

**EFFECTS OF VIGILANTE GROUPS ON NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY  
OF KIBERA INFORMAL SETTLEMENT, NAIROBI COUNTY, KENYA**

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**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of master of science  
in governance, peace and security studies in the department of governance, peace and  
security, school of humanities and social sciences of Africa Nazarene University**

**JUNE, 2022**

## DECLARATION

I declare that this document and the research it describes is my original work and has not been presented in any other University.

  
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This thesis was conducted under our supervision and is submitted with our approval as university supervisors.

  
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## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved wife Farhiya Abyan Mohamed and my son Ibrahim Shukri Abass who have supported me and always motivated me to be and do my best. Most importantly, to God who has given me the strength and opportunity, and without whom I would not be able to accomplish all that I have.

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## ABSTRACT

There has been a steady increase in vigilante group in informal settlement in recent days because they have been seen as a solution to security provision by the residents of Kibera while security organs term them as causes of insecurity. This study looked at the effects of vigilante groups in Kenya with specific focus to informal settlement area of Kibera in Nairobi County. Descriptively, the study accessed the core reasons that led to the existence of vigilante groups as well as residents and state involvement in vigilante activities. This was guided by the following objectives: to establish the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security; to establish the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera and to assess the challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera. The study was based on social disorganization theory, broken windows theory and security actor-network theory. The study was in the form of a descriptive survey design. A descriptive survey design describes, articulates and organizes a phenomenon under investigation. Primary and secondary data collection methods were applied to obtain data for the study. Simple random sampling approach was used to select 130 respondents for the study sample. The primary methods involved qualitative and quantitative approaches. Qualitatively, local administrators and vigilante group leaders were subjected to in-depth interviews. They gave in-depth views on vigilante activities. Quantitatively, youths registered in different self-help groups were subjected to semi structured interviews. The in-depth interviews were done through face-to-face interviews. The SPSS version 21 was a key statistical instrument that was used for data analysis. The data was presented by the use of tables and charts. The study established that inefficiency by the state to offer essential services to the residents of informal settlement is the genesis of vigilante groups (80%). Further, strategies applied by vigilante groups in addressing security needs in Kibera seem to be effective compared to state response (40%). The study established that one of the major challenges facing Vigilante groups in Kibera is lack of funding and recognition by government (90%) and this have resulted into harassment by police when carrying out their duties (80%). The study concluded that whereas the state is struggling to stop vigilante activities in Kenya, its inefficient in offering security especially in the informal settlement areas can be the cause of existence of vigilante groups. The study also concluded that even though some of the strategies applied by vigilante groups in punishing the criminal gangs especially killing are not appropriate. The study recommends that the Government of Kenya develop plans for economically empowering young people to reduce the high unemployment rate that results to crime in society. The study suggests that the Kenyan government employ more policemen to ensure the safety of children and ensure compliance with the rule of law. The study also recommends the government should ensure that vigilante groups are enrolled to life skills and ethical trainings to make them provide security to the residents as per appropriate moral codes.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>DECLARATION.....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>DEDICATION.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS.....</b>	<b>xii</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction .....	1
1.2 Background of the Study .....	1
1.3 Statement of the problem .....	6
1.4 Purpose of the study .....	7
1.5 Objectives of Study .....	7
1.5.1 General Objective .....	7
1.5.2 Specific Objectives .....	7
1.6 Research questions .....	8
1.7 Significance of the Study .....	8
1.8 Scope of the study .....	8
1.9 Delimitation of the Study .....	9
1.10 Limitations of the Study .....	10
1.11 Assumptions .....	10
1.12 Theoretical framework .....	11
1.12.1 Social Disorganization Theory .....	11
1.12.2 Broken Windows Theory .....	12
1.12.3 Security Actor-Network theory.....	14
1.13 Conceptual framework .....	15
<b>CHAPTER TWO .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>18</b>

2.1 Introduction .....	18
2.2 Theoretical review of literature .....	18
2.2.1 National Security .....	18
2.2.2 Vigilantism.....	20
2.2.3 History of Vigilantism .....	23
2.3 Empirical Review of Literature .....	25
2.3.1 Reasons why Communities depend on Vigilante for Security .....	26
2.3.2 Strategies used by Vigilante in Provision of Security .....	30
2.3.3 Challenges of the Strategies used by Vigilante Groups.....	33
2.4 Summary of review of literature and Research Gaps .....	35
<b>CHAPTER THREE .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>38</b>
3.1 Introduction to research methodology.....	38
3.2 Research Design .....	38
3.3 Research site.....	38
3.4 Target Population .....	39
3.5 Determination of study sample.....	40
3.5.1 Sampling Procedure .....	40
3.5.2 Study Sample Size .....	41
3.6 Data collection Procedures .....	42
3.6.1 Developing of instruments.....	43
3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments .....	43
3.6.3 Instrument Reliability .....	43
3.6.4 Instrument Validity .....	44
3.7 Data processing and analysis.....	45
3.8 Legal and ethical Considerations .....	46
<b>CHAPTER FOUR.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>47</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	47
4.2 General characteristics of the study sample .....	47
4.3 Study Findings.....	48
4.3.1 Response rate .....	48
4.3.2 Age and Gender of the Respondents.....	49

4.3.3 Duration of Stay in Kibera .....	50
4.3.4 Level of Education .....	50
4.4 Reliability Analysis .....	51
4.5 Descriptive and Qualitative Analysis on Each Variable .....	52
4.5.1 Reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security .....	52
4.5.1.1 Awareness of the different vigilante groups operating in Kibera slum .....	52
4.5.1.2 Reasons given by the Residents as to the Origin of Vigilante Groups in Kibera .....	53
4.5.1.3 Security needs addressed by Vigilante groups in Kibera.....	54
4.5.1.4 Residents views on vigilante activities .....	55
4.5.1.5 Comparison between the security provided by the state and that of vigilante groups .....	58
4.5.2 Strategies Used by Vigilante in Provision of Security in Kibera.....	58
4.5.2.1 Security Strategies by Vigilante.....	58
4.5.2.2 Effectiveness of the Security Strategies by Vigilante Groups .....	60
4.5.3 Challenges of the strategies used by Vigilante in Kibera.....	61
4.5.3.1 Reported challenges .....	61
4.5.3.2 Outcome on the State's effort to eliminate vigilante groups in Kibera .....	63
4.5.3.3 Benefits of vigilante activities to the residents of Kibera slum .....	64
4.6 National Security .....	65
4.7 Multi-colinearity Test and Inferential Statistics .....	66
<b>CHAPTER FIVE .....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>67</b>
5.1 Introduction .....	67
5.2 Summary of the Findings .....	67
5.2.1 Reasons why Communities in Kibera depend on Vigilante for Security .....	67
5.2.2 Strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera .....	70
5.2.3 Challenges of the Strategies Used by Vigilante in Kibera.....	72
5.3 Theoretical Relationship with the Study Findings .....	74
5.3.1 Social Disorganization Theory .....	74
5.3.2 Broken Windows Theory .....	74
5.4 Conclusions .....	75
Generally, the study concluded that vigilante groups have a significant and positive effect on national security in Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya. ....	75



5.4.1 Reasons why Communities in Kibera depend on Vigilante for Security .....	75
5.4.2 Strategies used by Vigilante in Provision of Security in Kibera .....	75
5.4.3 Challenges of the strategies used by Vigilante in Kibera .....	76
5.5 Recommendations .....	76
5.6 Suggestions for Further Research.....	78
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>APPENDICES.....</b>	<b>85</b>
Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire .....	85
Appendix II: In-Depth Interview Guide .....	92
Appendix III: Map of the Study Area .....	93
Appendix IV: Approval letter.....	94
Appendix V: NACOSTI research permit .....	95

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3. 1: Target population.....	40
Table 3. 2: Sample size .....	42
Table 3. 3: Reliability Results.....	44
Table 4. 1: Response per each Study Group .....	48
Table 4. 2: Age and Gender of the Respondents .....	49
Table 4. 3: Duration of Stay.....	50
Table 4. 4: Education Level .....	51
Table 4. 5: Reliability Tests .....	51
Table 4. 6: Awareness of Vigilante Groups in Kibera.....	52
Table 4. 7: Residents Views on Vigilante Activities .....	56
Table 4. 8: Respondents Agreement with Statements on National Security .....	66
Table 4. 9: Correlation between Variables and Vigilante Activities on National Security .....	66

**LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1. 1: Conceptual framework .....	17
Figure 4. 1: Qualitative feedback on the origin of vigilante groups .....	54
Figure 4. 2: Whether Vigilante Groups Address any Needs.....	54
Figure 4. 3: Security needs addressed by vigilante groups .....	55
Figure 4. 4: Opinion of residents on vigilante activities .....	57
Figure 4. 5: Comparison between Vigilante Security and State Security .....	58
Figure 4. 6: Security Strategies by Vigilante groups .....	59
Figure 4. 7: Effectiveness of vigilante strategies .....	61
Figure 4. 8: Challenges on vigilante strategies .....	62
Figure 4. 9: Success on the Government to face out Vigilante Groups .....	64
Figure 4. 10: Benefits of vigilante activities to Kibera residents.....	65

## OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS

**Crime:** An action or omission which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law.

**Gangs:** An organized group of criminals.

**Hybrid state:** This is a security term used to define a state where there is collaboration between the government and private sector in security management.

**Informal security:** This is a state where organized groups provide security services to the community without the approval of the legal security agencies. They are mostly termed as vigilantes.

**Insecurity:** The state of being open to danger or threat; lack of protection.

**Militia group:** A group of citizens organized in a paramilitary group, typically considered as advocates for individual rights against the alleged interference of the Federal government.

**National security:** The safety of a nation against threats such as terrorism, war, or espionage.

**Policing:** Creation and implementation of strategies that protect and guard against the state of insecurity in a community

**Vigilante groups:** A formation of individuals who tries in an unofficial way to create social order or purport to offer essential services to the community because they think the official agencies have failed to do so.

**Vigilantism:** This is defined as law enforcement undertaken without legal authority by a self-appointed group of people.

**ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS**

<b>CBD</b>	Central Business District
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed Circuit Television
<b>DCC</b>	Deputy County Commissioner
<b>DCI</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
<b>GOK</b>	Government of Kenya
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>KNBS</b>	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
<b>NCRC</b>	National Crime Research Centre
<b>NIS</b>	National Intelligence service
<b>SCCIO</b>	Sub County Criminal Intelligence Officer

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

#### 1.1 Introduction

The study evaluated the effects of vigilante groups on national security, a case of Kibera, Nairobi Kenya. This chapter looks at the background information, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, study objectives, research questions, and study hypothesis, the significant of the study, scope of the study, delimitation, limitations, assumptions, theoretical framework and conceptual framework.

#### 1.2 Background of the Study

The multi-coexistence of Kenya can be looked at as hybrid and the key to this is that, non-state actors are also involved in the security affair of the country. Boege, *et al.*, (2011) argues that such states have diverse competition claims on security affairs between non-actors and the government in place. Based on this characteristic, Kenya does not bear an authoritative privilege to fully control its security apparatus as well as other legitimation on social welfare of its citizens (Sidang, 2020). In order for Kenya to maintain the status quo, it has to share its legacy with other players in the industry. It is the responsibility of the government to enhance national security (Apollo, 2017).

National security is the security and defense of a nation state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. there are times when the government is unable to control violence or acts initiated by non-state actors (Apollo, 2017). This have led to increase in number of community-based groups for providing security called vigilante groups. According to Haggai (2016), vigilante gangs rely on for informal security provision to the society is termed as vigilantes. Apollo (2017) argues that it is safe to assume

that it is only the state which has the capacity and mandate to offer security to its citizens. Imperatively, it can be noted that it is only the state despite the economic marginalization that has a responsibility of offering security and other social systems in terms of security management. Which person would, and under what/which motives would make vigilante groups to offer security to their community are some of the questions to be asked (Haggai, 2016)? These questions have however been answered through vigilantism and vigilante groups existence. Their motives though self-generated have always been harbored mainly through hybrid nature of different states across the world. Haggai (2016) further states that genuine vigilantes across the world are defined by the motives towards honest addressing of the security issues towards the questions raised.

Globally, different vigilante groups derive and exist with social conformities on issues within contexts of each country to provide and ensure national security. For example, Homeland Defense was founded by Simcox in early 1990s. Simcox was the owner of the Tombstone Tumbleweed, a newspaper published in Mexico. Simcox having been annoyed by the border patrol police officers from the United States of America Border, who had deliberately decided to stop Mexico immigrants from crossing into their territory formed a vigilante group to protest (O'Meara, 2013; Oliviero, 2014). In Mexico and other Latin American Counties, the origin of vigilante groups is attributed to displeasure by the independent states to curb the domination by Catholic Church in 19<sup>th</sup> century. They independent states came up with counter mechanisms including vigilante groups. Their role was solely to create mayhem and disorder to make the catholic church unpopular (O'Meara, 2013). According to Gomez (2012), the Mexican vigilante groups emerged in at least two waves, in response to two distinct sources of insecurity. Vigilantism in Colombia emerged when the government approved the creation of citizen security groups in the early 1990s (Gomez, 2012). The then government of Colombia had good

motives of stopping violence and crime which had blossomed a lot. However, twenty years later these groups linger on, running shadowy criminal networks and charge residents for their “security” tax. This worsened the national security. One of the groups which dictates a huge following a large recruitment of youths and has big muscles in its operation and management is known as *Parque Bolivar* which operates mainly in Medellin City (Velásquez, 2014). The group appeared to be “green” and “shady plaza” in the confinements of the city, which was totally opposite to their actual activities. In reality, they were engaging in drug trafficking, child prostitution and gang crimes.

Colombian Vigilante groups as Rea (2013) states are characterized by connections to powerful drug lords as well as mafias who are involved in all sorts of criminal activities. This mafias use the group for their own protection and enrichment. According to Guillermo (2016) they have created a monster of many heads. *Convivir* is currently the epicenter of all negative deeds in Colombia. It has even made Colombia to be on the world censor for all the negative reasons. Fighting them is another milestone which the government of Colombia has failed and unless the efforts of international security organs are engaged the group will continue to rampage (Guillermo 2016).

Okeke (2013) narrates that, in Africa weak states face insurgences from Vigilante groups. African vigilante groups do what weak states tend to do: subcontract certain security functions and leave them in the hands of “un-controlled” individuals operating as vigilante groups. Unfortunately, some of these groups even have arms or other dangerous weapons used in the name of protecting their communities. Even though governments with such neglected responsibilities deem these actions to be necessary, they are in most cases very dangerous and hard to regulate (Okeke, 2013). Okeke adds that vulnerable states with high poverty levels are makes this mistake compared to countries with stable economies. For example, some war-torn



nations like Sierra Leone have allowed vigilante groups to dominate citizens' security provision more than state machineries.

According to Haggai (2016), one of the most powerful vigilante groups in Africa is the *Kamajors* of Sierra Leone. For over eleven years Sierra Leone witnessed brutal killings and displacement of its citizens due to war. Among the most powerful fighting groups were the *Kamajors*, who evolved from small groups of youthful population offering community security to their villages against armed invaders to armed organizations that could fight alongside Sierra Leone police and the country's military (Okeke, 2013). Another well-known vigilante group in Africa is the *Arrow Boys* of Teso in Uganda (Nicholas, 2012). The group was formed in the late 1980s after the mayhem caused by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). According to Nicholas (2012), went through a rough path of civil war and political turmoil between 1988 and 1989. Lord's Resistance Army was a key rebel militia that caused the mayhem. The worst hit region was Northern Uganda occupied by the Acholi community (Okeke, 2013). This saw them form a repellent group (*Arrow Boys*) to protect them from the Lord's resistant army. As the name suggests, *Arrow Boys* could later be equipped with bows and arrows to retaliate LRA (Nicholas, 2012). Fortunately, they were well disciplined did not engage in criminal activities. However, as a result of a poor withdrawal of troops, many *Arrow Boys* returned home with no wages or long-term support and resented the central government (Okeke, 2013).

In Kenya, Vigilante groups cuts across all ages with the youth being more vulnerable. The city of Nairobi is critically on focus; where crime is worrying (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Incidents of crime and insecurity are evident in central business district. Some of those criminal activities include: mugging, car thefts, prostitution, human trafficking, property vandalism, trading in illegal firearms, political goons among others (Republic of Kenya, 2019). Vigilante groups is a formation of individuals who tries in an unofficial way to create social order or purport to

offer essential services to the community because they think the official agencies have failed to do so. On the other hand, traditional policing system is a form of governance where community leaders who have recently been replaced by Nyumba Kumi leaders maintain order in the community (Sidang, 2020).

Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya is among a few cities in the world with a large number of slums. More than half of the city's population lives in over 10 slums and squatter settlements within the city. These areas have little or inadequate access to safety and security, safe water and sanitation. Slum dwellers have the worst housing and sanitation conditions. To make the matters worse, many residents do not have secure tenure to their houses. Crime incidents are highly recorded in Nairobi's major slums including Kibera, Mathare, Ngomongo and other. Data from Transparency international (2010) indicates that organized gangs, cartels and militias who constantly harass, extort money and commit all sorts of crimes reside from Nairobi's central business district or any other prime area within Nairobi mainly comes from major slum settlement areas. It is worrying given that the capital city is the first interaction between the foreigners and the country. A visitor booked in a top hotel in the city cannot comfortably stroll in the streets.

According to Sidang (2020), Nairobi's Vigilante groups are composed of young, half educated and unemployed youths. They attribute their existence to many courses including: Providing the much-needed security to their communities as a result of negligence from state security machinery, providing cheap garbage collection, regulating Matatu fares, providing safe drinking water among many other reasons. However, rivalry and disagreement over territory command from the groups has made them to be more lethal to the residents than their formation motives. Some greedy politicians with the intention of gaining political mileage over their opponents go to greater extend of providing the vigilante groups with crude weapons,

intoxicate them with drugs and alcohol and create all sorts of weak link to make them loyal to them (Transparency international, 2010). This study dug deeper into the intentions on the vigilante group formation and their impact on the security with the informal settlement areas. The null hypothesis was whether these groups are the source of insecurity or provide security within their areas of operation. Specifically, within Kibera slum.

### **1.3 Statement of the problem**

The problem of the study is to assess the effects of vigilante groups on national security. This is because state of national security in any country depends on the stakeholders in security sector which has evolved from the state of being the only provider of security. One of these stakeholders is the vigilante groups. Whereas formal police exist, vigilante activities are still reported in Kibera. In this case, Vigilante groups complement the community policing by providing intel of criminal activities that community policing may not be able to obtain. Although there are various studies on vigilante groups, few focus on why they thrive especially in the slums. Francis, *et al*, (2015), states that the prevalence of vigilante groups in slums is more enormous compared to other social economic class categories. This sentiment has been echoed by other scholars such as Peter (2011), who argues that Vigilante groups are a creation of the poor. Another scholar with similar views is Haggai (2016) who argues that Vigilante groups are formed with the intention of offering slum residents security which cannot be provided by the state.

Vigilantism is a problem of the whole society especially during the election periods. This is because they are taken advantage by the politicians to cause chaos. As per the previous studies done on vigilantism, there is an indication of vigilante groups being actively involved in security provision especially to the poor in the slums. Despite this indication, there is little information on how these vigilante groups thrive in slums. Some of the studies done on this

subject include Phillips (2017) who did a study on inequality and the emergence of vigilante organizations based on the case of Mexican auto defensas, Chikwendu, Nwankwo and Oli (2016) who examined the role of vigilante service groups in crime control for sustainable development in Anambra State, South-East Nigeria and Gichira (2019) who examined the influence of Vigilantism on National Security in Kenya based on a Case Study of Sungusungu in Kisii County (2002-2019). These studies gave little information about the general effects of vigilante groups on National security. This study therefore sought to bridge these gaps by detailing the effects of vigilante groups on national security and more specifically in Kibera slum.

#### **1.4 Purpose of the study**

The study focused on examining the effects of vigilante groups on national security, a case of Kibera slum, Nairobi County, Kenya. According to The Government of Kenya (2011), the existence of Vigilante groups is characterized by extortion, exploitation and robbery. The study sought more information on whether vigilante groups cause insecurity in Kibera or whether they enhance national security.

#### **1.5 Objectives of Study**

##### **1.5.1 General Objective**

The general objective of the study was to examine the effects of vigilante groups on National security, taking a case of Kibera's informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya.

##### **1.5.2 Specific Objectives**

The study had the following particular objectives:

- i. To examine the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security.
- ii. To establish the strategies used by vigilantes in provision of security in Kibera.

- iii. To assess the challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera.

### **1.6 Research questions**

The following were the developed research questions that guided the study:

- i. Why do the communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security?
- ii. Which strategies have the vigilante used in provision of security in Kibera?
- iii. What are challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera?

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

According to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2017), significance of the study is a critical component that defines in advance the beneficiaries to the study and the specific ways in which the audience linked to that study will benefit. Among the beneficiaries of this study will be institutions involved in security policy formulation and implementations in Kenya. Findings of this study will be made available to the Ministry of Interior, and Coordination of National Government. Based on the findings and recommendations provided, the ministry may seek further scrutiny on the entire phenomena of vigilante groups in Kibera slum and come up with policies to further enhance national security. This study will further contribute to the pool of research on security management, particularly on effects of vigilante groups on national security. The findings of this research will be made available through Africa Nazarene University, postgraduate research guidelines. Any scholar as well as other non-state actors interested on related information will access the information to enhance their research needs.

### **1.8 Scope of the study**

Rummel (2017) defines the scope of the study as a detailed explanation of the work to be conducted, which typically includes the main objective, deliverables and specific location

where the study will be conducted. This study examined the effects of vigilante groups on national security with a key focus on Kibera slum. The study was conducted in 4 wards out of the 5 wards forming Kibera constituency. The 4 wards including; Sarang'ombe, Makina, Laini Saba and Lindi are described by IEBC (2018) as a formation of Kibera slum. The 5<sup>th</sup> Ward, Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course was not part of the study site because it is not found inside Kibera slum. The study was only interested in wards within the slum area as they suit its main objective. However, literature review and secondary data analysis entailed information and case studies beyond the study site. Any relevant information on effects of vigilante groups on national security within and outside Kenyan borders was sourced. Primary data was collected through quantitative and qualitative methods. The target population was youths in Kibera registered in different self-help groups, members of vigilante groups and local administrative leaders. Analysis also followed the quantitative and qualitative methods. Both primary data collection and analysis lasted for 2 months after all clearance and compliance to design processes had been confirmed.

### **1.9 Delimitation of the Study**

Delimitation according to Saunders, *et al*, (2017), is researcher's point of actions that describes the boundaries set for the study. The study did not look at other informal settlements in Nairobi County. The study did not focus on other vigilante group in other parts of the county. The study will not investigate if vigilante are a threat to national security. The study was also delimited to vigilante groups only and did not include other security agents like private security companies and national police. For data collection, government security agents were not included. All the information regarding the objectives will be detailed through primary data carried out in Kibera informal settlement area and secondary data obtained through published literature materials.

### **1.10 Limitations of the Study**

According to Babbie (2012), study limitation is the expected shortcomings or challenges during the formulation and execution of the study topic. The limitation that was faced by this study was identifying and getting information from officials or senior members of the vigilante groups. They were deemed to be part of key informants. To counter that, the study opted for snowballing and insider informant. Additionally, as per the sensitivity of the research topic, some aspects of qualitative data collection including open focus group discussions and audio or video recording of the responses was avoided. The main reason was to eliminate cases of suspicious attention. However, in-depth interviews ensured that detailed qualitative feedback was captured. It was difficult to interview some section of the population, specifically, those living in “dark” zones of Kibera that are adjacent or near the river. These are considered as unsafe areas which might have compromised the security of the researcher or research assistants. To solve that challenge, the researcher hired the services of vigilante group members to help in providing security in “dark zones”.

### **1.11 Assumptions**

Cooper and Schindler (2012) define study assumptions as things that are accepted as true or at least plausible by researchers and peers who will be exposed to the findings of the study. The following were the assumptions made during the study design: That there are vigilantes groups providing security in Nairobi’s informal settlement areas. That identification of the members of the vigilante groups was not possible unless through snow balling. That Residents and leaders who reside in Kibera slum for more than 3 years are knowledgeable on security issues and vigilante activities in Kibera.

## **1.12 Theoretical framework**

According to Kombo and Tromp (2016), theoretical framework is the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study. This study is guided by two theories; social disorganization theory and broken windows theory. The two theories discussed next demonstrate formulation structures of vigilante groups as well mechanisms propagating their coexistence or expansion within the society (Crossman 2018).

### **1.12.1 Social Disorganization Theory**

The social disorganization theory was Developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942. This theory has been useful in understanding neighbourhood effects on crime and continues to be used in different ways today (Sampson, 2012). Researchers Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay from the University of Chicago began a series of studies in 1929 using records showing that rates of delinquency, criminality along with commitment to correctional facilities in the City of Chicago varied by area. Mostly, slums near the city centre had the highest rates with reductions as the distance increased from the city center except in commercial and industrial areas outside the central district, which had some of the highest rates (Shaw & McKay, 1942). This perspective has been challenged by recent emergent theories.

According to Taylor (1996), social disorganization exists once a community's structure and culture are unable to implement and express its resident's values. According to this theory, a crime-free community is a common value among neighbourhood residents. In principle, neighbourhoods that are disorganized socially are unsuccessful in fighting crime. At this point, other mechanisms are employed by the affected communities to counter the absence of social control, and in the case of Kenya, the vigilante moved in to fill the gap. From this perspective, this study employs this theory in arguing that since the gap of security provision was widened,



communities living together collectively decided to bridge this gap by the formation of these groups in order to provide security to them

Over the years, a lot of criticisms have been levelled against social disorganization theory, mostly, which is echoed in contemporary versions of the theory. For instance, Sampson and Groves (1989) posits that the theory is deficient because it argues that social networks of people living in any society is limited to other members of the community and that by studying communities with cross-sectional data, the community's physical and social structure is stable over time.

Furthermore, Kingston, Huizinga and Elliott (2009) contend that the theory acts as if each community subsists in a fizz and proposes that future research drawing upon this theory includes in one way or another larger cultural background measures and the urban political economy which both obviously influence the community structure. Social disorganization theory is relevant to the study as it seeks to highlight the role of vigilante groups and explain the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security. However, this theory doesn't highlight the possibility that vigilante groups can play a key role in enhancing national and community security. Hence the need for another theory like broken window theory.

### **1.12.2 Broken Windows Theory**

Broken windows theory was proposed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982 that used broken windows as a metaphor for disorder within neighborhoods. The theory establishes a link between community disorder and incivility and corresponding occurrences of serious crime. The theory says visible signs of crime, anti-social behavior and civic disorder create an urban environment which promotes additional crime and disorder, including grave crime. The Broken Window Theory (BWT) explains the extent to which informal policing structures may

be efficient and effective in crime management in some communal aspects, as compared to formal policing structures consisting of “strangers” (Gau & Pratt, 2010).

The Broken Windows Theory tends to suggest that minor forms of public disorder popularly known as broken windows may lead to serious crime and a descending spiral of decay within cities or urban centres. Wilson and Kelling (1982) state that untended behaviour leads to community control breakdown. A key part of this theory is the perception of untended disorder (Tukur, Hamza, & Yahuza, 2020). The disorder leads to law-abiding citizens associating their neighborhoods with insecurity, and thus these citizens withdraw from informal social controls and regulations. Thus, there is reduced community participation and contribution to addressing insecurity. The theory insinuates that occasionally, disorders have posed a challenge toward civilian-police interactions hence deteriorating community security and participation

Broken Window Theory holds that it is only members of the community that can be able to safeguard themselves from crimes. This is grounded on the point that community members live within the community and therefore know the potential criminals and how best to control them. The main standard of casual policing structures is constantly maintaining law and order by various members of communities. Thus, in agreement with the main opinion of broken windows theory, which emphasizes that relentless police availability makes a community less encouraging to criminals and crime. An increased presence of police and employments of casual rules and ways as well as laws can make a community seem less confused and safer, thereby growing the presence and the participation of inhabitants in their community and dropping rates of crime (Palmiotto, 2000).

The assumption of BWT is that offenders who reside near victims tend to commit most neighbourhood crimes. In other words, most crimes are generally a local problem that needs local solutions. The theory also submits that a flaw somewhere in the community with no one

present or vigilant enough to take care of it makes it become worse and may bring about a serious breach in security to members of the community.

When disorder in the community is at a critically high level, more grave problems are created of crime and urban decay. The broken windows theory typically implies instability, decay, high crime and lack of social order and control. This attracts crime and unlawful activities from other communities creating a state of lawlessness. The primary notion of this strategy of policing is that petty offences can result to more severe offences if those minor offences are not addressed, removed or repaired (Kamalu, *et al.*, 2018). The road to lawlessness begins when a community starts to tolerate minor violations that defy public order and do not contribute to maintain law and order.

The theory puts much emphasis that the police and the criminal justice system are not enough to address the security concerns, which endangers human lives as well as properties owned. There is a need to involve the community through use of vigilante groups (Omowunmi, 2016). The contribution of this theory to the study was that there is a possibility vigilante groups can play a key role in enhancing national and community security because they consist of community members who are privy to the community issues. However, this theory doesn't highlight how state interact with local actors in informal settlements like Kibera to formulate, enforce and contest 'local' norms for provision of national security. Hence the need for a third and last theory to address this,

### **1.12.3 Security Actor-Network theory**

Security Actor-Network theory was postulated by Bruno Latour and John Law in 1980s. Actor-network theory (ANT) is a theoretical and methodological approach to social theory where everything in the social and natural worlds exists in constantly shifting networks of relationships (Salter, 2019). The theory posits that nothing exists outside those relationships.

All the factors involved in a social situation are on the same level, and thus there are no external social forces beyond what and how the network participants interact at present. Hence, objects, ideas, processes, and any other relevant factors are seen as just as important in creating social situations as humans (Esmaili, Gholizadeh, Ebrahim Pour, & Moradi, 2021).


The theory holds that social forces do not exist in themselves, and therefore cannot be used to explain social phenomena. Rather than that, rigorous empirical analysis should be used to "describe" rather than "explain" social behavior. Only then can the concept of social forces be introduced, and only as an abstract theoretical approach, not as something that actually exists in the real world (Stachel, & DeLaHaye, 2015).

Security Actor-network theory demonstrates the role that nonhuman actants play in securitization processes in order to avoid prejudging power relations and oversimplifying complex political processes (Esmaili, Gholizadeh, Ebrahim Pour, & Moradi, 2021). A radical reimagining of agency and politics is necessary to reintroduce securitization theory to its original policy and political promise. This theory is relevant to the study as it how state interact with local actors in in informal settlements like Kibera to formulate, enforce and contest 'local' norms for provision of national security.

### **1.13 Conceptual framework**

Conceptual framework according to Kombo & Tromp (2016) is the natural progression of the phenomenon to be studied. This comprises of the dependent and independent variables. In this case, the dependent variable is national security. The independent variables are: The role played by Kibera vigilante groups on national security, the perceptions of Kibera residents' regarding vigilantes providing security and the role of the state in the existence of vigilante groups in Kibera. As per the illustrations in Figure 1.1 above, the study will look into the contribution of vigilante groups on national security. This will be looked at as to whether the existence of

vigilante groups contributes to state of insecurity or provides security to slum residents. The study will answer its general objective by discussing the three specific objectives formulated. Firstly, the study will look at the reasons why communities depend on vigilante where information will be collected on increasing crime rates, corruption within the police service, corrupt and ineffective judicial justice systems, mistrust on the prosecution systems and substantial security inequality. Secondly, the study will explore the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security by collection information on surveillance on suspected criminal individuals, cultivation of security information, security patrols and crime reporting. Thirdly, the study will explore the Challenges of the Strategies used by Vigilante where information will be collected on lack of government funding, police harassment when conducting their duties, inadequate training and inadequate basic equipment's of operation. Figure 1.1 below shows the conceptual framework:



**Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework**

Source: Researcher, 2021

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter will review the theoretical framework by looking at vigilantism in detail; it discusses the empirical review and look at the research gaps.

#### **2.2 Theoretical review of literature**

Vigilantism can be looked at theoretically in terms of social action using various academic and news sources. The theoretical review thereon examines how the definition of vigilantism is constructed by people protected by vigilantes, people victimized by vigilantes, and by vigilantes themselves. Further, the history of vigilantism and the philosophy of their operation have also been reviewed.

##### **2.2.1 National Security**

National security has been described, “as the freedom from foreign dictation” (Peterside, 2014). Mangold (2013) on his part conceptualizes it, “as the ability of a nation not to sacrifice its core values to avoid war, and is able to, if challenged to maintain them by war.” These definitions are deemed too narrow since they present State as the referent object requiring protection from other States. Today, national security has been expanded to include other several potential threats that are non-military in nature that include economic, political, environmental and societal threats. As such, this study will adopt Kenya’s conceptualization, which views national security as the “protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity and other national interests (Constitution of Kenya, 2010).”

National security is understood to revolve around territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and national survival. As such, State is seen as the focal point and the sole custodian of security, achieved mainly through military means (Peterside, 2014). However, such traditional understanding of national security, built around military power, territorial integrity and State survival, has increasingly been challenged. Since the end of cold war, the scope of national security has been expanded from the narrow state-centrism approach towards a more broad-based human centric approach. The idea that the State is the only provider of national security has increasingly been challenged. Gichira (2019) has noted that the non-state security actors such as vigilantes, private guards, and private security firms among others are increasingly becoming key factors in contemporary national security.

Consequently, non-state security actors, particularly vigilantes, have attracted a lot of interest from policy makers and scholars in the recent past as their persistence and prominence in many countries continue to be progressively acknowledged. Provision and governance of national security is now being distributed and shared among network of State and Non-State actors such as vigilantes and private security firms (Gichira, 2019). However, private security firms are a bit expensive and thus unaffordable to many citizens, particularly in developing countries. This leaves vigilantism as the most viably preferred alternative to the formal security machinery amongst the citizenry. This change of security governance helps us to appreciate the significance and relevance of non-state security actors in the contemporary security context since it recognizes their motivations and their impacts on national security (Mangold, 2013).

The Kenya's national security is well defined in the chapter fourteen (14) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) as the, "protection against internal and external threats to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity and other national interests" (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). This definition agrees



with the contemporary views of national security that appreciates the multidimensionality of security that includes other non-military aspects such as political, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan, 1991). The Constitution of Kenya (2010) further highlights Kenya's threats to national security as Internal and External threats and outlines Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS) and National Police Service (NPS) as the national security organs.

According to Gichira (2019) the key internal threats to Kenyan National's security includes terrorism, diseases, violent robberies, ethnic hostilities triggered by unresolved boundary disputes, livestock theft/ cattle rustling and competition for natural resources, upsurge of criminal gangs/ vigilantes, proliferation of illegal firearms and illegal weapons and influx of illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants. External threats include threats to Kenya's National security that are emanates from outside the territory of Kenya (Kones, 2017). They are shaped by the traditional conceptualization of security that views national security from an anarchic international system, where State is seen as the sole custodian of security, achieved mainly through military means. However, the impact of globalization coupled with the expanded conception of security has added new external security challenges to States to include environmental insecurity, instabilities from neighboring countries, international terrorism, and transnational organized crimes such as poaching, narco trafficking, human trafficking/smuggling, money laundering, arms trafficking and piracy (Gichira, 2019).

### **2.2.2 Vigilantism**

The universal image of the vigilantism is drawn from Western popular culture bearing a dictionary definition: "a formation of volunteer committees organized to suppress and punish crime summarily based on a popular belief that the processes of law assigned is inadequate". According to Dahrendorf (2018), this is given as a strong word bearing a symbolic image of

bigger firing ammunition to hunt on criminals. Vigilantes are believed to be with no moral obligations ruthless and with full criminal mindset (Turner, 2014). The image has been magnified in the entertainment and media industry through acts in television shows, comic books and films. In these works of arts, assigned roles to antagonists or main characters including Batman, Punisher and Rambo are seen to paint notions portrayed by vigilante groups. However, their acts and the symbolic definition presented in those actors do not reflect the modern day's vigilantism based on their English definition. The formulation of the definition given does not provide an actual scholarly component rather an imagery of individual views. Initial definitions paint vigilante groups to be social misfit on the other hand current definition creates a notion of them being heroes (Scott, 2011).

Scott (2011) argues that definitions earlier stated were not reflective on scholarly arguments rather individual opinions. Vigilantism is explored in several scenarios and the characterization of the vigilante depends on who builds the image. This construction is contingent upon the constructor's nature (that is., his or her views on justice, morality, ethics, and politics), the vigilante's actions, the constructor's relationship to the vigilante's actions, and the cultural norms and preferences regarding criminal justice in that location and time (Scott, 2011). Vigilantes, by definition, operate outside of institutional structures. According to Miller (2018), Each vigilante or vigilante organization, in the resolution of a specific social problem, considers the current social structure ineffective. In addition, the vigilantes believed that the social problem was simply resolved. The failure of the system was not due to the fact that the problem was not recognized but due to the lack of action.

Social scientists primarily addressed this commonality in two ways: by couching alert people in discussions about deviance or crime (Culberson 2013; McClory 2015; Abrams, 2015 & Alston, 2012). Neither view explores the fact of vigilantes identifying cracks in the social

structure that need to be fixed. In the case of vigilantism, the vigilante is distinct from other citizens by deciding not to ask the establishment to amend itself but to take action against those shortcomings. According to Harre (2016), the act of vigilantism requires the opportunity for non-institutional behaviour. This necessitates an exploration of the agency exercised by vigilantes. Harre (2016) further states that agency as “nuanced,” referring to resistance as much as it refers to compliance, strategy, and lack of intention. Boege, *et al.*, (2011) argues that, both the bureaucratic and informal structural constraints enable a dynamic understanding of when, why and how an individual decides to act. For vigilantes, such barriers could include legal definitions of the extent to which popular sovereignty is allowed to go before an act of sovereignty is regarded a criminal (Okoth & Olong’, 2010).

According to Miller (2018), discussing the issue of vigilantism should also focus on motives and counter motives of why breaking laws are justified or unjustified. The very root of the watchdog agency can be their socially built identity. The fact that the actions of the watchman are carried out outside of institutional social structures does not mean that they cannot be included or at least treated as acceptable by the institution. Vigilantes have most recently been casted in the works of art as heroes with decency in their actions and behaviors. Miller (2018) describes how Benjamin Fodor started clothing a Seattle citizen as a superhero, who called himself Phoenix Jones, and patrolled the streets to fight the crime. From the video, the police were happy to have someone like him to assist in creating order. Little did they know that he would turn up into a monster and spray people with pepper. Miller uses this analogy to demonstrate that having a group run without laid institutional policies can be very dangerous.

O’Meara (2013) notes that, the actions of border guards have their roots in the cultural mythologies of national heroes that protect their country against the threat of invaders. This was termed as a direct link to the actions of the Civil Homeland Defense with the history of

vigilantism that makes Tombstone, Arizona famous. O'Meara (2013) further indicates that the origin of vigilantism should not be given as a medieval phenomenon. Historical evidence indicates that vigilantism might have started in 1856 as a counter effect to criminal activities and societal sufferings. In both cases, we see a cultural and historical precedence for vigilantism. Nicholas (2012) goes as far as to call vigilantism an American tradition.

### **2.2.3 History of Vigilantism**

Historian Culberson (2013) states that vigilantism and the vigilante ethos existed long before the word vigilante was introduced into the English language. Scholarly evidence brings forth some controversy on the existence of vigilantism between Dark Age to medieval times. However, most literature indicates that true vigilantism is a recent happening. According to Culberson (2013), the Biblical account in Genesis 34 of abduction and rape or certain interpretations of elements of the concept of watchfulness can be found, Dinah who was Jacob's daughter being seduced, by the eponymous son of the King in the city of Shechem, Canaan. This led to the hostile response of Simeon and Levi, her brothers who killed in vengeance all the men in the city and rescued their sister and plundered Shechem. The story from Genesis 34 states further that when Jacob protested against his son's actions in fear of that causing trouble upon him and his family, the brothers replied they would not allow anybody to treat their sister like a harlot. The use of personal vengeance and dueling was seen as a class prerogative in the aristocracy of the sword before the formation of a centralist, liberal-bureaucratic nation-state (Haggai, 2016).

Originally, vigilantism in part of the world arose as a frontier response to the threat and reality of crime (Apollo, 2017). In America for instance, the first few people who moved to the Deep South and the Old West, the criminal justice system was not protecting. By then America did not have any systems of enforcing laws. It was not in a state where courts were not properly

developed; they did not have jails to lock criminals and had a lot of loopholes that could allow offenders to walk freely and even take the law into their own hands. This involved lynching and public whippings carried out in Virginia in the late 1700s by a vigilance committee led by a Colonel Lynch (Culberson, 2013).

Vigilante violence is the opposite of revolutionary violence (Francis et al, 2015). The revolutionary violence are groups or an opposition wing formed clearly to tarnish or overthrow a properly instituted law and order. On the other hand, vigilantism has a core purpose of fighting to uphold law and order when such is neglected or when there are individuals involved in overthrowing it. This implies that vigilantisms put revolutionists in check. According to Francis, *et al.*, (2015), early vigilantes argued that their ends justified their means to legitimize their lawless deeds. To safeguard sacred traditions, apply conventional moral codes and continue to respect sovereignty, "honorable red-blooded, law-abiding" citizens sometimes were compelled to impose "retaliatory justice." They portrayed themselves as acting in self-defense as they lashed out in righteous and indignation against "idlers," "parasites," "intruders," "corrupters," and "predators." They filled their manifestos with appeals to natural law, patriotism, and religion.

Hofstadter, *et al.*, (2012) indicates that while the frontier vigilantes have long since disappeared from scenes, outbreaks of vigilance prevail and can even be seen as common, if defined broadly. For instance, the act of vigilantisms is seen as a force militating against criminal perpetrators involving drug traffickers, street gangs and other social misfits currently in Countries like Mexico, Colombia, South Africa and many more. Those entrenched in criminal activities feel obstructed to present themselves to authorities. Madison (2015) argues that Teens act as vigilantes when individuals attack homeless vagabonds and drive them away or set fire to them.

Philosophically, Vigilante impulses to inflict on-the-spot punishments surface whenever angry crowds quickly gather, chase after, and mete out "curbstone justice" or "street justice" known or suspected purse snatchers, prowlers, burglars, robbers, and rapists before the police arrive (Marx, 2015). This string if vigilantism can involve police officers who instead of arresting and presenting the suspect before the court, they can decide to give the offender some punishment. The punishment can be in the form of a street beating or simply engaging the offender in a manual activity to ensure the perpetrator is punished before being released with a mere "slap on the wrist" by the "revolving door" of an overly lenient justice system (Marx, 2015).

McClory (2015) argues that tendencies toward vigilantism are held in check by countervailing forces and ideologies. This is through having an ex-checker from the police and legal processes when they exit their litigation measures. This means that they are also in the confinements of the legal processes of any nation. To McClory (2015), civil rights and civil liberties institutions argue that due process safety measures and constitutional guarantees should be followed to prevent innocent people from being misrepresented, wrongfully convicted and punished unfairly. The "justice" imposed by vigilante groups through calling for mob justice on the confirmed "guilty" individuals are seen as too swift though not satisfactorily to the rule of law for fair trials. Vigilantism transforms victims into victims. The label vigilante, previously accepted with pride, remains a derogatory term (Shotland, 2017).

### **2.3 Empirical Review of Literature**

This section will provide a detailed review of the independent variables based on their engagement to the study topic. The variables under review are: reasons why communities depend on vigilante for security, strategies used by vigilante in provision of security and challenges of the strategies used by vigilante.

### **2.3.1 Reasons why Communities depend on Vigilante for Security**

High crime level is the main motivation behind people to taking the law into their own hands. The ever-increasing crime rate has most often been attributed to low police to citizen ratio, inadequate resources for crime detection and prevention and poor public to police relationship (Higazi, 2016). Accordingly, the communities have devised self-protection mechanisms. The self-protection mechanisms mainly involve the formation of vigilante groups within communities affected by crime. Several reasons are advanced for the rise of vigilante groups. These reasons range from insecurity, unemployment and idleness, corruption within the police service, youth empowerment to political reasons, corrupt and ineffective judicial justice systems, mistrust on the prosecution systems, easy or lenient bail conditions for the suspects and frustrations about rising criminal activities (Schuberth, 2018).

The feeling of relative insecurity or deprivation in areas of significant safety inequality may encourage poorer citizens to organize vigilance. Inequalities in security can result from the use of private security and public security issues. With respect to private security, citizens who can afford to take certain measures to combat crime (Phillips, 2017). Private guards protect a lot of gated apartment buildings. Furthermore, economic inequality can lead to organized surveillance since inequality signifies the distribution of labor which alleviates the problems of collective action in the formation of self-defense groups. In a locality with relatively equal distribution of wealth, it might be a challenge to get a group of citizens to adopt the law (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2017).

The expansion of slums and the rapid urbanization has led to slums without basic services for instance lack of police presence. The acuteness of crime challenge has led to organized criminal groups and gangs filling this vacuum extorting, kidnapping and violently robbing the local population (Higazi, 2016). The ineffective African crime response has also resulted into public

distrust and fear, bleeding state institutions of their legitimacy and undermined economic development of the society. This has given birth to a culture of impunity. The violent crime is linked to the weakness of police department. The institution of police is underfunded, understaffed and majorities are not trained. Majority of Africans rarely meet police officers and thus do not view them as a source of protection (Singh, 2015).

The increase in criminal acts and therefore insecurity raise fundamental questions on the capability of the Kenyan state to discharge her duties appropriately. The state is a community of human beings that (effectively maintains the domination of lawful utilization of material force inside a given region. The ever-increasing crime rate has most often been attributed to low police to citizen ratio, inadequate resources for crime detection and prevention and poor public to police relationship (Abrams, 2015). Accordingly, the communities have devised self-protection mechanisms. This self-protection mechanism mainly involves the formation of vigilante groups within the communities affected by crimes. When they believe, the government has failed to protect them and their community, vigilante groups take up arms to protect themselves and their community (Schuberth, 2018).

The ineffective African crime response has also result into public distrust and fear, bleeding state institutions of their legitimacy and undermined economic development of the society. This has given birth to a culture of impunity (Yahaya, & Bello, 2019). The violent crime is linked to the weakness of police department. The institution of police is unfunded, understaffed and majorities are not well trained. Schuberth (2015) outlines that corruption and institutional deficiencies, lack of partnership between law enforcement and communities and historical injustices among other factors have led to the rise of crime and insecurity to Kenya as they broadcast the seed of mistrust, fear and suspicion amongst members of the society.



Also, Singh (2015) did a study on resorting to community justice when state policing fails: South Africa. The study found that community-based justice practices are particularly prevalent among the poorer Black residents of South Africa and are mostly based on the basic distrust of police forces and the conviction that the police fail the community. Community justice proponents argue that ineffective service delivery, flaws in the justice system and processes, and police corruption all contribute to people supporting community justice and vigilante activities. This study was done in South Africa where vigilante groups may have different effects on national security as compared to Kenya. The study did not link vigilante groups with national security.

Chikwendu, Nwankwo and Oli (2016) examined the role of vigilante service groups in crime control for sustainable development in Anambra State, South-East Nigeria. The study used a cross-sectional survey design. The data collection process included both quantitative and qualitative methods. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, and bar charts. The study's results suggest that socio-cultural factors such as the formal police's inability to adequately and successfully control crime facilitated the establishment of informal policing structures. Additionally, the findings indicate that informal policing structures are widely accepted as agents of crime prevention in the communities where it operates. This study was done in Nigeria where vigilante groups may have different effects on national security as compared to Kenya. The study also looked at crime control instead of national security.

Moreover, Oyagi (2016) examined the role of vigilante groups in the management of security in urban centers based on a case study of Sungusungu in Suneka Township, Kisii County. After interpretation, it was determined that the primary factor motivating individuals to join the Sungusungu vigilante group was crime. The study established that residents of Suneka had

backed the Sungusungu's operations. Finally, in terms of the effect of Sungusungu operations, the study established that the area's security had improved as a result of its operations, despite opposition from some segments of the population. The study focused on Kisii County only and could not be generalized to cover all the counties in Kenya.

Phillips (2017) did a study on inequality and the emergence of vigilante organizations based on the case of Mexican auto defensas. The study revealed that income inequality on a local level creates an environment conducive to vigilante organizations. Inequality fuels the demand for vigilantism, as poorer citizens perceive themselves to be significantly less secure than their wealthier neighbors, who enjoy advantages in terms of private and public security. Consequently, inequality implies a patron-worker labor distribution, which is ideal for organizing a specific type of group, the patron-financed vigilante group. The study established that when under siege, communities begin to organize into emergency community vanguards to defend themselves and this gives rise to community vigilante movements. The study did not link vigilante groups with national security.

Additionally, Zizumbo-Colunga (2017) did a study on community, authorities, and support for vigilantism based on experimental evidence. The findings revealed that participants are more receptive to vigilante action when those contemplating it are described as members of a trustworthy community. Additionally, the study discovered that this effect is mitigated by law enforcement's described trustworthiness. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the emergence of vigilantism and also how trust in authorities can act as a moderator of social capital's normative expression. The study did not link vigilante groups with national security.

### **2.3.2 Strategies used by Vigilante in Provision of Security**

Provision of adequate security is a social pre-requisite for the survival of any society. Every society takes reasonable steps to protect the lives and property of those within its borders. Corporate and social activities cannot continue freely without sufficient security. This basic essence of security may be why companies have made efforts to police their neighborhoods since time immemorial to protect them from violent activity (Darko, 2016). Security is aimed at preventing and safeguarding certain facilities, equipment, people or activities from damage, prevention, destruction, murder or interruptions. This has been entrusted to police and when they fail, communities rely on vigilante groups who apply various strategies to provide security (Sidang, 2020).

Actually, strategies for providing security are adopted by the police or vigilante group to envision or reduce the opportunity or avenue for committing crime, and it is appreciated that crime prevention is cheaper than detection. The method used by vigilante usually includes surveillance of buildings and potential criminal persons. This method offers motorized patrols and foot patrols, including road and border patrols, to the police. This is still the best way to collect intelligence from criminals (Yahaya, & Bello, 2019).

Another strategy is cultivation of information since information is essential to all functional police activity. Intellectual ability reports on criminal individuals and associate recipients of loots must be constantly collected. Information is essential and research must consider everybody they do well as a prospective information source (Otiso, 2015). Information obtained via this medium is beneficial in the planning of crime prevention strategies. The cultivation of information is an essential part of police duties and it is achieved through the creation of relationships and the creation of relationships with members of the public with good intent to assist the police, police guards and victims of criminal activities, each investigation

has a moral, professional and ethical obligation to protect the identity of informants. Failure to do so can lead to the informant and/or his family being killed, injured or bullied (Suryana, 2019).

Moreover, vigilante crime detection is a crucial part of the security work of the community. Every Vigilante entity, with its different commands, has a detective unit. This important division is responsible for the resolution or clarification of reports of crimes to the appropriate security groups. After taking the suspect or key information into the police force, a detective or interrogator interviews and collects evidence and proceeds from the scene of the crime (searches the scene of a crime for physical evidence collects the evidence and takes it to the police lab for scrutiny) (Grant, 2019). The detective/investigator shall also carry out screens (searches of the witnesses' area), interrogate possible suspects, arrest the alleged crime and prepare the case for presentation in courts, with the assistance of the District Attorney/Procurator (Gichira, 2019).

Additionally, surveillance is among the older methods of crime detection. This method is often used by vigilante groups if it is informed that a crime will occur at a particular location or if some people are allegedly involved in a crime (Suryana, 2019). When a surveillance group suspects a crime or is about to take place it reports quickly to the nearest and most relevant safety training for the appropriate action. The first scenario is usually dealt with by a stakeout called fixed policing observation: The second circumstance may also require mobile observation, maybe on foot or by car. Some situations may require aerial monitoring (use of aircraft) or electronic process (use digital communication monitoring equipment). The method of observation must be legal (Phillips, 2017).

Muchira (2016) examined the role of community policing in crime prevention: Kirinyaga county, Central Kenya. The researcher used both a qualitative and quantitative approach to

conduct descriptive survey analysis. The results suggest that collaborative police-community patrols, vigilante groups, and community courts have all aided in crime prevention in Kirinyaga County. The court system was established to be less effective than the other three areas of focus. The residents of Kirinyaga County could very well benefit from the research findings. The study may identify areas that require additional research, vocational training, and a shift in attitudes toward community policing and management measures that can be implemented in the future to reduce crime. The study looked at community policing which is different from vigilantism and also did not link the vigilante groups with national security.

Yahaya and Bello (2019) examined the impact of vigilantism and crime control in contemporary Nigeria based on Gezawa Local Government Area, Kano State, Nigeria (2010-2015). The study also established that the Nigerian police are ineffective in criminal control and vigilante groups have taken up this inefficiency and have filled the loophole of insecurity at community level. The results also showed that members of the vigilante group are recruited and monitored through their neighborhoods and are efficient in the fight against crime. The results also showed that Nigeria's easiest way to fix the crime problem is to increase vigilante activities, through support and training from local communities and governments.

Gichira (2019) examined the influence of Vigilantism on National Security in Kenya based on a Case Study of Sungusungu in Kisii County (2002-2019). The research utilized both primary and secondary data. The analysis indicated that Sungusungu emerged as a result of a wave of criminal operations in Kisii County and the failure of the NPS to control the crime. The impact of Sungusungu surveillance on the security of residents of Kisii county was found to be considerably inconsistent and apparently paradoxical: whilst Sungusungu representatives have been quick, prompt and efficient to protect the public from criminals, their involvement in many criminal activities, such as extrajudicial killings, torture, racketeering, illegal electricity

and water connections, illegal detention, and several kangaroo courts running, have been instrumental in increasing insecurity. It has been established that what occurs in Kisii County together under guise of law enforcement is nothing other than criminal activity.

### **2.3.3 Challenges of the Strategies used by Vigilante Groups**

Despite the perceived effectiveness and commitment of vigilante groups, their operations and strategies have been noted to face many challenges. These challenges include their faulty association with police and legal system; Their legitimacy in the view of the communities they want to serve; recruitment and retention management; choice of appropriate operations and maintenance of resources, incentives and motivations to survive groups (Schuberth, 2015). Other challenges include inadequate government funding, police harassment in the performance of their tasks, lack of appropriate training and weapons, lack of basic operating equipment such as lamps, warm clothing, rain boots, rain coats, identity cards and whistles and uniforms, amongst others. Other weaknesses experienced by groups include poor monitoring of the new members and the presence of touts or "bad eggs" among the alert members, a wide range of institutions, and poor group accountability (Onwuegbusi, 2017).

In addition, Schuberth (2015) examined the challenge of community-based armed groups: Towards a conceptualization of militias, gangs, and vigilantes. The study established that the proliferation of irregular, armed actors defying simplistic definitions has attracted both public and academic attention, not least in this journal's pages. One important typological problem is the tendency for CBAGs to turn bad and threaten the stability they were expected to transform and become a major problem in their own countries. It has been concluded that the challenge of CBAG should finally be addressed by establishing a functioning state, which can deal first and foremost with the underlying problems that led to its proliferation.

Onwuegbusi (2017), the fact that many Nigerian societies no longer depend on police for their safety, instead, they have needed to resort to unrestricted and violent reprisals against suspect sources of collective threat, because of the deficiencies of the Nigeria Police. Of course, people's preference for the police by the wakeful groups would generate rifts and mutual distrust between both security authorities, the wake-up group always would accuse police of corruption, while the police accuse the wake-up officer of extrajudicial killing and illegal detention of suspects. This scenario causes a major reverse in the safety activities of the two institutions and thus worsens the security challenges in the country (Ikuteyijo, 2009).

Vigilante groups have often disrupted from their primary duties, both at the state level and also at the Grassroots level, in the face of conflicting interest. The members of the vigilante's group have often relieved their objective mission and showed their loyalty towards the powers at national and community level (Tyson, 2013). Vigilant groups often face threats from hoodlums, which in their robbery activities use sophisticated weapons. He also criticized the existence of cooperation between the members of the group, especially of the senior officials who fail to respect certain decisions made (Moncada, 2017).

Ikuteyijo (2009) examined the challenges of community policing in Nigeria. The study found that community policing forums should also extend to involve residents of all ethnic, religious, occupational and age groups in the community, so that the needs and perspectives of all residents are included in the discussion of community challenges and concerns. The underfunding of community policing is another major constraint. Community policing needs far greater funding than conventional policing, as it requires training and re-training of all officers, more modern crime fighting equipment and an increase in moral standards for officers. Another issue that concerns community police success in Nigeria is the emergence of local watchdog groups to combat crime in communities where the police have done little to preserve

law and order. Local government encourages regular local seminars to inform the police forces of their roles, limitations and cooperation. The study focused on Kisii County only and could not be generalized to cover all the counties in Kenya.

#### **2.4 Summary of review of literature and Research Gaps**

Based on the reviews of different literature materials on vigilantism, it can be observed that the history of vigilantism dates back in old biblical age as demonstrated in Genesis 34. It can also be noted that the motives behind vigilante formation lies in individual or group volunteerism to participate in community protection and upholding of justice. This is compelled by state failures or collaboration in doing so. Vigilante groups in slum areas have stepped up to address the inability of the state to offer social services such as security, employment, hygiene services and satisfactory justice among others. It can also be observed that in some instances the state collaborates in the formation and operationalization of vigilante groups. An example of state propagated vigilante is the *Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)* of Nigeria which was formed to help the government to fight against Boko Haram (Okeke, 2013). Finally, the relationship of vigilante groups and local communities can be described as symbiotic. The communities get social services from the groups while the groups benefit from the fee obtained.

Vigilantism as a topic and in particular, the effects of vigilante groups on national security has had a scanty empirical approach from the scholarly work in Kenya. This was only able to access two similar studies done previously. They include: a study on “Militia gangs in relation to vigilantes in the Country, Kenya: abandoning and consequences of the reform agenda” by Nicholas (2012) and “the role of vigilante groups in the management of security in urban centers: a case study of Sungusungu in Suneka Township, Kisii County” by (Haggai, 2016).

The study by Nicholas (2012), on the Militias, gangs and vigilantes in Kenya looked at sprouting of vigilante groups as part of the negative consequences when the reform agenda has



been abandoned by the state. His study entailed an analysis of institutional reforms mainly legal reforms and political reforms. He collects primary data qualitatively from legal experts in Nairobi on the outcome of failed institutional reforms. The findings indicated that Militia groups, gangs and vigilantes sprout when institutional reforms have failed. The three groups (Militia, gangs and vigilantes) are formed by dissatisfied individuals who fight the state mechanisms as a result of being excluded in the reform agendas by the state. Nicholas however fails to provide a divisive line between militias, gangs and vigilantes. This notion as per the dictionary definition is misleading. Further, the study fails to provide circumstances under which these groups are formed, how they are operated and who in the government these groups fight. The study is also framed badly and does not clearly indicate if Militias, gangs and vigilantes are the dependent variable or is it legal reforms.

The study by Haggai (2016) on “the role of vigilante groups in the management of security in urban centers: a case study of *Sungusungu* in Suneka Township, Kisii County” is perceived by this study as the first scholarly milestone in Kenya on vigilantism. Haggai’s study looked at the motivations behind residents of Suneka Township joining *Sungusungu* vigilante group, reasons why *Sungusungu* vigilante groups thrived over the years and how the *Sungusungu* vigilante group’s activities affects the security of residents of Suneka Township. Haggai (2016) used a judgmental sampling method to pick a sample size of 110 residents of Suneka as respondents. They were interviewed through a questionnaire to provide quantitative data. Further, former members of *Sungusungu*, the local chief and his assistant and the police officers utilized were interviewed as key informants for the qualitative data. Based on the findings it was established that crime was the main driving force for the residents Suneka to join *Sungusungu*. The study also established that the residents had supported *Sungusungu* and that the group had improved the security of the area.

Despite a brilliant scholarly milestone by Haggai (2016) on the study of vigilantism in Kenya, the selection of the respondents and key informants was without any current member of the *Sungusungu* group. This might have resulted in a one-sided opinion on the objectives under scrutiny. According to Kombo and Tromp (2016), one sided opinion led to biased data and high instances of error margins. Based on this, relying on Haggai's conclusions might be misleading. Instead of using former members of Sungusungu as part of the key informants, he should have used current members. Former member might have had different experiences that had made them leave the group.

The two studies above though with some gaps provide a good precedence for this study to build on. Although Haggai (2016) sought in one of his objectives to find out about why vigilante groups thrive in Suneka Township, there is no indication of whether Suneka Township is an informal settlement or not. This study will expound on that in relation to slum areas. The study will also focus more on the effect of vigilante groups on national security which has not been demonstrated clearly in the two studies.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction to research methodology**

This chapter discusses the research methodology used. The chapter describes the research design, the target population, sample design, data collection approach and data analysis.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

According to Kumar (2019), a research design refers to the overall strategy chosen to coherently and logically incorporate the various components of a study to ensure an effective resolution of the research problem; it is the blueprint for data collection, measurement and analysis. This study adopted a descriptive survey design. Kumar (2019) describes this design as concentrated and detailed in which statements and concerns on an occurrence are carefully examined and formulated. The study gathered data that describe the events as ascertained to the Kibera vigilante groups and then organized, tabulated, depicted and described the data. The collected data describes the impact of Kibera vigilante groups on national security. The use of who, what and how has aided in coming up with facts which after tabulation helps to meet the objectives of the research. The design permits the researcher to generalize the findings to the larger population of informal settlement areas in Kenya and allows for the analysis and relations of variables.

#### **3.3 Research site**

According to Crossman (2018), research site is the geographical location of the study. Geographically, this study was conducted in Kibera slum, Nairobi. The slum is the biggest settlement in Africa and one of the largest slums in the world (World Bank, 2017). According to World population reviews of 2019, Kibera slum dwelling in Kenya houses approximately

500,000 residents. Most Kibera population are termed as poor as their household income is less than \$1 per a day. This have led to emergency of gangs and crimes within the slum. Clean water and education are lacking and, in addition to these shortcomings, violations and attacks are common (Government of Kenya, 2011). The slum has been partially demolished recently in order to rebuild roads to reduce congestion in Nairobi and this construction destruction suddenly displaced numerous local residents. It is located in Lang'ata area in Nairobi, approximately 5 kilometers from Nairobi City Centre in Kenya. Kibera slum is part of Kibra constituency. The entire constituency is composed of 5 wards which are Sarang'ombe, Makina, Laini Saba, Lindi and Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course. However, this study was only interested in 4 wards forming Kibera slum. The four wards studied are: Sarang'ombe, Makina, Laini Saba and Lindi. The 5th Ward, Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course was not part of the study site because it is not found inside Kibera slum. Appendix 5 shows the map of the research site. There are many cases of insecurity in Kibera and this have led to rise in number of vigilante groups (Skilling, & Rogers, 2017).

### **3.4 Target Population**

The study population consisted of youths in Kibera, specifically; those enrolled in youth self-help groups, Sub-County Criminal Intelligence Officer (SCCIO), Deputy County commissioner (DCC), chiefs, Nyumba Kumi representatives and top officials of the vigilante groups. The study focused on youths since they are the ones who are hugely involved in vigilante activities and hence are in a position to provide adequate information on influence of vigilante groups on national security. To sample from a large population of youths in Kibera estimated to be over 500,000 (UN Habitat, 2010), the specific target population was Kibera youths enrolled in youth self-help groups. A total of 5000 registered youths in over 100 youth self-help groups qualified for the study (Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, 2018).

Kibera's DCC, SCCIO, 281 Nyumba Kumi cluster representatives and all 4 chiefs each representing the 4 wards qualified for the study. Additionally, 3 top officials of the Vigilante groups operating in Kibera including: Siafu, 12 Disciples, Kamukunji, Pressure Group, Military, Yes We Can, Mungiki, J-10 and Debunchers were targeted (National Crime Research Centre, 2012). The study used snow balling to recruit the 3 top officials from each group to participate in the survey. Target population is tabulated in Table 3.1 below.

**Table 3. 1: Target population**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total population</b>	<b>Source</b>
Youths registered in youth self-help groups	5,000	Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, 2018).
Government representatives (DCC, SCCIO and Chiefs)	27	IEBC 2018
Nyumba Kumi representatives	281	IEBC 2018
Siafu Vigilante group	400	NCRC 2018
12 Disciples group	200	NCRC 2018
Kamukunji group	150	NCRC 2018
Pressure group	200	NCRC 2018
Yes we Can group	300	NCRC 2018
Mungiki group	600	NCRC 2018
J-10 group	100	NCRC 2018
Debunchers group	100	NCRC 2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,358</b>	

Source: Author 2021

### **3.5 Determination of study sample**

#### **3.5.1 Sampling Procedure**

A combination of stratified and simple random sampling techniques was applied in this study. Since members of vigilante groups prefer their identity to be anonymous to the strangers for

security reasons, simple random sampling was applied to identify and include them in the from various groups (strata). Stratified sampling technique was used to place respondents in various vigilante groups. The members of the groups were identified through community members who are aware of their existence and the members were assured that their identity was kept confidential. Initial identifiers were recruited through the assistance from SCCIO. The simple random sampling enabled the study to conduct in-depth interviews with 3 top officials of each group/category. Local administration leaders were selected through Purposive sampling. The approach was used to purposively get 1 DCC, 1 SCCIO, 4 Nyumba Kumi representatives and 4 chiefs for the study.

### **3.5.2 Study Sample Size**

On sample size determination, the study used a stratified approach to categorize different study target group. The numbers given for each group was based on bias definition of officials represented in each group. The assumptions on the bias determinations are that, each group has a minimum of 3 officials. For the registered youth groups, the bias selection was targeted for top 3 officials. Based on this stratified and bias sampling approach, a sample size of 24 vigilante group members, 3 from each of the 8 groups reported to exist in Kibera, 1 DCC, 1 SCCIO, 4 Nyumba Kumi representatives; 1 from each of the 4 wards, 4 chiefs and 100 youths registered in 50 active youth self-help groups formed the total sample size of the study. The study further applied quota sampling during the administration of the questionnaire to obtain the sample size of 100 youths registered in self-help groups within Kibera slum. The 6 administrative leaders were selected through purposive sampling. The sample size was 134. Those familiar with vigilante operations were interviewed during the study duration (Table 3.2).

**Table 3. 2: Sample size**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>	<b>Sampling process</b>
Youths registered in youth self-help groups	5,000	100	Quota sampling
Government representatives (DCC, SCCIO and Chiefs)	27	6	Purposive sampling
Nyumba Kumi representatives	281	4	Purposive sampling
Siafu group	400	3	Random sampling
12 Disciples group	200	3	Random sampling
Kamukunji group	150	3	Random sampling
Pressure group	200	3	Random sampling
Yes we Can group	300	3	Random sampling
Mungiki group	600	3	Random sampling
J-10 group	100	3	Random sampling
Debunchers group	100	3	Random sampling
<b>Total sample size</b>	<b>7,358</b>	<b>134</b>	

Source: Author 2021

### **3.6 Data collection Procedures**

Both secondary and primary data were collected. Secondary data does not directly collect information but is from publicly available materials and other sources. It is easy to access, convenient and economical (Clark, & Vealé, 2018). This research relied on publications from Human right groups and security sources. Other publications included: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, local newspapers, journals, website literature and other published documents. This information was obtained from libraries, internet, public and private organizations and largely desk review of published literature on security management and vigilantism. Primary data was obtained through quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, the study used a structured questionnaire to interview youths of Kibera slum on the effect of vigilante groups on National security. This was be done through face-to-face interviews. Qualitatively, the study

conducted in-depth interviews with officials of vigilante groups as well as local administration leaders.

### **3.6.1 Developing of instruments**

A structured questionnaire (Appendix 2) and an interview guide (appendix 3) were the key data collection instruments. Trained research assistants approached 2 top officials in each of the 50 registered youth groups in Kibera and requested them for face-to-face interviews. Interviews were conducted at their most convenient time and place. Administrators and vigilante group members were also approached by trained research assistants and recruited for in-depth interviews. They were interviewed at their own convenient place. However, insecure areas such as back streets were avoided for security purposes. Selection of research assistants were also based on the gender of the respondents. A male research assistant interviewed a male vigilante and vice versa.

### **3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments**

Before conducting the interview process, a pilot study was carried out to determine the validity and reliability of the questionnaires. The study subjected the draft questionnaire to 10% of the sample of the study. This was done at Mathare slum which is a different informal settlement area similar to Kibera. Conducting pilot outside Kibera prevented chances of having duplicate interviews during pilot and actual interviews. Any amendment made after pilot was retested. The purpose of this pilot test was to ensure that the questionnaire was logically organized and all necessary questions were included.

### **3.6.3 Instrument Reliability**

Reliability analysis was done using Cronbach's Alpha, which according to Kombo & Tromp (2006) measures the internal consistency by establishing if certain item within a scale measures the same construct. The below formula was applied:



$$\alpha = \frac{N \cdot \bar{c}}{\bar{v} + (N-1) \cdot \bar{c}}$$

where N is the total sample while c is the test variable.

From the formula, N is equal to 100 residents, 6 leaders and 24 vigilante group members who were conducted during the study; c-bar was responsive variables reported by the target population average, while v-bar was common variables across all the population on vigilantism. The findings show in Table 3.3, implied that the research instrument could be relied upon since the Cronbach's Alpha for reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security (0.87), strategies used by vigilantes (0.85) and challenges of the strategies used by vigilante (0.62) were greater than 0.7.

**Table 3. 3: Reliability Results**

	<b>Cronbach's Alpha</b>
Reasons why Communities in Kibera depend on Vigilante for Security	0.87
Strategies used by vigilantes	0.85
Challenges of the strategies used by vigilante	0.62

Source: Author 2021

### **3.6.4 Instrument Validity**

To test the validity of the survey tool, in-depth interviews with administrators and members of vigilante groups were conducted. This was after the calibration of the survey data. Obtained themes during the calibration were added to in-depth interview guides in cases where they were skipped during the initial design. Furthermore, data from secondary sources including newspapers and publications on vigilante groups were compared to the results. The study looked at content and construct validity of the research instruments.

### 3.7 Data processing and analysis

Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were used. Quantitative data was analyzed through the use of descriptive statistics tabulated in Microsoft Excel from SPSS version 21. This provided frequency distributions illustrations such as tables, pie charts and bar graphs. Inferential statistics enabled the study to infer findings into the general effects of vigilante groups on security of Nairobi's informal settlement.

For further fine tuning the data, the analysis of variance inflation factor was performed to check the possible degree of multi-linearity of the independent variables in the regression model. The extent of correlation is a situation where the regression model is highly correlated with two or more variables. This was determined by means of correlation matrix showing the extent of correlation between the role Kibera vigilante groups play on national security, perceptions of Kibera residents on vigilante groups and the role of the state in the operations of vigilante groups in Kibera slum. Multiple linear regression analysis was then carried out specifically in cases of multiple response questions. Cooper and Schindler (2018) assert that, multiple linear regressions provide a rich and flexible framework that suits the needs of many analysts.

The multiple linear regression models were used as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3$$

Qualitative data was analyzed through narrative methods. Calibrated quantitative data formulated stories and presented to key informants based on their different experiences or participation with vigilante groups. For example, vigilante informants were probed to provide their own stories on their experience within the groups, what they feel is their role to the general security situation and how they relate with residents. Administrative leaders were probed to provide stories on their encounters with vigilante groups as well as measures put in place or

implemented through their supervision on how to handle vigilante groups. These narratives were then be transcribed, coded and analyzed through statistical methods.

### **3.8 Legal and ethical Considerations**

Clearance for research was sought from the Post Graduate School of African Nazarene University and National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). Participants were issued with the informed consent forms which they signed. They were informed about the purpose of the study and the procedure as well as the possible risks and benefits. In the informed consent, they were informed that they will be free to withdraw from the research at any stage. However, the researcher asked for their cooperation. The other aspect of ethical considerations for this research was confidentiality and anonymity. Participants were informed that the information they provided were to remain confidential and it will not be used for other purposes other than the stated. In anonymity, the participants were assured that their true identities will not be disclosed. This was done through avoiding or removal of identifiers such as names.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The study was meant to establish the effects of vigilante groups on national security: a case of Kibera's informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya. The study was guided by the following specific objectives: Firstly, it established the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security. Secondly, it explored the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera. Finally, assessed the challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera.

This chapter provides the findings of the study. The response rate has been evaluated, as well as reliability and validity of the study variables. The general background information of vigilante groups, local administrative leaders and registered youth groups in Kibera is presented. This is followed by descriptive analysis of the study variables, as well as results of statistical analysis to test the research hypotheses. Discussion of the results as well as the implications arising from the findings is presented.

#### **4.2 General characteristics of the study sample**

The study was conducted in 4 wards of Kibera slum which are: Sarangombe, Makina, Laini Saba and Lindi. Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course though it is one of the wards within Kibera was not studied because it does not have informal settlement. The study was only interested in the informal settlement part of Kibera. The sample comprised of Kibera youths enrolled in self-help groups within their locality, the Sub-County Criminal Intelligence Officer (SCCIO), Deputy County commissioner (DCC), chiefs, Nyumba Kumi representatives and top officials of the vigilante groups. The study was specific on youths enrolled in local self-help groups

based on the assumption they must be involved in community activities making them susceptible of interacting with vigilante group members.

### 4.3 Study Findings

#### 4.3.1 Response rate

The questionnaires fielded were 130 out of which 120 were successfully filled and returned for analysis. This works out to  $(120/130*100) = 92.3\%$ . In their submission, Mugenda and Mugenda (2014), asserts that 50 % response rate is termed as adequate, 60% is termed as good, while, above 70% is termed as excellent. High response rate might be as a result of 2021 Covid lockdown measures imposed by the Government making residents to be available in their place of residence. In addition, the study separated targeted 24 top officials of each group and 10 local administration leaders (DCC, SCCIO, Nyumba Kumi representatives and chiefs) for interviews. However, the researcher was only able to interview 21 key informants and this gave a response rate of 61.8%. Table 4.1 below demonstrates the received response versus questionnaire distributed.

**Table 4. 1: Response per each Study Group**

<b>Distributed versus received questionnaires</b>			
<b>Category</b>	<b>Distributed</b>	<b>Received</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Youths registered in youth self-help groups	100	95	95%
Administrative leaders (DCC, SCCIO and Chiefs)	6	3	50%
Nyumba Kumi representatives	4	4	100%
Siafu group	3	0	0%
12 Disciples group	3	2	67%
Kamukunji group	3	2	67%
Pressure group	3	2	67%
Yes we Can group	3	3	100%
Mungiki group	3	3	100%
J-10 group	3	3	100%
Debunchers group	3	3	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>92%</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

Different groups of Kibera population directly involved or with information on vigilante activities were approached as indicated in table 4.1 above. Based on the responses received, a higher response rate of 100% was received from Debunchers group, J-10 group, Mungiki group, Yes We Can group and Nyumba Kumi representatives. Siafu group did not have any representation. The reason for un-representation from Siafu is that all its top officials had been arrested by police during the study period. Efforts to trace any other member of Siafu group were futile due to the arrest tension. On the other hand, administrative leaders (DCC, chiefs and Assistant chiefs) also gave a smaller percentage of 50%. A smaller percentage of administrative leaders was attributed to the fact that majority of them have a busy schedule hence unreachable during the data collection duration.

#### 4.3.2 Age and Gender of the Respondents

Table 4.2 below shows a cross tabulation between age and gender of the respondents. Based on the cross tabulation, majority of the youths were male with an age of between 18 and 29 years as shown by at 65%. This implies that most of youths involved in vigilante groups are male with youthful years. Moreover, the study design was biased towards youths based on the fact that they are more involved in vigilante activities than older population. This shows that more information was obtained regarding the effects of vigilante groups on national security.

**Table 4. 2: Age and Gender of the Respondents**

Age	Gender			Percentage
	Male	Female	Total	
18-29 years	60	15	75	65%
30-35 years	40	5	45	35%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

### 4.3.3 Duration of Stay in Kibera

The study finding indicates that majority (39%) respondents have stayed in different wards of Kibera for between 6-10 years. A significance majority (35%) have been residents for above 10 years. This gives a cumulative 74% or residents who have stayed in Kibera for over 6 years. Table 4.3 below demonstrates the duration of stay of the respondents in each ward. Longer period of stay in Kibera meant that the participants could provide more information regarding effects of vigilante groups on national security.

**Table 4. 3: Duration of Stay**

Residential area	Duration of stay			Total
	1-5 years	6-10 Years	Above 10 years	
<b>Sarangombe</b>	5	11	4	<b>20</b>
<b>Lindi</b>	12	15	13	<b>40</b>
<b>Laini Saba</b>	8	17	15	<b>40</b>
<b>Makina</b>	6	4	10	<b>20</b>
Total	<b>31</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>120</b>
Percentage	<b>26%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

### 4.3.4 Level of Education

The findings indicate that 35% of the respondents had secondary education, 23% had primary education, 17% had tertiary education and 10% had university education. This implies that most of the respondents were learnt enough to respond comprehensively to questions regarding the effects of vigilante groups on national security. Table 4.4 below demonstrates the level of education across the 4 wards forming Kibera slum.

**Table 4. 4: Education Level**

<b>Level of education</b>	<b>Sarangombe</b>	<b>Lindi</b>	<b>Laini Saba</b>	<b>Makina</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percentage %</b>
University	2	3	4	3	12	10%
Tertiary institution	4	5	7	4	20	17%
Secondary	12	10	17	3	42	35%
Primary	2	13	8	4	27	23%
None	0	9	4	6	19	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

#### **4.4 Reliability Analysis**

According to Bryman and Cramer (1997), a test on reliability is the determination of the degree to which individual items used in the study provides a good measure of the results. To test the Tau-equivalent reliability, this study employed Cronbach's coefficient alpha. This gave a clear central tendency on independent variables. Table 4.5 below demonstrates the applied tastes on reliability analysis

**Table 4. 5: Reliability Tests**

<b>Entrepreneurial practices</b>	<b>Number of Items(questions)</b>	<b>Reliability Cronbach's Alpha</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Reasons why Communities depend on Vigilante	6	0.87	Accepted
Strategies used by Vigilante in Provision of Security	6	0.85	Accepted
Challenges of the Strategies used by Vigilante	6	0.62	Accepted

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

Each item subjected to reliability test was rated as reliable and acceptable for meaningful conclusions. They were all above an average mark (0.5) on a Cronbach's Alpha whose index is 1. Any Item near 1 is acceptable for meaningful conclusions. The reliability test using



Cronbach's alpha was conducted after the pilot data. Each variable indicated for the study was accepted. Descriptive and qualitative analysis on each variable is thus reflective of the effects of vigilante groups on national security.

#### 4.5 Descriptive and Qualitative Analysis on Each Variable

##### 4.5.1 Reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security

###### 4.5.1.1 Awareness of the different vigilante groups operating in Kibera slum

The respondents were asked to indicate their awareness of the different vigilante groups operating in Kibera slum. The findings indicate that Mchwa is the most famous vigilante group in Kibera slum followed by Kombe Kombe. Out of the total population who confirmed knowing vigilante groups in Kibera, 13% confirmed knowing Mchwa while 11% indicated knowing Kombe Kombe, 5% confirmed to know Siafu group, 6% confirmed to know 12 Disciples group, 5% confirmed to know Kamukunji group, 6% confirmed to know pressure group, 6% confirmed to know Yes we can group, 8% confirmed to know Mungiki group and 6% confirmed to know J-10 group. Debunchers group has the least awareness at 4%. Table 4.5 below shows the awareness level of vigilante groups in Kibera slum.

**Table 4. 6: Awareness of Vigilante Groups in Kibera**

	Sarangomb e	Lindi	Laini Saba	Makina	Total
Siafu group	8%	3%	8%	2%	5%
12 Disciples group	8%	5%	7%	3%	6%
Kamukunji group	3%	4%	5%	6%	5%
Pressure group	5%	1%	8%	8%	6%
Yes we Can group	5%	8%	4%	6%	6%
Mungiki group	7%	9%	6%	8%	8%
J-10 group	8%	3%	5%	8%	6%
Debunchers group	5%	5%	2%	4%	4%
Kombe Kombe	11%	12%	10%	10%	11%
Mchwa	10%	10%	15%	15%	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Researcher, 2021

#### 4.5.1.2 Reasons given by the Residents as to the Origin of Vigilante Groups in Kibera

The study sought qualitative feedback from, youths, vigilante group members and local administration for the reasons why vigilante groups came into existence. Majority of the respondents (40%) indicated that vigilante groups came about because they wanted to offer the residents the missing security from the state. One of the respondents said:


Maze huku kulikuwa kubaya, mangeta, mabiz kubreakiwa na mastuff kibao. Si tuliona lazima tusitopishe hizi stori zite. Gover haikuwa inarespond (This place was pathetic, muggings, business break inns and other bad stuffs. We decided to stop all this thing because the government was not responding) (Source: Respondent 1 (18<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

In support of this, a respondent said:

The reasons why the vigilante groups came into existence include youths' dissatisfaction with the state of hygiene in Kibera and unemployment among youths in Kibera. In addition, I have heard stories from some vigilante group members claiming that they wanted to offer garbage collection services to the residents. They felt that the state of hygiene is not adequate (Source: Respondent 2 (18<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

The findings from the quotes imply that the security in Kibera was worse before emergence of vigilante groups since there was little response from the government security officials. The cases of muggings, business break inns and other bad stuffs were on the rise. This implies that the reasons why the vigilante groups came into existence include youths' dissatisfaction with the state of hygiene in Kibera and unemployment among youths in Kibera

The respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for emergence of vigilante groups. The findings showed that the vigilante groups originated in order to offer residents the missing security as shown by 40%, because of youths who were dissatisfied by state of hygiene in Kibera as shown by 30% and because of unemployment among youths in Kibera as shown by 30%. Figure 4.1 below shows a chart with the qualitative feedback as to the reasons of the origin of vigilante groups.




**Figure 4. 1: Qualitative feedback on the origin of vigilante groups**

Source: Researcher, 2021

#### 4.5.1.3 Security needs addressed by Vigilante groups in Kibera


The respondents were asked to indicate whether vigilante groups address any security needs. The study findings indicate that majority (65%) of the residents of Kibera felt that Vigilante group address their needs while 35% of the respondents felt that vigilante group don't address their needs. This implies that residents have faith in Vigilante group to address their security needs. Figure 4.2 indicated whether vigilante groups address needs in the community.



**Figure 4. 2: Whether Vigilante Groups Address any Needs**

Source: Researcher, 2021

On the security needs addressed by vigilante groups, their quick response to security issues was mostly quoted by the residents at 68%. Majority of the residents also indicated that Police ask for bribes when they come to respond to security issues at 53%. Other security needs mentioned were: Police come late when they respond to security issues at 40%, the courts take too long to dispense justice at 32% and Inadequate presence of government representation in the communities at 20%. These findings are shown in Figure 4.3.



**Figure 4. 3: Security needs addressed by vigilante groups**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

#### **4.5.1.4 Residents views on vigilante activities**

A variance inflation factor analysis was adopted by the study to determine the opinion of Kibera residents on the activities of the vigilante groups. The findings are shown in Table 4.7.

**Table 4. 7: Residents Views on Vigilante Activities**

<b>Option statement</b>	<b>SD%</b>	<b>D%</b>	<b>N%</b>	<b>A%</b>	<b>SA%</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>
Vigilante groups offer employment to idle youths in Kibera	5	5	5	8	8	6.2	0.31
Vigilante groups stop criminal activities in Kibera slums	4	4	10	7	10	7	0.35
Vigilante groups offer community protection in Kibera slum.	5	5	8	10	10	7.6	0.34
Vigilante groups engage in criminal activities in Kibera slum	8	8	5	2	2	4.3	0.21

*N=120, Cronbach alpha obtained is =0.62, SD% to SA% are rank attributes from completely disagree to completely agree.*

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

### **Key**

**SD**-strongly disagree, **D**-Disagree, **N**-Neutral, **A**-Agree, **SA**-Strongly agree, **M**-Mean and **SD**-Standard deviation

Extrapolations obtained indicate that the highest mean (M) is 7.6 while the lowest mean is 4.3. This provides a mean difference between the highest mean and lowest mean to be 3.3. The standard deviation is averaged at 0.31. The mean difference and standard deviation also indicate that the variation is very little. Hence conclusions made are viable.


Further extrapolation on each statement using itemized rating indicates that majority (cumulative 70%) defended vigilante groups when they were linked to participation in criminal activities. According to qualitative feedback, residents felt that vigilante groups rarely participate in criminal activities unless funded by politicians to do so. For that case, the criminal activities involved in when funded by politicians do not harm the residents. In support of this, one of the respondents said:

To be frank, if these guys are not provoked or funded to do bad things, they never do so. They act based on their own decisions. Qualitative feedback on vigilante groups offering employment to Kibera youths indicate that they only engage youths to stop

them from being idle. This engagement involves garbage collection (Source: Respondent 8 (17<sup>th</sup> June 2021).

This correlates with a cumulative 85% rating indicating that vigilante groups offer community protection in Kibera. Further, a combined 90% agreed and strongly agreed that vigilante groups stop criminal activities in Kibera slum. Contrary, majority (cumulative 90%) felt that vigilante groups to not offer employment to youths in Kibera.

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the various statements in relation to vigilante activities in Kibera slums. The findings (in Figure 4.4) indicated that 40% of the residents completely disagreed that vigilante groups engage in criminal activities in Kibera slum, 60% of the residents completely agreed that vigilante groups offer community, 50% of the residents completely agreed that vigilante groups stop criminal activities in Kibera slums and 50% of the residents completely agreed vigilante groups offer employment to idle youths in Kibera. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4.4.




**Figure 4. 4: Opinion of residents on vigilante activities**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

#### 4.5.1.5 Comparison between the security provided by the state and that of vigilante groups

Based on the indications that vigilante groups offer the much-needed security, the study sought the effectiveness of vigilante security. The findings indicate that majority (60%) felt that vigilante groups offer better security compared to that provided by the state. Figure 4.5 below shows residents' views on vigilante providing security to them.



**Figure 4. 5: Comparison between Vigilante Security and State Security**


**Source: Researcher, 2021**

#### 4.5.2 Strategies Used by Vigilante in Provision of Security in Kibera

##### 4.5.2.1 Security Strategies by Vigilante

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the various statements in relation to strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera. The study findings in Figure 4.6 indicate that majority of the Kibera residents (80%) indicated that Vigilante groups monitor other criminal gangs and escort community members during

night hours. Another majority (70%) indicated that that vigilante groups respond to emergencies like fire and act as a link between the police and the community. A slight majority (60%) felt that vigilante groups offer night patrols. Contrary, majority of the residents (80%) indicated that Vigilante groups do not contribute to harambees and social events. The findings are shown in Figure 4.6 below.



**Figure 4. 6: Security Strategies by Vigilante groups**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

In support of the findings in Figure 4.6, one respondent said:

Vigilante strategies on security provision have worked pretty well. They help in monitoring other group gangs and there are some groups of unemployed youths who could be pausing as a security thread in Kibera. However, vigilante groups have been able to curtail them by flashing them out and reporting them to security agencies (Source: Respondent 9 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

Moreover, one of the respondents said:



Kuna vijana walikuwa wameanza kukaa kwa Reli kila jioni wakiwaibia watu simu. Hawa vijana wa vijana wa Kombe Kombe waliwavamia siku moja na hata wakachoma mmoja wao. Mambo ikatulia baada ya hiyo (There was a group of youths who were sitting at the Railway, they had started to steal phones from the residents, these Kombe Kombe youths countered them. They even burnt one of them. Since then, it has been calm) (Source: Respondent 4 (19<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

Further, one respondent said:

Vigilante groups do not participate in social events such as contributing in harambees because they fear public events that might make them exposed to police. He continued to say: Buda, hawa mazanze ni geugeu sana, huwa hatulike place tutameet. Wanaeza kukelea bunde hata kama huna show na msee. Si huchapa ya kiblackout, maevents za mtaa, Zi (My friend, these police are unpredictable, we don't like public places, they can even gun you down even when you are just minding your business. That is why we like to operate in darkness. Community events, No!) (Source: Respondent 10 (18<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).


Respondent also said:

There is little trust in police making the vigilante to operate behind the scenes and there are many NGOs and other community organizations that are more equipped and trained to respond to them than vigilante groups. Kibera is lucky to have many NGOs such as SHOFCO who handle issues related to gender-based violence. Vigilante engagement on this is very minimal (Source: Respondent 12 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

The findings from the quotes implies that vigilante groups have strategies for security provision which have worked pretty well and they help in monitoring other group gangs and preventing criminal activities.

#### **4.5.2.2 Effectiveness of the Security Strategies by Vigilante Groups**

The study sought to find out if the Security strategies by vigilante groups are effective. Majority (40%) felt that vigilante activities are slightly effective to them. Another simple majority (30%) were definite that vigilante activities are very effective. Monitoring criminal gangs and escorting community members at night seen as the most effective strategies. This was obtained through qualitative feedback. Figure 4.7 below demonstrates the ratings on the effectiveness of vigilante strategies.



**Figure 4. 7: Effectiveness of vigilante strategies**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

In support of the findings in Figure 4.7, one of the respondents in Kibera said:

To me, the vigilante activities are very effective to us. Imagine reduced muggings? I can assure you that, you can walk freely in Kibera without worrying for your security (Source: Respondent 11 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).


From the quotes, it is clear that vigilante activities are very effective to us since it has reduced muggings and people can walk freely in Kibera without worrying for their security.

### **4.5.3 Challenges of the strategies used by Vigilante in Kibera**

#### **4.5.3.1 Reported challenges**

The study sort to find out on the challenges faced by Vigilante groups in Kibera in their security strategies. Based on the findings, majority (90%) felt that vigilante groups do not get funding from the state. Another majority, 80%, 75% and 70% reported that Vigilante groups are harassed by police when carrying out their duties, they face opposition from some community members, community members term the members criminals, they lack basic operational equipment's such as such as flashlights, warm clothing and rain boots and lack of proper training for vigilante members respectively. Contrary, majority (60%) indicated that vigilante

group members do not face any attacks by the gangs in the community. Other respondents also indicated that there were cases when vigilante groups experienced clash with one another and also with Nyumba Kumi, NPS and even local community members. Figure 4.8 below demonstrates findings on the security challenges on vigilante strategies.



**Figure 4. 8: Challenges on vigilante strategies**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

In support of the findings in Figure 4.8, respondent said:

Vigilante groups are not recognized as a security provision agency by the state. Hence, they should not receive any funding from the state (Source: Respondent 4 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

Further, respondent said:


Since they are not part of the official security provision agency by the state, their activities are termed as criminal. Some of the members are frequently arrested at night especially during curfew hours. They do not possess any legal documentation indicating

their role in the security provision or as part of a vital agency allowed to operate within the government confinements. Any official security agency is supposed to be vetted by state security machinery and given a permit to operate within their jurisdiction. These guys do not have that. We treat them as criminals. In fact, we recently apprehended a group called Siafu, unless they prove otherwise, they will be arraigned in court (Source: Respondent 13 (21<sup>st</sup> June 2021)).

From the quotes, the state government have not been recognizing vigilante groups as a security provision agency. This is because they are not part of the official security provision agency by the state and do not possess any legal documentation indicating their role in the security provision or as part of a vital agency allowed to operate within the government confinements.

#### **4.5.3.2 Outcome on the State's effort to eliminate vigilante groups in Kibera**

The study sought information on the whether the government have succeeded to eliminate vigilante groups in Kibera slums. Majority of the respondents (80%) demonstrated that the government has not succeeded while 20% were of the opinion that the government's efforts have been successful in vigilante groups. Figure 4.9 below shows the outcome on the government's effort to face out vigilante activities.



### **Figure 4. 9: Success on the Government to face out Vigilante Groups**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

In support of the findings in Figure 4.9, respondent said:

For sometimes now the state has a plan of eliminating any vigilante operations in Kibera. However, the government has not succeeded in eliminating vigilante activities (Source: Respondent 5 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).


In addition, respondent said:

Vigilantes' groups always operate in secrete. This makes it hard for the security agencies to identify them. Buda, kwani utajianika? zi. Si hujapa za kiundertaker (My friend, do you think we will just expose ourselves? We always act in secrete) (Source: Respondent 14 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

The findings from the quotes showed that the government have use Nyumba Kumi strategy to eliminate vigilantes' groups where the members of the vigilante groups are being encouraged to be part of the initiative and help the government keep the community safe. Other strategies which have been unsuccessful is arresting the members of the vigilante groups. This is because the members have used the arrests and convictions as an incentive to form more groups and they term it as an injustice.

#### **4.5.3.3 Benefits of vigilante activities to the residents of Kibera slum**

The study sought to find out if residents of Kibera benefit from vigilante activities. Majority (40%) felt that vigilante activities are slightly beneficial to them. Another simple majority (30%) were definite that vigilante activities are very beneficial. The findings imply that provision of security was the key reason why residents indicated that vigilante activities are very beneficial or slightly beneficial. Figure 4.8 below demonstrates the findings on benefits of vigilante activities to the residents of Kibera.



**Figure 4. 10: Benefits of vigilante activities to Kibera residents**

**Source: Researcher, 2021**

In support of the findings, one respondent in Kibera said:

To me, the vigilante activities are very beneficial to us. Imagine reduced muggings? I can assure you that, you can walk freely in Kibera without worrying for your security (Source: Respondent 7 (20<sup>th</sup> June 2021)).

#### **4.6 National Security**

The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with various statements on national security. From the findings, the respondents strongly agreed that There is reduced criminal activities in Kibera (55.4%), that the community safety has increased through detection of criminal activities (48.9%) and that socio-political stability have been enhanced (60.1%). However, the respondents strongly disagreed that There is rapid response by police when crimes occur in Kibera (54.7%). The findings are illustrated in Table 4.8.

**Table 4. 8: Respondents Agreement with Statements on National Security**

	SD	D	N	A	SA	M	SDE
There is reduced criminal activities in Kibera	1.7%	0.3%	1.7%	40.9%	55.4%	4.48	0.709
There is rapid response by police when crimes occur in Kibera	54.7%	1.7%	5.3%	37%	1.3%	2.42	0.78
The community safety has increased through detection of criminal activities	1%	2.6%	5.3%	42.2%	48.9%	4.35	0.783
Socio-political stability have been enhanced	1%	1%	3.6%	34.3%	60.1%	4.52	0.709

Source: Researcher, 2021

#### 4.7 Multi-Colinearity Test and Inferential Statistics

According to Bickel (2007), multi-co linearity in statistics occurs where two or more predictable variables are highly correlated. Various models have been tasted on multi-co linearity. This study applied an inferential statistic using a Pearson correlation (Sig-2 tailed). The study found that vigilante groups have a significant and positive effect on national security in Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya as shown by a coefficient of 0.625\*\*. Table 4.9 below shows the correlation factors between the variables.

**Table 4. 9: Correlation between Variables and Vigilante Activities on National Security**

		Residents' involvement	Sate involvement
Vigilante activities	Pearson correlation Sig(2-tailed)	1	0.625**
National security	Pearson correlation Sig(2-tailed)	0.625**	1

\*\* . Correlation variables are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Researcher, 2021

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the summary of the study findings as guided by the study objectives. The chapter will also present the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The study sought to find out about the effect of vigilante groups on National security, taking a case of Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya. Specifically, the study sought to find out the role played by vigilante groups on Kibera's security management, the perceptions of Kibera residents' regarding vigilantes providing security to them and the role of the state in the existence of vigilante groups in Kibera.

#### **5.2 Summary of the Findings**

There are various main inferences originating from this study findings. This section presents discussion of findings by comparing the current findings with past studies and scholar's arguments. From gender and age data, most of youths involved in vigilante groups are male with youthful years. In addition, the study established most of residents had lived in Kibera for long enough to be aware of vigilante activities existing in the area. Also, the study established that most Kibera residents have adequate educations to provide adequate information regarding vigilante activities.

##### **5.2.1 Reasons why Communities in Kibera depend on Vigilante for Security**

The study established that lack of or inefficient state security to the residents of Kibera is a key contributor to the existence of vigilante groups. The findings concur with Singh (2015) who noted that the ineffective African crime response has also resulted into public distrust and fear,



bleeding state institutions of their legitimacy and undermined economic development of the society. This has given birth to a culture of impunity. The violent crime is linked to the weakness of police department. The institution of police is underfunded, understaffed and majorities are not trained. Majority of Africans rarely meet police officers and thus do not view them as a source of protection. In addition, Phillips (2017) argued that established that regional economic inequity fosters the growth of vigilante organizations. Inequality fuels the demand for vigilantism, as poorer citizens perceive themselves to be significantly less secure than their wealthier neighbors, who enjoy advantages in terms of private and public security. Consequently, inequality implies a patron-worker labor distribution, which is ideal for organizing a specific type of group, the patron-financed vigilante group.

The study established that vigilante groups come into existence include youths' dissatisfaction with the state of hygiene in Kibera and unemployment among youths in Kibera. The study also established that residents have faith in Vigilante group to address their security needs. The findings correlate with Yahaya and Bello (2019) who asserts that the increase in criminal acts and therefore insecurity raise fundamental questions on the capability of the Kenyan state to discharge her duties appropriately. The state is a community of human beings that (effectively maintains the domination of lawful utilization of material force inside a given region. The ever-increasing crime rate has most often been attributed to low police to citizen ratio, inadequate resources for crime detection and prevention and poor public to police relationship. Moreover, Zizumbo-Colunga (2017) noted that members of the community are more receptive to vigilante action when those contemplating it are described as members of a trustworthy community. Additionally, the study discovered that this effect is mitigated by law enforcement's described trustworthiness. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the resurgence of

vigilantism and how commitment in authorities can act as a moderator of social capital's normative expression.

The study established that Vigilante groups came about because they wanted to offer the residents the missing security from the state. They also came about because the residents are dissatisfied by the slow response of the police who come late whenever there is a security issue. This is contrary to vigilante groups who are fast in responding. The findings correlate with Abrams (2015) who noted that the communities have devised self-protection mechanisms when they are dissatisfied by the slow response of the police. This self-protection mechanism mainly involves the formation of vigilante groups within the communities affected by crimes. When they believe, the government has failed to protect them and their community, vigilante groups take up arms to protect themselves and their community. Also, Oyagi (2016) established that the Suneka residents have supported Sungusungu's operations, because the security of the area had improved through its operations, even if some of the population was not familiar with it.

Further, the study established that vigilante groups thrive due to unemployment among youths in Kibera. On the specific role played by the vigilante groups, provision of security seen as the key role played by vigilante groups in Kibera. Other roles cited were: stopping criminal activities in Kibera slums and offering employment to youths. The findings agree with Schubert (2018) who noted that several reasons are advanced for the rise of vigilante groups and they range from insecurity, unemployment and idleness, corruption within the police service, youth empowerment to political reasons, corrupt and ineffective judicial justice systems, mistrust on the prosecution systems, easy or lenient bail conditions for the suspects and frustrations about rising criminal activities. Additionally, Chikwendu, Nwankwo and Oli (2016) noted that the formation of informal policing structures required socio-cultural factors such as the inability of the formal police to adequately and effectively control crime. The results

also show that informal police structures in the communities in which they exist are widely accepted as agents of crime control.

### **5.2.2 Strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera**

The study found that Vigilante groups have been effective in monitoring other criminal gangs in Kibera sum. This concurs with Gichira (2019) who argued that Sungusungu vigilante group members have been swift, prompt and effective in protecting members of the public against criminals. He also contended that members of Sungusungu vigilante group contributed, in contrast, to an intensified wave of insecurity through their involvement in a number of criminal activities, including extrajudicial killings, torture, extortion, illegal water and electricity connections, illegal arrest and the running of a number of kangaroo courts. The findings were also in agreement with Muchira (2016) who noted that Joint police-community patrols and the participation of vigilant groups and community courts in Kirinyaga County contributes to crime prevention.

Vigilante groups sometimes apply authoritarian punishment to the offenders including killing them which is not morally appropriate. They would act on their own rather than reporting the matter to relevant authorities. The findings agree with Yahaya and Bello (2019) who noted that strategies used by vigilante include surveillance on building and suspected criminal individuals and applying authoritarian punishment to the offenders including killing them which is not morally appropriate. Moreover, Sidang (2020) noted that strategies for providing security are implemented by the police or the vigilante group to forestall or decrease the crime opportunity or avenue, it is recognized that crime prevention is cheaper than detection. The methods used by Vigilante usually include building surveillance and suspected criminals. This method offers motorized patrols and foot patrols, including road and border patrols, to the police. This is still the best way to collect intelligence from criminals.

The study established that Vigilante groups also escort Kibera residents at night as a way of offering them security. Other strategies used include: responding to emergencies like fire, acting as a link between the police and the community and offering night patrols (Figure 4.6). The strategies applied by vigilante are done carefully and in secrete to avoid being exposed to the police or local authorities. That is the reason why they are not engaged in community harambees or they do not report criminal activities to relevant authorities. The findings also correlate with Yahaya and Bello (2019) who noted that the best way to solve crime in Nigeria is by increasing vigilante groups' activity by training and supporting local communities and the government as the police have been ineffective with regard to crime control and vigilante groups have sprung up in their present form to make up for this lack and fill the insecurity gap at the community level. Suryana (2019) noted that collecting information is a key part of a policing task and this is done by building relationships with members of the public with good intentions to help police, police-custodial criminals, and victims of criminal activity, each investigation has a moral and ethical responsibility to protect the identity of informants.

The study established that Vigilante strategies on security provision have worked pretty as they help in monitoring other group gangs and there are some groups of unemployed youths who could be pausing as a security thread in Kibera. Vigilante groups have been able to curtail them by flashing them out and reporting them to security agencies. The findings concur with Otiso (2015) who noted that another strategy used by vigilante groups is cultivation of information since information is essential to all fully functioning police operations Intelligence reports on unlawful individuals and associate receivers of loot operations must be continuously collected. Information is essential and research must consider everybody they do well as a potential source of information.

The study established that vigilante groups respond to emergencies like fire and act as a link between the police and the community and detect crimes through night patrols. The findings agree with Grant (2019) who noted that vigilante crime detection is an important part of community security work. Each Vigilante entity has an investigator unit in its different commands responsible for night patrols. This significant division shall be responsible for resolving or clearing the crimes of the corresponding security groups. After taking the suspect or important information into the police force, a detective or interrogator interviews and collects evidence and proceeds from the scene of the crime (searches the scene of a crime for physical evidence collects the evidence and take it to the police labs for scrutiny).

### **5.2.3 Challenges of the Strategies Used by Vigilante in Kibera**

The study established that despite vigilante strategies being efficient in the provision of security to the residents of Kibera, lack of funding from the state and harassment by police when carrying out their duties have been the main challenges. This also correlate with Onwuegbusi (2017) who argue that the shortcomings experienced by the vigilante groups in provision of security include, poor screening of new members and presence of touts or 'bad eggs' among the vigilante members, multiplicity of the organizations, and poor accountability by the groups. Also, Schubert (2015) noted that the proliferation of irregular, armed actors that defy simplistic definitions has attracted public and academic attention, not least on this journal's pages. A main typological issue for the CBAGs is the tendance to 'turn bad' and become threats to the stability they have always been expected to transform.

The study also found that other challenges facing vigilante groups in providing security include opposition from some community members and being termed as criminals by the state and some community members. This concurs with Onwuegbusi (2017) who noted that the Nigerian police are accusing the guard of indulging in extrajudicial executions and illegally detaining

suspects. This scenario causes a major reverse in the safety activities of the two institutions and thus worsens the security challenges in the country. Also, Tyson (2013) argued that vigilant groups often face threats from hoodlums, which in their robbery activities use sophisticated weapons. He also criticized the existence of cooperation between the members of the group, especially of the senior officials who fail to respect certain decisions taken.

The other key challenges faced by the vigilante groups in executing their strategies include lack of basic equipment's such as such as flashlights, warm clothing and rain boots and lack of proper training for vigilante members. This concurs with Schuberth (2015) who examined the challenge of community-based armed groups: Towards a conceptualization of militias, gangs, and vigilantes and found that challenges include Inadequate government funding, police harassment while performing its functions, lack of adequate training and weapons, lack of basic operating gears such as torches, warm clothing, rain boots, raincoats, identity cards, whistles, uniforms and others. Ikuteyijo (2009) also argued that despite the perceived effectiveness and commitment of vigilante groups, their operations and strategies have been noted to face many challenges. These challenges include their faulty relationship to the police and legal system; their legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they wish to serve; the recruitment and management of personnel; the choice of appropriate operations; and the maintenance of resources, incentives, and motivation for the groups' survival.

Further, the government's strategy of eliminating all vigilante operations seems to be the key challenge. Most often, they are arrested by state security mechanism. This jeopardizes their operations and even creates a sense of self disbelief from the residents who benefit from their activities. For instance, the study was unable to interview any member or official of vigilante during the data collection phase because their officials had been arrested. The findings are in line with Moncada (2017) who noted that vigilant groups often face threats from hoodlums,

which in their robbery activities use sophisticated weapons. He also noted the lack of cooperation between the members of the group, especially of the senior officials who fail to respect certain decisions made.

### **5.3 Theoretical Relationship with the Study Findings**

#### **5.3.1 Social Disorganization Theory**

The social disorganization theory was Developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942. This theory has been useful in understanding neighbourhood effects on crime and continues to be used in different ways today (Sampson, 2012). Social disorganization theory is relevant to the study as it seeks to highlight the role of vigilante groups and explain the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security. Based on the findings indicated here, Government's failure to provide security and other necessities like hygiene to the residents of Kibera, led to the existence of vigilante groups. They were formed with the intention of mitigating in tough situations where the government has failed to do so. Social disorganization theory is hence reflected in the study findings.

#### **5.3.2 Broken Windows Theory**

Broken windows theory was proposed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982 that used broken windows as a metaphor for disorder within neighborhoods. The theory establishes a link between community disorder and subsequent occurrences of serious crime. According to the theory, visible signs of crime, anti-social behavior, and civil disorder contribute to the development of an urban environment that fosters additional crime and disorder, including serious crimes. The findings also indicate that there is an amalgamation between vigilante groups and the residents of Kibera. Just as it is indicated that Vigilante groups' offers services where the state has failed, the residents on the other hand make them to exist by paying for those services and refusing to inform local authorities on the whereabouts of the vigilantes.

This shows there is a possibility vigilante groups can play a key role in enhancing national and community security because they consist of community members who are privy to the community issues.

## **5.4 Conclusions**

Generally, the study concluded that vigilante groups have a significant and positive effect on national security in Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya.

### **5.4.1 Reasons why Communities in Kibera depend on Vigilante for Security**

It can be concluded that whereas the state is struggling to stop vigilante activities in Kenya, its inefficient in offering security especially in the informal settlement areas can be the cause of vigilante existence. Besides, inefficient provision of security, the state has also failed to deliver on other services such as hygiene and employment to idle youths, hence the genesis of vigilante existence. It can also be concluded that vigilante's main roles are the provision of security and offering employment opportunities to youths should be commented by the state and not jeopardized. These roles are supposed to be provided by the state. Vigilante groups can hence be termed as active players towards security

### **5.4.2 Strategies used by Vigilante in Provision of Security in Kibera**

It can be concluded that even though some of the strategies applied by vigilante groups in punishing the criminal gangs especially killing are not appropriate, they have succeeded in controlling insecurity to the residents of Kibera. This is through the monitoring of criminal gangs and escorting residents of Kibera at night. Other strategies that have also worked are: responding to emergencies like fire, acting as a link between the police and the community and offering night patrols. It can also be concluded that vigilante groups avoid strategies that will make them exposed to government security agencies for fear of being arrested. As a result, they avoid participating in community social events. It can also be concluded that due to community



NGOs in Kibera slum, vigilante groups have not been effective in addressing gender-based violence. They have left that role to NGOs operating in Kibera.

#### **5.4.3 Challenges of the strategies used by Vigilante in Kibera**

The study concludes that the main challenge faced by Vigilante groups in executing their roles is the curtailment from the state. The state's crackdown on unlawful gangs has limited vigilante operations to secrete affairs only known to the residents. It can also be concluded that despite the efforts by the government to stop vigilante activities, they have managed to evade all crackdowns and are still operating. However, some of them face frequent arrests. The study further concludes that despite the states view of vigilante as criminal gangs, goodwill from the residents and inconsistencies in the government's role of providing security to Kibera residents makes it hard to completely eliminate vigilante operations.

#### **5.5 Recommendations**

Overall, the study recommends that vigilante groups should be given support by the government as well as the community members since they have a significant and positive effect on national security in Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi County, Kenya.

The study recommends that the government of Kenya both national and county needs to craft plans to empower youths economically to reduce high unemployment rate, which leads to idleness and crime in society. This can be done by reintroducing and sustaining Kazi kwa vijana programme and also funding startup businesses for youths. In addition, there should be policies geared towards empowering the youth with relevant vocational skills to reduce idleness among them and making them more self-sufficient.

The study recommends that the government of Kenya both national and county should employ more police officers to shield life and property and ensure the observation of rule of law. This

can be done conducting recruitments twice a year. Moreover, the justice system should be strengthened so that the aggrieved members of the society could get their justice delivered at the right time.

The study recommends that the Kenyan government should be put in place strategies to support vigilante groups' role in crime management. These include strengthening community policing by incorporating vigilantes to ensure better management of crime at community level, provision of training and incentives and engagement with vigilante groups on human rights issues to ensure that they observe human rights in their operations.

The study also recommends that county government of Nairobi should realize the need to sensitize members of the public about their rights, responsibilities and obligations as citizens. This civic education may enable them become more patriotic and brothers' keeper. In addition, the government has a responsibility of transforming the general perception of the public to the police officers. This will bond the relationship between the police and the public wooing the public willingness and freedom to give critical information on crime to the police.

The study also recommends instead of the state government focusing on eliminating vigilante activities, they should come up with strategies to ensure that they are enrolled to life skills and ethical trainings to make them provide security to the residents with the observation of proper moral codes. Moreover, the vigilante group activities should be regulated by the government to ensure that vigilantes only engage in positive activities that contribute to crime management and that there is no encroachment of negative activities which run contrary to security provision.

The study also recommends that human rights watch NGOs should conduct sensitization on the role of vigilante groups at community level to enable the community better understand and support the role of vigilante groups in crime management.

There is need for the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to tackle corruption allegations by dealing with officers engaged in such vices so as to restore judiciary's public trust and credibility. Further, there is need for the Judiciary to carry out judicial reforms to ensure that the guilty are not only punished and the innocent are acquitted but also that there are no delays in delivering justice.

The study further recommends that communities in Kibera slums should offer support to Vigilante groups and ensure that they are engaged in communal development activities. This will ensure collaboration between the community leaders in ensuring security within the community.

### **5.6 Suggestions for Further Research**

This study on the effects of vigilante groups on national security: a case study of Kibera's informal settlement is a descriptive study that was able to capture in detail the role played by vigilante groups in Kibera. However, there are opportunities for further studies related to this topic. Such studies may include:

Similar studies using case studies of other informal settlement areas in Nairobi like Mathare slum, Dandora and Ngomongo. Suggested informal settlement areas have similar social patterns like Kibera slum. The study also suggests separate studies on the role of the state to the existence of vigilante groups in Kenya.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire

#### Introduction Letter and Consent

Dear Sir/madam,

My name is Shukri Abass Mohamed, a master's student from African Nazarene University. As part of my academic requirement, I am carrying out this research to establish the effect of vigilante groups on National security. I would like to engage you for a detailed analysis on my questions and a few assumptions I have raised. I promise that this is purely for academic purpose and everything we will discuss shall be treated with utmost confidentiality.

All data collected in this study will be kept confidential; each research form will be assigned a unique number to ensure your privacy is protected. Your name or other identifying information will not be included in any report or publication.

My Consent to Participate:

By signing below, I consent to participate in this study.

Print Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Signature (mm/dd/yy): \_\_\_\_\_

**PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION** ( Please tick (√) where applicable)

1. Gender: Female  Male

2. Age bracket:

18 to 23 years

24 to 29 years

30 to 35 years

36 to 41 years

42 to 47 years

More than 47 years

3. Residential area/ward:

Category	Research assistants to indicate appropriately
Sarang'ombe	
Lindi	
Laini Saba	
Makina	

4. For how long have you lived in Kibera?

Less than 3 years  3-6 years  7- 10 years  More than 10 years

5. Please indicate your level of education

University  Tertiary institution  Secondary  Primary  None

**PART B: ESTABLISH REASONS WHY COMMUNITIES IN KIBERA DEPEND ON VIGILANTE FOR SECURITY**

1. Name any vigilante groups operating in your area that you are aware of

- i. ....
- ii. ....
- iii. ....

2. a) Do you belong to any of the Vigilante group?

Yes [ ]      No [ ]

b) If yes, please specify.....

3. a) Do vigilante groups address any need in your community?

Yes [ ]      No [ ]

b. If yes, please list any security need addressed by the vigilante groups

- i. ....
- ii. ....
- iii. ....

4. The following are the reasons why the communities rely on Vigilante groups for security. On a scale of 1 to 3 where 1 is agree, 2 is disagree and 3 is I don't know, pick the one that explains your opinion on why the community turn to vigilante for security.

**Agree      Disagree      I don't know**

- Police ask for bribes when they come to respond to security issues
- Police come late when they respond to security issues
- Police don't respond at all
- Vigilante provides instant justice
- Vigilante respond faster
- The courts take too long to dispense justice
- Inadequate presence of government representation in the communities
- Increasing crime rates

5. Briefly explain any other reason why the community rely on vigilante instead of the police or state machinery on established security system.

.....

.....

.....

6. To what level do you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to vigilante activities in Kibera slums:

<b>Rank appropriately</b>	<b>Completely disagree</b>	<b>Slightly disagree</b>	<b>Slightly agree</b>	<b>Completely agree</b>
Vigilante groups offer employment to idle youths in Kibera				
Vigilante groups stop criminal activities in Kibera slums				
Vigilante groups offer community protection in Kibera slum.				
Vigilante groups engage in criminal activities in Kibera slum				

7. Do you think security provided by Vigilante groups to Kibera residents is better than the one given by the state?

Yes { }      No { }

**SECTION C: ESTABLISH STRATEGIES USED BY VIGILANTE IN PROVISION OF SECURITY IN KIBERA**

1. Below are some of the strategies used by vigilante. On a scale of 1 to 3 where 1 is agree, 2 is disagree and 3 is I don't know, pick the one that explains your opinion on common strategy that is used frequently.

**Agree      Disagree      I don't know**

Night patrols

Monitoring other criminal gangs

Acting as a link between the police and the community

Collecting security information in the community

Reporting crimes to the relevant authorities

Escorting community members during night hours

Responding to emergencies like fire

Responding to gender based violence

Contributing to harambees in social events

2. Explain any other security strategy vigilante use

.....  
.....

3. Explain any other service you provide in the community

.....  
.....

4. Do you think the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera have been effective?

Yes          No   

If yes, Explain

.....  
.....  
.....

**SECTION D: ASSESS THE CHALLENGES OF THE STRATEGIES USED BY VIGILANTE IN KIBERA**

1. Below are some of the challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in kibera. On a scale of 1 to 3 where 1 is agree, 2 is disagree and 3 is I don't know, pick the one that explains common challenges.

**Agree      Disagree      I don't know**

Vigilante does not get funding from the government

Vigilante groups are harassed by police when carrying out their duties

There is lack of proper training for vigilante members

There is lack of basic operational equipment's such as such as flashlights, warm clothing and rain boots

Opposition from some community members

Community members terms the members criminals

Lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they wish to serve

Inadequate recruitment and management of personnel

Attack by the gangs in the community

Poor accountability by the groups

2. In your own opinion indicate any other challenge of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera.

.....  
.....  
.....

3. a) Do you think challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera have derailed the contributions of vigilante groups on national security in Kibera?

Yes            [ ]            No            [ ]

b) If yes, In which ways

.....  
.....

4. ) What are some of the benefits of vigilante activities to you as a resident of Kibera Slum

.....  
.....  
.....




## **Appendix II: In-Depth Interview Guide**

My name is Shukri Abass Mohamed, a master's student from African Nazarene University. As part of my academic requirement, I am carrying out this research to establish the effects of vigilante groups on security of Nairobi's informal settlement areas. I would like to engage you for a detailed analysis on my questions and a few assumptions I have raised. I promise that this is purely for academic purpose and everything we discuss shall be treated with utmost confidentiality.

1. Based on your experience with vigilante groups, what do you think is their origin?
2. Which roles do vigilante groups play in your area?
3. Do you think there is any political connection with the origin and existence of vigilante groups in this area? If yes, please describe.
4. What are the reasons why communities in Kibera depend on vigilante for security?
5. What are the strategies used by vigilante in provision of security in Kibera?
6. What are some of the challenges of the strategies used by vigilante in Kibera?
7. What do you think there are some of the disputes or community solutions being offered by Vigilante groups?
8. Is the solution provided by vigilante groups more effective compared to state dispute resolutions? Please elaborate.
9. What are some of the benefits of vigilante groups to the residents of Kibera?
10. What do you think are some of the benefits that vigilante groups get from the residents of Kibera?

**Thanks so much for your time and participation.**

**Appendix III: Map of the Study Area**



Source: <https://www.informationcradle.com>

**Appendix IV: Approval letter**


16<sup>th</sup> October, 2020

**RE: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

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Shukri Abass Mohammed (17J03DMGP042) is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University. He has finished his course work and has defended his thesis proposal entitled: - *“Effects of Vigilante Groups on National Security: A case Study of Kibera Informal Settlement, Nairobi County Kenya”*.

Any assistance accorded to him to facilitate data collection and finish his thesis is highly welcomed.




**Prof. Rodney Reed.**

**DVC, Academic & Student Affairs**

Appendix V: NACOSTI research permit

  
REPUBLIC OF KENYA

  
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

RefNo: **191241** Date of Issue: **26/October/2020**


**RESEARCH LICENSE**




This is to Certify that Mr. **SHUKRI ABASS MOHAMED** of Africa Nazarene University, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: **Effects of Vigilante Groups on National Security: A case Study of Kibera Informal Settlement, Nairobi County Kenya** for the period ending : **26/October/2021**.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/20/7353**

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