INFLUENCE OF TERROR ACTIVITIES ON KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT 2005 – 2020

LOISINA MAHILA AMBEYI

A RESEARCH THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GOVERNANCE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES OF AFRICA NAZARENE UNIVERSITY

JUNE 2021

DECLARATION

I declare that this research thesis is my original work and that they have not been presented in any other university for academic work.

23rd June 2021

Signature

Date

Loisina Mahila Ambeyi

14J03EMGP020

Supervisors' Declaration

This research thesis was conducted under our supervision and is submitted with our approval as the university supervisors.

23rd June 2021.

Dr. Martin Ouma

Date

23rd June 2021

Dr. Emily Okuto

Date

Africa Nazarene University

Nairobi, Kenya

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Ambeyi Ligabo who sparked my interest in the world of peace and diplomacy. I appreciate all your inspiration and support through this process. Thank you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to send my special thanks to my supervisors Dr. Emily Okuto and Dr. Martin Ouma for their patience, guidance, constructive criticism and tireless effort to ensure that this thesis is completed. In addition, I must thank the lecturers and my classmates for their assistance in one way or another that enable me to complete my postgraduate studies successfully.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ..... **ii**
DEDICATION ..... **iii**
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... **iv**
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... **v**
LIST OF TABLES ..... **viii**
LIST OF FIGURES ..... **ix**
ABSTRACT ..... **x**
OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS ..... **xi**
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..... **xiii**
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION **1**
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Background of the Study 1
1.3 Statement of the Problem 5
1.4 Purpose of the Study 6
1.5 Objectives of the Study 6
1.5.1 General Objective 6
1.5.2 Specific Objectives 7
1.6 Research Questions 7
1.7 Significance of the Study 7
1.8 Scope of the Study 8
1.9 Delimitation of the Study 9
1.10 Limitations of the Study 9
1.11 Assumptions of the Study 10
1.12 Theoretical Framework 10
1.12.1 Realism Theory 10
1.12.2 Human Motivation Theory 11
1.13 Conceptual Framework 11
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW **14**
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Empirical Review 14
2.2.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations 14
2.2.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift 19
2.2.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes 23
2.2.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift 27
2.3 Summary and Research Gaps 30

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 32
3.1 Introduction 32
3.3 Research Site 32
3.4 Target Population 33
3.5 Determination of Study Sample 34
3.5.1 Sampling Procedure 34
3.5.2 Sample Size 34
3.6 Data Collection Procedure and Instruments 36
3.6.1 Developing of Instruments 36
3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments 37
3.6.3 Validity of the Research Instruments 38
3.6.4 Reliability of the Research Instruments 39
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 42
4.1 Introduction 42
4.2 Response Rate and Respondents' Demographic Profile 42
4.2.1 Response Rate 42
4.2.2 Respondents' Gender 42
4.2.3 Age Bracket 43
4.2.4 Employer, Government Office/Security Agency 44
4.2.5 Duration Worked in the Government Office/Security Agency 45
4.3 Presentation of Research Analysis and Findings 46
4.3.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations 46
4.3.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift 52
4.3.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes 60
4.3.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift 64
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 67
5.1 Introduction 67
5.2 Discussions 67
5.2.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations 67
5.2.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift 69
5.2.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes 71
5.2.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift 72
5.3 Summary of Main Findings 73
5.4 Conclusions 75
5.5 Recommendations 75
5.6 Areas for Further Research 77

REFERENCES **78**
APPENDICES **83**
Appendix I: Research Questionnaire 83
Appendix II: Interview Schedule for the Key Informants 92
Appendix III: ANU Data Collection Authorization Letter 93
Appendix IV: NACOSTI Research Permit 94
Appendix V: Map of Study Area 96

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Target Population.....34
Table 3.2: Distribution of the Sample Size.....35
Table 4.1: Response Rate.....42
Table: 4.2: Influence of Radicalization on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy.....50
Table 4.3: Influence of Terrorism Financing on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy.....57
Table 4.4: Influence of Cyberterrorism on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy.....61
Table 4.5: Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift.....65

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 13
Figure 4.1: Respondents 'Gender 43
Figure 4.2: Age Distribution 44
Figure 4.3: Employer, Government Office/Security Agency 45
Figure 4.4: Duration Worked in the Government Office/Security Agency 46
Figure 4.5: Most Prevalent Aspect of Radicalization Terrorist Employ in the Country 47
Figure 4.6: Extent to which Radicalization Contributed to Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy 48
Figure 4.7: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy to Combat Radicalization 51
Figure 4.8: Most Common Means Through Which Terrorists Finance Their Activities 53
Figure 4.9: Whether Terror Financing is Widely Spread and Easily Conducted in Kenya 54
Figure 4.10: Whether Terrorism Financing has Made it Easy for Terrorists to Conduct Their Activities in Kenya 55
Figure 4.11: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy to Combat Terrorism Financing 58
Figure 4.12: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy in Combating Cyberterrorism 63

ABSTRACT

In order to protect their sovereignty, nations have at their exposure both soft and hard diplomatic tools and approaches to apply. Foreign policy is one of the key diplomatic tools at the exposure of governments who are keen to defend their territories against foreign aggressors. Policies therefore, both domestic and foreign, play a crucial and irreplaceable role in the fight against modern terrorism. The East Africa region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and inter-state conflict which has led to poverty, instability and political isolation which result in the regions vulnerability to terrorist exploitation. Kenya's conservative low-risk and non-interventionist approach to peace-making and peace-building that was grounded in principles of 'good neighbourliness' and respect for national sovereignty, changed dramatically in October 2011 with the nation's unprecedented military intervention in Somalia. The general objective of this research study was to establish the influence terror activities have had on Kenya's foreign policy shift between the years 2005 to 2020. The specific objectives of this study are as follows; to assess the influence of radicalization on foreign policy shift, to establish how terrorism financing inspired foreign policy shift, to determine the influence of cyberterrorism on foreign policy changes, and to assess the challenges experienced in the implementation of foreign policy shift in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020. The findings of the study are expected to be essential to policy makers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, as well as the academia. Realism Theory and Role Approach Theory were used to guide this study. Descriptive research design was chosen for this study. Analysis of the data was conducted using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods. The research study was primarily performed in Nairobi. The target population of this study was comprised the KDF, National Intelligence Services (NIS), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). The study also targeted officers from the Political Diplomatic Secretary Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officers from the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit. Participants for this research were chosen using non-probability sampling, specifically heterogeneous sampling. The study established that Kenya's foreign policy was substantially influenced by influenced by terrorism activities not only within and outside Kenya. Increase in radicalizations activities in the country motivated shifts in Kenya's foreign policies as indicated by the government's decision to send troops into Somalia's territory to combat the militants. Growing terror financing activities occasioned the government to amend the country's foreign policies towards addressing terrorism within Kenya's territory. Intensified cyberterrorism activities also instigated Kenya's decision to shift its policies to combat the security threats. Implementation of the policy shifts has not been without challenges such as laxity in policy enforcement, poor coordination among security agencies. Furtherance to shift in foreign policy to address radicalization, the following recommendations are made; development of intercultural policies by the policy makers to foster a culture of diversity by encouraging intercultural mixing and interaction as well as political and civic participation, management of conflict positively by engaging with instead of criminalising those holding extremist views where judicious and practical, complementing the foreign policies with strong legislations that deter terrorism financing, and enhancing levels of cooperation among intelligence agencies both nationally and internationally.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS

Anti-terrorism : In the context of this study these refer to measures taken defensively to reduce the level of vulnerability of property and individuals to terrorist attacks.

Counter-terrorism : This refers to the offensive actions taken by the government of Kenya to prevent terrorists from executing their attack plans in the country.

East Africa : In this context the countries referred to are the Republic of Burundi, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of South Sudan, the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Uganda.

Foreign policy : In the context of this study this refer to the objectives and activities of and by the government of Kenya or its foreign counterparts in relation to its interactions with other states bilaterally, multilaterally or through multilateral platforms.

Hawala : This refers to a traditional and informal money transfer system, mostly common among Muslim, Arab and South Asia countries, and involves being money is paid to an agent in one country who in turn instructs an associate in the other relevant country or area to pay the final recipient. The agents then earn commission form the transactions.

Terrorism : This refers to the use of violence, terror and intimidation against communities, nations or a region with the intent to kill, seriously harm, or to provoke a state of anxiety and

terror in order to coerce the population, government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing an act that is against the belief of the terrorist organization.

Terrorist : This refers to an individual who uses unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of, religious or political goals.

Terrorist group : A collection of individuals or groups whose aim is to commit acts of violence or threatens violence in order to achieve its political or religious objectives.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANU	:	Africa Nazarene University
ATPU	:	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AU	:	African Union
CSIS	:	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CFP	:	Comparative Foreign Policy
CVE	:	Countering Violent Extremism
DHKP-C	:	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
EA	:	East Africa
EAC	:	East African Community
IEP	:	Institute for Economics and Peace
ISIS	:	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISS	:	Institute for Security Studies
KDF	:	Kenya Defence Forces
MENAs	:	Middle East and North Africa
MRC	:	Mombasa Republican Council
NACOSTI	:	National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation
NCC	:	Nairobi City County
NCTC	:	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSIS	:	National Security Intelligence Service
NTV	:	Nation Television
OSCE	:	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	:	Kurdistan Workers Party
SDGs	:	Sustainable Development Goals

SupKem	:	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UN	:	United Nations
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	:	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	:	United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into parts that build on the research subject by providing a detailed discussion of the study's context, which helps to provide the study's foundation and structure. The statement of the issue, goals of the study, research query, study importance, scope of the study, limitations and delimitations of the study, and the conceptual structure are the main sections of this chapter of the text, in logical order.

1.2 Background of the Study

In order to protect their sovereignty, nations have at their exposure both and hard diplomatic tools and approaches to apply. Foreign policy is one of the key diplomatic tools at the exposure of governments who are keen to defend their territories against foreign aggressors. Policies therefore, both domestic and foreign, play a crucial and irreplaceable role in the fight against modern terrorism. A country's foreign policy is a set of objectives that serves as a framework on how the country will interact with other countries socially, militarily, politically and economically as well as how it will engage with non-state actors. Foreign policy is primarily concerned with the boundaries between the external environment outside of the State and the internal environment, and its various sub-national sources of influence (Webber and Smith, 2000). Foreign policies are designed to help protect a country's national interests, security, economic prosperity, and ideological goals (Wanjohi, 2011). This can occur due to peaceful cooperation with other nations or exploitation.

Of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa (EA) is the most vulnerable to terrorism (Bashir, 2007). Nearly all countries in the East Africa region have been

victims of terrorist acts. The acts were either carried out by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause or were focused on 'extra-national' or 'extra-regional' targets, such as Western targets located in the region (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009). Examples of Western targets in the region that have experienced terrorism include: the 1980 attacks on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya, August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the embassies of the United States of America in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; 2002 simultaneous attacks on Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and on an Israel-bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombasa International Airport, Kenya; July 2011 attacks during the World Cup finals in Kampala, Uganda and the December 2011 bombing of a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi. Local communities in the region have borne the burden of loss of life and property as well as other economic damage due these attacks (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009).

The East Africa region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and inter-state conflict which has led to poverty, instability and political isolation which result in the regions vulnerability to terrorist exploitation. Civil war in Somalia since 1991 has left the country without a fully functioning national Government (despite external efforts to foster national reconciliation) and has been an important factor in fuelling the spread of violent Islamic radicalism in East Africa (Kimunguyi, 2011).

Somalia continues to face violence in the south with rebel forces and terrorist groups using terror tactics. According to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, Somalia has been considered as one of the ten most affected countries by terrorism for the past eight years in a row, having experienced double the number of attacks and deaths in 2014 than in 2013.

In 2013, the Al-Shabaab group was responsible for all claimed attacks. This militant group is allied to Al-Qaeda and has an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 soldiers

(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015). Unlike other Al-Qaeda affiliates, there has been internal wrangles within Al-Shabaab on its objectives, whether it should focus on local and regional objectives or a transcontinental jihad. Al-Shabaab attracts foreign fighters and has partnered with other groups in the past. Al-Shabaab was responsible for the Westgate shopping mall attack in September 2013 in Kenya, which resulted in 67 deaths and 175 injuries reportedly in retaliation of Kenya's military intervention to eradicate the group in Somalia (Institute for Economics and Peace –IEP, 2014); as well as the 2 April 5 2015 massacre at Garissa University where gunmen stormed a university and killed 147 people. Guerrilla warfare is Al-Shabaab's main tactic and the group is structured as an insurgency force divided three areas: law enforcement; intelligence gathering; and military (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015).

Since Kenya's independence, it has pursued a foreign policy based on the fundamental principles of preservation of national security, peaceful co-existence and settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, national interests, non-alignment and adherence to the United Nations Charter and the Africa Union Charter. However, Kenya has now changed its foreign policy orientation, this is dramatically noted through its military operation in Somalia that started in October 2011 and the current focus on five interlinked pillars of diplomacy: peace; economy; culture; environment and diaspora. Even with this shift, Kenya's foreign policy still retains its fundamental principles pursued at the country's independence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2013).

The economic diplomacy pillar aims to achieve a robust and sustained economic transformation in order to secure Kenya's socio-economic development and prosperity to ensures that the country becomes an industrialized middle-income economy by 2030 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2013). The peace diplomacy pillar

seeks to consolidate Kenya's legacy in promoting peace and stability as pre-requisites for prosperity and development in countries within the region. Environmental diplomacy pillar takes note of Kenya's vast stake in the sustainable management of its own natural resources, as well as those of the region and the world. Underlying this commitment is the insistence to confront the impact of environmental problems such as ozone depletion, global climate change, resource degradation and air and ocean pollution, compounded by the increasing world population.

The cultural diplomacy pillar intends to use culture as a vital component in international relations specifically through the use of cultural heritage and endowments as platforms for foreign engagement. Knowledge exchange, values, traditions and aspects of cultural diversity and identity is used to enhance socio-cultural cooperation, strengthen relationships and promote national interests.

The Diaspora diplomacy pillar notes the importance of bringing in the potential diverse skills set and expertise of Kenyans living abroad. Whilst facilitating their integration into the national development agenda. The outlined pillars inform the core priorities and approaches for bilateral and multilateral engagement with the intent to strengthen relationships, enhance social cultural cooperation and promote Kenya's national interests. In 2013, terrorist activity increased significantly throughout the globe with the total number of deaths rising by 61%, 11,133 deaths were recorded in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013. During the same period of time, the number of countries which experienced more than 50 deaths due to terrorism rose from 15 to 24. This shows that not only is the intensity of terrorism increasing, it is spreading as well. Terrorism is a both highly concentrated and globally distributed phenomenon. Although over 80 % of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan,

Afghanistan and Syria. Another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity in the same year (Institute for Economics and Peace –IEP, 2014).

According to Claire (2013), Kenya's conservative low-risk and non-interventionist approach to peace-making and peace-building, that was grounded in principles of 'good neighbourliness' and respect for national sovereignty, changed dramatically in October 2011 with the nation's unprecedented military intervention of Somalia. This action is underpinned by nations growing confidence as an emerging East African power, jointly with a heightened interest in protecting its economic interests. Kenya in the center of an unprecedented military effort to stabilise Somalia, jointly engaged in a regional and global diplomatic stabilisation effort that is noted to be high-risk and multifaceted (Claire, 2013). This study set out to establish the influence that terror activities in Kenya's territory had on shifts in the country's foreign policy between the years 2005 to 2020.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

With terror activities now noted as a leading threat to global security, combating terrorism has become a critical agenda for Kenya's external relations and a key subject of its strategic partnerships (Kenya, 2016). In 2011, Kenya made a pivotal step in the shift of how it engages with the world as part of a general trajectory towards more strategic, self-interested and assured policymaking (Claire, 2013). Kenya's unprecedented military engagement as a foreign policy instrument in Somalia is conceivably an inevitable part of this shift (Claire, 2013). While it clearly represents a break from the norm, it is not demonstrative of a more expansionist policy or agenda than in the past. Somalia's case is deemed unique such that the intervention is part of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that was implemented by the Kibaki Government

(2002-2013), that followed the more introspective and deferential Moi years (1978-2002). Both international and local scholars have studied the topic of foreign policy in various aspects such as e-diplomacy, foreign policy transformation. However, based on the researcher's knowledge and available literature, there is limited study that has been undertaken to investigate the triggers, changes aimed at countering terror and the effectiveness of the changes in Kenya's foreign policy as influenced by terror activities. This study therefore sought to answer the question, how have foreign policy shift in Kenya been influenced by terror activities in the country between years 2005 and 2020?

1.4 Purpose of the Study

As terrorists become bolder and intensify their activities, citizens of the world become more exposed to insecurity which at the end of the day affect lives and livelihoods in numerous ways. Governments react and respond to these security threats by putting in place laws and policies that enhance security of their citizens by preventing or significantly eliminating the security threats brought about by terrorism. The purpose of this research therefore is to study the shifts and adjustments that the government of Kenya made between years 2005 to 2020 to in response to terror activities during this period to protect its citizens and also play the all-important global duty of combating terrorism.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

1.5.1 General Objective

The general objective of this research study was to establish the influence terror activities have had on Kenya's foreign policy shift between the years 2005 to 2020.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this study are as outlined below;

i) To assess the influence of radicalization on foreign policy transformations in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020.
ii) To establish how terrorism financing inspired foreign policy shift in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020.
iii) To determine the influence of cyberterrorism on foreign policy changes in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020.
iv) To assess the challenges experienced in the implementation of foreign policy shift in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020.

1.6 Research Questions

i) What is influence of radicalization on foreign policy transformations in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020?
ii) How has terrorism financing inspired foreign policy shift in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020?
iii) What is the influence of cyberterrorism on foreign policy changes in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020?
iv) Which challenges have been experienced in implementation of foreign policy shift in Kenya between the years 2005 to 2020?

1.7 Significance of the Study

Research is important for the following reasons: knowledge, practice improvement and informs policy debates (Creswell, 2012). The study's findings will help the Government of Kenya to gain insights on areas that need more attention in

terms of foreign policy changes integration. In addition, the study will provide important perceptions into core matters between the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations. Thus, the findings of this study will provide the necessary information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence and their various partners for purposes of executing foreign policy. The study will also contribute to the existing body of knowledge and provides literature to scholars in the field of peace, security, international relations and other related fields. In addition, the study will also be reference material for future researchers and scholars on the related topic. Finally, the study will help the general population to understand the changes in Kenya's foreign policy and the triggers for the change. Also, the public will be able to comprehend Kenya's role in the region as implied by the change dimension of her foreign policy. Finally, this research paper is also an effort to open up and contribute to the existing literature on the terrorism and policies put forward by nations to combat the scourge.

1.8 Scope of the Study

The scope of the study focused on foreign policy changes with greater alienation to the external sources of triggers to the change i.e. terrorism. The research involved Senior Officers from KDF, National Intelligence Services (NIS), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), Political Diplomatic Secretary Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officers from the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit. Geographically, the study is was concerned with Kenya's territory. The period of focus is between the years 2005 and 2020. .

1.9 Delimitation of the Study

Delimitations are characteristics that limit the scope and define the area of your study (Simon, 2011). Delimitations describe the scope of the study or establish parameters or limits for the study. Participation of the respondents in the study was delimited as follows: Senior Officers from KDF, National Intelligence Services (NIS), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), Political Diplomatic Secretary Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officers from the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit. , This was restricted to only those that are engaged in the field of international peace, foreign policy administration and security agencies. Further, in order to assure manageability of the collected data, survey instruments mostly included quantitative questions and few open-ended response items. While acknowledging that terror activities are wide and varied, this study excluded the activities of local insurgent groups whose criminal activities (some) mirror those of the known terrorist groups but are themselves not terrorist. These include vigilante groups and criminal gangs. This study also ought to have but did not take into consideration shifts on foreign policy shifts in the years preceding 2005.

1.10 Limitations of the Study

Limitations of the study were; inaccurate information that selected respondents could give due to either fear of the topic on terrorism or they may have been victims of a terrorist attack, reluctance to provide information by respondents due to concern of national security. However, the limitations were dealt with by aptly informing the respondents that the findings of the research would add immense value in their activities aimed at fighting terrorism in Kenya. The researcher provided all the necessary

documentation from relevant ministerial offices, to show that this was an authorized academic study that shall not impinge on national security.

1.11 Assumptions of the Study

According to Simon (2011) assumptions are matters that are somewhat out of the researcher's control, though if they were to disappear, the study would become irrelevant. The research study was based on the assumptions that Kenya's foreign policy has shifted, therefore resulting in Kenya's military operation in Somalia in October 2011. The study also assumed that the selected respondents were knowledgeable and would agree to give reliable information regarding the study objectives.

1.12 Theoretical Framework

1.12.1 Realism Theory

Hans J. Morgenthau's realism theory is based on the following three core assumptions about how the world works: groupism, power centrism and egoism (Wohlforth, 2012). Today the most import human groups are nation-states and the most important source of in-group cohesion is nationalism; this is an example of groupism, a core assumption of the realism theory where solidarity and cohesion as group is needed by humans in order to survive. The second core assumption is power centrism, where social influence (control) and resources, both of whom are disproportionally endowed to some groups or individuals which are key to politics in any area. Thirdly, the egoism assumption is where about political behaviour is driven by self-interest due to the fact that egoism is rooted in human nature, and power-centrism, which is a fundamental part of politics and power in both terms of social influence (control) and resources. Based on the realism theory, it is clear that there is an emphasis on the role

of national power, a state's domestic environment and the character of states (Morgenthau, 1948). The researcher uses the theory to analyse the triggers of Kenya's foreign policy changes on its power centrism and if there are any effects on its group cohesion as a state.

1.12.2 Human Motivation Theory

This theory was developed by Psychologist David McClelland in the 1960s. This motivational theory states that every person has one of three main driving motivators: the needs for achievement, affiliation, or power. Consequently, Individuals' needs for success, power, and association have a major impact on their actions (Rybnicek, Bergner & Gutschelhofer, 2019). McClelland's theory of needs is not restricted to employee motivation of employees but is widely applicable to other contexts such as terrorism as in the case of this study. In using the three driving motivators, motivations behind terrorism can be explained. Terrorists, it can therefore be deduced, engage in terror activities in order to achieve their goals of destroying the public's sense of security, attain maximum attainable publicity and prove from the targets such as governments. Terrorist also conduct their activities to have the sense of feeling that they have the power therefore are in control. An ideal example in this case is in countries such as Somalia and Iraq where terrorist have successfully or are almost successfully running down the governments and occupy and control significant regions in these countries.

1.13 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework depicts the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable and how each of the indicators of the independent

variables influence Kenya's foreign policy shift in combating terrorism. Radicalization has the potential effect of making radicalized individuals to detest their government if the ideology is political, hate people of other religions if the radical message takes a religious dimension and hate other ethnic communities if that is the goal the terrorist in tend to achieve. In instances where such a terror activities is being directed towards the country by external aggressors, the government will have no option but to shift its policies to restrict the available avenues for the terrorists to radicalize its citizens. Similarly, policies are shifted as and when appropriate to deny terrorists funds by preventing illegal activities and preventing the flow of the legally or illegally earned money from coming into or going out of the country to fund their activities. The internet space has also been exploited by terrorist to conduct attacks of different types from passing propaganda information, recruiting people into their cells, stealing information and destroying databases of public and private institutions. New policies must therefore be developed and the existing ones shifted to prevent terrorist attacks and to arrest and punish those who engage in such activities as a means of deterrence. Implementation of the adjusted policies is never a smooth sail and the process and its related activities are bound to face numerous challenges such as Laxity in policy enforcement, Poor coordination among security agencies, Poor sensitization of civilians and Poor coordination with international partners as depicted by the indicators of fourth independent variable in the conceptual framework.




Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework
Source: Researcher, (2021)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Centered on the study's thematic areas and basic goals, this chapter offers a thorough overview of previous research studies. The information gaps, which were outlined in the last section of this chapter and on which this study was based, were derived from a review of relevant literature and research related to the basic objectives of this study.

2.2 Empirical Review

2.2.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations

One of the key objectives of terrorist organizations is usually to turn people against their governments, or turn different social groups living in the same community against one another. Besides, terrorist work to ensure continuity of their groups long after the leaders and founders of the groups are jailed or dead. The main strategy to achieve these is through radicalization which refers to the process by which individuals are induced to adopt extremist ideologies that can lead them to commit terrorist acts or make them more susceptible to recruitment into terrorist groups (Qureshi, 2020). Often young people are the targets and the contexts in which they join the terror groups vary and include being duped, trafficked, kidnapped, or forcibly recruited. Vulnerabilities that expose individuals to radicalization and eventual recruitment include factors such as appeal of a group-based identity, geographic proximity to a terrorist group, economic and financial vulnerability, perceptions that one's community has been socially or politically marginalized, exposure to permissive social networks such as friends and family member, and exposure to extremist propaganda (Darden, 2019).

Governments, for these reasons, have to contend with radicalization because if left unchecked it could spread quickly and a whole society could get radicalized. Policy and practice has been widely applied by governments to address the threat terrorism through radicalization. A research study on countering radicalization in America, Vidino (2010) established that in order to fight radicalization in Muslim-majority where terrorism and radicalization was prevalent, there were notable policy shift from deterrence to preemption by the US government. The government of US shifted its policies to work closely with some Muslim-majority countries like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia that, having been the first targets of Al-Qaeda–inspired attacks, had engineered counter-radicalization programs that focused on deradicalization and disengagement. The effectiveness of these programs were irresistible to U.S. policymakers who were then moved to shift their policies in order to work closely with these countries to counter radicalization and other terrorist activities.

Across the world, top national security officials have constantly been engaged in conversations about how to confront radicalization through legislations and policies. The continuous transformation of foreign policy is motivated by identification gaps in understanding of radicalization as well as metamorphism of terrorists' activities. In a research study conducted on US, Nowrasteh (2017) observed that the foreign policy shift initiated by President Trump's Executive Order dubbed the Muslim Ban was motivated by the belief, at least by the president and a few of his handlers, that nationals from the affected six Muslim majority countries; Iran, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Sudan and Libya were potential security threats who, among other terror activities, were engaged in radicalization and recruitment of Americans to join terrorist groups. Although the move was not popular in some quarters, the shift in policy to profile and suspended US visas to foreign nationals of these Muslim majority countries was seen

by others as a government's attempt to keep terror activities at bay. Maghraoui (2006) and Haynie (2016) aver that the federal government of the US is note alive to realities. They argue that the US government still does not have an integrated and sustainable strategy to confront religious extremism in the Muslim world and that the government is in denial that its counterterrorism policy has largely failed to address the fact that female combatants are active in most violent extremist groups. Their proposal with regard to policy shift is, for these reasons that the US government should consider backing the "Islamic renewal," which to them is a diffuse but growing social, political, and intellectual movement whose goal is to reform of Muslim societies and polities profoundly.

Hlatky and Ibrahim (2017) in their research found that in Canada policy-makers focus on application of preventative, soft power strategies to drivers of radicalization and combat threats of terrorism. This shift in foreign policy was in response recommendations by the country's scholars that Canada's foreign policy should be shifted towards endeavours that alleviate conditions that propagate vulnerability to radicalization thus contributing to terrorism. This, if effectively done, according to these two authors, would besides terrorism be integral in addressing domestic violent extremism currently being experienced in Canada perpetuated by social, racial and ethnic differences in certain communities. In the face of jihadist related incidents in besides the far-right and far-left violent extremism, Germany has significantly shifted it counter-terrorism policies over the years. In the recent past, policies have been shifted to incorporate a multidimensional approach by the Ministry of the Interior. These shifts include civic education to reinforce fundamental liberal democratic values, attempts to foster interfaith and religious-political dialogue, and broader policies aimed at improving integration and social cohesion within German society. Further, the

Germany government have also moved to counter and refute extremist ideologies, narratives and messaging. An ideal example to demonstrate this is the establishment by the Federal Government of formal, institutionalised dialogue between Muslims and the security services to fight radicalisation, violence, and jihadism. The overarching goal was to identify and challenge radicalisation at an early stage (Butt & Tuck, 2014).

Radicalisation and violent extremism is a major security concern which the Turkish government is constantly contending with. In Turkey terror cells such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda and other extremist groups like Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C) are heavily involved in radicalization and recruitment of individuals into their groups. Activities which pose threat to the stability of the country. The shift in policies by the Turkish government, with the support of organizations like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), through implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 in the year 2001 was aimed at suppressing the activities of these terror and rebel groups including radicalization and prevention of young Turkish from being attracted to the lure of the terrorist groups (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014; Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013). Research studies by San (2020) and Darden (2019) established that shifts and transformations in Turkey's countering violent extremism (CVE) policies which encompass interventions like support, religious counselling, educational and employment incentives are aimed at interrupting the activities of the radicalizers, removing them from the field and making it unattractive for individuals to join the terror groups.

Radicalization, along with other terror activities, has become a focus for governments and their security agencies which have increasingly become more engrossed in recent years with control and preventive strategies to counter this

contributor of domestic and global insecurity (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). Across Africa, top national security officials are constantly engaged in conversations about how to confront radicalization through legislation and policy shifts and enhancements. The continuous transformation of domestic and foreign policy is motivated by identification of gaps in understanding of radicalization as well as metamorphism of terrorists' activities. The enduring frosty relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbour Sudan finally began thawing when Ethiopia softened its stance and eased its previously tough foreign policies with regard to diplomatic relations with Sudan. Historically the two countries had poor relations from 1995 until late 1998. Before 1998, Ethiopia was among the African countries party to the American-led "frontline states" policy against Sudan. Ethiopia considered Sudan its enemy because of the exportation of Islamic radicalism from Sudan into its territory posing a serious security threat. Further, Sudan supported a number of rebel organizations in Ethiopian that intended to overthrow the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia retaliated by offering support to Sudanese rebels including military assistance to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) whose main objective was to stage a coup, overthrow and replace the government. The hostility against Sudan came to an end after Ethiopia shifted its foreign policy attitude against Sudan and normalized its foreign relations its southern neighbour (United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

Prior to 2011 Kenya's defence forces had never gone on an offensive military missions save for multilateral peacekeeping missions. This is because the defence policy restricted such activities. However, with the increasing terror threat from Al-Shabaab who began operating almost freely and conducting their activities in the country, including radicalization of youths at the Kenyan coast, almost at will, it was time for the government to change realign its defence and foreign policies to protect

Kenya's territorial integrity and ensure safety and security of its citizens from external assailants. The 2011 Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) engagement in pursuit of the Al-Shabaab deep into Somalia's territory marked a paradigm shift in the practice of Kenya's foreign policy (Kaburu, 2020). Moreover, Mwanika (2015) and Kaburu (2017) in their respective research studies established that the shift in policy to delve into Somalia's territory was informed by the need for a more politically stable Horn of Africa. An assessment of the efficacy of the KDF's intervention in Somalia established that the move had been ineffective in managing transnational terrorism because the counter-radicalization programs that were put in place were weak and disjointed and civil society groups were ineffectually engaged in such programs (Chumba 2016). Besides intervention in Somalia, the Kenyan government, given its relatively limited military intelligence capacity, has also partnered with foreign military and security agencies, mostly US, UK and Israeli intelligence officers, in the fight against radicalization (Patterson, 2015).

2.2.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift

Attah (2019) notes that terrorism has been able to grow and spread worldwide especially in the last two decades thanks to the important role played by its financing. Terror groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Boko Haram and ISIL have established ways of acquiring funds to finance their activities which comprise recruitment, training of their members, compensation to family members of those being sent to suicide missions, purchase of weapons, purchase of intelligence and supporting their offshoot cells. Terrorist organizations use various means such as money laundering, drug trafficking, market manipulation, fraud and tax evasion to raise cash for these activities. As terrorism financing continues to influence and shape both domestic and foreign policies

of many countries across the world, governments across the world have over the years had to shift their foreign and even domestic policies to ensure that as much as possible terrorist organizations are starved of the much needed funds as demonstrated in the findings of various literature reviewed herein.

The US is arguably the most targeted country in the world by these terrorist groups. Its interests domestically and abroad are constant targets of terror groups like ISIS, ISIL, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Being the number one target for terrorist together with its European counterparts, the US government is regularly shifting its policies appropriately to secure itself and its partners from terror attacks. As evidenced by the findings of previous studies, terrorism financing is one of the key aspects that the US is intent on combating. The US government works closely with the country's legislative institutions have had to find ways of stopping terrorism financing by tightening its policies to seal any potential loopholes their terrorists and their sympathizers can use to access funds. The relationship between US and Sudan for a long time was severed following claims by the US that the government of Sudan was a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993 (Mumuni, 2017). This led to US policy shift declaring Sudan and enemy of the US and other countries fighting terrorism thus leading to suspension of US Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996. After periods of sustained pressure and sanctions by the US and other countries, the US recently shifted its foreign policy against Sudan and removed it from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism after and payment of penalties by the government of Sudan (Bearak & Mohieddin, 2020). Through global alliances the US has engaged various partners in the fight against terrorism. Previous studies have shown the US federal government has in the past facilitated and provided foreign governments and other international organizations and with policy-relevant research and analysis to help them in the fight

against terrorism financing. Other policy shifts in the US to disrupt and combat terrorism financing have encompassed the freezing of suspected terrorist's financial accounts during investigations without approval of courts. This denied the suspects right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise (Rollins & Wyler, 2013; Millar & Rosand, 2008).

The European Union (EU) is another major target of the global terror organizations. Risks of terrorism financing through activities such as money laundering is therefore a reality and a major concern for the EU's financial system. Empirical studies' findings show the EU has also been actively revising and improving its policies, both foreign and domestic, to ensure stronger ant-terrorism financing rules. Bakowski and van Ballegooij (2018) established that in the recent years, the EU has initiated and a raft of measures to augment and strengthen its laws and policies to make eliminate or make it extremely difficult for terrorists and their sympathizers to engage in activities that promote terror financing. In June 2018 the Council for European Union shifted its policy on anti-money laundering, for instance, by giving reinforcing the authority of financial supervision authorities to improve their access to and exchange of information on customers and transactions between them and the commercial institutions. Another policy shift influenced by the terrorism financing is the directive that the Commission maintains a list of non-EU nations considered risky due to deficiencies in their anti-money laundering prevention regimes, countries like Afghanistan, Bahamas, Ghana, Syria and Zimbabwe among others, and subsequently demanded that financial transactions with these countries require additional due diligence measures. These policy transferrals, contained in the fifth anti-money laundering directive (EU) 2018/843 and the directive (EU) 2015/849 are aimed at making it difficult for sympathizers and accomplices of terror organizations to conceal

illegal funds under layers of fictitious companies and to strengthen checks on the third countries considered by the Commission to be risky (Bloemkolk, 2015). The ultimate goal is to combat terrorism by tackling terrorism financing.

In Africa, countering terrorism is now a critical part of peace and security agenda and as evidenced by the positively evolving foreign policy attitudes across different countries in the continent. The nations perceived by the terror groups as pro-West supporters in the fight against international terrorism have borne the greatest brunt of the terrorist attacks. Most of these attacks are propagated by terrorists from immediate neighbouring countries who receive financial and material support from the parent terror cell they are affiliated to and in some instances from sympathizers from immediate neighbouring countries or within the attacked countries (Dingji, Koldaş & Aksit, 2020). The hostility scenario between Ethiopia and Sudan was also punctuated by many aspects of terrorism financing. The government of former president Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was accused of financially supporting a number of regional terrorist organizations. Additionally, the Sudanese government was reproached for giving sanctuary, material support and assets to Osama bin Laden during his stay there from 1991 to 1996 (Duursma & Müller, 2019). This led to anti-Sudan policies being put in place by its neighbours like Uganda (for financially and materially supporting the Lord's Resistance Army), Eritrean (for financial support and providing sanctuary to Islamic Jihad), Ethiopia (for financial and military support and proving save haven to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia) and other countries like Egyptian whose president Hosni Mubarak the terrorists harboured by the Sudan government attempted to assassinate in 1995. However, pressure from the US post 9/11 and the accompanying sanctions compelled Sudan to clamp down on terrorist and withdraw financial and any other form of support it previously gave the terrorist and

rebel groups. Subsequently, the countries that had anti-Sudan policies began shifting their policies and softening their stance with Khartoum and improve their relations restoring full diplomatic ties in the process except for Egypt and Eritrea who still have strained relations with their southern and eastern neighbour respectively, Sudan (Darwisheh, 2020; Nur, 2013; Schomerus & Titeca, 2012; United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

The government of Kenya is alive to the fact that countering terrorism financing is one of the most effective ways to fight terrorism because in the greatest scheme it prevents future attacks by disrupting their material support. It has therefore made it a priority to develop policy responses and shift the existing ones to all aspects of terrorism financing. In aligning its foreign and domestic policies in line with those of international organizations like Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in order to effectively be part of combating crime, the government of Kenya has adjusted its policies to encompass correspondent banking with foreign banks, made it mandatory for all financial institutions operating within its territory to have customer due diligence and record keeping has part of their operations policies, and made it mandatory for these financial institutions to report suspicious transactions among other raft of measures (Central Bank of Kenya, 2018; Desta & Cockayne, 2012).

2.2.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes

Just how much impact does cyberterrorism have on foreign policy decisions? This is the question some researchers have attempted to answer through research studies that sought to establish policy decisions that governments across the world have taken in the past to keep pace and enhance their cyber defences while protecting their territories and interest as well as those of their neighbours. According to Al-Suwaidi

and Nobanee (2020) and Ogunlana (2019), cyberterrorists use the internet to disseminate information, spread propaganda, radicalize their targets, demonize opponents - who in most cases are governments, and solicit support for their ideologies and positions. Further, cyberterrorist use the internet platform to attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data. In line with this information, Tereshchenko (2013) advances that for policy makers, understanding the objectives, the means and intended consequences terrorists could and would want to use the cyber domain as opposed to or in addition to other terror activities for terror attacks purposes is essential to formulating the best policy practices or shifting the existing ones in order to preventing and managing the emergence of a cyber-empowered terrorist organizations. In a research study carried out by van der Meer (2015) to assess the foreign policy response of countries like the US, Estonia, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, the researcher established that each of these countries adjusted their foreign policy instruments and, among other actions, imposed sanctions on the countries that shielded the aggressors, such as Iran, thus limiting the damage of a cyber-attacks.

In separate studies, Denning (2000) and Tereshchenko (2013) researched on the role that cyberterrorism has played in shaping and influencing policy formulation and adjustments in the US. Arguing that cyberterrorism is largely in its formative stages, the two studies established that the US has over the years largely been involved in shifting its foreign policies to establish mutual legal assistance treaties, the sharing of intelligence, deportation and common computer crime laws to facilitate arrest, investigation and prosecution of cyberterrorists even when their crimes cross international borders. The international cooperation is demonstrated by the US working together with its international partners both state and non-state actors to ratify a number

of conventions on arms control in cyberspace. Tereshchenko (2013) further established that besides the US, Russia has also been keen in joining forces to address terrorism. According to the findings of the study, the government of held talks with the arms committee of the UN Security Council to, through policy shift, join forces with the US and other developed nations to join forces in combating cyberterrorism. These interstates relations are informed by the fact that terrorism is pervasive and widespread such as that terror groups are able to develop, share and access information across borders.

Rethinking foreign policy practice in the face of intensified and innovative terrorism acts such as the use internet and computers (cyberterrorism) is essential for every nation that wants to keep abreast in the fight against terrorism and beat the terrorists in their own game. Cyberterrorism have been shown to influence foreign terrorism towards aggressive, emotionally driven foreign policy responses. In a study conducted across different countries to establish the reaction of the public to terrorist-instigated cyber-attacks the researchers established that exposure to terror threats such as cyberterrorism motivated strong public support for retaliatory policies with the public increasingly demand that their government to implement and retaliatory policies to deter the terrorists from attacking their countries in future (Kupatadze & Zeitzoff 2019). Similar findings were reached in a separate study that also established that terrorism conducted through the digital platform (cyberterrorism) have substantial effect on public support for retaliatory policies which in some instances governments have been forced to adopt in order to protect their countries (Shandler, Gross, Backhaus & Canetti, 2021).

A study conducted between 2013 and 2016 across different countries showed that just like the other forms of terror attacks, cyberterrorism leaves victims, and even

those related to them, with feelings of stress, anxiety, insecurity, heightened perception of risk and support for forceful government policies. As a result, governments are either compelled or voluntarily shift their policies towards internet surveillance, high regulation of internet activities government and in some instances forceful military response to cyberterrorism (Gross, Canetti & Vashdi, 2017).

In the continent of Africa, empirical research on the effects of cyberterrorism on policy shift it still in its infancy. This is portrayed by the absence of systematic, methodologically sound data collection and analysis (Cavelty 2018). African has in the last decade witnessed significant achievements in building Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructures and internet access and penetration has grown rapidly. While ICT and internet have become matters of strategic importance in spurring economic growth and development, enhancing free flow of information and promoting gains in efficiency and productivity across the continent, they have also opened up new opportunities for perpetrating cybercrime such as cyberterrorism thus dealing a blow to national, regional, continental and international peace and security. Increase to internet access has subsequently led to increase in issues relating to cybersecurity and cybercrime. African government therefore have the responsibility to ensure that their citizens and private business as well as the government interests and ICT infrastructure and internet space are protected. The available few literature reveal that creation of continent-wide harmonized robust response capabilities and enactment of appropriate and effective national policies are some of the measures already being taken by African governments working collaboratively to address cyberterrorism and other forms of cybercrime. These strategies include among others the Convention on Cybersecurity and personal data protection –dubbed Malabo Convention - adopted in 2014, which seeks to establishment of a Legal Framework for Cyber-security and

Personal Data Protection and sets broad guidelines for incrimination and repression of cybercrime (Ogonji, 2019; Eno-Akpa, 2016).

2.2.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift

Policy implementation is defined as the mechanisms, resources, and relationships that link the policies to program action. Implementations encompasses all processes and activities from the technical and relational aspects stipulating the institutions responsible for implementation and also guaranteeing that the institutions have the capacity for implementation and that the relations among institutions are conducive for collaboration (Hardee, Irani, MacInnis & Hamilton, 2012). Policy implementation is a non-linear, complex and difficult process. The process does not take place in a closed systems thus, because to the disruptions of the normalcy that policy shift comes with and the resultant changes in the structure and rules, the implementation process is bound to be politicized and fragmented. Consequently, for policy changes to be effective, institutionalization of policy domains and the implementation process must be considered as important as the policy creation process as well as the policy itself.

Hudson, Hunter and Peckham (2019) assessed policy-implementation gap and the associated challenges that faced policy implementation thus causing policy failure in the UK. The findings of the study were to the effect that implementation in dispersed governance, deficient collaborative policymaking among key players in the implementation process and the vagaries of the political cycle and politicization of the policies ominously drew back the implementation process. Implementation in dispersed governance addresses the difficulty of achieving consistency in delivery at subnational level. Inadequate collaborative policymaking touches on the siloes approach to policy

development where policy formulation tend to be done in distinct administrative siloes even though most interventions will almost certainly have wider implications that affect external parties. The absence of collaboration and coordination in the formulation stage therefore makes the implementation phase even more challenging. Politicians are rarely held accountable for the outcomes of their policy initiatives, more so in the undemocratic nations and in countries where democracy is at infant stage. Additionally, one the politician exist the political office, the new administration is likely to discontinue or alternatively shift the policy to suit their beliefs.

In much of Africa as is indeed in other Global South countries, implementation of foreign policy is impeded by two critical factors; destitution characterized by unemployment, inequity and inequality as well as control by foreign countries through foreign aid assistance. In an assessment of developmental foreign policy implementation in South Africa, Brynard (2011) argues that due to high levels of poverty in the country implementation of these policies become a serious challenge because the people who, in a way, directly and indirectly supposed to be implementation these policies are not motivated to do. In the same vein, Landsberg (2005) argues that sustained and prolonged periods of white supremacy coupled with high influence of donors significantly antagonize efforts by the South African government to implement its developmental foreign policy. Nigeria is another country which has witnessed significant shift in its foreign policies, shifts which have been marked by varying degrees of success and failure in the implementation of the policies. The belief and idea that economically weak countries like Nigeria do not have the wherewithal and the might to create foreign policies that are able to shake, shape and influence world affairs presents an impediment to the implementation of foreign policies especially among the developing countries. The effect of this is that the

implementation is done superficially and without zeal (Lawal & Aluko; Sule, 2012). Another study established that besides professional deficiency implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy implementation was faced obstacles such as poor staffing and training as well as inadequate funding required for successful implementation (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016). In Chad, Dingji, Koldaş & Aksit (2020) established that inability of relevant players to operationalize the various counterterrorist financing (CTF) policies against terror groups like Boko Haram proved to be a major setback in the fight against terrorism.

As established by Boaz (2017), diversity can be a source of serious challenges in foreign policy implementation. Diversity not just in terms of ideologies but also in terms of interests instigated by underlying differences in geographic region of origin and ethnic background have proven to impede implementation in Africa as evidenced by the findings of the study on challenges of foreign policies implementation in Africa. These diversities have the effect of creating a sense of ownership with some groups feeling that they were not their input in the policy making process was not sought or was not adequately considered thus making the implementation process a great challenge. To address such challenges beforehand and minimize the possibilities for misinterpretations and misconception of the aims and objectives of foreign policy, the researcher advances for creation of structures that permits classification and ownership of policy the initiatives by the diverse interest groups. Based on the research findings on a study on Kamande (2017) argues that in countries like Kenya where there are more than one levels of governance, county governments in the case of Kenya, effective implementation of foreign policy is impede by non-involvement of the other government tiers. This is because as opposed to domestic policies, formulation of foreign policies is a preserve of the national government thus the deliberate decision to

leave out the other tiers of government during the policy formulation and decision making stage. However, it this decision, which is in most cases is the right approach, that comes back to haunt the national government during implementation. Conflicting interests between the national and lower tier government, captured or not captured in the foreign policy document. These divergences in interest result from a wide array of facets such as environment, human rights, energy flow, and cultural exchanges among others all which are a concern of the other tiers of government which they believe should form a significant component of the agenda in foreign policy and international relations.

2.3 Summary and Research Gaps

The foregoing literature review established that over the years countries shift their policies depending on prevailing and situations. These shifts are made because of various reasons. In the context of this study, the shifts in policies are informed by the need to protect and secure their countries from acts of terrorism. The reviewed literature have revealed that during the period under review and even before, governments shifted their policies in order to collaborate with other governments and non-state players to combat terrorism, adjusting the policies to get offensive and attack terrorists in foreign lands, to stifle avenues through which terrorists make or transfer finances and to punish those who engage in internet and computer-based acts of terror. The objectives among others are to combat and end terrorism in domestically and across the globe.

Most of these studies have however focused on Western World countries. There is a glaring knowledge and research gap on Africa. Further, numerous research studies on terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya, some basic and important gaps remain with regard to application of foreign policy and counterterrorism. The number of studies

conducted to establish how terror activities have influenced Kenya's foreign policy over the years remain limited. Moreover, there has not been much research identifying impediments that hamper implementation of the shifts in foreign policy. In order to understand the influence of domestic and international terror activities on Kenya's foreign policy shift there is need to conduct a study to investigate the approaches that have been taken to combat the three aspects of terrorism identified in this study. This study thus aims to fill the research gap in regard to shifts in Kenya's foreign policy to combat and the counter terrorism scourge that has considerably affected the country in numerous way for more than two decades.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The study's research methodology is presented in this chapter. It explains the steps that were taken to complete the research. This chapter covers the research design, sample population, sampling methods and procedures, data collection procedures and tools, data processing and reporting, as well as ethical issues.

3.2 Research Design

According to Rahi (2017), research design is the overall approach used by a researcher to combine the various components of a study in a coherent and logical manner in order to ensure that the research issue is effectively addressed. The descriptive research design was chosen for this study because it helps the researcher to accurately portray the participants without interfering with their responses. The researcher worked with security actors who are familiar with the multiagency approach in this situation. This research design is also suitable for assessing the cause and effect relationship between the multiagency strategy and Kenya's counter-terrorism efforts. This analysis was conducted using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Williams (2014) advances that adoption of both approaches is essential in improving the study's outcomes and conclusions by ensuring that the flaws in one strategy are balanced out by the strengths of the other.

3.3 Research Site

Despite the fact that the terrorism phenomenon existed in Kenya, the research study was primarily performed in Nairobi, where the numerous agencies whose

employees were involved in the study were based. Nairobi, as Kenya's capital, is home to the state security agencies' headquarters as well as the ministry of home affairs, from which strategies are formulated and then cascaded down to the smallest units at local levels for implementation. The National Counter Terrorism Centre's (NCTC) headquarters, which brings together members from different state security agencies to gather the necessary data, as well as the headquarters of targeted departments participating in the multiagency strategy, were visited for data collection. The Security Law Amendment Act of 2014 created the NCTC as a legal entity. It is a multi-agency instrument, predominantly comprised of intelligence forces, designed to improve counter-terrorism cooperation. The institution's responsibilities include coordinating national counter-terrorism activities, raising public awareness about terrorism prevention, designing counter-radicalization and de-radicalization initiatives, and assisting in capacity building in counter-terrorism and prevention (NCTC, 2020).

3.4 Target Population

A target population is a group of individuals or items that share common measurable characteristics of a particular nature that distinguishes them from other populations and from which a researcher wishes to collect data. It's the group of people to which a researcher applied the findings of a survey (Thompson, 2012). The target population of this study comprised of the KDF, National Intelligence Services (NIS), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) (NCTC, 2020). The study also targeted officers from the Political Diplomatic Secretary Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officers from the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit. These are the specific major actors involved in formulation and

implementation, including shifting, of foreign affairs policies aimed at combating terrorism in the country.

Table 3.1: Target Population

Target Population	**Frequency**
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit	681
Kenya Defence Forces	307
National Intelligence Service	143
Directorate of Criminal Investigations	132
Political Diplomatic Secretary Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	8
Banking Fraud Investigations Unit	12
Total	**1,283**

Source*:* State Department of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020, Ministry of Finance 2020

3.5 Determination of Study Sample

3.5.1 Sampling Procedure

Participants for this research were chosen using non-probability sampling, specifically heterogeneous sampling. This method of non-probability sampling, according to Moser and Korstjens (2018), entails collecting data from a diverse group of people with various points of view in order to investigate a phenomenon. As a result, in this research, individuals from various categories of the target population are likely to have differing viewpoints on the study's goals, which offers a wealth of information about the topic under investigation and helps to enrich the study's results.

3.5.2 Sample Size

Kadam and Bhalerao (2010) aver that the sample size for any research study should be calculated based on satisfactory levels of significance, nature of the study, expected effect size, underlying event rate in the population, and standard deviation in

the population. As presented below, Yamane's (1967) sample size formula was used to calculate this study's sample size;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where;

n is the sample size

N is the population size

e is the alpha level

Using the formula, the sample size for this study was 304 individuals, and the numbers were distributed as shown in Table 3.2.

$$n = \frac{1{,}283}{1 + 1{,}283(0.05)^2} = 304$$

Random sample sizes and disproportionate methods was used to distribute the selected individuals across the different strata as explained in the sampling procedure and portrayed in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Distribution of the Sample Size

Target Population	**Frequency**	**Proportion (%)**
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit	161	53
Kenya Defence Forces	72	24
National Intelligence Service	33	11

Directorate of Criminal Investigations	30	10
Political Diplomatic Secretary Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	3	1
Banking Fraud Investigations Unit	5	1
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.6 Data Collection Procedure and Instruments

3.6.1 Developing of Instruments

This study employed two tools during data collections. The first part of the study involved data collection using a well-structured, semi-structured comprehensive questionnaires. The questionnaire (Appendix I) was used to collect data exclusively from officers from Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Kenya Defence Forces and the National Intelligence Service. In the second part of the study, interviews were held with key informants specifically from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Political Diplomatic Secretary Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit. Similarly, a semi-structured interview schedule was developed for the study (Appendix II). Each of the data collections tools was structured into five main sections. Provision for collection of bio-data and background information of the respondents formed the first section. Section two of the data collection instruments encompassed questions based on the first objective of the study (influence of radicalization on foreign policy transformations). The third section covered the second objective of the study (terrorism financing). The third objective of the study (influence of cyberterrorism on foreign policy changes) made up the fourth section of the instruments. The final section of the instruments was founded on the study's fourth objective. Questions in all the data collection instruments included the intervening variables of the study topic.

Accurate data collection, essential to maintaining the integrity of research, was done in an established systematic manner throughout the county to enable the researcher to answer the research questions and accurately evaluate the outcomes. Data collection was carried out in two weeks. The first week involved administration of questionnaires to the groups identified above. The research assistant was used to distribute the and collect questionnaires from the field. They also assisted with helping the respondents in understanding the questions in instances where the respondents had difficulties understanding questions. It was important to ensure that all questions were fully answered and all the questionnaires collected from the field. In the second week of data collection the researcher, with the aid of the research assistants, engaged key informants from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Political Diplomatic Secretary Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit in online interviews because of the prevailing pandemic. The interviews were conducted based on the interview schedule and will be crucial in understanding the study subject at a deeper level.

3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments

Pilot testing is a time best spent on any research project and allows a researcher to test the research approach with a small number of test participants before conducting the main study (Malmqvist, Hellberg, Möllås, Rose & Shevlin, 2019). Prior to undertaking the study, a pilot test was conducted to assess the feasibility and suitability of the procedures for survey participant recruitment, usability of the survey instrument, data collection processes, and data analysis. To determine the feasibility of the study protocol, a pilot study was conducted in Nakuru County due to its proximity to Nairobi County. During this test, the provisional study protocol was adhered to. This involved

a reduced-scale version of the complete survey, from respondent recruitment to data analysis. In testing participant recruitment, the researcher invited 40 individuals to participate in the pilot study. Participants were then given the data collection instruments to fill. The data collection process and progress was observed and the response rate recorded. The general reception and perception of the study by the participants was also assessed. Another phase of the piloting involved testing the data collection instruments to ensure that the items accurately addressed the research questions. Additionally, this phase tested respondents' ability to understand the instructions contained in the instruments, the questions, the terms used, the sequence of questions and the flow of statements. All comments were taken into consideration and errors amended appropriately.

3.6.3 Validity of the Research Instruments

Patino and Ferreira (2018), define research validity as the generalizability of a study, in essence how well the findings among the study participants represent true findings among similar individuals outside the study. The guideline given by Peat, Mellis, Williams and Xuan (2002) was used to test and improve the internal validity, both construct and content validity, of the research instruments. Internal validity refers to the fidelity of the results and conclusions, the extent to which the observed results represent the truth in the population under study and, thus, are not due to methodological errors (Andrade, 2018). To ensure internal validity, the instruments were subjected to test through administration to pilot participants in exactly manner as they would be administered in the actual study. The participants were then asked to provide feedback in order to identify difficulties they had in answering the questions and any ambiguities they may have identified in the instruments. The duration taken for

the data collection simulation was recorded to assess the average time required to complete each activity for appropriate adjustments. At the end of the activity, it was ascertained whether all questions are answered. After the pilot study, the researcher held a discussion with all the participants to get their views of the study process and to assess whether questions the instrument were comprehensive in the context of the subject scope of the study. Necessary and appropriate adjustment were then made in the data collection instrument to ensure validity of the findings of the study at the end of the actual research period.

3.6.4 Reliability of the Research Instruments

Instrument reliability, as defined by Shirali, Shekari and Angali (2018), is the consistency with which the instrument produces identical results time and again. Reliability tests must therefore produce stable outcomes over time and ensure that a similar test, when performed upon the same subject repeatedly, yields exactly the same results. The internal-consistency method was used to measure and improve the research instruments' reliability. Cronbach's alpha was specifically employed in measuring the internal consistency of the instruments. Cronbach's alpha is a scientific measure commonly used in social sciences to assess the reliability, or internal consistency, of a set of scale or test items. The measure can was carried out in SPSS using the reliability analysis or using the formulae Cronbach's alpha formula shown below (Emerson, 2019).

$$\alpha = \frac{N \times \bar{c}}{\bar{v} + (N - 1) \times \bar{c}}$$

Where;

α refers to Cronbach's alpha

N refers to the number of items.

$\bar{c}$ refers to the average covariance between item-pairs.

$\bar{v}$ refers to the average variance

Using the formula, a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.81 was obtained and this signified that the tools have admissible internal consistency hence reliable.

$$\alpha = \frac{40 \times 0.656}{(1.16) + (40 - 1) \times 0.656} = 0.98$$

3.7 Data Analysis and Reporting

Data analysis in this study entails summarizing essential data features and relationships in order to generalize and assess patterns of behavior and specific outcomes. The completed questionnaires were edited for completeness and accuracy before being processed. In order to analyze the results, the researcher used both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive analysis namely frequencies and percentages. The organized data was interpreted in light of the goals, and the data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 24. For ease of analysis and comprehension, the results are summarized in the next chapter as tables, graphs, and maps. Content and grounded research approaches were used to interpret qualitative results. In order to make replicable and true inferences, this entailed systematically coding, analyzing, and interpreting qualitative data collected from questionnaires and interviews. Finally, a paper detailing the study's results was published.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Institutional board approval was sought from Africa Nazarene University and the County Government of Nairobi. The researcher first sent an introductory letter to the relevant government agencies targeted in this study informing them of the study and asking for permission to be allowed to conduct the study in the county. Equally, the researcher applied for and obtained a research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). The researcher maintained high standards of professionalism throughout the study and after. Confidentiality was be at the centre of the ethical considerations of the study. To assure the respondents of their dignity and privacy, the information obtained from them was kept private and be used for the purposes of this study only. The research also concealed the identities of all the survey participants. The research was purely objective, there was no subjectivity such as personal biases and opinions. Survey participants were treated in a professional manner without any coercion or undue influence on the respondents.

Finally, with regard to academic integrity, academic plagiarism was avoided. Credit was duly accorded to other researchers and scholars for using their ideas. Information borrowed from other sources were adequately and properly acknowledged.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the collected data's findings and interpretation. The results are related to the study's research objectives. Percentages and frequencies are used in the study, which are then displayed in tables and pie charts. This chapter also includes the response rate from the data collection process.

4.2 Response Rate and Respondents' Demographic Profile

4.2.1 Response Rate

A response rate of at least 60% is deemed adequate for a researcher to rely on for data analysis (Fincham, 2008). In this study, a response rate of 72% which implies that out of the 304 individuals were engaged in the study, 330 and successfully completed the data collection task. This proportion was therefore adequate to allow the researcher to proceed and use the collected data for analysis. Table 4.1 presents the data on response rate.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

	Number of surveys sent	**Number of respondents who successfully completed they survey**	**Response rate**
Questionnaires	304	218	72%
Total/Average		218	72%

Source: Field data, (2020)

4.2.2 Respondents' Gender

Figure 4.1 depicts the distribution of gender among the respondents. From the pie chart 61% of the respondents were male and the rest 39% were female. This possible explanation of this distribution of gender among the respondents is that nature of the operation activities the agencies are involved are deemed more menial.




Figure 4.1: Respondents 'Gender
Source: Field data, (2020)

4.2.3 Age Bracket

Results of the analysis of the data one gender indicate that 43% of the survey participants were aged between 31-40 years, 21% were in the 41-50 age bracket, 18% were between 21-30 years of age and an equal proportion, 18% were 51 years old or more as presented in Figure 4.2. Given that majority of the respondents were in their mid-adulthood this could be an indicator that the most of the activities by the various agencies require energetic and mature people who have considerable experience in the agencies. Those aged 21-30 years and those 51 years or more are relatively few because of recruitment and retirement from active involvement in the agencies' operations.




Figure 4.2: Age Distribution
Source: Research data, 2020.

4.2.4 Employer, Government Office/Security Agency

Regarding the agencies which were represented in this study, Figure 4.3 shows that approximately 26% of the survey participants were from the DCI, 18% represented the KDF and an equal percentage, 18% were respondents from the NIS. About 21% were from the ATPU, 9% from the Political Diplomatic Secretary Office and the rest 8% were drawn from the Banking and Fraud Investigation Unit. The distribution of respondents from the various agencies indicate that the information provided was from all the relevant institutions involved in foreign policy affairs as well as the agencies responsible for implementing the polices. Similarly, the information was balanced because there was input from all these apposite institutions.




Figure 4.3: Employer, Government Office/Security Agency
Source: Research data, 2020.

4.2.5 Duration Worked in the Government Office/Security Agency

As illustrated in Figure 4.4, approximately 48% of the survey participants had worked with their respective agencies for 6 to 10 years, 31% had worked with their agencies for more than ten years, 16% had served in their respective agencies for between 1 to 5 years while the remaining 5% had been in services for the respective institutions for less than 1 year. This distribution in years of service, with more than two thirds of the respondents having worked for their agencies for at least 6 years shows that they had adequate experience in service and could therefore provide rich, reliable and adequate information crucial for answering the research questions of this study.




Figure 4.4: Duration Worked in the Government Office/Security Agency
Source: Research data, 2020.

4.3 Presentation of Research Analysis and Findings

4.3.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations

Respondents were asked their views on the most prevalent aspect of radicalization that terrorist employ in the country. Results in Figure 4.5 indicates that 71% of the survey participants were of the view that terrorists engage mostly in Islamic radicalization, 18% were of the opinion that ethnic radicalization is the most prevalent aspect of radicalization in the country, 9% opined that political radicalization was the most prevalent in the country and the rest 2% of the respondents were of the view that racial radicalization is the aspect of radicalization employed more by terrorists in the country. These results simply indicate that terrorists are more focused on using religion, specifically the Islam religion, to radicalize their targets.




Figure 4.5: Most Prevalent Aspect of Radicalization Terrorist Employ in the Country
Source: Research data, 2020.

Asked the extent to which they felt radicalization had contributed to shift in Kenya's foreign policy between the years 2005 and 2020, Figure 4.6 shows that 47% of the respondents were of the view that radicalization had contributed moderately to the shifts, 30% held the view that due to radicalization by terrorists the country's foreign policy had shifted slightly, 21% were of the opinion that the extent was extreme while the rest 2% opined that radicalization had not contributed at all to shift in Kenya's foreign policy during the period under review. The interpretation here is that generally, this particular terror activity had there were no radial changes in Kenya's foreign policy but just slight shifts to address the security threats posed by terrorists through radicalization.




Figure 4.6: Extent to which Radicalization Contributed to Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy
Source: Research data, 2020.

Table 4.2 illustrates results on the questions regarding the influence of radicalization on shifts in various areas of Kenya's foreign policy to combat terror threats. Results of the question on efforts to by terror groups to radicalize individuals by spreading messages of ethnic intolerance prompting Kenya to shift its foreign policy to adopt offensive strategies shows that 8% strongly agreed with the question statement, 13% of the respondents moderately agreed that efforts to by terror groups to radicalize individuals by spreading messages of ethnic intolerance has motivated Kenya's foreign policy to adopt offensive strategies and allow for its military to intervene in foreign countries while 17% of the survey respondents were neutral. On the other end, 50% of the respondents disagreed that efforts by terrorists to radicalize individuals through messages of ethnic hatred had prompted Kenya to shift its foreign policy to allow its military to intervene in foreign countries. This results indicate possibly ethnic radicalization did not significantly prompt shift in Kenya's foreign policy to send the country's troops to fight in a foreign country.

With regard to the question on whether religious radicalization influenced the decision of the government of Kenya to shift the country's foreign policy to towards external military intervention thus sending its troops to Somalia to fight terrorists, 49% of the respondents strongly agreed with this question statement, 23% moderately agreed, 11% were neutral, 10% moderately disagreed with the question statement while the remaining 7% of the survey participants strongly disagreed with the question statement as depicted in Table 4.2. These findings imply that radicalization on the dimension of religion played a critical role in the shift in the country's foreign policy.

Approximately 24% of the respondents strongly agreed that in the period under review terrorists had heightened their efforts to politically radicalizing their targets thereby stimulating the government to shift its policy and see foreign military assistance to combat the radicalization activities, 54% of the respondents moderately agreed with this question statement while 9% expressed neutrality. Of the negative respondents, 8% moderately disagreed that intensification of political radicalization prompted shift in Kenya's foreign policy to invite foreign governments for military assistance in combating political radicalization while the rest 5% strongly disagreed with the question statement as portrayed in Table 4.2. These implication of these results is that political radicalization by terrorists such as formation of the Mombasa Republican Council was gradually becoming a threat to the country's political thus the shift in foreign policy to seek foreign military assistance.

Table: 4.2: Influence of Radicalization on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Neutral	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Efforts to by terror groups to radicalize individuals by spreading messages of ethnic intolerance has motivated Kenya's foreign policy to adopt offensive strategies and allow for its military to intervene in foreign countries.	8%	13%	17%	50%	12%
Radicalization through distortion and exploitation of religious beliefs has resulted in Kenya opening to adjust its foreign defence policy and send its troops to foreign country, Somalia, to combat the terrorists.	49%	23%	11%	10%	7%
In the intervening period, terrorist organizations have intensified their efforts to distort Kenya's political ideologies in the minds of their radicalization targets thus prompting the previous governments adjust its policies towards foreign military assistance.	24%	54%	9%	8%	5%

Source: Research data, 2020.

Among the positive responders, 23% were of the opinion that the shift in Kenya's foreign policy in the period under review contributed was very effective in the fight against radicalization as an element of terrorism, approximately 36% were of the view that the shift was very effective and 23% were not sure whether or not the shift in foreign policy was effective in the fight against radicalization in the country. On the other hand, 20% of the negative responders found the shift to be ineffective in the fight against terrorism while the rest 9% opined that the Kenya's shift in foreign policy in the intervening period was very ineffective in the fight against terrorism in the country as presented in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy to Combat Radicalization
Source: Research data, 2020.

From the open ended questions, the respondents were of the view that in addition to security measures, the government should also adjust its foreign policy regarding acceptance of refugees into the country. This proposal was informed by the view that terrorists and their sympathizers use refugee camps in the country such as the Daadab Refugee Camp as grounds for radicalization. The opinion among this groups of respondents was more stringent measures to be included in the country's foreign policy so that refugees are properly identified before they are allowed into the country and a proper database in put in place to track the activities of the refugees. Another major proposition from the respondents with regard to shift in Kenya' foreign policies was restriction of foreigners from taking part in any sort of political activities in the country. The reason given for this was that some foreigners radicalize their targets through political activities and put a restriction to participation in political activities would eliminate chances of foreigners politically radicalizing their targets in the country.

Similar sentiments were expressed by the interviewees. One of the key interview informants commented as follows;

> "Yes radicalization has indeed left to considerable shift in the country's policy over the years, more so in the period between 2010 and 2020 when the terrorist intensified their activities in the country. Much information is not in the public domain because of the sensitive nature of the operations. However what I can tell you generally is that due to these shifts the intelligence agency was able to stop radicalization numerous activities by Al-Shabaab who were largely operating at Kenya's Coast." [Interviewee 3].

Another interviewee observed that attempts by Al-Shabaab through their proxies, allegedly Muslim clerics in Nairobi and Mombasa County, to radicalize the Muslim against Christians and to recruit youth from both religions into joining the terrorist groups.

> "The Al-Shabaab for a long time was active in recruiting and radicalizing youth in Kenya. The government had to change tact with regard to its foreign policy in order to tackle the problem. A lot of movements were seen with regards to the country's relationship with other countries and intergovernmental institutions in order to fight the crime. Kenya signed many accords with countries like the US and the UK on intelligence sharing and military involvement to address radicalization by terrorist groups in the country" [Interviewee 5]

Other interviewees also noted that notable changes in Kenya's foreign policy also touched on the introduction of an encampment policy which required all refugees and asylum seekers in the country's urban areas to relocate to designated camps as they were suspected of infiltrating into parts of the country and taking part in terrorism activities including radicalization.

4.3.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift

Results in Figure 4.1 shows that 53% of the survey participants ere of the view that informal money transfer was the most common means through which terrorists raise money for their terror activities in Kenya, 38% considered money service business such as Forex Bureaus as the most prevalent channel of raising for terrorism financing while the rest 9% considered abductions and ransoms as the most prevalent means that

terrorist raise money for their terror related activities. The implication herein is that in the Kenya context the informal money transfer systems such as *hawalas* were the most preferred by terrorists because of the inability of the government and other international agencies to track movement of the money. The process is also very swift thus the money being transacted reaches the recipient very quickly.




Figure 4.8: Most Common Means Through Which Terrorists Finance Their Activities
Source: Research data, 2020.

In response to the question on whether terror financing is widely spread and easily conducted in Kenya because of good networks of terror cells and terrorist sympathizers, Results in Figure 4.8 show that 43% were positive responders thus agreed with the questions statement, 39% were negative responders and therefore held the divergent view with regard to the question statement while the rest 18% were not sure whether or not terror financing is widely spread and easily conducted in Kenya because of good networks of terror cells and terrorist sympathizers. These results imply that to some extent there were good networks in the country that enable and made it easy for terrorists within and outside the country to access finances for their activities.




Figure 4.9: Whether Terror Financing is Widely Spread and Easily Conducted in Kenya
Source: Research data, 2020

In a related question the respondents were asked their views on whether terror groups have found it relatively easy to conduct their activities in Kenya through terror financing activities. The findings presented in Figure 4.9 show that 45% of the survey participants responded positively to the question thus indicating that they were of the opinion that terror groups have found it relatively easy to conduct their activities in Kenya through terror financing activities, approximately one third of the respondents, responded negatively to the question while an almost equivalent proportion, 32% were not sure whether terror groups have found it relatively easy to conduct their activities in Kenya through terror financing activities.




Figure 4.10: Whether Terrorism Financing has Made it Easy for Terrorists to Conduct their Activities in Kenya
Source: Research data, 2020

According to the analysis results presented in Table 4.3, 27% of the survey participants strongly agreed that Kenya has considerably shifted her foreign policies on international funds transfer in order to combat terrorism financing enabled by money service businesses such as forex bureaus, 34% of the respondents agreed with the question statement and 12% were neutral. On the other hand, 17% moderately disagreed that the country had shifted its international money transfer policies to combat this aspect of terror activities while the remaining 10% strongly disagreed with the question statement. It can be reliably construed that the country perceived that some terrorists and their sympathizers were using the legal money transfer services as conduits for funding terror activities thus the need to shift the foreign policies.

Approximately 30% of the survey participants, as per the results depicted in Table 4.3, strongly agreed that the shift in Kenya's foreign policy on international funds transfer was influenced by informal money transfer activities that were significantly financing terrorism, 39% moderately agreed with the question statement while 7% of the survey participants were not sure whether the shift in Kenya's foreign policy on

international funds transfer was impelled by intensification of informal money transfer activities in the country. Among the negative responders, 17% moderately disagreed with the questions statement while the rest 7% strongly disagreed that escalation of informal money transfer activities in Kenya, which is a main source of funds for terrorists inspired the shift in Kenya's foreign policy on international funds transfer. Going by the proportion of the positive responders to this question, it can be deduced that informal money transfer activities such as the *hawalas* was a critical channel for movement of money to and from the terror groups.

Regarding the question on terrorism financing which is enabled by the money service businesses prodding the government of Kenya to enhance its cooperation with international finance intelligence units to curb terrorism financing, 23% strongly agreed that this was the case, almost one third of the respondents, 33%, moderately agreed with the question statement, 15% were neutral, 10% moderately disagreed with the question statement while the rest 19% strongly disagreed that the shift in Kenya's foreign policy to establish cooperation with international finance intelligence units to combat terrorism financing was not stimulated by terrorism financing through money service businesses such as bureaus as portrayed in Table 4.3. The impression here is that as terrorists enhanced their financing activities within and outside the country, Kenya could no longer rely on its own internal mechanisms to combat the problem probably because of inadequacies in system and personnel and therefore had to engage and cooperate with external partners to successfully combat the problem.

Results illustrated in Table 4.3 also show that 37% of the respondents agreed that in the period under review cases of abductions within the country and off the Kenyan Coast prompted the government to shift its foreign defence policy in order to get military assistance in combating this aspect of terrorism which was increasingly

becoming a menace within its territory, 24% of the survey participants moderately agreed with the question statement while 14% expressed neutrality. Approximately 20% of the survey respondents moderately disagreed that cases of abductions with ransom demands in the intervening period elicited Kenya's move to shift its policies to enable it seek foreign military assistance in combating terrorism instigated abductions and the rest 5% strongly disagreed with the question statement. This infers that like any other terror activities that were increasingly bound to cause physical harm, abductions and piracy was a grave concern for the government of Kenya hence its move to seek foreign military assistance to address the problem.

Table 4.3: Influence of Terrorism Financing on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy

	Strongly Agree	**Moderately Agree**	**Neutral**	**Moderately Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
In the intervening period, Kenya has considerably improved its foreign policies on international funds transfer reporting to combat terror financing through conducted through money service businesses.	27%	34%	12%	17%	10%
Intensification of informal money transfer activities in Kenya, which is a main source of funds for terrorists prompted the government of Kenya to shift and tighten its foreign policy on international funds transfer.	30%	39%	7%	17%	7%
Terrorism financing enabled by the money service businesses such as bureaus have led Kenya to establish cooperation with international finance intelligence units to curb terrorism financing.	23%	33%	15%	10%	19%

In the intervening period cases of abductions with ransom demands have prompted Kenya to adjust its policies to enable it seek foreign military assistance in combating terrorism instigated abductions.	37%	24%	14%	20%	5%

Source: Research data, 2020

With regard to the question on effectiveness of shift in the country's foreign policy to combat terrorism financing, an aspect of terror activities, 41% of the survey respondents agreed that this shift was effective in addressing the scourge, 13% were of the opinion that the shift was very effective while an equal proportion of the survey participants, 13%, opined that shift Kenya's foreign policy to combat terrorism financing was moderately effective and a further 20% found the shift to be ineffective. The rest 13% were of the opinion that Kenya's decision to shift its foreign policy to combat terrorism financing was very ineffective as shown in Figure 4.10. Generally the inference is that the decision by Kenya's government to, in the period under review, shift its foreign policy to establish partnership with foreign institutions and to engage foreign policy in the fight against terrorism financing largely achieved the desired objectives.




Figure 4.11: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy to Combat Terrorism Financing

Source: Research data, 2020

Strengthening foreign policy regarding donor funding was the most prevalent view among responders in response to the question on other ways have terrorism financing activities prompted the government of Kenya to shift its foreign policies. A significant proportion of the survey participants were of the opinion that donor funds was a serious source of terrorism financing with funds disguised as donations being channelled through unsuspecting individuals or through sympathizers. During the period under review, respondents observed that terror financing in the country impelled the government of Kenya to shift its policy put more checks on foreign investments being done in the country by foreigners. For instance, the government tightened the process of work permit issuances and enforcement from 2018 to restrict entry of individuals whose intentions may have been to promote terror financing in the country.

From the interviews it came out that Money service businesses, Informal money transfer systems and Abductions with ransom demands as terror financing activities were significantly contributing to terrorism in the country thus the government had act promptly to arrest the escalating threats;

> "Surveillance showed significant trails in movement of money from suspicious sources to recipients both in and out of the country. Closer look revealed that the money was being used to funds terror activities both in the country and outside the country. The government therefore shifted its foreign policies in order to cooperate with international financial intelligence units and Adopt of international standards for cyber security in order to stop terrorism financing activities in the country." [Interviewee 1]

These shifts were considered significant in the fight against terrorism in the country. Introduction of international measures on know your customer (KYC) have been considered in the fight against terrorism financing in the country.

4.3.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes

Table 4.4 shows respondents' views with regard to the research objective on influence of cyberterrorism on foreign policy changes in Kenya. In response to the question on whether in the period under review Kenya increasingly experienced cases of ransomware due to infiltration by terrorist into government's and local organizations' computers, 12% of the respondents strongly agreed with the question statement, 31% moderately agreed, 16% were neutral, 29% moderately disagreed that the country had experienced increasing incidences of terrorism-related cyber-attacks while the 20% strongly disagreed with the question statement. The inference here is that generally, in the intervening period Kenya did not experience significant levels of terrorism-motivated cyber-attacks on private or government computers and this could be attributed to low pervasiveness of this facet of cyberterrorism at that time.

Analysis results in Table 4.4 also show that 18% of the respondents strongly agreed that growing cases of online disinformation moved Kenya's government to shift its foreign policy to adopt international standards for cyber security, 31% agreed with the question statement while 13% were indifferent on whether or not the intensification of online disinformation by terrorists in order to mislead the public have obligated Kenya's government to shift its policy and adopt international standards for cyber security. On the other end, 19% moderately disagreed with the question statement while a similar proportion of respondents strongly disagreed with the question statement. This shows that while cyberterrorism may have not been common during the period under review, Kenya's government was proactive with to combat the problem before it became entrenched in the country.

As per the results in Table 4.4 about 13% of the respondents strongly agreed that inadequacy in technical capability impelled the Kenyan government to shift its

foreign policy to cooperate with international financial intelligence units to address cases of terrorism motivated ransomware, approximately 36% of the respondents moderately agreed with the question statement and 19% of the respondents were neutral with regard to this question. Among the negative responders, 27% moderately disagreed that Inadequacies in technical capability encouraged Kenya to shift its foreign policies in the intervening period to cooperate with international financial intelligence units to combat ransomware attacks by terrorists.

Results of data analysis presented in Table 4.4 also portrayed that 15% of the survey respondents strongly agreed that during the period under review increasing cases of hacking of computer systems in Kenya by terrorists prompted the government shift the country's foreign policy to allow for adoption of international standards for cyber security, 19%of the respondents moderately agreed with the question statement while 27% were indifferent with regard to this question statement. Among the negative responders, 18% disagreed that the shift in Kenya's foreign policy during the period under review to allow for adoption of international standards for cyber security was instigated by increasing cases of hacking of computer systems by terrorists while the rest 21% strongly disagreed with the question statement.

Table 4.4: Influence of Cyberterrorism on Shifts in Various Areas of Kenya's Foreign Policy

	Strongly Agree	**Moderately Agree**	**Neutral**	**Moderately Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
In the period under review Kenya increasingly experienced cases of ransomware due to infiltration by terrorist into government's and local organizations' computers.	12%	23%	16%	29%	20%
Intensification of online disinformation by terrorists in order to mislead the public have	18%	31%	13%	19%	19%

obligated Kenya's government to shift its policy and adopt international standards for cyber security.					
Inadequacies in technical capability prompted Kenya to shift its foreign policies in the intervening period by cooperating with international financial intelligence units to address cases of terrorism motivated ransomware.	13%	36%	19%	27%	13%
Increasing cases of hacking of computer systems in Kenya by terrorists prompted the government shift the country's foreign policy to allow for adoption of international standards for cyber security.	15%	19%	27%	18%	21%

Source: Research data, 2020

Figure 4.11 indicates survey participants' responses to the question on effectiveness of Kenya's foreign policy shift in addressing the cyberterrorism activities in the country during the period under review. From these results, 24% were of the opinion that the shift was very effective in combating cyberterrorism, 37% found the shift to be effective in achieving the foreign policy objectives, 11% were of the opinion that shift was moderately effective while 15% were of the view that the shift in foreign policy to address this aspect of cyberterrorism was ineffective. The rest 13% held the view that the shift was very ineffective in combating cyberterrorism activities in Kenya during that time. This denotes that generally the foreign policy shift during the period largely achieved the objective of preventing cyberterrorism attack of any form.




Figure 4.12: Effectiveness of Shift in Kenya's Foreign Policy in Combating Cyberterrorism
Source: Research data, 2020

In summing up the comments in open-ended section of this objective, the respondents identified other measures and strategies that were not necessarily policy oriented by nonetheless crucial in actively or passively combating cyberterrorism. These identified passive defense mechanisms included the use of various technologies and products such as firewalls and intrusion detection as well as systems access governance procedures to protect the information technology assets owned by the government or private institutions and individuals. Imposition of punitive and stringent penalties on attackers and cyberterrorists is another measure that was identifies by the respondents as a deterrence mechanisms to stop cyberterrorism attacks.

In response to the interview question on how terrorism-instigated cyber-attacks influenced shifts in Kenya's foreign policy in the last fifteen years, the respondents noted that significantly, the country's Information and Communication Technology policy has been instrumental in addressing cases of cyberterrorism;

> "Shifts in the foreign policy has seen the government as captured in this particular policy saw the country establish partnership with

> intergovernmental institutions as well as other foreign governments to adopt international standards for cyber security." [Interviewee 5]

These shifts in foreign policy have been critical in managing ICT systems and facilities in the country to prevent terrorism activities in relation to disinformation, ransomware and hacking. Subsequently, the security agencies in the country have been able to counter terrorism menace in the country between the years 2005 and 2020.

4.3.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift

Table 4.5 depicts results of analyses on challenges experienced in implementation of adjusted foreign policies in the fight against terrorism in Kenya. From these results 24% of the respondents were of the view that laxity in policy enforcement impeded implementation of shifts in foreign policies directed towards tackling terror activities in Kenya, 39% were of the view that the effect of this challenge is moderate, 35% found the laxity in policy enforcement as a slight challenge and the rest 3% were of the view that this did not at all impeded implementation of the revised foreign policy as presented in Table 4.5.

With regard to the question on poor coordination among the local government agencies, as shown in Table 4.5, 32% held the opinion that this aspect impeded implementation of the foreign policy shift extremely, one half of the respondents, 50%, opined that the effect of this challenge was moderate, 16% help the opinion that its effect was slight and the remaining 2% felt that poor coordination among local agencies did not negatively affect implementation of the foreign policy shift at all.

Poor coordination among local agencies and their international partners was considered to extremely affect negatively the foreign shift implementation by 25% of the respondents. Approximately 43% of the survey participants felt that this aspect was

an impediment to moderate extent with 26% expressing their views that poor coordination between local agencies and international partners slightly impeded implementation of the foreign policy shift. The rest 4% were of the opinion that poor coordination between local agencies and international partners did not impede implementation of the foreign policy shift at all as depicted in Table 4.5.

Respondents were also asked their views on poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy as a possible impediment to implementation of the adjusted foreign policy shift in the fight against corruption. In response to this question, 31% of the responded were of the opinion that poor sensitization impeded the process of implementation extremely, slightly more than a half of the respondents, 52% found the effect of this impediment to be moderate, 15% were of the opinion that poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy impeded implementation of the foreign policy shift slightly and the remaining 2% were of the view that poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy was not a challenge at all. Overall, from these analyses, it appears that poor coordination among local government agencies, poor coordination between local agencies and international partners and poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy were the most significant challenges impeding the implementation.

Table 4.5: Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift

	Extremely	**Moderately**	**Slightly**	**Not at all**
Laxity in policy enforcement.	24%	39%	35%	3%
Poor coordination among local government agencies.	32%	50%	16%	2%
Poor coordination between local agencies and international partners.	25%	43%	26%	4%
Poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy.	31%	52%	15%	2%

Source: Research data, 2020

Laxity in policy enforcement came out among the interviewees as the most significant impediment to the implementation of the shifted policy;

> "As per my experience in the ministry, and working together will the law enforcement agencies, whenever policies have been shifted in the past to address the problem of terrorism in the country, laxity among the officers has been great. This because of the movement from the norm to relatively new operations. I would say that is more of resistance to change, which according to me is normal in most instances but should be an exception in this one because we are dealing with safety and security of our citizens." [Interviewee 4]

Coordination internally among officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their counterparts in the security agencies as well as poor coordination among the relevant domestic officers and their foreign counterparts also came out as a key challenge to the implementation of the policy shifts. More of the challenges, according to majority of the interviewees, seems to originate from the local officers as pointed out by one of the interviewees;

> "In my view, due to factors that are not very clear, our officers both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as those in the security agencies do drag their feet when it comes to cooperation with their foreign counterparts. Sometimes you are tempted to think that it is an issue of inferiority complex but I don't this so because our officers were well trained and properly qualified in their respective professions. But generally the poor cooperation as a result of policy shift has sometimes proved to be a challenged in implementing the shifted policies." [Interviewee 2]

Poor sensitization among civilians on the shifted policies as well as their role in the fight against terrorism in the country was a challenge that the interviewees argued affected counterterrorism efforts through the foreign policies. The interviewees argue that the government rarely, if never, sensitizes the general public on the adjustments in the policies and how these changes affected the citizens and their consequent roles in supporting the government to fight terrorism.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research results in light of the study's four research objectives and, where applicable, previous research findings and available literature in order to establish points of alignment and departure between the findings of this study and previous studies and literature. The research results are summarized, as well as the conclusions drawn from the findings of this report. At the end of the chapter, there are recommendations and areas for further study.

5.2 Discussions

5.2.1 Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations

Kenya is constantly faced with terrorism threats especially from Al-Shabaab which is an affiliate of the Al-Qaeda terror group. In recent years, besides the several terrorist attacks that have occurred in Kenya causing massive destruction and loss of property, injuries to victims and their close relations and loss of lives, terrorists have also been keen on radicalizing Kenyans into recruitment into the terror groups. Radicalization is a major weapon for the terrorist because it helps them acquire individuals who are ready and willing to advance their agenda against the government. The major approaches to radicalization that have been employed by terrorists targeting Kenyans are political and religious radicalism. To some extent the terrorists have been successful in their radicalization missions as evidenced by the number of Kenyans who have reportedly crossed the border into Somalia to join the jihadists.

Terror activities in Kenya continue to present the government with complex, multifaceted, and constantly evolving challenges that affect almost every area of the

country's policy and practice. The increasing threat of Islamic radicalization by the Al-Shabaab terror group has become a key concern for policy makers, law enforcement agencies and the population at large. Consequently, the concerted war against radicalization implies continuous shift and transformation of the priorities of Kenya's foreign policy to meet and address security threats that emanate from radicalization. The goal is to ensure that radicalization activities such as spreading messages of ethnic intolerance, distortion and exploitation of religious beliefs and distortion and exploitation of political ideologies are, as far as possible, stopped before they occur and reversing the gains made by terrorists in radicalizing individuals.

As established in this study, one of the key areas that the government of Kenya has had to adjust its foreign policies is with regard to external military intervention. Circa 2011, and even after, the Al-Shabaab terror group succeeded in making forays into Kenyan territory especially the north eastern regions which borders Somalia and also at the coast to radicalize and recruit youths. This is evidenced by radicalization and recruitment of youths by radical Muslim clerics in mosques in the Coastal Counties, North Eastern Counties and Nairobi County as well as the existence and association of Mombasa Republican Council, Wahhabi and other extremist forms of Islam in Kenya. In response, the government of the then president Mwai Kibaki, through approval of the Kenyan parliament adjusted the Kenyan defence policy to allow it cross into Somalia's territory to take the war at Al-Shabaab's door step (Hlatky & Ibrahim, 2017). Contrary to the findings by Chumba (2016) this study established that the intervention in Somalia to fight terrorism was successfully. The KDF have largely been able to prevent the terrorist from crossing over to radicalize Kenyan youths.

Confluence in findings between this research study and that carried out by Patterson (2015) indicate that shift in Kenya's foreign and military policy as allowed

for the intervention of foreign security agencies in the country's territory to help in the fight against Islamic radicalization. In adjusting its foreign and military policy to align with the global counterterrorism efforts, Kenya has become an important strategic partner in the broader Horn of Africa region.

5.2.2 Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift

Globalization brought with it new and greater global security threats far, greater than the conventional intra-state and inter-state conflicts that the world was used to. As globalization intensifies so does the number, nature and complexity of these security threats. Kenya has experienced its fair share of these threats, which include transnational organized crime, terrorism in its all forms, piracy, drug and human trafficking, and money laundering, whose effects are profound and far reaching. Financing of terror activities contributes has contributed significantly to enabling and facilitating other terror-related activities in Kenya. Consequently, the government of Kenya has over the years been compelled Kenya to shift its policies to find superior anchors for the conduct of its foreign relations to address terrorism financing. The goals of these policy shift range from ranging from preventive actions and criminalization to international co-operation and assets recovery. Establishing strategic partnerships to combat this scourge, as established in the research findings in the previous chapter, has become a crucial agendum of Kenya's external relations (Duursma & Müller, 2019). Taking active role and being part of the common agenda to fight terrorism financing, the government of Kenya has over the years much shared information as possible regarding suspicious financial transaction activities in the country. This has made it possible for the financial intelligence organizations and foreign government to tracking of such transactions thereby preventing terrorism financing in instances where money

was meant for such heinous criminal activities. Enactment of legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks such as the anti-money laundering as well as establishment of the Financial Reporting Centre are indicators of Kenya's commitment to the international community in the fight against terrorism financing.

The finding of this study on international intergovernmental cooperation in the fight against terrorism is also consistent with that of Kibet (2016) who determined that there has been enhanced cooperation between Kenya and other friendly states and non-state actors in the global war against terrorism financing. Significant strides made with regard to international funds transfer reporting as a result of foreign policy shift by Kenya is a massive and comprehensive contribution to international efforts against terrorism as makes it easy for the country's international partners to prevent terrorism financing. As a result the good working relationship between Kenya, the United States, Israel and Britain, Kenya was recruited Kenya as its strategic partner in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa thus has benefitting more than any other nation in the horn of Africa. Additionally, adoption and implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism financing has been momentous in preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism. It is important to take into account that at a time when maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Mombasa was a lucrative source of funds for Somalia-based and other international terrorist, Kenya acted decisively to adjust its defence policy to sanction the intervention and assistance of foreign governments to help the country combat the menace. Though cooperation with foreign governments for foreign military assistance, Kenya was effectively able to fully stop the scourge of vessel hijacking and kidnapping and holding crew hostage by Somali pirates, a terrorism act that was quite prevalent in the Indian Ocean and a key source of funds for Somalia and international terrorists.

5.2.3 Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes

The internet is the new and latest frontier terrorists are using to wage war against their targets. It has evolved into a powerful tool for perpetrators such as extremists and terrorist groups to spread radical agendas and propaganda materials, as well as to instil fear in the public by destroying properties that are vital to national security and national interest. Fortunately, Kenya has not experienced numerous and extreme cases of cyberterrorism. Nonetheless, it is prudent to expect that such attacks will be launched sooner or later. Therefore preparing to combat the scourge has always remained top of the agenda of the government. As established in the study, countering the use of the internet for terrorism purposes informed some of the shifts in the countries policies as established in this study. The Communications Authority of Kenya, working with other agencies, have put in policies which target not only domestic but also foreign citizens to take down websites that use and promote the use of hate speech or call for violence or discrimination.

Since cyberterrorism is a global phenomenon that transcends national borders, Kenya's foreign policy has also shifted during the period under review to enhance cooperation with international partners in the fight against cyberterrorism (Tereshchenko, 2013). For instance, as a member of the international community and a significant player in the fight against terrorism in Africa and specifically the Horn of Africa, Kenya has signed treaties and conventions which are substantive international instruments that cover the various cyberterrorism acts as well as other forms of computer crime. As part of coordination among international partners, Kenya's foreign policy is also framed to enhance information sharing on suspected cyberterrorism acts and cyberterrorists in the country.

Shifts on foreign policy combat cyberterrorism must also focus on protecting the country's critical information systems infrastructure from cyber threats advanced by terrorists. Additionally, collaborating with worldwide partners to promote internet freedom and rally support for a cyberspace that is open, interoperable, safe, and dependable has been critical in wadding off cyberterrorism activities which would have otherwise cost the country a lot had the threats not been dealt with effectively. Stopping cyberterrorists before they executive their planned attacks requires an effective pursuit of active types of defense with a high chance of correct identification and low false positives.

5.2.4 Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift

Developing or shifting a policy is just the first step in a long processing. For policies to contribute to the successful realization of the policy objectives, they must be effectively implemented. The challenges to implementation of the adjustments in foreign policies indisputably obstruct successful realization of the policy objectives which in the context of this study is the fight against terrorism in the Kenya. From the findings of the study, laxity in policy enforcement is a definite barrier to policy implementation thus imposing crippling constraints in the fight against terrorism in Kenya. For instance, slackness on the part of officers and agencies responsible for implementation the policies on international funds transfer reporting imply that terrorist and their sympathizers will have some leeway to move money from one country into Kenya or from one part of the country to negligence another without being detected. Additionally, negligence and failure to cooperate with international financial intelligence units compromises the fight against financing of terrorism.

Consistent with the findings of Hudson, Hunter and Peckham (2019), interagency cooperation among security agencies is invaluable in the national counter

terrorism strategy. However, as established this study, poor coordination among security agencies is crippling the fight against terror. The poor cooperation, which in some instances stems from inter-security agency rivalry, in some instances leads to unwillingness to share intelligence or sharing of incomprehensive thus unreliable and unactionable information (Eme, 2018). Besides inter-security agency rivalry, weak institutional capacity to mount collaboration affect implementation of foreign policy shift and subsequently giving scope for terrorism groups to conduct their activities. Further, failure of the local agencies to effectively coordinate with international partners by providing comprehensive information in a timely manner negates the fight against corruption.

Civilians are a critical cog in the counter-terrorism wheel. Implementation of the foreign policy therefore requires a level of awareness through effective sensitization among the society of new or adjusted policies. Without sensitization the citizens would not be aware of what is expected of them and any situation to report alarm of prevent conduct of terror activities such as money laundering and radicalization would go unreported.

5.3 Summary of Main Findings

The primary objective of this research were to establish the influence that terror activities had on shift in foreign policies in Kenya between the year 2005 and 2020. Specifically, the study sought to find out the influence of radicalization, terror financing and cyberterrorism on policy shift as well as the challenges experienced during implementation of the resultant adjusted policies. One of the major findings of this study is that the increase in radicalizations activities in the country through spreading messages of ethnic intolerance, distortion and exploitation of religious beliefs and distortion and exploitation of political ideologies by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group

initiated shifts in Kenya's policies as indicated by among others the government's decision to get offensive by sending its troops into Somalia's territory to combat the militants. Radicalization prompted adjustment of the foreign policies to allow the country's security agencies to combat terrorist's radicalization activities in the country.

Another key findings was that terrorism financing activities were prevalent in the country during the period under review. Some of these were being conducted through the money service businesses such as the Forex Bureaus while informal money transfer activities such as the *hawalas* were contributing significantly to financing of terrorism activities. Additionally, terrorist organizations were raising considerable amounts of money through abductions with ransom demands by hijacking ships off the coast of Kenya and taking the crew hostage besides abduction of tourists and other members of the pubic. The prevalence in these financing activities occasioned the government to amend its policies towards cooperation with international financial intelligence units, put in place effective systems for reporting international funds transfers involvement of foreign military assistance to fight piracy in Kenya's territory of the Indian Ocean and by extension the Horn of Africa.

Intensified cyberterrorism activities namely disinformation, ransomware and hacking targeting Kenya also informed Kenya's decision to shift its policies to combat the security threats. Specifically, policy makers aimed at getting assistance of international partners in addressing cyber terrorist activity through adoption and implementation of international standards for cyber security such as the International Standards Organization (ISO), American National Standards Institute, and British Standards Institute all which have been useful in the fight against local and foreign instigated terror attacks.

5.4 Conclusions

Going by the findings of the study it is clear that Kenya has always been awake to the security threats presented by terror activities and has been proactive in most instances to combat the terror activities before they occur. This is evidenced by shifts in its foreign policies from time to in response and to prevent radicalization, terrorism financing and cyberterrorism. The shifts in its foreign policy are characterized and indicated by external military intervention, cooperation with international financial intelligence units, international funds transfer reporting, adoption of international standards for cyber security and foreign military assistance. Implementation of the policy shifts has however not been without challenges. Laxity in policy enforcement, Poor coordination among security agencies, Poor sensitization of civilians and Poor coordination with international partners are just some of the challenges that have impeded effective implementation of the shifts thus preventing realization of the policy objectives.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study. The following recommendations are made. With regard to radicalization, furtherance to shift in foreign policy to address radicalization, the responsible government agencies such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as well as the country's political leadership should consider taking the following proposed approaches to address radicalization in the county. Since Islamic and other types of radicalization arise principally from a lack of integration and poor diversity management among the different ethnicities and religions in Kenyans, it would be apposite to take an intercultural approach to prevent radicalisation. Policy makers should therefore consider developing intercultural policies that foster a culture

of diversity by encouraging intercultural mixing and interaction as well as political and civic participation. The intercultural policies should be formulated in a manner that counter-radicalization efforts begin at an early stage and working with those most vulnerable to radicalisation.

The policy makers should also consider management of conflict positively by, where judicious and practical, engaging with instead of criminalising those holding extremist views. Finally the policies should considers measures and mechanisms of tackling stereotypes about Islam and its association with terrorism to unequivocally castoff the bigotry relating of terrorism with a particular religion, race or nationality.

Regarding financing of terrorism activities and cyberterrorism, the government should work towards complementing the foreign policies with strong legislations that deter activities like money laundering, abductions, disinformation, ransomware and hacking. These research results seem to bring to the fore convergence of impression that policies do not succeed or fail on their own merits.

The complex and unpredictable nature of the policy implementation process therefore demands that the process is can strengthened and supported by, among other measures, putting in place an effective monitoring and evaluation system to ensure effective policy design and implementation. Relevant governmental institutions should research, identify and remove obstacles to national coordination and international cooperation in implementation of the adjusted policies. This should be followed by establishing appropriate and timely corrective measures to remedy the areas of deficiency. Further, efforts should be made to enhance levels of cooperation among intelligence agencies both nationally and internationally.

5.6 Areas for Further Research

A potential area for further research is converse to the subject of this study. This implies carrying out a study to establish the influence of Kenya's foreign policy on terrorism activities in the country. It would also be worthy to conduct a study to establish how terror activities in Kenya influence shifts in domestic policies as well as establishment of new policies. Another would be interesting area to conduct a study is the measures and strategies that can be taken to address the challenges faced during implementation of counter-terrorism policies in Kenya.

REFERENCES

Al-Suwaidi, N. A. & Nobanee, H., (2020). Anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing: A survey of the existing literature and a future research agenda. *Journal of Money Laundering Control*.

Attah, C. (2019). Financing Terrorism in Nigeria: Cutting off the Oxygen. *Africa Development, 44*(2), pp. 5-26.

Bakowski, P. & van Ballegooij, W., (2018). The fight against terrorism: Cost of Non-Europe Report.

Bearak, M. & Mohieddin, N., (2020). U.S. lifts Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Retrieved April 7, 2021 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html

Bloemkolk, I.C. (2015). *The European Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism: A study of the European Union's Third AML/CFT Directive.*

Boaz, K. T. (2017). Challenges of Foreign Policy Implementation in Africa: Role of Media Diplomacy in Kenya.

Brynard, P. A. (2011). Policies and Poverty in Southern Africa

Butt, R. & Tuck, H., (2014). European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany

Cavelty, D. M., (2018). Thomas rid, cyber war will not take place. *ERIS–European Review of International Studies* 5(1), pp. 131–134.

Central Bank of Kenya, (2018). Guidance note: Conducting money laundering/terrorism financing risk assessment. Retrieved April 7, 2021 from https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Guidance-note-on-ML_TF-risk-assessment.pdf

Chumba, C., (2016). Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management Between Kenya and Somalia.

Darden, J. T. (2019). Tackling Terrorists' Exploitation of Youth.

Darwisheh, H. (2020). Egyptian-Sudanese Relations amidst Changing Geopolitics. *Middle East Review, 7*.

Denning, D., (2000). Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. 248.

Desta, A. & Cockayne, J., (2012). Baseline study on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism in the IGAD sub-region. Retrieved April 7, 2021 from https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf

Dingji, M., K., Koldaş, U., & Aksit, S. (2020). Challenges of Combating Terrorist Financing in the Lake Chad Region: A Case of Boko Haram. *SAGE Open*.

Eme, O. I., (2018). Inter-Security Agency Rivalry as an Impediment to National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST).

Eno-Akpa, R. N., (2016). The Case for an African Solution to Cybercrime -A Critical Assessment of the African Union Convention on Security in Cyberspace and Personal Data Protection. *African Journals Online, 31*.

Enuka, C. & Ojukwu, E. C. (2016). Challenges of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar-Ethiopia, 5*(2), pp. 52 – 66.

FATF (2012-2020). *International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation,* FATF, Paris, France.

Gruening, E. (2018). Prevention of radicalisation through intercultural policies.

Hardee, K., L. Irani, R. MacInnis, and M. Hamilton. 2012. Linking Health Policy with Health Systems and Health Outcomes: A Conceptual Framework. Washington, DC: Futures Group, Health Policy Project. Available at: http://www.healthpolicyproject. com/pubs/186_HealthPolicySystemOutcomesConceptualALDec.pdf.

Haynie, J. G. (2016). Women, Gender and Terrorism: Gendered Aspects of Radicalization and Recruitment," Women in International Security.

Huang, R. B & Johnston, O. M., (2004). The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets.

Hudson, B., Hunter, D. & Peckham, S. (2019). Policy Failure and the Policy-Implementation Gap: Can Policy Support Programs Help? *Policy Design and Practice, 2*(1), pp. 1-14.

Kaburu, M. K., (2020). Decision Making and Kenya's Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Moi and Kibaki Presidencies in Perspective.

Kaburu, M. K. (2017). Decision Making Theory and Foreign Policy Process: Empirical Ontological and Epistemological Contextualization of Kenya's Diplomacy Towards Somalia, 1996-2012. PhD Dissertion, United States International University-Africa.

Kamande, S. W., (2017). The Rising Challenges in the Implementation of Foreign Policy: A Case of Sub-State Diplomacy in Kenya.

Kibet, K. R., (2016). Terrorism and Kenya's foreign policy: A contextual analysis. Unpublished research thesis, United States Internatonal University – Africa, Kenya.

Kilmartin, P. J., (2016). Kenya's Foreign Policy Priorities: Peace, Security and Prosperity.

Kupatadze, A and Zeitzoff, T (2019) In the shadow of conflict: how emotions, threat perceptions and victimization influence foreign policy attitudes. *British Journal of Political Science*, pp. 1–22.

Landsberg, C. (2005). Toward a Developmental Foreign Policy? Challenges for South Africa's Diplomacy in the Second Decade of Liberation. *Social Research, 72*(3), 723-756. Retrieved April 4, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971788

Lawal, E. E. & Aluko, O. I., (2016). Nigerian Foreign Policy: a Fourth Republic Diplomatic Escapade. *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences, 4* (2016, 9), pp. 708-721.

Lub, V. (2013). Polarisation, radicalisation and social policy: evaluating the theories of change

Mackintosh, K., & Duplat, P., (2013). Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action.

Maghraoui, A. M., (2006). American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal.

Millar, A. & Rosand, E. (2008). Building Global Alliances in the Fight Against Terrorism.

Moser, A., & Korstjens, I., (2018). Practical guidance to qualitative research. Part 3: Sampling, data collection and analysis. *European Journal of General Practice, 24*(1), pp. 9-18.

Mumuni, S. M. (2017). China's non-intervention policy in Africa: Principle versus pragmatism. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 11*(9), pp. 258-273.

Mwangi O.G. (2016) Continuity and Change in Kenya's Defence and Foreign Policies: The Impact of the New Security Dilemma. In: Kithinji M.M., Koster M.M., Rotich J.P. (eds) Kenya After 50. African Histories and Modernities. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Retrieved April 2, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137558305_11

Mwanika, P. N. (2015). Kenya's Soft Power Dipomacy and Strategic Intervention in the Somali Conflict. Occassional Paper, No.1. Africa Institute of South Africa.

Nowrasteh, A. (2017). Little National Security Benefit to Trump's Executive Order on Immigration. CATO at Liberty: CATO Institute. Retrieved January, 2021 from https://www.cato.org/blog/little-national-security-benefittrumps-executive-order-immigration.

Nur, S. O., (2013). Foreign policy of Eritrea: Explained in the light of 'democratic peace' proposition. *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 4*(5), pp. 76-89.

Ogonji, M., (2019). Promoting Security in Africa Through Effective Counter Cyberterrorism Strategies: A Case Study of Kenya. Unpublished Research Thesis, University if Nairobi, Kenya.

Ogunlana, S. O., (2019). Halting Boko Haram/Islamic State's West Africa Province Propaganda in Cyberspace with Cybersecurity Technologies. *Journal of Strategic Security, 12*(1), pp. 72-106.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, (2014). Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach.

Ozer, S., & Bertelsen, P. (2018). Capturing violent radicalization: Developing and validating scales measuring central aspects of radicalization. *Scandinavian journal of psychology, 59*(6), 653–660.

Patterson, W. R., (2015). Islamic Radicalization in Kenya. Joint Force Quarterly 78. Retrieved April 9, 2021 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-78/Article/607564/islamic-radicalization-in-kenya/

Pettinger, T., (2015). What is the Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on Radicalization?

Qureshi, A. J., (2020). Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism: A National Issue Within a Global Context. Retrieved April 19, 2020 from https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism

Rollins, J. & Wyler, S. W., (2013). *Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress*.

Rybnicek, R., Bergner, S. & Gutschelhofer, A., (2019). How individual needs influence motivation effects: A neuroscientific study on McClelland's need theory. *Review of Managerial Science*, 13**,** pp**.** 443–482.

San, S., (2020). Counter-terrorism policing innovations in Turkey: A case study of Turkish National Police CVE experiment, Policing and Society, 30(5), pp. 583-598.

Schomerus, M., & Titeca, K., (2012). Deals and Dealings: Inconclusive Peace and Treacherous Trade along the South Sudan-Uganda Border. *Africa Spectrum, 47*(2–3), pp. 5–31.

Shandler, R., Gross, M., Backhaus, S., & Canetti, D. (2021). Cyber Terrorism and Public Support for Retaliation – A Multi-Country Survey Experiment. *British Journal of Political Science*, pp. 1-19.

Sule A., (2012). Challenges of foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria: *An Insider's Perspective*.

Tereshchenko, N., (2013). US Foreign Policy Challenges: Cyber Terrorism & Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved April 4, 2021 https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/us-foreign-policy-challenges-of-non-state-actors-cyber-terrorism-against-critical-infrastructure/

United States Institute of Peace (2004). Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Al-Suwaidi, N. A. & Nobanee, H., (2020). Anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing: A survey of the existing literature and a future research agenda. *Journal of Money Laundering Control*.

Van der Meer, S., (2015). Foreign Policy Responses to International Cyber-attacks: Some Lessons Learned.

Vidino, L., (2010). *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe. Special Report for the U.S. Institute of Peace*.

Von Hlatky, S. & Ibrahim, N. A., (2017). *Violent Extremism in Canada and Abroad*.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Research Questionnaire

SECTION A: Background Information

1. Gender

   A. Male [ ]

   B. Female [ ]

2. Age bracket

   A. 21-30years [ ]

   B. 31-40 years [ ]

   C. 41-50 years [ ]

   D. Over 51 years [ ]

3. Which of the following government office/security agency are you employed in?

   A. ATPU [ ]

   B. NIS [ ]

   C. KDF [ ]

   D. DCI [ ]

   E. Political Diplomatic Secretary Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [ ]

   F. Banking Fraud Investigations Unit [ ]

4. For how many years have you worked with the above government office/security agency?

   A. Less than 1 year [ ]

   B. 1 to 5 years [ ]

   C. 6 to 10 years [ ]

   D. Over 10 years [ ]

SECTION B: Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations

5. Which of the following would you say is the most prevalent type of radicalization in Kenya?
   A. Islamic radicalization
   B. Political radicalization
   C. Ethnic radicalization
   D. Racial radicalization
6. In your view, to what extent has radicalization contributed to shift in Kenya's foreign policy between the years 2005 and 2020?
   A. Extremely [ ]
   B. Moderately [ ]
   C. Slightly [ ]
   D. Not at all [ ]

In your view, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations in Kenya between 2005 and 2020?

	Strongly Agree	**Moderately Agree**	**Neutral**	**Moderately Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
7. Efforts to by terror groups to radicalize individuals by spreading messages of ethnic intolerance has motivated Kenya's foreign policy to adopt offensive strategies and allow for its military to intervene in foreign countries.					

8. Radicalization through distortion and exploitation of religious beliefs has resulted in Kenya opening its borders increased military assistance by foreign nations in the fight against terrorism.					
9. In the intervening period, terrorist organizations have intensified their efforts to distort Kenya's political ideologies in the minds of their radicalization targets thus prompting the previous governments adjust its policies towards external military intervention.					

10. How effective would you say shift in Kenya's foreign policy been in addressing terrorism-instigated radicalization?

    A. Very effective [ ]

    B. Effective [ ]

    C. Moderately effective [ ]

    D. Ineffective [ ]

    E. Very ineffective [ ]

11. Explain other ways that radicalization activities have causes a shift in Kenya's foreign policy in order to address this aspect of terror activities.

……

……

……

……

12. In your view, how else can Kenya's foreign policy be shifted to address the issue of radicalization?

……

……

……

……

SECTION C: Terrorism Financing and its Influence on Foreign Policy Shift

13. In your view, which of the following is the predominant means through which terrorists raise money for their terror activities in Kenya?
    A. Money service businesses such as forex bureaus
    B. Informal money transfer systems such as hawala
    C. Abductions with ransom demands
14. Would you say that terror financing is widely spread and easily conducted in Kenya because of good networks of terror cells and terrorist sympathizers?
    A. Yes
    B. No
    C. Not sure
15. In your view, have terror groups found it relatively easy to conduct their activities in Kenya through terror financing activities?
    A. Yes
    B. No
    C. Not sure

In your view, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations in Kenya between 2005 and 2020?

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Neutral	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
16. In the intervening period, Kenya has considerably improved its foreign policies on international funds transfer reporting to combat terror financing through conducted through money service businesses.					
17. Intensification of informal money transfer activities in Kenya, which is a main source of funds for terrorists prompted the government of Kenya to shift and tighten its foreign policy on international funds transfer.					
18. Terrorism financing enabled by the money service businesses such as bureaus have led Kenya to establish cooperation with international finance intelligence units to curb terrorism financing.					
19. Between the years 2005 and 2020 cases of abductions with ransom demands have prompted Kenya to adjust its policies to enable it seek foreign military assistance in combating terrorism instigated abductions.					

20. How effective would you say Kenya's policy shift has been in addressing the terrorism financing activities?
    A. Very effective
    B. Effective
    C. Moderately effective
    D. Ineffective
    E. Very ineffective
21. In what other ways have terrorism financing activities prompted the government of Kenya to shift its foreign policies?

……

……

……

……

SECTION D: Influence of Cyberterrorism on Foreign Policy Changes

In your view, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Influence of Radicalization on Foreign Policy Transformations in Kenya between 2005 and 2020?

	Strongly Agree	**Moderately Agree**	**Neutral**	**Moderately Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
22. Intensification of disinformation by terrorists in order to mislead the public have obligated Kenya's government to seek assistance of foreign military to battle the terror threat.					
23. Kenya has increasingly experienced cases of ransomware due to infiltration by terrorist					

into government's and local organizations' computers.					
24. Inadequacies in technical capability prompted Kenya to shift its foreign policies in the last fifteen years by 25. Cooperating with international financial intelligence units to address cases of terrorism motivated ransomware.					
26. Increasing cases of hacking of computer systems in Kenya by terrorists prompted the government shift the country's foreign policy to allow for adoption of international standards for cyber security.					

27. How effective would you say Kenya's policy shift has been in addressing the cyberterrorism activities?

    A. Very effective

    B. Effective

    C. Moderately effective

    D. Ineffective

    E. Very ineffective

28. How else would you say Kenya's foreign policy has shifted in the last fifteen years as a result increased cyberterrorism experienced in the same period?

……

……

……

……

SECTION E: Challenges Experienced in Implementation of Foreign Policy Shift

To what extent would you say the following challenges have impeded implementation of shifts in foreign policies directed towards tackling terror activities in Kenya?

	Extremely	**Moderately**	**Slightly**	**Not at all**
29. Laxity in policy enforcement.				
30. Poor coordination among local government agencies.				
31. Poor coordination between local agencies and international partners.				
32. Poor sensitization of civilians on the new policy.				

33. What other challenges would you say impede implementation of policy shifts aimed at combating terrorism in Kenya?

……

……

……

……

34. How, in your view, can these challenges be addressed to enhance the fight against terrorism in Kenya?

……

……


……

……

Appendix II: Interview Schedule for the Key Informants

1. Based on your experience in your profession, how would you say radicalization has influenced shift in Kenya's foreign policy in the last fifteen years?
2. How, if in any way, did the following triggered shift in Kenya's foreign policies between 2005 and 2020?
    a) Spreading messages of ethnic intolerance.
    b) Distortion and exploitation of religious beliefs.
    c) Distortion and exploitation of political ideologies.
3. What shifts in Kenya's foreign policy in the last fifteen years have been necessitated by the following aspects of terrorism financing?
    a) Money service businesses.
    b) Informal money transfer systems.
    c) Abductions with ransom demands.
4. Please describe how terrorism-instigated cyber-attacks influenced shifts in Kenya's foreign policy in the last fifteen years.
    a) Disinformation.
    b) Ransomware.
    c) Hacking.
5. Please comment on the following challenges to the implementation of foreign policy changes in Kenya over the last fifteen years?
    a) Laxity in policy enforcement.
    b) Poor coordination among security agencies.
    c) Poor sensitization of civilians.
    d) Poor coordination with international partners

Appendix III: ANU Data Collection Authorization Letter



AFRICA NAZARENE
UNIVERSITY

School of Governance, Peace and Security
Nairobi CBD, Campus
15th February, 2016

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

RE: LOISINA MAHILA AMBEYI -ADM 14J03EMGP020

The above mentioned student is a bona fide student of Africa Nazarene University pursuing a Master of Science Degree in Governance, Peace and Security. In anticipation to her graduation on 28th October 2016, she is expected to write a Thesis entitled "KENYA'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICIES IN LIGHT OF TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA". This title has been approved by the Board of Post Graduate Studies of the University and the student was given permission by the University after her PROPOSAL DEFENCE and is now expected to collect field raw data and thereafter write Chapter Four – Data Analysis and Chapter Five-Summary and Conclusion.

The purpose of this letter is therefore to ask you allow the student herewith mentioned collect information related to the title herewith mentioned. Be advised that the information obtained is solely for academic purposes. Kindly accord her the necessary assistance. This letter is varied between March 2016 – September 2016


In case of any query, kindly don't hesitate to contact me on the undersigned contacts

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. Njenga, Solomon
Chair-School of Governance, Peace and Security
Africa Nazarene University
snjenga@anu.ac.ke
254-723371056

P.O Box 53067 - 00200 Nairobi, Kenya • Tel: 020 253 71700 - 5 • Fax: 020 201 2233 • Cell: 0733 874 111 • Email: registrar@anu.ac.ke • www.anu.ac.ke

Appendix IV: NACOSTI Research Permit



NACOSTI

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471, 2241349, 310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: secretary@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref: No. **NACOSTI/P/16/43137/10226**

Date: **23rd March, 2016**

Loisina Mahila Ambeyi
Africa Nazarene University
P.O. Box 53067-00200
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on ***"Foreign policy shift due to terrorism in East Africa case study: Kenya (2005-2015),"*** I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for a period ending **22nd March, 2017.**

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence, the Chief Executive Officers of selected government agencies, the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

DR. STEPHEN K. KIBIRU, PhD.
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The Principal Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

The Principal Secretary
Ministry of Defence.

Dr. Rotich
Kindly facilitate her to carry out data collection. Assign someone to take her to directorates.
28.6.2016

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO 9001: 2008 Certified

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MISS. LOISINA MAHILA AMBEYI
of AFRICA NAZARENE UNIVERSITY,
0-400 Nairobi,has been permitted to
conduct research in *Nairobi County*

on the topic: *FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT DUE TO TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA CASE STUDY: KENYA (2005-2015)*

for the period ending:
22nd March,2017

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/16/43137/10226
Date Of Issue : 23rd March,2016
Fee Recieved :Ksh 1000



.....
Applicant's Signature

.....
Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

CONDITIONS

1. You must report to the County Commissioner and the County Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit
2. Government Officers will not be interviewed without prior appointment.
3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries.
5. You are required to submit at least two(2) hard copies and one(1) soft copy of your final report.
6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NACOSTI


National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

RESEARCH CLEARANCE PERMIT

Serial No. A 8242

CONDITIONS: see back page

Appendix V: Map of Study Area



Map of Nairobi
Source: Google Maps, 2020