INFLUENCES OF MEDIA REPORTING IN ANTI-TERRORISM WAR. A CASE STUDY OF KENYA DEFENCE FORCES OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA (2011 -2018)

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DECLARATION AND APPROVAL

I declare that this document and the research it describes are my original work and that they have not been presented in any other university for academic work.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to KDF personnel of all cadres who have participated in the fight against the spread of terrorism in the world. A special mention goes to the diplomats, security planners and the executing troops who have taken part in the liberation of Somali since 2011. I wish also to dedicate this study to Kenyan reporters, photojournalists and cameramen who have covered the operations in its different phases and who found themselves in life threatening situations as troops conducted ambushes and raids in terrorist's hideouts. Their journalistic work and courage have continued highlighting the professionalism, discipline and courage of the troops.

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ABSTRACT

Media coverage of conflicts has since time immemorial been a challenge owing to the complexities involved. For the Kenyan case, the country's Kenya Defence Force was getting involved in a maiden international war in 2011 otherwise dubbed Operation '*Linda Nchi*' to curb the terrorist threat on Kenyan soil. Similarly, Kenyan media were engaged in their maiden coverage of international war and had to deliver information about the war to the public with skills honed from the coverage of internal skirmishes where KDF had been involved. This study sought to examine the influence of media coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018 with a special focus on local media. Specifically, the study was to: find out the journalism methods employed by Kenya Television before and after the start of KDF operations against terrorism; examine the influence of Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and; explore strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and adoption of suitable methods. The study was premised on the Agenda Setting Theory, Social Learning Theory and Gatekeeping Theory. It employed a descriptive research and exploratory design, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches of data collection. The study target population included media professionals, KDF anti-terrorism lead operatives and key stakeholders including CAK officials, Ministry of Defence and ICT officials. A study sample size of 44 respondents was chosen for this study defined by a sampling formula by Yamane (1967) for primary respondents and purposive sampling for key informants. The study was conducted in Nairobi due to the availability of, targeted media personalities and media houses and key stakeholders based within the city. Qualitative data was analysed using content analysis technique while quantitative data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. From the study, it emerged that the media used different techniques to cover military operations depending on the individuals, institutions interests or stage of the operation. These included: investigative journalism as freelance journalists; embedding journalists with troops; live coverage and; parachuting journalism. Indeed the findings show that there was positive and significant relationship between the techniques and the fight against terrorism. Several strategies were seen as been of paramount importance in improving journalism strategies regarding media coverage in the fight against terrorism. Strategies such as policies on training, adherence to existing laws and ways of enhancing cooperation between the television reporters and the military were essential. Enabling access to information by the mass media since this could boost the morale of the media to support the military through objective reporting would be enhanced and this could yield positive results in counter-terrorism efforts. The study compared Kenya government and first world governments and recorded that it should use its superior resources and ICT infrastructure to win propaganda war through the state and private media. Effort should be made by the media to ensure that their reports are not used as avenues for carrying terrorist propaganda. Furthermore, journalists should be encouraged to be careful in their analysis and presentation of news to the general public. The study recommends comparative studies on other security agencies such as the National Police Service for comparative purposes. Comparative studies focused on other countries such as Uganda whose security forces are also involved in the fight against terrorism in Uganda could also be carried out.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AU	Africa Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CAK	Communication Authority of Kenya
CNN	Cable Network News
EBU	European Broadcasting Union
GOK	Government of Kenya
ICT	Information Computer and Technology
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
PIO	Public Information Officer
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Force
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
UN	United Nations

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Al-Qaeda: Operationally defined as a global militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988. It operates as a jihadist group with a network comprising of both multinational and stateless militaries

Al-Shabaab: Operationally defined, is a jihadist terrorist group allied to Al Qaeda and has its origin in Somalia.

CNN effect: Operationally defined, as a situation where media coverage is prolonged for a period and thereby influencing policies of government.

Expose: Television report is a form of a documentary conducted after an investigation on a matter of public importance to reveal wrongs committed by the military.

Media: This is the means of communication used to deliver information or data to reach intended audience, large numbers of people, such as television reports in the case of this study.

Terrorism: This is the use of violence or threatened use of violence, in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim. In modern times, terrorism is considered a major threat to society and therefore illegal under anti-terrorism laws in most jurisdictions.

Watershed: For the purpose of this study, it is a point of influence. In media the water shed period is a period when the media aims at influencing many people.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Introduction

This study seeks to examine the influence local media has had on the fight against terrorism through the coverage of KDF activities in Somalia. The fight against terror will be the dependent variable weighed against journalistic strategies employed in reporting terrorism incidents. This chapter will delve into different sections including; the background of the study, the problem statement of the study, purpose of the study, the objectives of the study, significance of the study, scope of the study, delimitations, assumptions and limitations of the study, theoretical and conceptual framework.

1.2 Background to the Study

The influence of the mass media has grown enormously over the last two decades. All over the world people are able to access information on all issues from different sources including television, newspapers and the internet. Alongside informing the public, the mass media has a responsibility to avoid the creation of animosity amongst readers and viewers. On the other hand, media coverage of war scenarios has been contentious. Scholarly evidence has aptly established a major role played by the mass media in the start, continuation and termination of any war (Vasterman, Yzermans, & Dirkzwager, 2005)

The symbiotic relationship between media and the military is played out in different aspects of media reporting, angling of issues and balance in coverage (Schmid, 2011). Media coverage especially in the use of images, words and reproduction of the terrorists' own images and words during military operations is regarded as only aiding terrorism (Howard

&Renfrow, 2006). In essence, terrorists want attention over counter-terrorism military efforts, seeking to publicize their cause, influence public opinions and subsequently they have become aware of the influence of the mass media.

The concept and practice of providing the citizenry with journalistic coverage of wars and armed conflicts is not new. Journalists like Ernie Pyle, Joe Galloway, and the current crop of Clarisa Ward and Arwa Damon both of CNN, are indelibly associated with the media and its role in covering wars. The 1991 Gulf War – Operation Desert Storm, saw the coming of age of the cable news era through CNN (Scholtz, 2012). Reporting on the war in and around Bagdad as the conflict progressed set standards of media involvement in conventional conflicts. The standards involved embedding reporters, which was revolutionary, and the impact was phenomenal. The proliferation of information by the various media outlets, continuous demand of war news, and growth of the internet accounted for the look and style of reporting of the ongoing-armed conflicts including the fight against terrorism.

Reflected in the new wave of information speed, reach and influence is the dynamics of public opinion and the influence they have on the strategies and tactics applied at all levels. An example can be drawn from the coverage of the Mumbai siege of Taj Mahal, where in 2008 terrorists attacked different hotels, detonated bombs in different streets and held hostages for close to sixty (60) hours. The local and international media reported of multiple attacks by different groups of terrorists and many estimated the figure to be up to sixty terrorists. As a result, the security operations were complicated due to the conflicting media reports, (Cathy Clark, 2013). Police were diverted to every detonation site, and left the main objective of the terrorists, which was the hotel. The panic created by the media made it harder for evacuation and rescue missions. Internationally, India was placed on a vulnerable position to explain her

security strategies and restore the almost collapsing tourism sector. At the end of the operation and the defeat of the terrorists, an investigation determined that only twelve terrorists conducted the acts by planting bombs in different taxis they used to get to Hotel Taj Mahal. Both the local and international media could not explain the 60 terrorist they had reported (Maltby, 2012). A commission on the Taj Mahal later concluded that the journalists exacerbated the effects of the terror act and wrong publicity curtailed proper planning of operations. Following the incident, tourism which is a major revenue earner for India dropped drastically forcing the country to spend more resources to resuscitate the important sector of its economy (Maltby, 2012).

Media in African countries appear guilt-ridden in relation to inadequate interpretation, often depending on stories from the wire services, and failing to supply sufficient background. Nwosu (1987) observes that in the Angolan crisis, the coverage by five influential Nigerian newspapers was in support of their hypothesis. These newspapers were overly dependent on international news services for information on the crisis, devoting less space for interpretation of the news about the war and most of the war received little attention on the newspaper front pages. In the assessment of how six USA and British newspapers sourced their news on the Angola Civil war, the New York Times used as much as 90.3% of its news space on stories supplied by foreign or special correspondents with only 0.8% local line stories and 7.2% wire service stories (Nwosu, 1987).

Military operations within Africa have involved session wars, civil wars and of late terrorism. The longest civil war in African between the Nuer and the Dinka of South Sudan found a curtailed media which could not reach the battle grounds. The Darfur conflict in the Sudan remains suppressed from the world and the media broadcast what is palatable to the Khartoum government (Klein, 2007).

However, the advent of terrorism requires involvement of the media to inform the public. Some of the countries that have been worst hit by terrorism include Egypt and Nigeria. Nigeria was hit by Bokoharam who have been on the rampage burning villages and kidnaping people. For instance, over two hundred and seventy (270) girls were kidnaped in 2014. The group has since been using the media to manipulate government efforts to secure the captured girls. Nigerian media has not aired any material on the issue but through international media the matter has repeatedly been highlighted and captured the attention of the US government and a mention by first lady Michele Obama (De Montclos, 2014).

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood movement was blackmailed and any media house or individual journalist who covered their activities was jailed. Aljazeera Arab and English journalist like Peter Gretse have suffered long periods in jail for the slightest association with the group. The government of General Fattah El-Sisi has been blamed for harshly handling the media due to the perceived wrong information some have covered regarding terrorism in Egypt (Busher, 2014).

The Kenyan media has been fronted as one of the most progressive in Sub Saharan Africa. Kenya guaranteed the freedom of the press by passing the 2010 constitution (GOK, 2010). However, there has been a continuous claim of the government trying to draught the freedoms in the wake of terror attacks in the country and increased insecurity. The government has weighed in on the way media has carried and propagated the insecurity stories. A Media Bill was acrimoniously passed in parliament, which despite being assented by the president; was declared unconstitutional by courts. The Penal Code was amended and Section 66 (a), introduced sub sections 2 and 3 specifically targeting broadcasters and publishers. As Margaret

Thatcher, (1985) suggested, "democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist the oxygen of publicity on which they depend." This could be the path; Kenya government was taking in passing a bill taunted as a way of silencing the journalists and blinding their cameras. Although there has been no other government attempt to discourage media freedom, some government officials notably the then interior Cabinet Secretary, General Nkaisery had confronted and questioned the way the media continues to report on insecurity and terror attacks (Ndonga, 2016).

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Media has been so influential such that, in the months after September 11, 2001, the news media were dominated by the war on terrorism, military operations in Afghanistan, comments by politicians and security pundits. The mass media coverage of the events that followed the Twin Tower Bombings was accompanied by tensions between government, the military and media practitioners. The media complained that they were denied information needed to inform the public while the military leadership fretted about security. In the Horn of Africa, war against terrorism was best highlighted by the KDF entry into Somalia. Local and international media followed ground troops and for the first time KDF was holding media briefs on the progress of the war.

Kenyan media in particular has found itself having to devise ways of dealing with the new phenomenon to avoid playing to the terrorist agenda. Reports of how families had lost their loved ones in war tragedies most of whom happened to be breadwinners and the heroic efforts of first responders to the tragedy were given more emphasis than the ideological twist of the terrorists. Despite all this the Media more often than not, had been accused by governments for being a catalyst for terrorist activities and being a propaganda mouthpiece. Media outlets in the

meantime are caught in a dilemma as they seek to meet the needs of their audience. According to the media, the audience is satisfied by providing stories that contain a number of specific elements: dramatic incidents, emotional resonance, or some highly disturbing aspect. This aspects according to government at times cause anxiety especially given Kenya's ethnic, religious and racial diversity. The media may cause resentment and play in the hands of terrorists. The study examined the extent to which media coverage of *Operation Linda Nchi's* events, incidences and outcomes of situations influenced the KDF war against terrorism.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine influence of media in war against terrorism. A case study of Kenya Defence Forces operations in Somalia (2011 -2018).

1.5 Objectives of the study

1.5.1. General Objective

The general objective of this study was to examine influence of influence of media in war against terrorism. A case study of Kenya defence forces operations in Somalia (2011 -2018)

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

i. To assess the journalism methods employed by Kenyan media to report on KDF operations in war against Terrorism in Somalia
ii. To examine the extent of effect of Kenyan media reporting on KDF operations in war against Terrorism in Somalia
iii. To establish strategies to enhance journalism policies regarding Kenyan media reporting on KDF operations in war against Terrorism in Somalia

1.6 Research Questions

i. What are the journalism methods employed by Kenyan media to report on KDF operations in war against Terrorism in Somalia?

ii. To what extent does Kenyan media reporting on KDF operations affect the war against Terrorism in Somalia?

iii. How can journalism policies regarding Kenyan media reporting on KDF operations in war against Terrorism in Somalia be enhanced?

1.7 Hypothesis

According to Creswell (1994), hypothesis is an operational theory that is tested in a research. This study endevoured to answer the following research hypothesis:

$H0_1$: There is no significant relationship between applied media coverage techniques and journalism styles of KDF military operations between 2011 and 2018 and the fight against terrorism.

HA_1: There is significant relationship between Kenyan media coverage techniques and journalism styles of KDF military operations between 2011 and 2018 and the fight against terrorism.

1.8 Significance of the Study

Significance demonstrates how positively the study will impact the lives of the intended consumers of the information generated (Maillard, 2013). The actions of any state should be understood in the words of Michael Roskin:

> States, being artificial creations, have no souls; they have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their survival.

The media should understand and help educate the populace the premise from which Kenya acted and continues to operate on in Somalia. Kenya as other emerging pluralist democracies grapple with the definition of its national interests highly contested by different quarters of the society media included. The lexicon national interest which presupposes internal and external affairs lies at the very heart of the military and diplomatic professions and leads to the formulation of a national strategy and of the calculation of the power necessary to support that strategy. Thus as a state seeks to promote and defend its national interest the state may confront internal as well as external resistance.

This study is important to policy and decision makers on how to develop frameworks to deter disseminating terrorist messages and propaganda by the media. This could help policy makers frame policies with a long-term view of eradicating or greatly minimizing aiding the course of terrorist operations. This could equally be informative to the media fraternity, the police force and the government to see how best media can be utilized to influence the KDF operations against terrorism positively. Such policies when developed will also guide media scholars in developing security conscious curriculums for the future media students.

The study shall also contribute to the already existing knowledge on the influence of the media on the fight against terrorism. The research will involve evidence-based contributions that will help to answer questions pertaining to the research topic and this will help bridge the gap of the already existing knowledge. Further, this study could be helpful pointing to gaps established in the course of the research that could form a basis for future empirical studies on the media-military operations nexus.

In the current study the media has a major role to play to help the people of Kenyan begin to internalize the national interest; it will help to spur the debate on the need to define and clearly identify the national interest and to harness the survival national security interests. It will augment Kenya's geo-strategic and national security interests in the region that is dwindling and cementing national resilience.

1.9 Scope of the Study

According to Simon and Goes (2013), the scope of the study provides an outline of what the study will cover including the geographical area, the time the study will take and the sample size of the population that will be used. This study was limited to media reports made about Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) by Kenya media outlets. Only mainstream media reports were used. Television was considered as the only influential media mode for this study.

Newspaper and radio reports were not used for analysis. The study did not cover terror reports which happened prior to the Kenya's involvement in Somalia. The study involved respondents from different media houses who have covered on the past incidences on KDF operations against terrorism since 2011. The study explored the past relationship that media has had with the military before 2011, compared the different techniques used by the media to cover military operations and analyzed the impact of Kenya television report against terrorism in Kenya.

1.10 Delimitation of the Study

Delimitations of a study are the confining elements in any study. These elements are derived from what the researcher will choose not to include in the research (Simon & Goes, 2013). There are many factors that influence KDF operations in countering terrorism during their

operations, but this study restricted itself to the influence of digital media on the operations of KDF against terrorism since 2011.

This study also delimits itself to television media reports and the three objectives of the study. In this light, the study shall examine the journalism methods employed by Kenya media in covering KDF operations and the associated influence on the fight against terrorism. Lastly, strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya television coverage in the fight against terrorism shall be explored.

1.11 Limitations of the Study

According to Glaser and Strauss (2009), limitations refer to the influences that the study cannot control. These are shortcomings, influences or conditions which cannot be regulated by the researcher that lay restrictions within a study methodology and conclusion.

Obtaining information from the KDF as the major security institution relied on the study posed a major challenge to the study. This is because any information in the institution is highly guarded and reaching security planners for interviews require authorization from the highest levels. The suspicions of trivializing the matter as merely academic highly deprived the study of vital information that would otherwise help tackle the study in depth. The hierarchical structure of the military also curtailed data collection. However, some open sources of information from high profile government officials were included in the study due to the amount of exchanges they elicited from the media.

Collecting data from the media fraternity would also be a challenge. The need for journalists to remain confidential without necessarily revealing their sources of information or methods used to gather such information will remain a challenge throughout this study. This challenge

was overcome by downloading the media reports and sending them through social media to audiences who were used to deduce on the content carried in the reports.

Further, the study employed the use of questionnaires that would clearly state the aim of the study which is for academic purpose. The data in these questionnaires would remain confidential. Collecting data on the influence of television on KDF operations against terrorism since 2011 proved to be a bit difficult. As a result, the study employed the use of both quantitative and qualitative tools of collecting data for an in-depth study of the research problem.

1.12 Assumptions

According to Creswell (2007), assumptions of a study are the realistic expectations that the researcher comes up within order to influence the implementation and the development of the research process. The study assumed that media as part of the public is aware of the government strategies, efforts and expectations in the fight against terrorism. The study made the assumption that, television reports have the same influence to the whole public despite difference in ideologies, religions and tribal backgrounds. On the military side, the study assumed that, the interest created by the media on the war against terrorism is not a surprise to the KDF and the conduct of its operations. Also the study considered the different biases by parties due to the specific persuasions especially by journalists' clarion call to freedom of the press. This was also countered by the security agencies persuasion of secrecy.

1.13 Theoretical Framework

Labarre (2009) points out that a theoretical framework is a structure that identifies and describes the major elements, variables or constructs that organize one's scholarship. This study

was guided by three theories namely: the agenda setting theory, social learning theory and the gatekeeping theory.

1.13.1 Agenda Setting Theory

McCombs and Shaw (1972) fronted the Agenda Setting theory to describe the ability of the media to influence public agenda. The influence according to them extends to both the citizenry and the government. Accordingly, the function of media in shaping opinions and behavior formations, especially on issues of public interest is important in understanding how media plays a role in either promoting or combating war against terrorism. In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff and broadcasters play an important role in shaping the citizens perceptions about occurrences like war.

The media filters and shapes reality and does not only narrate chronology of events.

Media practitioners therefore give some stories attention more than others and thereby determine what is vital for public assimilation. The theory has a scientific merit because it is based on the cognitive principle of accessibility, such that if a story is repeated, aired on prime time and fronted as special coverage, the story becomes part of the society and can change behaviors and perceptions (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). It is therefore easy for members of the society to retrieve information when required to; normal discussions easily replay what they heard or saw.

The Agenda setting theory is further expounded by Bandura (1977) in his Social Learning Theory, who argue that people learn “through storage of observations” as framed by the media. Deviance amplification which refers to the inadvertent promotion of anti-social behavior by the media, through consistent or glamorised reporting leading to escalation of similar anti-social or criminal acts by other actors with the desire to gain and generate similar media

attention and coverage or create panic. This was important in this study to help in analyzing the images and words used and how they may be used by the public. The agenda setting theory is highly criticized by media practitioners who argue that the media only broadcasts what the public wants or is requesting.

1.13.2 Gatekeeping Theory

According to Shabir et al. (2015), Kurt Zadek Lewin introduced the gatekeeping theory to communication studies in 1947 and referred to editors as the gatekeepers to mean decision shapers. Media practitioners decide what information should move to groups or individuals and what information should not. Based on personal or social influences the decision maker let information to the society. In broadcast medium, the editor decides what is sensitive and what is not. Through a channel's policy and ethics an editor decides what can be aired and what is rejected. Feldman, (1993), in 'The Military – Media Clash' introduces a new principle of war called the Media Spin, in which he advices military commanders to control information to the media. This is important to the study in evaluating why journalists go the extra mile to verify information released by security agents especially the military at different stages of engagement. The process of selecting which news stories to carry within the media and which to exclude involves serious gate keeping. This is the province of media editors and managers who determine what goes to the public based on the news value criteria and editorial policies of each media outlet.

The presence of vibrant television coverage has contributed to widespread and uninhibited coverage of terrorism activities. Kisang, (2014) in Reporting Terrorism among Kenyan Media, has posed the question whether journalists should be cautious and should they play the gate keeping role better than they do. He adds that media vibrancy has contributed to inadvertently

creation of a perception of unpreparedness by security agencies, lost war against terrorism, or one which the state is not in control. This situation was evident when the American international media channel, CNN, described Kenya as a 'hotbed' of terrorism in the wake of President Barack Obama's visit in July 2015. Kenyans spends six and a -half hours per day engaging in some form of media including mobile phones and television (Oganga, 2009). With the growth in social media and the high number of Kenyans with smart phones, any media clip that is of public interest is downloaded and posted on social media platforms thereby gaining more audiences. This way news on a Television channel is rebroadcasted increasing the number of audiences and influencing more people.

1.13.3 Social Responsibility Theory

The social responsibility theory advocates for a shift from simple reporting of facts to interpretative reporting or investigative reporting without censorship. This is interpreted to mean that although news should be factual and truthful, they should be analyzed or interpreted with clear explanations. Social Responsibility theory argues that the media reflects how the society appears. The environment of the journalists impact many events in society, the main intention being to present the information later on in a decent and responsible manner. The purpose behind such approaches and activities is to create a well-informed of the society. On issues affecting the society, journalists should seek solutions for problems as part of their responsibility to society. In times of terrorist attacks for instance, the general public is in need of information to avoid confusion. The social responsibility theory will be appropriate for the study as it will help in understanding the moral responsibility of journalists in reporting sensitive matters (Nacos 2002). This study will concern itself with editors and journalists who shape content in mainstream media outlets and who therefore determine what ultimately gets to the public, and how it is packaged. Thus, the study will seek to examine how these

gatekeepers have inadvertently let the gates open to content which has ended up shaping up the agenda for the terrorists and influenced the public and state policies towards combating terrorism.

1.14 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework provides a description of the interaction between the dependent and the independent variables in a research study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). This study conceptualized, that journalism methods and techniques (independent variable), effects of media coverage, (independent variable) and; strategies to improve journalism policies and reporting such as policy on coverage of military operations, military-media relations and government regulations (independent variable) influence the fight against terrorism evidenced by reduction in terrorism activities, advancement of terrorist propaganda and perception of lost war among others (the dependent variable).




Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher, (2019)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a review of literature on scholarly studies done on the influence television on KDF operations against terrorism since 2011 to 2017. It shall include; the theoretical literature review of the study, empirical review of the study, a summary of the chapter and research gap on the study topic.

2.2 Theoretical literature review

Terrorism has always been a psychological strategy designed to induce fear. Without the 'oxygen of publicity' it could be argued that terrorism would have no outlet and, therefore, no utility. The defining memories of the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 are visual, characterised by the image of the planes hitting the Twin Towers and a red London bus torn asunder. The larger and more violent the act of terrorism is, the more it will be reported on in the media. The media is, of course, vital for a terrorist group as they provide the means of attracting attention and spreading its message. The relationship between terrorism and the media depends very much on what one considers terrorism to mean. While some definitions focus on the physical act of violence others stress the centrality of the innocent or civilian target, the political nature of the act or the sub-state status of the terrorist actor.

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongmann (1988) compiled one of the most famous studies using different definitions of terrorism and came up with a list of possible definitional elements which could be used to forge some sort of consensus definition.

Table 1: Frequency of definitional elements in 109 definitions elements Frequency (%)

Elements	Frequency
Violence, force	83.5
Political	65
Fear, terror emphasised	51
Threat	47
Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
Victim-target differentiation	37.5
Purposive, planned, systematic, organised crime	32
Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
Publicity aspect	21.5
Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
Intimidation	17
Innocence of victims emphasised	15.5
Group, movement, organisation as perpetrator	14
Symbolic aspects, demonstration to others	13.5
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
Clandestine, covert nature	9
Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character violence	7
Criminal	6
Demand made on third parties	4

Source: Schmid and Jongman (1988)

Considering terrorism as a communications strategy, the media have often been seen as the terrorist's 'accomplices' or even their 'best friend' as they appear to provide the 'oxygen of publicity'. yet it has also been noted that terrorists provide the media with emotional, exciting and bloody news which helps them sell their product. There are, therefore, mutual benefits for both and the relationship could be described as 'symbiotic'. At the same time though, the media can also play an important part in countering terrorism.

This study was anchored on agenda setting theory that was fronted by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972). The Agenda Setting Theory is based on the fact that, the media is able to influence the opinion of the general public. The influence of the media goes beyond and it reaches the citizens and the government. This therefore, makes the media a key player in either combating or promoting terrorism operations as well as promotes the operations of KDF against terrorism. The relevance of this theory therefore enabled the researcher to provide an explanation on the influence of television reports on KDF operations against terrorism. This theory has a bigger view of media in terms of the reporting and media coverage and its influence on the general public. This theory however, does not take to account the environmental factors and the ability of the public to store and retrieve information as first highlighted by the media. Lang (2000) introduced the concept of network agenda setting model by including environmental factors, personal choices and networks. This model lifted the sole responsibility of agenda setting from the media.

2.3 Empirical review of literature

Kenya Constitution, 2010 specifically guarantees for freedom of expression and association, access to information and media freedom. Freedom of the press has no limitation except those intimated in the text of the constitution: war propaganda, incitement to violence, hate speech and ethnic intimidation and violence. The passing of the Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Act, 2013 and the Media Council Act, 2013 in December 2013 allowed a legal and regulatory framework in media, information and communication environment in Kenya and also cemented the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution which expand freedoms of expression and of the press, specifically by prohibiting the state from interfering with the editorial independence of individual journalists as well as both state-owned and private media.

2.3.1 Methods and Techniques used by media to cover military operations

The war on Iraq, however limited in its short three-week time frame, was joined by propaganda from numerous angles. The strange claims of the Iraqi data minister that the Americans would surrender or die, or that they were nowhere close to Baghdad; while coalition tanks could be heard only a mile from point he made the address. The unobtrusive propaganda of Coalition countries' media, that on occasion limited the regular citizen casualties, featured the marvelous military power of the coalition, limited geopolitical talk and setting, and frequently seized unverified reports as affirmed news (Shah, 2007). It is acknowledged part of the war that Iraq had endeavored to control media reports, screen foreign journalists, and even oust some. Implanted reporters embedded with Coalition powers, featured on TV reports that they were under strict control. This control is reasonable and even alluring viewpoint from a military point of view. This strategy was a major shift especially as contrasted by the events previously experienced, for instance, in Vietnam; the press was not looked on positively. More changes were evident in the Gulf War between of 1990 and 1991 and Kosovo strife of 1998 and 1999, the media was utilizing pools that could be bolstered with official data from squeeze briefings and a media form of a visit manual (Shah, 2007).

Independent journalists have often been looked at with suspicion, for they cannot be guided and controlled as much as embedded ‘journalists. Four independent journalists, two from Israel and two from Portugal; were beaten by American troops and expelled from reporting on the Iraq war. Embedded journalists have not suffered from the same problems. Other journalists have been fired for airing dissenting views, or in the case of a well-known American NBC reporter, Peter Arnett, for simply being interviewed by an Iraqi television station (Shah, 2007). EBU head of news, Tony Naets, noted of the Iraq war, that the British and US forces had created a caste system with embedded journalists from countries in the so-called coalition who

can associate with the troops – and the truly unilateral broadcaster who was prevented from getting anywhere near the news sources. Jean Stock, the EBU Secretary General was also quoted, saying that US central command policy was actively restricting independent newsgathering from southern Iraq. Accordingly, reporters and camera crews who put their lives at risk had been detained by American and British troops and returned to Kuwait (Shah, 2007).

Conley & Rashid (2006), after evaluating the Iraq war media coverage concluded that some section of the media were either independent, supportive or against the government. According to him the media can rally the populace towards a political ideology of war, influences the course of peace or fuel violence through its choice of topics to cover, the time allocated to the issues of the day through a process of either selectivity in approach, manipulation or exclusive interpretation pattern. Media can create trust among ethnic groups and nations and can spread the spirit of tolerance especially after a peace agreement. It is often the first to arrive on the scene thereby setting the agenda and defining the terms and context within which the crisis is henceforth discussed (Mbugua, 2013).

Snow (1943) exemplifies how media set an agenda in the Vietnam War. He says that, the concern, especially in Vietnam where media was seen as the agenda setting platform, stimulated many US veterans to get convinced that adverse coverage of the war effort after the Tet offensive was decisive in forcing an unsuccessful termination of the American participation in the conflict. It is, of course, a matter of major disagreement whether the US could have prevailed in the Vietnam conflict under any circumstances, and the argument that the media helped force the American withdrawal- thus preventing victory. This dispute has obscured military strategies and the decision process leading to the withdrawal from the conflict. Daddis (2015) summarised the Vietnam experience as ‘from escalation to a stalemate and from

stalemate to a withdrawal.' The search to explain the United States' first lost war was left to Richard Nixon after President Johnson found himself unable to seek a second term. Colonel Synder, (2003), concluded his research project at War College, USA; Seeing Through the Conflict, by ascertaining that journalists have never understood the commander's restriction when dealing with the media prior to, during and after an armed conflict and this dilemma has never been resolved.

2.3.2 Influence of media reports on perception of war against terrorism

McQuail (2000), in an admission of the rapidly changing environment in which the mass media operate gives a significant package of barometer through which the contemporary mass media impact can be demystified. He examines the mass media's importance as arising from its near universality reach, great popularity and public character. McQuail argues that these features have heavy consequences for the cultural life and political organization of contemporary societies. He reckons that, mass media has gradually become an essential element in the process of democratic politics by providing a channel for wide debate, distributing diverse information and a means of exercising power. This is made possible through the privileged access, agents of government can generally claim from the media as a legitimate right.

The media is a tool for dissemination of content, mostly in broadcast and print form, to distinguished target audience. It's deemed to be moderately a powerful tool employed to reach out to the public. Media organizations are highly trusted especially by loyal consumers. The content is received with a lot of authenticity. The information seeing the light of the day is hence likely to be absorbed as gospel truth, irrespective of the source.

According to Omanga (2016), the function of media in shaping opinions and behaviour, especially on issues of public interest is important in understanding how media plays a role in either promoting or combating war against terrorism. Albert Bandura in his Social Learning Theory, argues that people learn "through storage of observations" as framed by the media. A Media Council of Kenya Report titled, Deconstructing Terror: Assessing Medias Role in Religious Intolerance and Radicalization posits that, the media has promoted terrorist agenda by their choice of news sources. The article quotes Abubakar Sharrif Makaburi; a radical coast Muslim, being immortalised by the media when they started using him as news source over Muslim radicalization. The same can be said of the numerous investigative reports by notable media personalities in Kenya on matters that touch on the operations in Somalia. The Westgate Attack report portrayed a sense of a war between Islam and Christianity, while El Adde Attack reports showed a lack of coordination and a lost intelligence war.

Recently, citizens have increasingly been subjects of media influence often resulting to potentially dangerous manipulation of public opinion, specifically in time of war. According to Stoehr (2012) it now remains recognized that the media has the ability to alter and equally shape public opinion. Minear, Scott, and Weiss (1996) conceptualize the role of the media as a crisis triangle involving news media, governments and humanitarian organizations. Media's effectiveness of reaching people has been a valuable tool and a determinant whether there will be a response to an international crisis. In the 1991 Northern Iraq operation, televisions and newspapers across the US portrayed the Kurds as victims starving and freezing as a result of the war, espousing the average sympathetic viewer to raise concerns for consideration to the Congress and the President.

The presence of a vibrant media has contributed to widespread and uninhibited coverage of terrorism activities. Omanga (2016), in Reporting Terrorism among Kenyan media, has posed the question whether journalists should be cautious? He adds that media vibrancy has contributed to inadvertent creation of the perception of a lost war, or one which the state is not in control. This situation was evident when the American international media channel, CNN, described Kenya as a 'hotbed' of terrorism in the wake of President Barack Obama's visit in July, 2015. In a journal of Media and Communication Studies, The Power of the Mass Media in Promoting and Countering Terrorist Agendas (2012), the retired Chief of the General Staff Julius Karangi noted that the key to success in fighting terrorism is measured by media coverage.

Omanga (2016) in "media attention to terrorist attacks," opines that there is a symbiotic relationship and perhaps an ability of terrorists' groups to manipulate media in their actions. The ability is bound to generate media interest due to the news value and drama created. Media will select and report on issues due to their ability to draw attention and create public interest. On the other hand, the terrorists will strike in areas and targets where such interest is bound to generate media attention and widespread coverage. The principle intention of any terrorist attack, beyond the actual violence, is to influence the scale and tone of media attention to their attacks. Thus, in most cases, terrorists will design and plan their attacks with the intended media attention in mind to ensure that their message reaches both the targeted actors, and in some cases draw new sympathizers. Walsh further posits that, such coverage, due to more competitive and decentralized media management, gives the public a distorted picture of the threat from terrorism and reduce the ability of the authorities to explain their policies and to put the problem of terrorism in an appropriate context. This creates preferences and biases, including political pressure by public on state's counter-terrorism interventions.

After 9/11 Israel and the US citizens became emotionally connected with media coverage of terror events and demanded more violent responses by the government. For example, most voters in the US supported President Bush's military response to terrorism. In Kenya, while no concrete studies have been conducted on the relationship between media coverage of terrorism and government response, there exists some evidence to show a heightened violent response by the state to attacks by al-Shabaab. For example, the 'Operation *Linda Nchi* ' – Kenya military's' offensive into Somalia launched in 2011, was a culmination of extensive media coverage on the Al-shabab's abductions and attacks against Kenyans and foreigners.

The subsequent attacks in Kenya equally elicited an even harsher tone from the mainstream media and called for retaliatory attacks against al-Shabaab. Further, the continuous depiction of a lost war which has seen the cry of the public demanding the withdrawal of troops from Somalia has seen the president on many podiums reiterate that the troops have a mandate and won't be pulled out. Omanga (2016), best describes the nexus of media power and foreign policy, saying, 'where televisions instantly transmit images, it fires public opinion, demanding instant responses from government officials, shaping and reshaping foreign policy at the whim of electrons. This is known as the CNN Effect. It is a loss of policy control on the part of policy makers because of the power of the media, a power that the state can do nothing about. The power of the media to use images, investigative pieces, videos and reports to condition response from the public is an issue of greater interest.

According to Wilkinson (1997), terrorist's manipulation of the media is shown to play a crucial role in their propaganda war. He concludes the article by arguing that voluntary self-restraint and self-regulation by the media are the best policy options for a democratic society in regard to media's response to terrorism, but the mass media he adds, need to work harder at devising

measures of self-restraint that are both appropriate and effective. The influence of the media should therefore be understood in the distinct phases of military activities:

2.3.2.1 Role of media prior to military operation

This is the phase where commanders fear that their plans can be used against them by the enemy. War is won or lost at this stage (Nolan, 2017). The media role is solely to rally the public behind the war course. Information, perpetuating government policy and building confidence on the citizens are the media responsibilities. The "Vietnam Syndrome" where the media tilted the public opinion against the conflict should be avoided. Operation *Linda Nchi* to pursue Al Shabaab after crippling tourism along the coast enjoyed all the media efforts. B K Kuto (2012) in his article, Evaluating the Tourism Crisis, Kenya 2012, loss of jobs by tour guides was a rallying call by hoteliers who were frequent guests in media houses lamenting the low numbers of bookings in their facilities. A call for the government to crash the terror group was catalysed by the numerous travel bans issued by European countries and the USA. Kenya was prepared, had the public support and the enemy was portrayed as a rag tag militia who could not stand the KDF might.

2.3.2.2 Role of media during military engagement

According to Napoleon, four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets, especially when a conflict is in progress. Truth is the first war casualty as information on the progress of war can serve to strengthen or defeat gains. Journalists have a role to package and disseminate not just 'straight' news and information but also propaganda and disinformation (Mistry, 2008). Following up and measuring progress of the military strategies is key to the media. The watch dog role of application of conventions, rules of engagement and the international standards of war is a responsibility of the media.

However, since fighting terrorism is not well defined in all the known statutes, present day military commanders design tactics to fight the enemy and rescuing civilians trapped in the terror triangle. The first phase of Operation *Linda Nchi* saw media houses following troops in Somalia, others risking their lives in the process. Duncan Khaemba a Citizen TV reporter for example was caught up in an ambush but continued reporting. This was the epitome of support from the public. On January 2016 the BBC conflicted with KDF spokesperson Col David Obonyo and reported that enemy casualties were exaggerated while KDF was reported to have few casualties. Up to the capture of Kismaiyu Port, regarded as the engine of terrorism by Gen Julius Karangi, the media sided with the Kenyan forces. International media was also swallowed in the frail. Kenya was seen as the ultimate force in the fight to liberate Somalia. With the positive publicity talks to help the forces fight better were brokered and KDF joined a coalition of forces in Somalia – AMISOM (Chapia, 2015).

2.3.2.3 Role of media after military engagement and during the pacification phase

American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. Daddis (2015) summarised the Vietnam experience as 'from escalation to a stalemate and from stalemate to a withdrawal.' The search to explain the United States' first lost war was left to Richard Nixon after President Johnson found himself unable to seek a second term. The same according to many media houses in Kenya is the situation KDF has found itself in Somalia. The reports of progress are no longer shown on Television. The reports in all local media and the created public opinion are that of loss. Of soldiers who achieved their mission continuing being held in Somalia with no clear mandate. The reported losses in El Adde and Kolbio are always reported and the chorus to have the soldiers withdrawn is getting to government circles. Clandestine visits to battle area,

undisclosed media sources and electronic eaves dropping are the new strategies being employed by journalists to gather information from the theatre. This has replaced the guided tours, press briefings and embedding of reporters. The public opinion is currently of despair and anger.

The relationship between military and the media is not a new concept troubling only the modern joint force in AMISOM. The quest for information and the desire to quench it has made media to go after warring armies throughout history. For them, receiving information from images to printed sources does not matter as long as the information continues to expand and influence the general public (Aukofer, 1995). For instance, in the 17th century, naval historical drawings of Willem van de Velde an elder, was used as a reference by the kings and also served as a teaching tool for warfare. Similarly, some information on a diary describing the 431 B.C. Peloponnesian Wars provides clear evidence on the dangers of information because most people were inclined to accepting all the stories therein in an uncritical way (Bruijn, 2011). With the continual growth of information influence due to improved technologies, there is need for a deeper study on specific media channels and the military.

According to Sorley (1999), during the Vietnam wars, the general public understood warfare as it was made easier because of the introduction of television and the improvement of photojournalism which fulfilled the media's desire to influence the opinion of the world and also shape the global understanding of wars. The Vietnam War television coverage depicted the importance of credibility, power and trust that media has used to influence people. The media during this time fulfilled its role of informing people of America, but this was in turn affected by the environment that the media operated. Media back then was seen to either inform the public positively or negatively depending on the outcome of the war. This was caused by

the military who never wanted their enemy's story to be covered before their own. It was discovered that, in insurrectionary warfare, when media is leveraged, it can ensure that the story that the military wants to be told to the public is done before the story of the enemy. This pendulum of media-military relationship has swung widely since the Vietnam War and this relationship is important for the media and the military today.

Internationally and over decades, military and media institutions have often been at odds (Limor, 2006). The source of this strain has been the difficult question of how much information should be given to journalists. Both professions continue to interfere with the establishment of a more cooperative relationship. The military view the media as getting on the way of the soldier's ability to fight while the media view the military as holding important information which is of public interest. Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) has not been spared in this feud. It is viewed as a closed society by journalists attempting to break the ice. It is the epitome establishment, hierarchical, guided by uniform and strict discipline. All this has been compounded by the traditional tightlipped approach to media enquiries. Okwany, (2016), explains that KDF has come under intense scrutiny and received much public criticism due to the numerous media reports featured. The situation has injured the military reputation, from the reports of Wajir Massacre, Operation Nyundo of Pokot and the Mt Elgon skirmishes against SLDF. In all these operations KDF was depicted as a rogue institution which does not observe human rights, breaks laws and works just to fulfill its own mandate.

During the entry to Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab, the media had its elements embedded with the fighting troops. The public support was overwhelming, KDF was applauded from all quarters of the society; churches saying special prayers, schools composing poems and at the market place traders marveled at the troops bravery. Frequent media briefings by military spokesperson, Colonel Cyrus Oguna, endeared the military to the media and the public. As the

operation progressed the media left the military and retreated to editorial rooms (Migue, 2014). They embarked on investigative journalism; and a rift started emerging. The military has been at pains to debunk what the media is airing concerning the operation. Notably the article, 'Black and White' pitched the media against a conspiracy of KDF and Alshaabab.

2.3.3 Strategies to enhance journalism policies regarding Kenya media reporting on KDF operations in war against terrorism in Somalia

The modern news media, as the principal conduit of information about terrorist acts, play a vital part in the terrorists' calculus. Without the media's coverage the act's impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victims of the attack rather than reaching the wider target audience at whom the terrorists' violence is actually aimed. Only by spreading the terror and outrage to a much larger audience can the terrorists gain the maximum potential leverage that they need to effect fundamental political change (Hoffman 2006: 174).

The strategy of censorship has been fronted by policy makers overtime. It however viewed as reactionary and to deter the spread of specific terrorist events. Although the media is always censored to some extent as there are limits to what one can publicly, for example inciting racial hatred, a specific ban on the reporting of terrorist attacks it not compatible with basic democratic values on which Kenya is based. Censorship is therefore left for media channels to think about voluntary guidelines for reporting on terrorism.

The strategy of framing of terrorism in the media and the role of metaphors tries to consider the implications of how knowledge about terrorism is presented in the media and how the choice of language influences public perceptions and may ultimately influence the spread of terror as one of the key components of terrorism. Although it is impossible to fully control the media, public announcements by politicians and press briefings by government officials can

attempt to frame terrorism in certain ways and thereby aid a particular kind of construction of terrorism which is then picked up by the media by quotes or paraphrasing of statements and communicated to the public, thereby lessening the public's feeling of concern.

2.4 Summary of literature review

This chapter has provided explanations from different research contents on the influence of television on military operations both in conventional and the current engagements against the spread of terrorism. Globally, the media coverage focused more on the Al-Qaeda and little covered on military operations against Al-Shabaab. Review of literature points at Al-Shabaab usage of various media to proliferate their propaganda and improper coverage have enabled them create awareness and fear of their successful attacks. It has also provided a broader view of how television reports influences the military operations of defense forces including the KDF when it comes to issues to do with terrorism. Different empirical studies have been used to shed some more light to the study topic and this is from previous researches done on articles related to the topic of the study. Nonetheless, there is a paucity of empirical evidence to show what influence television reporting has specifically had in this Kenyan context.

2.5 Research Gap

Most of the literature available alludes to the relationship between the military and the media during conventional warfare. It also cites such interaction of first world countries which contrast with Kenya on the economic muscle and the pedestal on which their militaries ride. Literature review lack on the involvement in asymmetric warfare like terrorism specifically on Kenya involvement in the fight against terrorism within the borders and in Somalia. First world countries also differ from third world young democracies like Kenya on the media capabilities, roles, guidelines and the relationship they have built with their militaries overtime.

There is a paucity of empirical evidence in a number of areas. Further, it is equally evident that majority of the studies are drawn from the international and regional scene establishing a gap relative to the scope providing a rationale for further research in attempts to zero in the local context. Majority of studies have been based on Al-Qaeda terrorist group and limited scholarly work on Al-Shabaab, even fewer from Kenya. This points out to considerable gaps for further research. While empirical evidence has focused on media in general and specific contexts such as print media, it does not reveal the influence that television reporting has on the military operations, especially on the war against terrorism in Somalia. This study therefore, endeavoured to fill this gap by examining the working relationship between the KDF and the local media in the fight against terrorism since 2011.

Moreover, the coverage of wars has been centered on the conventional militaries of states against another and discrete adversaries. Terrorism is a war without a face, adversaries or front lines. In Kenya, it has been fought in malls, colleges, buses and even quarries. The media continues to equate the occurrences and compare the strategies used in each incident. The government security agencies have not yet developed a conclusive anti-terror plan from which all incidents can borrow strategies and techniques. These unique parameters leave major information and media academic gaps which this study tried to explore.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter embodies the methodological approaches to be employed by the study to answer research questions and address the research objectives. It entails the research design, research site, target population, determination of study sample, data collection approaches including instrument development, validity and reliability. Further, it outlines the legal and ethical considerations for the study.

3.2 Research Design

According to Burns & Grove (2003), research design entails the blueprint for conducting research; the collection measurement, analysis and presentation of data. The detailed plan is tailored to answer the study research questions and test study hypothesis. This study adopted the descriptive research design in focusing on the influence of Kenyan television reports on KDF operations. This design aims to provide an accurate and valid representation of variables relating to the research question and allows for collection of information from a large number of people by sampling (Marczyc, DeMatteo, & Festinger, 2005). Information was collected by means of interviews and questionnaires enabling the researcher to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data (Boudah, 2011). The design involved collection of data from a sample drawn from the study population, stakeholders in the media and military sector using qualitative and quantitative approaches.

3.3 Research Site

Research site refers to the physical, social and cultural setting within which a study is conducted (Johnson *et al,* 2007). This study was conducted in Nairobi County. The county suffices as a relevant area of study premised on the fact that it is a cosmopolitan city with heterogeneous population and highest reliance and access to different media including TV, internet and print media. The study area has equally been subject to numerous terror attacks and activities as well as counter-terrorism operations forming major media headlines. Numerous media houses that have been part of the reporting on terrorism and KDF and all the government security agencies mandated to conduct operations against terrorism have their headquarters in Nairobi and were approached to comment on some areas of importance to the study. Nairobi is also a hub of journalism schools which teach curriculums that draw a lot from the government policies on media. The Kenya Editors Guild, Media Council of Kenya and other national and international jurists' bodies are headquartered in Nairobi.

3.4 Target Population

Study population comprises the entirety of elements that meet eligibility criteria for possible inclusion in the study and pertinent to answering the research questions. The study target population will include 20 reporters from the Nation Media Group (NTV) and 20 Kenya Television Network (KTN) as members of the Kenya Union Journalists, 5 military officers recruited through the Ministry of Defence and, 5 communication officers recruited from the Ministry of Information and, the Communications and Technology (ICT). This makes a total target population of 50 individuals. The choice of the target population is informed by their knowledge and experience in the spheres of media and international crime and can easily comprehend the interplay between media and terrorism. Moreover, the population is expected to be accessible and equally appreciative of the role of research in development of knowledge

3.5 Determination of Study Sample

Study sample refers to the subset of a target population carefully selected for the purpose of the study. For any study, the study sample size ought to be of reasonable and selected in a way it is adequately representative of the general characteristics of the population. This section presents the sampling procedures and techniques to arrive at the desired sample size.

3.5.1 Sampling Procedures

Sampling refers to the process of selection of a subset of the population to measure the given research phenomenon (Neuman, William, & Karen, 2014). Proper sampling ensures findings obtained from the selected sample are representative of the population from which it was drawn and is important in research for reasons of reduced costs, ability to obtain detailed information and timelines in the collection of data. In this study, the researcher seeks to employ the purposive sampling technique in selection of the study sample. This sampling technique is a non-probability sampling method occurring when the elements are selected at the judgement of the researcher. The technique is appropriate when limited numbers of people can serve as primary data sources owing to the nature of the aims and objectives and the research design (Black, 2010).

3.5.2 Study Sample Size

Study sample size are directly associated with research costs and therefore an important element in research (Neuman, William, & Karen, 2014). To select the study target sample, the sampling formulae by Yamane (1967) was employed to obtain the desired sample size. Where,

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)}$$

And, n= the sample size; N = the size of population; e= error (level of confidence), which is 0.05% as prescribed by Yamane (1967). From a target population of 50 officers, the minimum sample size was computed as

$$n = \frac{50}{1 + 50(0.05^2)} = 44$$

In this regard, this study's sample size shall be 44 individuals sampled using simple random; purposive and; stratified sampling techniques across the different categories of key respondents as in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 Sampling Frame

Category	Target Population	Desired sample size	Sampling procedure
Kenya Union of Journalists	40	38	Purposive/simple random
KDF Public Information Officers	5	3	Purposive
Communication Authority of Kenya officials	5	3	Purposive
Total	**50**	**44**	

Source: Researcher (2019)

3.6 Data Collection Measures

Data collection involves the process of systematic information gathering on the study variables with an aim of answering the research questions (Johnson & Turner, 2003). The researcher will then approach the selected study institutions and book appoint with the targeted study participants through the public relations departments of each respective institution. Questionnaires were used to collect data from the television reporters totaling 38 individuals while the 3 military officers from KDF and the 3 Ministry of ICT officials were interviewed.

3.6.1 Development of Instruments

This involves the process of elaboration of the construct designed to obtain data from study respondents to answer the research questions (Wilkinson & Birmingham, 2003). The study will use questionnaires and Interview Guides as the data collection tools as shown in Appendices I and II. Different questionnaires were designed for each target group which includes the reporters, military officers and Ministry of ICT officials. The questionnaire shall have section A which shall collect background information of the respondents. Sections B to D shall collect information related to each of the study objectives. Here in Section B shall focus on the techniques used to report KDF operations, Section B shall focus on the effect of television reports on the fight against terrorism while section C shall collect information on the strategies that can be employed to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism.

The Interview Guide shall have questions with a similar approach to those in the questionnaire. In both tools, the questions formulated were based on the study variables. Questionnaires will be subjected to all the respondents; however, interviews will be conducted to respondents who are mainly involved at the strategic level in the different departments. In the media they will include officials in the media society of Kenya who are also journalists while in the ministry of defence and the ministry of ICT will interviews will be done to respondents the level of deputy directors. Questionnaires are aimed at receiving a general view of the topics on media and military at both the execution and policy level. This diverse view will help in the analysis of the study objectives. Interviews are for the policy makers in the departments the study focused on. They mainly aim at evaluating policy and legal issues.

3.6.2 Pilot testing of research instruments

Pilot testing involves initial administration of research instruments, questionnaire or interview schedule on a sample of study respondents before commencement of the study to evaluate their appropriateness and workability "in the real world" (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). This test helps gauge whether there are any differences in how respondents understand questions, assess for response latency and point to any areas in need of redress. For this study, a pilot test was done on a sample of media professionals and KDF personalities adequately representing variability in population characteristics.

The pilot was conducted in Lamu County due to the on-going anti-terrorism security operations named Operation *Linda Boni* in the county which has pulled both the media attention and all government agencies. The similarities of the operation were sufficient as a it was viewed as a subset of the major operation in the anti-terrorism in the whole country. As suggested by Billé (2010), a sample size of 1% to 10% suffices for pilot testing of research instruments. The researcher randomly choose ten participants from three local media houses for the pretest one-month before commencement of the study. In other sectors the researcher visited a multiagency base in Lamu which has all the government forces and pools from other ministries. Findings from this pretest were used to make necessary adjustments to the study instruments.

3.6.3 Instrument Reliability

Reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials (Trochim, 2005). This study will use test and retest techniques as recommended by Weir (2005), where the same data instrument was administered repeatedly to the same respondents after a period of two (2) weeks and evaluate consistency of results. Further, the study shall use the Cronbach's alpha statistic as a measure of internal consistency of the instrument. The statistic is an important measure of instrument internal validity with a

value approaching one indicating high reliability coefficient and a value approaching zero indicative of low reliability coefficient. A cut-off value of 0.7 was used for this study as to indicate sufficient reliability of the instrument (Cronbach & Shavelson, 2004).

3.6.4 Instrument Validity

An instrument is valid if it measures what it is designed to measure, (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Ascertaining instrument validity implies research findings present a true reflection of phenomenon under study. This study employed the content validity technique to ascertain instrument validity. According to Drost (2011), content validity evaluates whether the instrument covers every domain of the phenomenon to be explored, measuring the degree to which data collected using a particular instrument represents a specific domain of indicator or content of a particular concept. This involves involving subject matter experts for evaluation of the instruments; in this case the researcher shall engage the supervisor for expert review and make necessary adjustments based on expert opinion.

3.7 Data Processing and Analysis

Data analysis involves the systematic approach to manipulation of data using logical and analytical techniques to draw inference and suggest conclusions relative to research questions (Cresswell & Clark, 2017). This study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches to data analysis. Qualitative data was analysed using content analysis technique while quantitative data was analysed using descriptive (weighted means, frequencies and percentages) and inferential statistics (correlations and regression analysis). The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS version 24) shall be used in carrying out these tests.

Qualitative data was coded into themes and relevant information pertaining to the research questions extracted and inference was drawn by thematic analysis. Quantitative data was coded first and entered into statistical software – SPSS version 24 for further manipulation. Following data entry, data was cleaned to avoid any discrepancies including errors and missing data hence ascertain quality of the data. Descriptive statistics techniques including measures of central tendency, frequencies, percentages and graphs and charts were used to describe data. Inferential statistics including Chi-square test for association was used to test hypothesis. Quantitative data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics.

3.8 Legal and Ethical Considerations

Legal and ethical considerations embody the norms and standards for which research should be conducted to yield reliable research findings (Broom, 2006). The researcher seeks to ensure the aims of the study to impart authentic knowledge, truth and prevention of error. Participation of respondents was voluntary, guaranteed freedom of withdrawal and consent was sought before taking part in the study. Respondents rights to privacy and protection from any harm was maintained with all data and respondents treated as confidential. Further, all scholarly works used in this work with be acknowledged and properly cited with no form of plagiarism. Before embarking on the study, approval was sought from relevant authorities and institutions including the University and the National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the findings obtained are presented. The purpose of the study was to examine the influence of media coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018. The findings obtained are analyzed against the research objectives which were to: find out the journalism methods employed by Kenya media before and after the start of KDF operations against terrorism; examine the influence of Kenya media coverage in the fight against terrorism and; explore strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya media coverage in the fight against terrorism and adoption of suitable methods.

4.1.1 Response Rate

Out of the 44 respondents sampled in this study, 41 responded. This was as follows: 35 KTN and NTV reporters which was a representation of the Kenya Union of Journalists; 3 military public information officials and 3 ICT officials from the Communication Authority of Kenya. This made the overall response rate to be 93.2%. This was deemed sufficient to represent the study. From these, the 35 reporters responded to the questionnaires and some were interviewed due to their direct involvement in terrorism reporting, while the remaining 6 officials were interviewed. The response rate is presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Category	Sampled	Responded
Kenya Union of Journalists	38	35

KDF Public Information Officers	3	3
Communication Authority of Kenya officials	3	3
Total	**44**	**41**
Overall Response Rate		**93.2**

Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.2 Demographics of the Respondents

The study sought to establish selected demographic information regarding the respondents. In addition, information on access to media reports on terrorism as well as the influence of such media reports on the fight against terrorism was sought. The findings obtained are presented in the following section.

4.1.2.1 Gender of Respondents

The majority of the respondents were male (60%). On their part, females were 40%. This shows that both genders were well represented in the study. In all the security agencies of the government, very few female officers were deployed for operations. The respondents from the security sectors were in administration departments and few at the policy level. The same was experienced in the media. Photo journalists and reporters who reported from the war front were predominantly male. Those who participated were in the editorial level.




Figure 4.1 Gender of Respondents

Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.2.2 Age of Respondents

The majority of the respondents (40%) were aged between 41 and 50 years. These were followed by those aged 31 to 40 years at 31.4%. Those aged between 21 and 30 years and those over 50 years old were significantly few at 17.1% and 11.4% respectively. This is presented in Figure 4.2.





Figure 4.2 Ages of Respondents

Source: Field data, 2019


4.1.2.3 Level of Education

More than half of the respondents (45.7%) had Bachelor's degrees while more than a quarter (31.4%) had Master's degrees. Only 8 (22.9%) of the respondents had diplomas. The security recorded the low education level but had a structured skill improvement system that helps in promotion and appointments to higher offices. All journalist cadres recorded mainstream education standards but experience played a bigger role in placement to offices and assignment to reporting roles. These findings are shown in Figure 4.3.



4.1.2.4 Frequency watching TV

When asked how frequent they watch TV, the vast majority of the respondents (91.4%) pointed out that they watched very frequently. Only 3(8.6%) posited that they watched TV frequently. The study recorded that there is a high preference of watching television by all respondents at work and at home. The availability of different channels and diverse coverage and accessibility also helped in this finding. This is shown in Figure 4.4.



4.1.2.5 TV Station of Respondents

When asked to indicate their TV stations, most of the respondents (60%) pointed out that they reported for NTV. The rest, 40% were from KTN. These findings are presented in Figure 4.5. The two TV stations were recorded to have a great reach and appeal to the respondents specifically for topical issues like security and military engagement in Somalia. The assigning of specific journalists to cover the military operations had appealed to the respondents than other TV stations.




Figure 4.5 Respondents' TV Station

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.1.2.6 Reporting Terrorism Incidents by their TV Station

When asked if their TV station reported on terror incidents, all of the respondents (100%) answered in the affirmative. These findings are presented in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6 Reporting Terrorism Incidents in TV Station of Choice

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2.1.7 How TV Station Reports Terror Incidents

As presented in Figure 4.7, most of the respondents (62.9%) pointed out that their TV station reported terror incidents through investigative documentaries after the incident. These were followed by 25.7% those who opined that such TV stations relied on investigative documentaries after the incident and live reporting. Only 4 (11.4%) were of the view that the stations used live reporting.




Figure 4.7 How TV Station Reports Terror Incidents

Source: Research ffindings, 2019

4.1.2.8 TV Select Reporters to Cover Terrorism Incidents

When asked if their TV station select reporters to cover terrorism incidents, the vast majority of the respondents (94.3%) answered in the affirmative. These findings are presented in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8 TV Select Reporters to Cover Terrorism Incidents

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.1.2.9 Names of Journalists who have Extensively Reported on Terrorism

The respondents were asked to name some of the journalists they knew who had extensively reported on terrorism in Kenya. To this, the respondents mentioned names such as Mohammed Ali, John-Allan Namu, Dennis Okari, Stephen Omondi Juma, John Wafula, Brian Onyiego,

Francis Wambua, Dominic kule, Charles Ochieng, Hudson Mukanzi, Mahamed Hirmoge, Ian Wafula, Purity Mwambia and Yassin Juma.

4.1.2.10 Rating of the Influence of Media Reports and the Journalists on the Fight against Terrorism

Lastly, the respondents were asked to rate the influence of media reports and the journalists on the fight against terrorism. To this there was only a slight difference between those who pointed out that it was positive (48.6%) and those who said that it was negative (42.9%). Only three respondents (8.6%) were neutral to the statement.




Figure 4.9 Rating of the Influence of Media Reports and the Journalists on the Fight against Terrorism

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2 Presentation of Findings

The following section presents the research findings. These were analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively and presented according to the study objectives.

4.2.1 Methods used by Media to Cover Military Operations

The first objective of the study was, "find out the journalism methods employed by Kenya television before and after the start of KDF operations against terrorism." The findings obtained from questionnaires are presented in the following section.

4.2.1.1 Different Techniques Used

The findings obtained show that there are different techniques that the media uses to cover military operations. The main technique used was investigative journalism as freelance journalists (40%). This was followed by embedding journalists with troops (28.6%), and live coverage (20%). The least used technique was parachuting journalism (11.4%) as presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Different Techniques Used

Techniques used	Frequency	Percent
Live Coverage and Up sounds	7	20.0
Embedding reports with operating troops	10	28.6
Investigative journalism and freelance journalists	14	40.0
Parachuting journalism	4	11.4
Total	**35**	**100.0**

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.2.1.2 Appropriateness of Techniques Used

When asked if the techniques used were appropriate to cover military operations, most of the respondents (68.7%) disagreed. This is shown in Figure 4.10.




Figure 4.10 Appropriateness of Techniques Used

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.2.1.3 Techniques Provide Good Coverage

When asked if the techniques used provided a good coverage for military operations, most of the respondents (79.2%) said no. This is presented in Figure 4.11.




Figure 4.11 Do Media coverage Techniques Provide Good Coverage?

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.2.1.4 Rating of Media Coverage of Military Operation

The researcher went to ask the responded to rate media coverage on military operations in Kenya. To this, most of them (51.4%) said that the coverage was poor. This is presented in Figure 4.12.




Figure 4.12 Rating of Media Coverage of Military Operation

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2.1.5 Level of Agreement with Selected Statements on Techniques used by Media

The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with selected statements on the techniques used by media on a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree and, 5= strongly agree. This majorly focused on the embedded reporters programmes that the military has conducted with the media. Respondents vividly remembered the interaction and the level of reporting that took place during such interactions. To this, respondents strongly agreed that

ground rules are always in place whenever media want to mingle with the military to do a covering for their operations. Further, the respondents agreed that media uses open and independent journalism in covering military operations and that the military encourages the use of media pool when media is covering military operations. The respondents also agreed that media credentialing is a technique used by most media houses in making coverages on military operations. Lastly, the respondents agreed that security review promotes media coverage to a large extent.

Respondents also noted a difference in coverage, use of words and degree of understanding when comparing investigative journalism, embedded journalism and parachuting. Accordingly, respondents concurred with the fact that military operations are complex and differ in all aspects from planning to the actual execution.

Table 4.3 Level of Agreement with Statements on Techniques used by Media

Source: Researcher, 2019

Descriptive Statistics														
	1		**2**		**3**		**4**		**5**		**Total**		**Weighted Mean**	**Std. Deviation**
Statement	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%		
a) Media uses open and independent journalism in covering military operations	18	50.0	12	34.0	3	9.6	2	6.4	0	0.0	35	100	2	.88
b) The military encourages the use of media pool when media is covering military operations	21	59.6	8	22.3	4	12.8	2	5.3	0	0.0	35	100	2	.90
c) Media credentialing is a technique used by most media houses in making coverages on military operations	24	69.1	3	9.6	5	13.8	2	5.3	1	2.1	35	100	2	1.05
d) Ground rules are always in place whenever media want to mingle with the military to do a covering for their operations.	23	64.9	9	25.5	3	8.5	0	1.1	0	0.0	35	100	1	.70
e) Security review promotes media coverage to a large extent	16	46.8	11	30.9	3	9.6	3	9.6	1	3.2	35	100	2	1.16

4.2.1.6 Other Techniques used by Media

Lastly, the respondents were asked to indicate other techniques that were used by media to provide coverage on military operation. To this, the respondents pointed out that they used techniques such as obtaining information from military spokes persons, collaboration with international media houses to obtain reports from them. They also relied on citizen journalism through social media to obtain information on developing stories. Respondents also recalled reports that are done by unknown journalists and which form part of the mainstream media reports.

To the respondents such reports have been on the increase and do not necessarily report from the frontline. Majority of the respondents agreed that investigations conducted from undisclosed sources, techniques like distorting speech, blurring pictures and videos are on the increase in all the television station used in this study. Respondents quoted investigative pieces like Widows Brigade by NTV, the Enemy Within by KTN which to some respondents carried sensational information about the war against terrorism. Respondents also noted the low level of updates of the war by security agencies and the overreliance on the media version of the fight against terrorism.

4.2.2 Influence of Kenya Television Coverage on the Fight against Terrorism

The second objective of the study was to examine the influence of Kenya television coverage in the fight against terrorism. In this regard, the ways in which television coverage influenced the fight against terrorism was assessed. The findings obtained are presented in the following section. The findings obtained are presented in the following section.

4.2.2.1 Reliability of Kenya Television Reports

To begin with, the respondents were asked if they considered Kenyan television reports on the fight against terrorism as reliable information source. Interestingly, most of the respondents (60%) did not consider such reports as reliable. This is shown in Figure 4.13.




Figure 4.13 Reliability of Kenya Television Reports

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2.2.2 Reason for Unreliability of Kenya Television Reports

Those who thought that Kenya television reports were not reliable were asked to state the reasons for their position. To this, the respondents pointed out that some of the reports were

gathered by incompetent persons and over reliance on the Al Shabaab side of every story. Comparison between the government official position and the Al Shabaab position was cited as a source of unreliability. KTN was for example cited to have reported in November 2015 that:

> KDF has failed to implement a ban on one billion dollar charcoal trade in Kismaiyu, forcing the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution on the same.
>
> KDF commanders profiting from the charcoal and sugar trade which is fueling terrorism.

This was later followed by the 'Black and White' investigative documentary aired by KTN and a document published by the Journalists for Justice and presented to the AU Peace and Security Council by Eritrean Monitoring Group.

One of the respondents quoted the media reports as the beginning of a diplomatic row between Kenya, Somalia and Eritrea which to date seem to be sour.

Other reports were quoted from unreliable sources. Some were thought as mere propaganda. In addition, the fact that Somalia is a hostile environment made it hard to verify news from there. It was also made manifest that reliable investigative journalists were not interested in the area anymore and that some reports were obtained from the government and it was hard to tell their veracity.

4.2.2.3 Influence of Media Reports on Government Strategies against Terrorism

The respondents were asked to indicate the influence of the media reports on government strategies against terrorism in Kenya. To this, most of them 54.3% pointed out that the media reports had negative influences. Those who thought that such reports had positive influences followed at 37.1%. This is shown in Figure 4.14.




Figure 4.14 Media Reports and Government Strategies against Terrorism

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2.2.4 Media Reports have Glorified Terrorist's Agenda

When asked if some of the media reports had glorified the terrorist's agenda in Kenya, most of the respondents (62.9%) answered in the affirmative. This is shown in Figure 4.15.




Figure 4.15 Media Reports have Glorified Terrorist's Agenda

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.2.2.5 Kenya Media is a Good Partner

When asked whether the Kenyan media was a good partner in in combating terrorism, most of the respondents (54.3%) answered no. This is presented in Figure 4.16.




Figure 4.16 Kenya Media is a Good Partner

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.3 Analysis of Selected Words in Media Reports

The researcher carried out analysis of selected words used in television on various terror incidents that have occurred during the period selected for this study.

4.3.1 Analysis of the selected words used on Operation Linda Nchi in media reports

Some of the main words mostly used in TV reports were: Soldiers die in ambush; KDF under attack; Smuggling of charcoal and sugar; KDF soldiers still missing; Soldiers fall; Abduction of KDF soldiers; KDF kills Al-Shabaab fighters; Al-shabaab killed in air raid and Officers injured. Most of these (77.8%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.4 Analysis of the selected words used on Operation *Linda Nchi* in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
OPERATION *LINDA NCHI*	Soldiers die in ambush			
	KDF under attack			
	Smuggling of charcoal and sugar			
	KDF soldiers still missing			
	Soldiers fall			
	Abduction of KDF soldiers			
	KDF kills Al-Shabaab fighters			
	Al-shabaab killed in air raid			
	Officers injured			
Total (Frequency)		2	7	0
Total (Percentage)		22.2%	77.8%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.3.2 Analysis of the selected words used on Mandera Killings in Media reports

Regarding the words used in the Mandera killings, the following words were recurring: KDF recovers stolen weapons; police station attacked; militants killed; soldiers under attack; security officers killed; policemen abducted; teachers killed; bus under undertake; grenades hauled; quarry workers attacked; Al-shabaab planning attack; people rescued from al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab attack foiled and; vehicles burned down. Most of these words (64.3%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.5 Analysis of the selected words used on Mandera Killings in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
MANDERA KILLINGS	KDF recovers stolen weapons			
	Police station attacked			
	Militants killed			
	Soldiers under attack			
	Security Officers Killed			
	Policemen abducted			
	Teachers killed			
	Bus under undertake			
	Grenades hauled			
	Quarry workers attacked			
	Intelligence foil Al Shabaab planned attack			
	People rescued from Al-shabaab			
	Al-Shabaab attack foiled			

	Vehicles burned down			
Total (Frequency)		5	9	0
Total (Percentage)		35.7%	64.3%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.3.3 Analysis of the selected words used on Westgate Attack in Media reports

The main words occurring on the Westgate Attack were: terror in Nairobi; massacre at a Nairobi mall; American family rescued by hero; policeman shot dead; KDF accused of theft; White widow; Samantha Lewthwaite; attacker escapes and; attacker killed. Evidently, most of these words (66.7%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.6 Analysis of the selected words used on Westgate Attack in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	**NEGATIVE**	**NUETRAL**
WESTGATE ATTACK	Terror in Nairobi			
	Massacre at a Nairobi mall			
	American family rescued by hero			
	Policeman shot dead			
	KDF clears the building			
	White widow			
	Samantha Lewthwaite			
	Attacker escapes			
	Attacker killed			
Total (Frequency)		3	6	0
Total (Percentage)		33.3%	66.7%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.3.4 Analysis of the selected words used on Garissa Attack in Media reports

In the Garissa Attack, the main words occurring were: students lined up and killed, university under attack; 147 killed; there were screams; witness tells of horror; heinous Attack; when the sparrows fell; Kenyans killed in daring attack; cops killed in Garissa attack; Al-Shabaab confirms death of leader; Islamic terrorism and; give attack Christian meaning. Out of these words, most of them (91.7%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.7 Analysis of the selected words used on Garissa Attack in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	**NEGATIVE**	**NUETRAL**
GARISSA ATTACK	Lined up and killed			
	University under attack			
	147 killed			
	There were screams			
	Witness tells of horror			
	Heinous Attack			
	When the sparrows fell			
	Kenyans killed in daring attack			
	Cops killed in Garissa attack			
	Al-Shabaab confirms death of leader			
	Islamic terrorism			
	Give attack Christian meaning			
Total (Frequency)		1	11	0
Total (Percentage)		8.3%	91.7%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.3.5 Analysis of the selected words used on El Adde Attack in Media reports

In the El Adde Attack, the main words occurring were: KDF lost 173 soldiers; Took 6 hours to repulse attackers; KDF soldier captured; Al-Shabaab releases video of attack; Deadly attack; Al-Shabaab overrun KDF army base; video surfaces of brutal attack; Al-Shabaab releases photos of captured; bodies of Kenyan soldiers dragged along streets; how Al-Shabaab attacked;

Kenya blames Daesh and; Kenya cover up. It is clear that all these words (100%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.8 Analysis of the selected words used on El Adde Attack in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	**NEGATIVE**	**NUETRAL**
EL-ADDE ATTACK	KDF lost 173 soldiers			
	Took 6 hours to repulse attackers			
	KDF soldier captured			
	Al-Shabaab releases video of attack			
	Deadly attack			
	Al-Shabaab overrun KDF army base			
	Video surfaces of brutal attack			
	Al-Shabaab releases photos of captured			
	Bodies of Kenyan soldiers dragged along streets			
	How Al-Shabaab attacked			
	Kenya blames Daesh			
	Kenya cover up			
Total (Frequency)		0	12	0
Total (Percentage)		0	100%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.3.6 Analysis of the selected words used on Kolbio Attack in Media reports

The key words arising from the Kolbio Attack were: Kenya military base attacked; names of 16 soldiers killed; face to face with Al-shabaab; KDF killed 70 Al-Shabaab and many dead as Al-Shabaab attack KDF. Evidently, most of these words (80%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.9 Analysis of the selected words used on Kolbio Attack in Media reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS IN MEDIA REPORTS	IMPACT ON KDF FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
KOLBIO ATTACK	Kenya military base attacked			
	Names of 16 soldiers killed			
	Face to face with Al-shabaab			
	KDF killed 70 Al-Shabaab			

	Many dead as Al-Shabaab attack KDF			
Total (Frequency)		1	4	0
Total (Percentage)		20%	80%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.4. Analysis of pictures and videos used on TV Reports in selected terrorist attacks

The main pictures and videos appearing in TV reports when reporting on selected terrorist incidents were also analyzed. Selected incidents included Operation Lina Nchi, Garrisa University attack, Westgate attack, Mandera and Kolbio terrorist attacks. The findings obtained are presented in the following section.

4.4.1 Analysis of the pictures used on Operation Linda Nchi in TV reports

The pictures used on Operation *Linda Nchi* depicted: Dead KDF soldiers; dead al-Shabaab militia; damaged artillery; burnt down camp; burning army trucks; agonizing families; al-Shabaab statement; fortified military camps and; KDF Personal belongings strewn over. Most of these pictures (77.8%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.10 Analysis of the pictures used on Operation *Linda Nchi* in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
OPERATION *LINDA NCHI*	Dead KDF soldiers			
	Dead al-Shabaab militia			
	Damaged artillery			
	Burnt down camp			
	Burning army trucks			
	Agonizing families			
	Al-Shabaab statement			
	Fortified military camps			
	KDF Personal belongings strewn over			
Total (Frequency)		2	7	0
Total (Percentage)		22.2%	77.8%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.4.2 Analysis of the pictures used on Mandera Killings in TV reports

The pictures emanating from the Mandera Killings were: cache of recovered weapons; bullet riddled camp camps; dead militants; burnt down vehicles; damaged buildings; dead mine workers and agonizing families. Most of these pictures (71.4%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.11 Analysis of the pictures used on Mandera Killings in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
MANDERA KILLINGS	Cache of recovered weapons			
	Bullet riddled camp camps			
	Dead militants			
	Burnt down vehicles			
	Damaged buildings			
	Dead mine workers			
	Agonizing families			
Total (Frequency)		2	5	0
Total (Percentage)		28.6%	71.4%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.4.3 Analysis of the pictures used on Westgate Attack in TV reports

Regarding the Westgate Attach, the main pictures were: fire rising from building; some victims still trapped; survivor accounts; operation by security forces; media briefings by spokespersons and; mages of bullet riddles walls. Evidently, most of these pictures (66.7%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.12 Analysis of the pictures used on Westgate Attack in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY

		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
WESTGATE ATTACK	Fire rising from building			
	Some victims still trapped			
	Survivor accounts			
	Operation by security forces			
	Media briefings by spokespersons			
	Images of bullet riddled walls			
Total (Frequency)		2	4	0
Total (Percentage)		33.3%	66.7%	0%

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.4.4 Analysis of selected pictures and videos used on Garissa Attack in TV reports

On the Garissa Attack, there were images of shoot out; analysis of attack; survivors' accounts; agonizing families; hospital accounts; dead militia and bullet riddled walls. This makes it clear that most of the pictures (85.7%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

Table 4.13 Analysis of the pictures used on Garissa Attack in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
GARISSA ATTACK	Images of shoot out			
	Analysis of attack			
	Survivors accounts			
	Agonizing families			
	Hospital accounts			
	Dead militia			
	Bullet riddled walls			
Total (Frequency)		1	6	0
Total (Percentage)		14.3%	85.7%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.4.5 Analysis of the pictures used on El Adde Attack in TV reports

Picture depictions of the El Adde Attack were images of: damaged KDF camp; dead Al-Shabaab militia; captured Al-Shabaab weapons; al-Shabaab post Video of brutal attack; images of burnt vehicles; damaged artillery and agonizing families. Most of these pictures (85.7%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy. This is shown in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14 Analysis of the pictures used on El Adde Attack in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
EL-ADDE ATTACK	Damaged KDF camp			
	Dead Al-Shabaab militia			
	Al Shabaab driving away with KDF armoured vehicles			
	Al-Shabaab video of brutal attack on KDF			
	Images of burnt vehicles			
	Damaged artillery			
	Agonizing families			
Total (Frequency)		1	6	0
Total (Percentage)		14.3%	85.7%	0%

Source: Field data, 2019

4.4.6 Analysis of the pictures used on Kolbio Attack in TV reports

From Kolbio, there were images of: military base damage; damaged artillery; recovered weapons; KDF killed 70 Al-Shabaab; Agonizing families. Most of these pictures (60%) had negative impact on antiterrorism policy as shown in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15 Analysis of the pictures used on Kolbio Attack in TV reports

TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
		POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
KOLBIO ATTACK	KDF secure camp after attack			
	Documentary of the bravery of the soldiers			
	Recovered weapons			
	KDF killed suspected to have bombed civilians in Kolbio			
	Agonizing families			
Total (Frequency)		3	2	0
Total (Percentage)		60%	40%	0%

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.5 Responses from Interviews

Ministry of Defence officials and KDF military officers were posed with numerous questions regarding the influence of television coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018. The first question posed to the respondents was: “what is your view of Kenyan media coverage of KDF military operations?” To this, the respondents pointed out that it was hard and sketchy (not able to bring the real picture objectively). The planners of military operations responded that media is inquisitive and over reliance on secondary information. Respondents reported lack of background information and the procedures undertaken before launching forces into war.

Col David Obonyo and Col (Rtd) Cyrus Oguna, reposponded that the media always reported contrary to the briefs they had given them. On the issue of rehatting from KDF operation to AMISOM operation for example said:

> The media totally ignored the facts, AMISOM wrote to Kenya requesting Kenya to deploy its forces as part of the larger pacification plan. The media reported that, it was an issue of expenditure where Kenya felt the pinch of the cost of the war. This was despite being in the theatre for one year and Kenya being able to attract support from super powers like USA and France.

On the issue of the sugar and charcoal trade the two spokespersons lamented that the media relied on a report from the Eritrea Monitoring Group, which according to them was not true. According to the spokespersons:

> Official documents, the first Commander of the operation Lt Gen Leonard Ngondi, presented a report to the National Security Committee in which he reported that charcoal trade was the main source of funds for the purchase of arms by Al Shabaab. The report triggered a diplomatic resolution which was presented by Ambassador Macharia Kamau the UN representative for adoption as UN Security Council 2113 of 2013.

They added that this was the official way but the media never pursued the truth through the government sources. Further, they reported that Kenya could not be able to stop such major trade on its own fighting in Somalia as a country. The UN SCR 2113/2013 has continued to be expanded and named other countries like Iran and Eritrea.

The fact that most military operations were hostile and hard to access, some operations were intelligence driven and others required aerial targeting did not allow the media to accompany troops. In some instances, the media did not have well trained personnel to fit into KDF operations without causing disarray or “over reporting on incidents’. Due to the nature of war, it is hard for most media to know what to air without compromising national security. Officials

from the ministry of defence, explained how difficult it was to respond to certain claims made against KDF by world bodies which could be traced from media reports. To demonstrate how media reports can inform decisions, officials explained a incident in 2017:

> NTV reported that civilians in villages close to KDF camps in Somalia were reporting indiscriminate dropping of bombs by KDF planes. Officials quoted a document where KDF was named by the UN as violating human rights in Somalia. What followed was a diplomatic tussle trying to remove KDF from that report.

The researcher went on to ask the respondents to "describe the media coverage, especially television reporting of KDF military operations before 2011." The findings show that historically, it was hard for the media to report KDF operations because the security forces were always shrouded in mystery. It was hard to access combat areas and the media had to rely on secondary sources after the military operations to tell their stories. Since the military was not involved in many ways, except its involvement in the Sabbot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) and few other internal security operations, there had not been a lot the coverage of KDF operations by the media prior to 2011. When this happened, it was almost always, reports after the operations through features, documentaries and special investigative editions.

Lastly, the respondents were posed with the question, "comparatively, how has this changed prior to 2011 (before Operation *Linda Nchi*) and after 2011 (start of Operation *Linda Nchi*)?" The responses obtained show that a lot had changed. This was due to the fact that at the outset of the Operation *Linda Nchi* , the media was embedded into KDF operations. This means that journalists could access the war front and interact with soldiers. This enabled them to obtain information first had. Things however deteriorated over the years, with the media having got to rely on occasional excursions for few hours into the war zone. The relationship between the two organizations has become frosty currently, seeing that the military resulted to giving news

updates and press briefings themselves which cannot be outright trusted by the media. This has made the situation very difficult for the mass media to report KDF military operations. Accordingly the media has adopted ‘clever’ means of obtaining information. Interviewees reported on over emphasis on losses on the KDF side, over expenditure on security and corruption involvements.

The interviewees were also asked if there were any situations they supposed that Al-Shabaab had been aided in their agenda by the media. To this the responses show that al-Shabaab was aided in a way since the reports of terror, damage and killings in Kenya soil or of KDF in Somalia tended to boost the morale of al-Shabaab. It made them feel that their agenda were being met. Interviewees from the intelligence operations and ICT departments reported of instances where media captions like videos and pictures and sometimes words had been replicated in Al Shabaab propaganda videos.

When asked if they considered Kenyan media as good partners in counter-terrorism efforts, the majority of interviewees answered in the negative. They cited numerous instances where the media seemed unpatriotic and out of touch with the government policies on the war. Sometimes the media reports rubbed government officials the wrong way and the reply was enough evidence of the conflict. On 11 April 2019, permanent secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs, Ambassador Macharia Kamau wrote on Twitter:

> Dear @daily nation next time show a little responsible and patriotic journalism. Headline should read, US Again Erroneously Issues Kidnap Report on Kenya. Who is your editor?

He followed the story with numerous rebuttals with media pundits and civil society who all seemed angered with his comments. Unapologetically, he answered on Twitter to the State Department and the US Embassy, Kenya:

> @State Department @US Embassy Kenya. These ruinous perfunctory reports need to stop. With "friend's" reports like these who needs enemies? No American kidnapped in Kenya in the recent memory. Americans have a greater chance of being kidnapped in the US than in Kenya. So why these reports?

Those who responded on the positive highlighted that the media had done its part of informing the citizens. To this, they added out that more could however, be achieved if the military cultivated a good relationship with the media, constantly reviewed rules and regulation concerning covering KDF operations and enabled access to information by the mass media. If the media was supported, they morale to support the military through objective reporting would be enhanced and this could yield positive results in counter-terrorism efforts.

The interviewees were also posed with the question, "do you suppose the Al-Shabaab has projected itself better in television reporting than the Kenyan government?" To this, most of them pointed out that although the Kenya government had better resources, Al-Shabaab had often scored better in propaganda war. However, the Kenya government was shown to be performing better in the television reporting although their updates were not perceived as being sufficient enough.

Another question posed to the interviewees was, "in your own evaluation, what is the impact of Kenyan television reports on KDF military operations against terrorism?" To this, the respondents pointed out that Kenya television reports often affected the morale of soldiers. It also affected operations since airing information on Al-shabaab terror attacks tended to help

them win the propaganda war. This could draw more militants to the Al-shabaab cause, which could go on to increase terrorist activities in future.

Lastly, the interviewees were asked to give the recommendations they have for television reporting of KDF military operations. To this end, the interviewees pointed out that television reporting should always follow the set laws and regulations. The military should be consistent in dealing with the media concerning access to information. Any valuable information should be divulged promptly. Thereafter journalists should be encouraged to be careful in their analysis and presentation of news to the general public. For this to happen there should be specialized regular training of journalists that cover military operations. Media houses should always revise their self-regulation provisions to ensure that they complied with emergent antiterrorism demands.

4.6 Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies Regarding Kenya Television Coverage in the Fight against Terrorism

The last objective of the study was to explore strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and adoption of suitable methods. In this regard, the ways in which television coverage could be enhanced through the right policies and a good regulatory environment assessed. The findings obtained are presented in the following section.

4.6.1 Awareness of the Laws and Regulations Governing Media

As shown in Figure 4.17, all the respondents (100%) were aware of the laws and regulations governing the media in Kenya.



igure 4.17 Awareness of the Laws and Regulations Governing Media

Source: Field data, 2019

4.6.2 Following of Laws and Regulations

When asked if the laws and regulations governing media had been followed in reporting terror incidents by journalists, most of the respondents (54.3%) disagreed. However, 45.7% thought that such laws and regulations were being followed.




Figure 4.18 Following of Laws and Regulations

Source: Research findings, 2019

4.6.3 Need for Mechanisms for enhancing the Relationship between Media and Military

First and foremost, the respondents were asked to voice their opinions regarding the need for mechanisms for improving the relationship between the media and the military during armed operations in Kenya. To this, the majority (47.9%) posited that it was negative. Those who were of the view that such relationship was positive comprised of 37.2% while 14.9% were neutral. These findings are presented in Figure 4.19.




Figure 4.19 Relationships between Media and Military

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.6.4 Extent of Training of Journalists

Regarding the need for improving training of journalist to cover military operations and terrorist operations, most of respondents agreed to a great extent (48.6%). These were followed by 31.4% who agreed to a very great extent as shown in Figure 4.20.




Figure 4.20 Need for Improving Training of Journalists

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.6.5 Need for Enacting and Implementing Policies for Checking Disruption of Security Operations through Television Live Coverage

When asked whether, there was need to implement policies on television live coverage of terrorist incidents in order to avoid disrupting security operations, most of the respondents (85.7%) answered in the affirmative. Conversely 14.3% were of contrary opinion as shown in Figure 4.21.




Figure 4.21 Enacting and Implementing Policies on Television Live Coverage

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.6.6 Need for Enacting and Implementing Policies for Checking Compromise of Security Operations through Investigative Television Reports

When asked if there was need to enact and implement policies aimed at checking the compromise of national security through investigative television reports on terrorism, most of the respondents (48.6%) agreed to a very great extent. Another 31.4% agreed to a great extent. These findings are shown in Figure 4.22.




Figure 4.22 Investigative Television Reports on Terrorism Compromise National Security

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.6.7 Government Should Cooperate with the Media

The respondents went to be posed with the question, “should the government cooperate with the media in covering terror incidents?” To this, 51.4% agreed to a great extent. These were

followed by 28.6% who agreed to a moderate extent and, 14.3% who agreed to a very great extent as shown in Figure 4.23.




Figure 4.23 Government Should Cooperate with the Media

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.7 Responses from Interviews

Lastly, the interviewees were asked to give the recommendations they had for television reporting of KDF military operations. To this end, the interviewees pointed out that television reporting should always follow the set laws and regulations. The military should be consistent in dealing with the media concerning access to information. Any valuable information should be divulged promptly. Thereafter journalists should be encouraged to be careful in their analysis and presentation of news to the general public. For this to happen there should be specialized regular training of journalists that cover military operations. Media houses should always revise their self-regulation provisions to ensure that they complied with emergent antiterrorism demands.

4.8 Analysis

4.8.1 Test for Multicollinearity

Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were used to find out if the variables had multicollinearity. The findings, as presented in Table 4.16, show that VIF values of less than 10 were obtained for the three independent variables. This shows that there was no multicollinearity problem.

Table 4.16 Test for Multicollinearity

		Collinearity Statistics	
Model		**Tolerance**	**VIF**
1	(Constant)		
	Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television	.317	3.159
	Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies	.274	3.646

a. Dependent Variable: Influence on Fight against Terrorism

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.8.2 Pearson Correlation

The findings as shown in Table 4.17 shows that there was positive and significant relation between all the three independent variables and the dependent variables as follows (Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television, r= 0.850, p<0.05 and; Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies, r= 0.856, p<0.05). Since there was positive and significant relationships between all the independent and dependent variables, the study could go on to carry out regression analysis.

Table 4.17 Pearson Correlation

Correlations

		Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television	Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies
Influence on Fight against Terrorism	Pearson Correlation	.850**	.856**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); N=94

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.8.3 Regression Analysis

Regression analysis was undertaken to test the relationship between the study variables. The findings obtained are presented in the following sections.

4.8.3.1 Model Summary

Table 4.18 shows the model summary. Herein, multiple correlation coefficients R had a value of 0.913. This indicates that 91.3% of the variability in the regression model can be explained by the data used in this study. On the other hand, the coefficient of determination R2 was 0.833 implying that 83.3% of variance in success in influence of media on fight against terrorism could be explained by the predictors.

Table 4.18 Model Summary

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.913[a]	.833	.827	.27657

a. Predictors: (Constant), Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television, Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.8.4 Analysis of Variance

As shown in Table 4.19, the joint independent variables statistically significantly predict the dependent variable, F = 149.693, p <0.05. Conversely, it can be argued that other variables not included in this model may have accounted for the remaining variance. As such, it is evident that the regression model was a good fit for the data.

Table 4.19 Analysis of Variance

ANOVA[b]						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	34.350	3	11.450	149.693	.000[a]
	Residual	6.884	90	.076		
	Total	41.234	93			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Predictors: (Constant), Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television, Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies

b. Dependent Variable: Influence on Fight against Terrorism

Source: Researcher, 2019

4.8.5 Regression Coefficients

Table 4.20 shows the relative contribution of the independent variables to the variation of the dependent variable, expressed as beta weights.

Table 4.20 Regression Coefficients

Coefficients[a]					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	-.315	.090		-3.496	.001
Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television	.533	.112	.364	4.758	.000
Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies	.467	.112	.343	4.167	.000
a. Dependent Variable: Influence on Fight against Terrorism					

Source: Researcher, 2019

It is evident from Table 4.20 that there was significant relationship between journalism methods used by Kenyan television and fight against terrorism (0.364, t=4.758, p<0.05). This was also the case influence on strategies to Improve Journalism Policies (β=0.343, t=4.167, p<0.05). Furthermore, the significant t-test values (P<0.05) obtained for each of the independent variables shows that all the variables can be fitted in the following regression model when using the un-standardized coefficients β values.

The regression model is:

$Y=\beta o+\beta iXi+\beta iiXii + E$

Where:

Y	=	Influence on Fight against Terrorism
$\beta_0, \beta_{ii}, \beta_{iii}, \beta_{iii}$	=	Regression Constants
Xi	=	Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television
Xii	=	Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies
E	=	Error

To this, the estimated multiple regression equation can be fitted as follows:

Influence of television coverage on the fight against terrorism = -0.315 + (0.533* Journalism Methods used by Kenyan Television) + (0.467* Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies) + 0.090

4.9 Hypotheses Testing

Based on the significant relationships obtained in correlation analysis (**Table 4.17 above**), the null hypothesis, **H0**: there is no significant relationship between Kenyan media coverage of KDF military operations between 2011 and 2018 and the fight against terrorism was rejected. In this regard, the alternative hypothesis, there is significant relationship between Kenyan media coverage of KDF military operations between 2011 and 2018 and the fight against terrorism was not rejected. It is thus evident that the way Kenya media reports on KDF operations directly influences the fight against terrorism both at the execution stage and the planning level.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the discussion, summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations are presented. The purpose of this research was to examine the influence of television coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018. The findings obtained are analyzed against the research objectives which were to: find out the journalism methods employed by Kenya Television before and after the start of KDF operations against terrorism; examine the influence of Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and; explore strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and adoption of suitable methods.

5.2 Discussion of Findings

In this section, the study findings obtained in the study are discussed. This is done in line with the study objectives are presented.

5.2.1 Methods used by Media to Cover Military Operations

The first objective of the study was, “find out the journalism methods employed by Kenya television before and after the start of KDF operations against terrorism.” The findings obtained from questionnaires are presented in the following section. The findings obtained show that there are different techniques that the media uses to cover military operations. The main technique used was investigative journalism and freelance journalists (40%). This was followed by embedding journalists with troops (28.6%), and live coverage (20%). The least used technique was parachuting journalism (11.4%).

Terrorism incidents are unplanned for and always occur without the knowledge of the media. As such the methods the media uses to report on such incidents is situational driven. In cases where there are media personnel, they are forced to really on secondary information from the victims or first responders. In instances where the media cannot access by any means, they employ parachute journalism where they search the place and start reporting from historical incidents or use personnel with local knowledge. An interview respondent gave an example during the Kolbio attack, where a TV station used Ombachi Machokaa an entertainment presenter who was stationed at Kolbio as a young policeman. He was to narrate where Kolbio is located and the area in general. In his reporting Ombachi Machokaa used his 1980 experience to build the story. According to the respondent there were a lot of mistakes generated and transferred to other media houses.

Investigative journalism scored the highest because journalists have a chance to follow up on the story after the incident and pacification has been done. These findings agree with Shah (2007) who argues that many techniques were used in covering war scenarios due to various parameters. Shah (2007) adds that despite the technique chosen the influence of the media to the citizens support of a war course is real and is sometimes directly felt by the executors. When asked if the techniques used were appropriate to cover military operations, most of the respondents (77.7%) disagreed. When asked if the techniques used provided a good coverage for military operations, most of the respondents (79.2%) said no. These findings show that the techniques used did not provide good coverage of war in contrast to the study by Wilkinson (1997) who posits that the methods used to cover war should be appropriate for the situation so as not to propagate war and to ensure that a polity realizes peace within a limited timeframe. War is expensive and external variables which intrude the conduct of fighting makes the war riskier in lives and expensive in treasure.

The researcher asked the respondents to rate media coverage on military operations in Kenya. To this, most of them (51.4%) said that the coverage was poor. The concentration on negative issues, lack of reference to government position and disregard of the efforts of the soldiers on the ground contributed to this. Editorial choice of news headlines, up sounds and construction of reporting words was a major contributor to the poor rating.

The respondents were also asked to indicate their level of agreement with selected statements on the techniques used by media. To this, respondents strongly agreed that ground rules are always in place whenever media want to mingle with the military to do a covering for their operations. Furthermore, the respondents agreed that media uses open and independent journalism in covering military operations and that the military encourages the use of media pool when media is covering military operations. The respondents also agreed that media credentialing is a technique used by most media houses when interacting with the military especially while in active deployments. Lastly, the respondents agreed that security review promotes media coverage to a large extent. These findings agree with Schmid (2011) who argue that "the relationship between media and the military is played out in different aspects of media reporting, angling of issues and balance in coverage."

Lastly, the respondents were asked to indicate other techniques that were used by media to provide coverage on military operation. To this, the respondents pointed out that they used techniques such as obtaining information from military spokes persons and, collaboration with international media houses to obtain reports from them. This shows the central role played by collaborations in covering military operations as argued by Limor (2006). They also relied on citizen journalism through social media which was discovered to be a fast and highly depended on source of obtaining information on developing stories. Social media for example was highly

quoted as a major source of information to the mainstream media. Information from individual accounts on twitter especially are quoted and depicted as the source of news in TV stations. This is later recorded as breaking news as the story is being confirmed.

5.2.2 Influence of Kenya Television Coverage on the Fight against Terrorism

The main objective of the study was to examine the influence of Kenya television coverage in the fight against terrorism. To begin with, the respondents were asked if they considered Kenyan television reports on the fight against terrorism as reliable information source. Interestingly, most of the respondents (60%) did not consider such reports as reliable. Over reliance on secondary information, disputing official government stance on an issue and reporting after an incidence contribute to the high percentage.

On the part of journalists respondents though sometimes they make mistakes, in reporting on military operations, the military and government have made it hard to solve the problem. Most of them agreed that the military is a difficult institution to work with. This is in line with the findings of Omanga (2016) who shows the propensity of such news to be unreliable. Those who thought that Kenya television reports were not reliable were asked to state the reasons for their position. To this, the respondents pointed out that some of the reports were gathered by incompetent persons. Other reports were quoted from unreliable sources. Some were thought as mere propaganda. In addition, the fact that Somalia is a hostile environment made it hard to verify news from there. It was also made manifest that reliable investigative journalists were not interested in the area anymore and that some reports were obtained from the government and it was hard to tell their veracity.

The respondents were asked to indicate the influence of the media reports on government strategies against terrorism in Kenya. To this, most of them 54.3% pointed out that the media

reports had negative influences. Interviews quoted instances where some reports had made the military reconsider the actual deployment of the troops inside Somalia. On KTN one interviewee cited a poll question on prime time news:

> Should KDF continue being deployed in Somalia?

Later it recorded that KDF had starting closing forward operating bases inside Somalia and had started concentrating along the border. Those who thought that such reports had positive influences followed at 37.1%. Most journalists responded by saying that there work was to inform the public on incidents as they happen and that the influence was for the good of the general public. Examples of rooting in Westgate which later led to parliamentary report showed that soldiers were not contented with their pay despite the difficult working conditions they endure. These findings agree with those of (Vasterman et al., 2005) who also recorded negative socially influences of such media reports to the public.

When asked if some of the media reports had glorified the terrorist's agenda in Kenya, most of the respondents (62.9%) answered in the affirmative. These findings are in line with those of Omanga (2016) who was of the same opinion. When asked whether the Kenyan media was a good partner in in combating terrorism, most of the respondents (54.3%) answered no. The continuous desire to counter check government position with "undisclosed sources" for example was viewed as lack of trust on the part of the media. This further agrees with the findings of Omanga (2006). This is particularly so since bad reporting could have negative influence on the strategies employed by security agencies due to the fact that despite the stage of war it is only war planners and executors who should be able to direct operations without external prying.

The researcher carried out analysis of selected words used in television on various terror incidents. To this most of the words and pictures analyzed had negative impact on antiterrorism

policy. These is in line with Howard and Renfrow (2006) who argue that "media coverage especially in the use of images, words and reproduction of the terrorists own images and words during military operations is regarded as only aiding terrorism."

5.2.3 Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies Regarding Kenya Television Coverage in the Fight Against Terrorism

The last objective of the study was to explore strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism and adoption of suitable methods. In this regard, the ways in which television coverage could be enhanced through the right policies and a good regulatory environment assessed. To begin with, all the respondents (100%) were aware of the laws and regulations governing the media in Kenya. This agrees with Fortna (2015) who stresses the need for such awareness. When asked if the laws and regulations governing media had been followed in reporting terror incidents by journalists, most of the respondents (54.3%) disagreed. The media world is competitive and according to Denzel Washington (2015), when addressing the media on the current wave of news trends said "the need to be the first over rides the need to be factual, the truth is no longer news, breaking the news first is what matters."

However, 45.7% thought that such laws and regulations were being followed. This is in line with Okwany, (2016) who recommends following of law in conflict situations.

The respondents were asked to voice their opinions regarding the need for mechanisms for improving the relationship between the media and the military during armed operations in Kenya. To this, the majority (47.9%) posited that it was negative. Those who were of the view that such relationship was positive comprised of 37.2% while 14.9% were neutral. These findings agree with Sorley (1999) who during the Vietnam wars pointed out that in some

instances, the media had negative relationships with the military. As such, there was need to put in place strategies for improving this relationship.

Regarding the need for improving training of journalist to cover military operations and terrorist operations, most of respondents agreed to a great extent (68.6%). These were followed by 31.4% who agreed to a very great extent. These findings are in line with those of Mbugua (2013) who was of the same opinion; this shows that journalists are often well trained on how to report military operations although there was room for improvements. New phenomenon however, like the current global wave of terrorism calls for additional training on how to report it on television.

When asked whether, there was need to expand while implementing existing policies on television live coverage of terrorist incidents in order to avoid disrupting security operations, most of the respondents (85.7%) answered in the affirmative. Conversely 14.3% were of contrary opinion. These findings agree with those of Vasterman, Yzermans and Dirkzwager (2005) who take cognizance of the effect of the media on security operations.

When asked if there was need to enact and implement policies aimed at checking the compromise of national security through investigative television reports on terrorism, most of the respondents (48.6%) agreed to a very great extent. Another 31.4% agreed to a great extent. This corroborates extant literature that reported the same influence in Hotel Taj Mahal (Maltby, 2012). The investigative piece “Who murdered Aboud Rogo” by KTN reporter John Allan Namu, was quoted by ICT officials as one of the worst compromises of national security in Kenya. The ICT ministry officials later sued KTN for flouting broadcasting rules. The investigative expose’ involved the records of phone calls by the reporters to the family of the

Muslim cleric most of which were also being perused by the intelligence agencies and which had links with Al Shabaab leaders.

The study posed with the question, “should the government cooperate with the media in covering terror incidents?” To this, 51.4% agreed to a great extent. Journalists that responded to the study were optimistic that better results on security related stories can be achieved if the government security agencies collaborated with the media. These were followed by 28.6% who agreed to a moderate extent and, 14.3% who agreed to a lesser extent. Military planners were not optimistic on any collaboration with the media at any phase of military engagement. The fear of leakage of information, exaggeration of incidents and the urge to break news before they are ripe for military planners were some of the highlights of the low percentage on collaboration.. This could however be done with caution since the media often defeated government strategies as argued by Howard and Renfrow (2006).

5.3 Summary of the Study Findings

5.3.1 Methods used by Media to Cover Military Operations

It is evident that the local media continues to use different techniques to cover military operations. This is a global practice in a field that is well connected in personnel and who share information with each other. These included: investigative journalism and freelance journalists; embedding journalists with troops; live coverage and; parachuting journalism. Some of these techniques as used in the coverage of the operation against terrorism by local media were seen as being inappropriate to cover military operations. This was particularly so since some of the techniques like parachute journalism relied on incompetent people to cover military who highly depend on related events and try to superimpose them on every terror incident.

In most cases, it is evident that ground rules are always in place whenever media want to mingle with the military to do a covering for their operations. These rules are mostly developed by media associations with the guidance of the military due to the perceived sensitivity of tasks undertaken in active deployment. Furthermore, media uses open and independent journalism in covering military operations and that the military encourages the use of media pool when media is covering military operations. There was also a lot of media credentialing as a technique used by most media houses in making coverage on military operations. Evidently, security review promotes media coverage to a large extent.

The media was often forced to use other techniques to provide coverage on military operation especially when it is overwhelmed by the need to break news as the first. This in the media fraternity is a winning gesture of being on top of issues. These included obtaining information from military spokes persons and, collaboration with international media houses to obtain reports from them. As such, collaborations were vital in covering military operations. Lastly, citizen journalism through social media was also used to obtain information on developing stories.

5.3.2 Influence of Kenya Television Coverage on the Fight against Terrorism

It is clear that most people did not consider the media reports on KDF operations as being reliable. This was due to the fact the media reports were often gathered by incompetent persons. Since some reports were quoted from unreliable sources, these could be mere propaganda. Also the fact that Somalia is a hostile environment made it hard to verify news from there. It was also hard to very some of the media reports since some reliable investigative journalists were not interested in Somalia anymore. Since some of the reports were obtained from the government, it was hard to verify some of them.

Often, media reports were seen to have negative influences on government strategies against terrorism in Kenya. This made people to see the Kenyan media as not being a good partner in in combating terrorism. Regarding selected words used in television on various terror incidents, most of the words and pictures analyzed had negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

People were also of the view that al-Shabaab was aided in a way since the reports of terror, damage and killings in Kenya soil or of KDF in Somalia tended to boost the morale of al-Shabaab. It made them feel that their agenda were being met. The people also thought that although the Kenya government had better resources, Al-Shabaab had often scored better in propaganda war. However, the Kenya government was shown to be performing better in the television reporting although their updates were not perceived as being sufficient enough.

Evidently, Kenya television reports often affected the morale of soldiers. It also affected operations since airing information on Al-shabaab terror attacks tended to help them win the propaganda war. This could draw more militants to the Al-shabaab cause, which could go on to increase terrorist activities in future.

5.3.3 Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies Regarding Kenya Television Coverage in the Fight Against Terrorism

It is evident that there were numerous strategies that could be used to improve television coverage in the fight against terrorism. To begin with, the study discovered there were gaps related to the enactment of the right policies and a good regulatory environment so as to ensure good coverage of military operations. Evidently, all the reporters were aware of the laws and regulations governing the media in Kenya although the majority of them were not following them.

Most of the respondents opined that there was need to have mechanisms for improving the relationship between the media and the military during armed operations in Kenya. Regarding the need for improving training of journalist to cover military operations and terrorist operations, most of respondents though that this was of paramount importance. In journalism training should consider improvement on the curriculum so as to include reporting on specific issues. Peace journalism, war journalism, government policy reporting should be impacted at the early stages. International media like CNN have war correspondents whose reports are always war related. They are therefore vetted by government and allowed to follow militaries all over the world and be given military protection in the course of their reporting.

Policies aimed at ensuring that television live coverage of terrorist incidents in order to avoid disrupting security operations were yet to be implemented fully. This also pertains to enactment and implementation of policies aimed at checking the compromise of national security through investigative television reports on terrorism. To make the fight against terrorism tenable, most of the respondents pointed out that the governments cooperate with the media in covering terror incidents.

5.4 Conclusion

5.4.1 Methods used by Media to Cover Military Operations

The methods used to cover military operations were numerous. Indeed the findings show that there was positive and significant relationship between the techniques and the fight against terrorism ($r= 0.850$, $p<0.05$). Such techniques included investigative journalism as freelance journalists; embedding journalists with troops; live coverage and; parachuting journalism. The challenge to overcome challenges of reporting can be averted through credentialing of

journalists who can be allowed to have military protection. The government agencies on the other hand should not be overprotective on the information they possess.

5.4.2 Influence of Kenya Media Reproting on the Fight against Terrorism

Although most of the methods employed by television were seen as being inappropriate to cover military operations since they could affect the fight against terrorism is they gathered unreliable information. This was particularly so since in some instances; the media was often forced to use other techniques to provide coverage on military operation such as collaboration with international media houses- some of which could be sympathetic to the terrorists - as well as resulting to citizen journalism. In a country such as Somalia, it was often hard to verify news from there. This shows that the media could easily fall prey of the terrorists to pass their propaganda unabated. This could be done directly or indirectly. In this light, it is clear that the selected words and pictures used in television on various terror incidents were often seen as having negative impact on antiterrorism policy.

5.4.3 Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies

Several strategies were seen as been of paramount importance in improving journalism strategies regarding Kenya television coverage in the fight against terrorism. This is exampled in the positive and significant relationship between the fight against terrorism and strategies to improve journalism policies ($r= 0.856$, $p<0.05$). Strategies such as policies on training, adherence to existing laws and ways of enhancing cooperation between the television reporters and the military were essential. There was also need to ensure that the governments cooperated with the media in covering terror incidents

5.5 Recommendations

5.5.1 Techniques and Methods used by Media to Cover Military Operations

The KDF and local media relationship has grown overtime. Previous interaction of the two, have been characterized by disbelief and therefore the need to counter check independently. The advent of terrorism has brought a new realization where according to the study findings more collaboration is demanded. Conventionally, where states went to war for specific interests like resources, power and territories, the methods used by the media was directed by the governments to fully support the war effort. The World War era for example recorded propaganda wars between the communist and the capitalists. The Korea peninsula border war between North and South Korea has seen the longest period of media propaganda by state owned stations which sometimes have pulled the interest of international stations like CNN and Aljazera and in the process pulling the interest of world powers and international organizations.

In Kenya the 'plain" reporting that was witnessed during internal skirmishes like in cattle rustling and Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) can no longer suffice in the current terrorism threat. The techniques of live reporting and investigative fact finding journalism cannot apply. Pictures that undermine the efforts by the military and choice of words that might weaken a country's resolve in the fight should be avoided by the media.

The military and the government as a whole should forge avenues to better the media field to collaborate more. Media credentialing for example, specific impacting of skills to conform to embedding guidelines should be embraced. The journalists themselves should also see a gap in the war of words experienced between them and government officials.

The media and the military should formulate guidelines that do not as reported by the Human Rights Watch (2017), do not obstruct free expression and access to information. Techniques

that expound such rights should be upheld to allow each institution to perform its duties without infringing on each other while still contributing towards fighting terrorism.

5.5.2 Influence of Kenya Media reporting on the Fight against Terrorism

Mohmoud Eid (2013), The New Era of Media and Terrorism, construed the news media are competitive and lucrative business and thrive on action and controversy. Accordingly they are known to sensationalize stories to boost ratings, grab attention while challenging power and influencing the general public. The fight against terrorism in Kenya is as such a platform to challenge power as the media cover violence action dramatized as neglect of the principle function of government to provide security.

The KDF and the Kenyan local media should realize the symbiotic relationship between modern day media industry which trends patterns and terrorism which is pursuing to manipulate and exploit the free media to propagate their agenda. Regular interactions between the military and the media is therefore advised to appraise on policies of covering military activities in terrorists active situations like Somalia and when they may occur internally.

5.5.3 Strategies to Improve Journalism Policies

The strategies developed by KDF and the local media should be premised on the two principles; media is not manipulated into promoting terrorism and that security policy makers are not forced to pass laws that erode constitutional freedoms like the freedom to information. Communication between the KDF and the media is an important element in any strategy designed to combat terrorism and preserving Kenya as a young democracy. The relationship between the media and KDF should be strengthened through measures such as constantly reviewing rules and regulation concerning covering KDF operations and; enabling access to information by the mass media since this could boost the morale of the media to support the military through objective reporting would be enhanced and this could yield positive results in counter-terrorism efforts. According to Col Cyrus Oguna;

> Specific practical considerations between KDF and the media would be financing joint media – military training exercises, establishing of a government terrorism information center (TIC), promoting use of media pools and promoting voluntary press coverage guidelines.

The government should use its superior resources and ICT infrastructure to win propaganda war. There should be effort to enhance regular updates in the mass media and strengthen its relationship with the media for more balanced and objective reporting.. The government should also ensure that the media understands and supports its antiterrorism policies.

Effort should be made by the media to ensure that their reports are not used as avenues for carrying terrorist propaganda. This is vital since if this is not done, more militants could be drawn to the terrorism cause, which could go on to increase terrorist activities in future.

Media reporting should always follow the set laws and regulations. This could be realized through regular training of reporters. Additionally, media houses should always revise their self-regulation provisions to ensure that they complied with emergent antiterrorism demands. On its part, the military should be consistent in dealing with the media concerning access to information. Any valuable information should be divulged promptly.

Furthermore, journalists should be encouraged to be careful in their analysis and presentation of news to the general public. For this to happen there should be specialized regular training of journalists that cover military operations as well as training on security issues.

It is also recommended that the media should conduct better research before having investigative reports that derail military operations. For the best results in coverage of military techniques, embedded journalism should be used as the optional technique.

Despite freedoms guaranteed in the constitution, media practitioners have a social responsibility to educate, prevent and propagate good values to support the government in defeating the nihilism ideology of terrorists.

The social responsibility theory advocates for a move from simple reporting of facts to interpretative reporting or investigative reporting without censorship. This is interpreted to mean that although news should be factual and truthful, they should be analyzed or interpreted with clear explanations. The urge to be the first to break news, without a background checks especially where national interests are involved should be controlled. The fight against terrorism can be termed as a zero-sum game of survival, where Kenya sought military force the key foci to safeguard national interests. In the realist tradition, states are rational actors and each state makes calculated choices about the means and ends of foreign policy by carefully rank ordering various policy preferences and the power capabilities required of each preference, and then selects the policy preference with the highest benefit to maximize the state's utility in securing self-preservation Hans Morgenthau (1949).

5.6 Suggestions for Further Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the working relationship of Kenya media and KDF on the fight against terrorism specifically Al-Shabaab in Kenya since 2011 to 2017. The

researcher recommends comparative studies on other security agencies such as the media influence on the increased acrimonious relationship between the National Police Service and the citizens for comparative purposes. Comparative studies should also be focused on other countries' media coverage such as Uganda and Ethiopia whose security forces are also involved in the fight against terrorism in Uganda could also be carried out. Other studies to complement this study finding should be conducted in similar national interest issues such as elections, food security and economic strategies.

At the regional level, under IGAD, AU and specifically AMISOM studies should be conducted on the relationship of media with security forces involved in combating terrorism. The AMISOM media branch should for example commission studies on the relationship between AMISOM forces with the local media in Somalia to study how well the Somalia population has embraced the international initiative to stabilize Somalia.

Internationally the United Nations should through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conduct studies on the influence the media has on the different forces it has deployed all over the world.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TELEVISION REPORTERS

Introduction

Dear respondent,

My name is Jackson Njihia Njoroge. I am a student at Africa Nazarene University pursuing a degree leading to masters in Science in governance, peace and security. I am conducting a study to the influence of television coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018 with a special focus on NTV and KTN. This study is for academics purpose and your view on it will be important for this study. The information obtained from you will be confidential. Kindly take a few minutes to answer the questions therein.

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

Tick where appropriate

1. Sex /Gender
   Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. Indicate your age group (years)
   Below 20 years [ ] 21-30 [ ] 31-40 [ ] 41-50 [ ] 50 years and above [ ]
3. Indicate your level of education

a) O level [ ] Diploma [ ] Degree [ ] Masters and above [ ]

4. How frequent do you watch TV?

a) Very frequent [ ]

b) Frequent [ ]

c) Not at all [ ]

5. What is your television station?

a) KTN [ ] NTV [ ]

6. Does your TV station report on terror incidents?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]
7. How does the TV station report terror incidents?

a) Live reporting [ ]

b) Investigative documentaries after the incident [ ]

c) Both a. & b [ ]

8. Does your TV station select reporters to cover terrorism incidents?

a) Yes [ ] No [ ]

9. Name some of the journalists you know who have extensively reported on terrorism in Kenya?

_____

_____

_____

Section B: Methods used by media to cover military operations

10. There are different techniques that the media uses to cover military operations.

a. Live coverage
b. Embedding with operating troops
c. Investigative journalism as freelance journalists
d. Parachuting journalism

In your opinion are these techniques appropriate to cover military operations?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

11. If yes, do these techniques provide a good coverage for military operations?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

12. In your own opinion, how would you rate media coverage on military operations in Kenya?

a) Poor coverage

b) Moderate coverage

c) Good coverage

d) Very good coverage

13. On a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree, kindly (√) indicating how your agree with the following statements on techniques used by media to cover military operations?

Statements	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Media uses open and independent journalism in covering military operations					
The military encourages the use of media pool when media is covering military operations					
Media Credentialing is a technique used by most media houses in making coverages on military operations					
Ground rules are always in place whenever media want to mingle with the military to do a covering for their operations.					
Security review promotes media coverage to a large extent					

14. Apart from the above statements, what other techniques are used by media to provide coverage on military operation?

_____

_____

_____

Section C: Influence of television reports on fight against terrorism

15. In your opinion, do you consider Kenyan television reports on terrorism as reliable information sources? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If No, please state reason(s) for your response

_____

_____

_____

_____

16. In your opinion what has been the influence of the media reports on government strategies against terrorism in Kenya?

a) Negative [ ]
b) Positive [ ]
c) Neutral [ ]

17. Do you think the media reports have glorified the terrorist's agenda in Kenya?

a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]

18. Would you consider Kenyan media as a good partner in combating terrorism?

a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) No [ ]

19. How would you rate the influence of media reports and the journalists on the fight against terrorism?

a) Negative [ ]
b) Positive [ ]
c) Neutral [ ]

Table 1:1:1 Analysis table on the words used on TV reports

SER NO	TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED WORDS ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
			POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
1	OPERATION *LINDA NCHI*				
2	MANDERA KILLINGS				
3	WESTGATE ATTACK				
4	GARISSA ATTACK				
5	EL ADDE ATTACK				
6	KOLBIO ATTACK				

Table 1:1:2 Analysis table on pictures used on TV reports

SER NO	TERROR INCIDENT	SELECTED PICTURES ON TV REPORTS	IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT ANTI TERRORISM POLICY		
			POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NUETRAL
1	OPERATION *LINDA NCHI*				
2	MANDERA KILLINGS				
3	WESTGATE ATTACK				
4	GARISSA ATTACK				
5	EL ADDE ATTACK				
6	KOLBIO ATTACK				

SECTION C: Strategies to improve journalism policies regarding Kenya Television coverage in the fight against terrorism

20. Are you aware of the Laws and Regulations governing the media in Kenya?

a) Yes [ ]No[ ]

21. Have the laws and regulations been followed in reporting terror incidents by journalists?

a) Yes [ ]No [ ]

22. There is need for mechanisms for improving the relationship between the media and the military during armed operations in Kenya?

a) Negative [ ]

b) Positive [ ]

c) Neutral [ ]

23. To what extent do you think that trained training of journalists to cover military operations and terrorist incidences should be improved?

a) Very small extent [ ]
b) Small extent [ ]
c) Moderate extent [ ]
d) Great extent [ ]
e) Very great extent [ ]

24. Policies for checking the disruption of security operations by television live coverage of terrorist incidents should be enacted and implemented?

a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]

25. To what extent do you think that policies for checking the compromise of national security through investigative television reports should be enacted and enforced?

a) Very small extent [ ]
b) Small extent [ ]
c) Moderate extent [ ]
d) Great extent [ ]
e) Very great extent [ ]

26. Should the government cooperate with the media in covering terror incidents?

a) Very small extent [ ]
b) Moderate extent [ ]
c) Very great extent [ ]

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KDF MILITARY OFFICERS AND ICT OFFICIALS

My name is Jackson Njihia Njoroge. I am a student at Africa Nazarene University pursuing a degree leading to masters in Science in governance, peace and security. I am conducting a study to examine the influence of television coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018 with a special focus on NTV and KTN. This study is for academics purpose and your view on it will be important for this study. The information obtained from you will be confidential. Kindly take a few minutes to answer the questions therein.

Profession (optional) _____

Ministry (optional) _____

Section A

1. What is your view of Kenyan media coverage of KDF military operations?

   _____

   _____

2. How would you describe the media coverage, especially television reporting of KDF military operations before 2011?

   _____

   _____

3. Comparatively, how has this changed prior to 2011 (before Operation *Linda Nchi*) and after 2011 (start of Operation *Linda Nchi*)?

   _____

   _____

4. What is your general view on terrorism media coverage in Kenya?

   _____

   _____

5. Are there any situations you suppose that Al-Shabaab have been aided in their agenda by the media?

   _____

   _____

6. Do you consider Kenyan media as good partners in counter-terrorism efforts?

   _____

   _____

7. Do you suppose the Al-Shabaab has projected itself better in television reporting than the Kenyan government?

   _____

   _____

8. In your own evaluation, what is the impact of Kenyan television reports on KDF military operations against terrorism?

   _____

   _____

9. What recommendations would you have for television reporting of KDF military operations?

_____

_____

APPENDIX IV: RESEARCH PERMIT

AFRICA NAZARENE
UNIVERSITY

11th February, 2019

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Njihia, Jackson Njoroge (16J03DMGP021) is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University. He/She has finished his/her course work and has defended his/her thesis proposal ***entitled "Influence of Kenya television coverage on KDF operations in the fight against terrorism from 2011 to 2017"***

Any assistance accorded to him/her to facilitate data collection and finish his/her thesis is highly welcomed.

Prof. Rodney Reed
Deputy Vice Chancellor – Academic Affairs

P.O Box 53067 - 00200 Nairobi, Kenya • Tel: 020 252 7170/1 - 5 • Fax: 020 201 2233 • Cell: 0733 874 111 • Email: registrar@anu.ac.ke • www.anu.ac.ke

APPENDIX V: MAP OF NAIROBI CITY



Source: mapsofworld.com

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

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Website : www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref: No. **NACOSTI/P/19/80429/28804**

Date: **11th April 2019**

Jackson Njoroge Njihia
Africa Nazarene University
P.O. Box 53067-00200
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on ***"The influence of television coverage of KDF operations on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2018: A case of NTV and KTN."*** I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **10th April, 2020.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

BONIFACE WANYAMA
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.