the areas of study.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the study findings presented, the discussion and the conclusion made the study makes the following recommendations:

i. The National Government expedites the enactment of the amnesty act in order to provide both legal and policy guidelines for the implementation of the programme;

ii. The National Government needs to consider widening the scope of the strategies in the amnesty programme to include but not limited to economic support, religious rehabilitation; sports, arts and recreation; psychosocial support, educational rehabilitation; vocational training rehabilitation; and family and community rehabilitation; and

iii. The National Government, the Kwale County Government and NSAs should heighten community sensitization and counter-messaging to win the community and bring it onboard to own up and participate in the programme so as to boost the uptake and build community resilience against terrorism activities. The community should be encouraged by the National Government and the NSAs to take a leading role in mentorship programme, sensitization and counter messaging and reporting terrorism activities to the Government through the *Nyumba Kumi* structures.

5.6 Areas for Further Research

The study identified the following areas that need further research by scholars: the role of the *Nyumba Kumi* programme in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County; how traditional dispute resolution mechanism can be used to help improve the amnesty programme; and the reasons why some youths with similar underlying conditions declined to join terrorist groups like their peers.

REFERENCES

Abatneh, A. (2006). *Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Rwandan Child Soldiers.* Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the subject sociology. University of South Africa. http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/1398/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1. (Accessed on 5th December, 2019).

Akhtar, I. (2016). *Research Design. Research in Social Science: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Akoth, S. (2018). *Returnees and Justice: Alternative Justice System as a Mechanism for Amnesty in Kwale County of Kenya. Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges.* Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Al-Bulushi, S., & Daghar, M. (2018). *Rehabilitation or Indefinite Detention? A critical examination of an emerging approach to 'CVE'. Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges*. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Agger, K. (2012). *The End of Amnesty in Uganda: Implications for LRA Defections*. *The End of Amnesty in Uganda: Implications for LRA Defections.* Enough. The project to end genocide and crimes against humanity.

Ali, M. (2014). *Sampling & Sample Size Estimation.* Department of Reproductive Health and Research. *GFMER.* World Health Organization Geneva, Switzerland.

Ahmed, M. (2018, February 21). *Al-Shabaab returnee tells of fear after escape from Somalia.* The Daily Nation. Available at: https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/. (Accessed on 10th December, 2019).

Badurdeen, F. (2018). *Online recruitment and Radicalization: Al Shabaab Luring Strategies with new technology*. *Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges*. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Bell, K. (2015). Looking Outward Enhancing Australia's Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programs. *Security Challenges*, 11, (2) 1-20. Current Security Issues: Deradicalisation, China's economic influence and maritime developments in South-East. Institute for Regional Security. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465435. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Cox, D. F., Orsborn, C. R., & Sisk, T. D. (2014). *In the Eye of the Beholder: Social Cohesion and Political Discourse in Post-War Sri Lanka. Case Study Overview*. Sié Chéou Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver.

Dahou, N. (2014). *The Niger Delta Amnesty: lessons four years on. Policy brief*. Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme. British council 2014. Available at www.nsrp-nigeria.org. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Dharmawardhane. (2013). *Post-Conflict Strategy in Sri Lanka: An Overview of National Reconciliation Efforts.* International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism. Available at: *https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351133.* (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Dode, R. O. (2015). Nigeria's Niger delta militancy and the amnesty policy: beyond the amnesty. *Global Journal of Politics and Law Research,* 3 (3) 96-104. European Centre for Research Training and Development UK. Department Of Political Science and Public Administration University of Uyo, Uyo. Available at: www.eajournals.org. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Downie, R. (2018). *Kenya's Struggling Amnesty Experiment: The Policy Challenge of Rehabilitating Former Terrorists.* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C.

Drost, E, A. (2011). Validity and Reliability in Social Science Research. *Education Research and Perspectives,* 38(1). California State University, Los Angeles.

Ekayu, J. (2015). Uganda: An NGO Perspective to Countering Violent Extremism. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 7 (9) 18-24. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351389. (Accessed on 15th January, 2019).

Ezzarqui, L. (2010). *De-radicalization and rehabilitation program: the case study of Saudi Arabia".* A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies. Washington, DC, USA. Available at: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu. (Accessed on 10th September, 2019).

Felbab-Brown, V. (2018). *The limits of punishment. Transitional justice and violent extremism. Nigeria case study.* Institute for integrated transitions. United Nations University.

Feldman, R. (2007). A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 18 (1) 134–143. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Goldsmith, P. (2018). *Comparative Perspective on Islamic Radicalism in Kenya and the Horn of Africa. Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges.* Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Gunaratna, R. (2012). Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: A Time for Reflection. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 4 (4) 2-7. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351052. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Gunaratna, R. (2013). Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement: New Frontiers in Combating Terrorism. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 5 (4) 2-4. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351137. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Gunaratna, R. (2013). Revisiting Challenges to De-Radicalization and Community Engagement. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 5 (8) 3-6. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351171. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Gunaratna, R. (2015). Countering Violent Extremism: Revisiting Rehabilitation and Community Engagement. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 7 (3) 5-13.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351336. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Gunaratna, R. (2017). Strategic Counter-Terrorism: A Game Changer in Fighting Terrorism? *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 9 (6) 1-5. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351525. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Gunaratna, R. (2018). Sinhala Muslim Riots in Sri Lanka: The need for Restoring Communual History. *Counter Terrorism Trends and Analysis,* 10 (4) 1-4. Accessed from https://www.jstor.org. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Hassan, A. S. R. B. (2015). The Mufti-Mustafti Approach to Religious Rehabilitation. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 7 (3) 14-20. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351337. (Accessed on 15th September, 2019).

Hassan, M. H. (2007). Singapore's Muslim Community -Based Initiatives against JI. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 1 (5) 3-8.* Terrorism Research Initiative. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298312. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Hettiarachchi, M. (2011. *Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter terrorism and Counter Insurgency.* Accessed from *https://www.bing.com.* (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Hettiarachchi, M. (2013). Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency. *PRISM* 4 (2) 105-121. Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26469814. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Hovil, L. & Lomo, Z. (2005). Whose justice? *Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: the potential for conflict resolution and long-term reconciliation*, 15. Refugee Law Project.

Ikoh, M. (2013). The Niger Delta Crisis: Taming Violence beyond the Amnesty. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 3 No. 17; 146. Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria. Available at www.ijhssnet.com. (Accessed on 15th September, 2019).

Israel, G. (1992). Determining Sample Size. *Fact Sheet*, 6. University of Florida. Florida Cooperative Extension Service.

Kam, S. (2016). Singapore. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 8 (1) 37-41* Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26369563. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

Kasuku, A. (2019, March 08). *Police raid Al Shabaab training centre in Kwale, recover bomb making material.* The Star. Available at: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/. (Accessed on 15th December, 2019).

Kasuku, A. (2019, August 13). *Al Shabaab returnees accused of Imam's murder*. The Star. Available at: https://www.the-star.co.ke/. (Accessed on 15th December, 2019).

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Report, (2019). *Kenya population and housing census. Population by county and sub-county, 1.* Nairobi, Kenya.

Republic of Kenya (2020). *The Constitution of Kenya, 2010. National Council for Law Reporting.* Available at www.kenyalaw.org. (Accessed on 5th January, 2020).

Kimari, B., & Ramadhan, R. (2017). *Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya.* Policy brief. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Kinsbergen, S. (2019). The legitimacy of Dutch do-it-yourself initiatives in Kwale County, Kenya. *Third World Quarterly.* Informal UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20. (Accessed on 5th January, 2020).

Laskar, M. (2013). Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Roussean. *SSRN electronic journal*. Symbiosis International University, Pune, India. Available at: publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261181816. (Accessed on 5th September, 2019).

McNamara, K. (2013). Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the Case of Thomas Kwoyelo. *The International Criminal Court at Ten (Symposium)* 12 (3). Washington University Global Studies Law Review Washington University Global Studies Law Review. St. Louis, School of Law.

Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G. (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches.* Acts Press, Nairobi.

Mohajan, H. (2017). *Two Criteria for Good Measurements in Research: Validity and Reliability. Munich Personal Archive.* Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh.

Mohsin, A. (2016). *A Manual for Selecting Sampling Techniques in Research. Munich Personal Archive*. University of Karachi, Iqra University.

Momanyi, M. (2015). *The Impact of Al-Shabab Terrorist Attacks in Kenya.* Master's Programme for Peace and Conflict Transformation. Faculty of Humanities, Social Science and Education. Centre for Peace Studies.

Muramuzi, I. Mawa, M. Ngabirano, M. (2019). The Implementation of Amnesty in Uganda: Limitations and Prospects. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications,* 9 (9). Nkumba University-Kampala Uganda. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.9.09.2019.p93117. (Accessed on 15th January, 2020).

National Police Service (2018). *Annual Crime Report*. Nairobi, Kenya.

Nahdohdin, M., Angelianawati, D., Prasetya, A., Yaoren, K., Dhanaraj, J., Bashar, I., See, S., & Amalina Nasir, A. (2019). South Asia. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 11 (1) 6-32. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26568577. (Accessed on 27th May, 2020).

Nyongesa, G. (2019). *Effects of terrorism on the political economy: case study of Garissa County, Kenya.* Master's programme of public policy and administration. School of humanities and social studies. Kenyatta University.

Nwankpa, M. (2014). The Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta Insurgencies. *The Economic of Peace and Security Journal,* 10 (1) 32. University of Roehampton, United Kingdom. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Nwajiaku-Dahou, K. (2014). *The Niger Delta Amnesty: Lessons four years on*. *Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation programme.* British council 2014 / e189 20 Mississippi Street, Maitama, Abuja, Nigeria. Available at nsrp.comms@ng.britishcouncil.org www.nsrp-nigeria.org. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Nthamburi, N. (2018). *Countering violence extremism: A gender perspective. Debates, Ideas and Challenges.* Centre for human rights and policy studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Olingo, A. (2019, September, 09). *Police link slain Kwale gangster to Dusit suicide bomber.* The Daily Nation. Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/. (Accessed on 11th January, 2020).

Ogada, M. (2017a). Emergency Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism in Kenya. Policy Brief. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Ogada, M. (2017b). A Policy Content Evaluation of Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. Policy brief. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Ogbogu, J. C. (2016). Nigeria's Approach to Terrorist Rehabilitation. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8 (4) 16-21. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351411. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Osah, G. (2016). Politics of amnesty and conflict management in Nigeria's Niger Delta. *Arabian Group of Journals*, 1 (3). Goodnews Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Ogun State Nigeria. Available at www.arabianjbmr.com. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Patrick, S. (2006). Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of "Spillovers". *Working Paper, 73.* Centre for global development.

Pkalya, D. (2016, June 09). *Reasons why the amnesty for 'reformed' al shabaab returnees is failing security in Kwale.* The Standard Digital. Available at: https://standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2000204575/. (Accessed on 15th October, 2019).

Ramadhan, R. (2018). *Countering Violent Extremism: Reflections from new Research*. *Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges*. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

Rose, C. (2008). Looking beyond amnesty and traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A Proposal for Truth-Telling and Reparations. *Third World Law Journal,* 28(2) 4. http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol28/iss2/4. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Ruteere, M., & Mutahi, P. (2018). *Introduction. Confronting violent extremism in Kenya*. *Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: debates, ideas and challenges*. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Nairobi, Kenya.

See, S. (2018). Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A Catalyst for Recidivism Among Disengaged Terrorists. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 10 (6) 7-15. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26435161. (Accessed on 11th October, 2019).

Shauri, H. (2017). *Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism. Technical Report.* Human Rights Agenda.

Silke, A., & Veldhuis, T. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps. *Perspectives on Terrorism,* 11 (5) 2-11. Terrorism Research Initiative. Accessed: 21-10-2019 10:20 UTC. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297927. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Simon, M. K. (2011). *Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations. Dissertation and scholarly research: Recipes for success.* Seattle, WA, Dissertation Success, LLC. Available at www.dissertationrecipes.com. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Sirisena, S. (2013). South Asia Country Assessment: Sri Lanka. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* 5 (1) 37-41. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351113. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Sparks, J. (2018). David Hume criticized social contract theory severely. *Sparks commentary.* Part history, part politics, and part random other stuff.

Styszynski, M. (2015). Detainee Rehabilitation Programmes in Europe. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7 (9) 3-9. Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351387. (Accessed on 10th October, 2019).

Taddeo, V. (2010). U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign. *Journal of Strategic Security,* 3 (2) 27-38. University of South Florida Board of Trustees. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26463128. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Thalpawila, O. N. (2015). Rehabilitation and Reintegration as a Key Activity of Post- War Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. *International Journal of Scientific Research and*

Innovative Technology ISSN: 2 (12) 2313-3759. Department of Economics, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka.

Waxman, D. (2011). Living with terror, not Living in Terror The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5, (5/6) 4-26. Terrorism Research Initiative. Accessed: 17-11-2019 13:40 UTC. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298536. (Accessed on 11th October, 2018).

Vakilpour., Z & Rastegari, B. (2018). The Need for Rehabilitation of Terrorists in Iran. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 10 (10) 17-19. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26501462. (Accessed on 27th May, 2020).

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Introduction Letter for Key Informants

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR YOUR RESPONSE DURING MY FIELD RESEARCH

I am Patrick Nau Kubasu, studying Governance Peace and Conflict master's degree at Africa Nazarene University.

I intend to conduct a research on the impact of the government returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya. You have been selected as a key respondent because of your knowledge and experience in this area of study. If you decide to participate, I would like to have a 1 hour interview session with you on the date that will be communicated later.

Before the interview, you and I will sign a consent note to signify that you have accepted to participate in the research and to commit myself to ensure that your true identity will be not be shared and the information that you will share will be handled with confidentiality. Additionally, the research findings will only be used for academic work as a partial fulfilment for my above mentioned master's degree.

For further clarification, kindly contact me on 0712242956 or pkubasu@tum.ac.ke.

Yours Sincerely,

Patrick Nau Kubasu

Student

Appendix 2: Interview Schedule for Heads of Households

Academic Research Interview for the Heads of Households in Kwale County, Kenya

Topic: Assess the influence of the government returnees' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya

Contact: Kubasu Nau Patrick - Student

Mobile Number: 0712242956

Email: pkubasu@tum.ac.ke

PART I: Demographic Information (tick the correct cycle)

1. What is your gender?

   ⬭ Male

   ⬭ Female

2. What is your age?

   ⬭ Between 18-35 ⬭ Between 36-50

   ⬭ Between 51-65 ⬭ Above 65

3. Which Sub-County do you reside?

   ⬭ Lunga lunga ⬭ Msambweni

   ⬭ Kinango ⬭ Matuga

PART II: What is the effect of the returnees amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya?

4. In your own opinion, has the amnesty programme reduced or increased terrorism activities? (tick the correct cycle)

   ⬭ Reduced

◯ Increased

◯ I don't know

5. In your own judgement, to what is the level of effectiveness of the amnesty programme in reducing terrorism activities? (cycle one)

Nor effective Very Effective

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6. Why do you think the amnesty programme has had this effect on the terrorism activities in Kwale County? ……...

.....

.....

7. What can be done to make the programme more successful?.....

.....

.....

8. What is your general comment on the effects of the programme on terrorism activities. ----------

……

……

PART III: What are the strategies employed by the government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya? (Tick the correct cycle)

9. What help does the Kenyan government offer the surrendered returnees?

◯ Religious education

- ⬭ Formal Education support
- ⬭ Vocational training support
- ⬭ Psycho-social support
- ⬭ Economic support
- ⬭ I don’t know

10. Which support is most preferred by the Kenyan government?

- ⬭ Religious education
- ⬭ Formal education
- ⬭ Vocational training support
- ⬭ Psycho-social support
- ⬭ Economic support
- ⬭ I don’t know

11. What support is the most preferred by the returnees?

- ⬭ Religious education
- ⬭ Formal Education support
- ⬭ Vocational training support
- ⬭ Psycho-social support
- ⬭ Economic support
- ⬭ All of the above
- ⬭ I don’t know

12. Other than the returnees, has the government helped any other group?

- ⬭ Yes
- ⬭ No

⬭ I don’t know

13. Which group has the government helped?

⬭ Affected families

⬭ Widows to dead terrorists

⬭ Wives of the returnees

⬭ School drop outs

⬭ None of the above

⬭ I don’t know

14. What kind of help has the government given them?

⬭ Economic Support

⬭ Psycho-social support

⬭ Formal education support

⬭ Vocational education support

⬭ Religious support

⬭ I don’t know

15. Your general comment of the strategies. ……

……

……

…….....

.....

.....

PART IV: What are the roles played by other non-state actors in the returnees' amnesty programme?

16. Are non-state actors involved in the Government Returnees' Amnesty Programme?

- ⬭ Yes
- ⬭ No
- ⬭ I don't know

17. Which are the Non State Actors involved in the Government Returnees' Amnesty Programme?

- ⬭ Non-Governmental Organizations
- ⬭ Community Based Organizations
- ⬭ Religious Based Organizations
- ⬭ Youth Groups
- ⬭ Women Groups
- ⬭ Private individuals
- ⬭ None
- ⬭ I don't know

18. What are the roles of these Non State Actors in the Government Returnees' Amnesty Programme?

- ⬭ Provide economic assistance to the returnees
- ⬭ Rehabilitation support
- ⬭ Psycho-social support
- ⬭ Mentorship programmes

◯ I don't know

19. Do the Non State Actors collaborate with the National Government Administration Officers involved in the returnees' amnesty programme?

◯ Yes

◯ No

◯ I don't know

20. In what area do they collaborate? ……

…….....

.....

.....

.....

21. Your general comment on role of Non State Actors……

……

……

……..

PART V: What is the level of participation of the community in the returnees' amnesty programme?

22. Does the community participate in the returnees' amnesty programme?

◯ Yes

◯ No

◯ I don't know

23. In your opinion, to what level does the community like the returnees' amnesty programme? (cycle one)

Doesn't like Likes it a lot

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

24. How does the community participate?

⬭ Reporting terrorist activities

⬭ Provide mentorship assistance

⬭ Provide financial support to the amnesty programme

⬭ Provide counseling assistance to the affected and the returnees

25. To what level does the community participation? (cycle one)

Doesn't participation Participates fully

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

26. Your general comment on the level of local community participation.

……..……

……

…… ……

Appendix 3: Key Informant Interview Guide

i. What are the strategies employed by the government in the implementation of the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

ii. What are the roles played by Non-State Actors in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

v. What is the level of community participation in the returnees' amnesty programme in Kwale County, Kenya?

vi. How has the returnees amnesty programme affected terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya?

Appendix 4: ANU Research Data Collection Approval Letter



AFRICA NAZARENE
UNIVERSITY

4th March 2020

RE: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Patrick Nau Kubasu (18S03DMGP017) is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University. He has finished his course work and has defended his thesis proposal entitled: - ***"Influence of Government Returnees' Amnesty Programme on Terrorism Activities in Kwale County, Kenya".***

Any assistance accorded to him to facilitate data collection and finish his thesis is highly welcomed.

Rodney Reed

Rodney Reed, PhD.
DVC Academic and Student Affairs.

P.O.Box 53067 – 00200 Nairobi, Kenya | Tel: 020 252 7170/1 – 5 | Email: vc@anu.ac.ke | www.anu.ac.ke

Appendix 5: Research Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **459307**

Date of Issue: **09/April/2020**

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Mr.. Patrick Nau Kubasu of Africa Nazarene University, has been licensed to conduct research in Kwale on the topic: Influence of the government returnees\' amnesty programme on terrorism activities in Kwale County, Kenya for the period ending : 09/April/2021.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/20/4420**

459307

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013


The Grant of Research Licenses is Guided by the Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period
2. The License any rights thereunder are non-transferable
3. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Director of Education, County Commissioner and County Governor before commencement of the research
4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearence from relevant Government Agencies
5. The License does not give authority to tranfer research materials
6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project
7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) within one of completion of the research
8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,
P. O. Box 30623, 00100 Nairobi, KENYA
Land line: 020 4007000, 020 2241349, 020 3310571, 020 8001077
Mobile: 0713 788 787 / 0735 404 245
E-mail: dg@nacosti.go.ke / registry@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke

Appendix 6: Map of Kwale County



Map of Kwale County. **Source:** Google Maps (2020).