

**CONTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS TO INTERNAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN UNION
MISSION IN SOMALIA**


**BY
LIBAN YAHYA MOHAMED**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of
the Degree of Master of Science in Governance, Peace and Security of the School
of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Governance, Peace and
Security Studies of Africa Nazarene University**

MARCH 2022

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis and the research it describes are my original work and that they have not been presented to any other university for academic work.

03rd January 2022

Name: LIBAN YAHYA MOHAMED

Reg. No. 18M03DMGP041

This research was conducted under our supervision and is submitted with our approval as university supervisors.

University Supervisor signature**Date**


Dr. David Muthondeki

05/01/2022

**University Supervisor signature****Date**

Dr. Peter Ogecha

07/Jan/2022



Africa Nazarene University

Nairobi, Kenya

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family members for their great support throughout my studies and in the course of writing this research project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I thank Allah most merciful for the grace and strength to accomplish my postgraduate studies. I am convinced with Him, everything is achievable. Secondly, I am grateful to my supervisors, Dr. David Muthondeki and Dr. Peter Ogecha for their understanding, patience and most importantly, taking the time to read my work, make corrections and guide me on how to go about implementing them. I am equally grateful to Africa Nazarene for the opportunity to pursue the Master of Science degree in Governance Peace and Security, which enabled me to meet and make new friends. Special thanks to the lecturers in the department of Governance Peace and Security Studies for their support throughout the writing process.

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ABSTRACT

The protracted conflict in Somalia following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime led to the rise of several actors, all contesting for power and control over the federal republic of Somalia. Among these actors has been the Al Shabaab terror group that has caused pain and suffering within Somalia and in the neighboring countries of Kenya and Somalia. The group's activities threatened regional security in the Horn of Africa leading to the establishment of the Africa Mission in Somalia to enforce peace. The aim of this research was to examine the contribution of AMISOM security forces in internal conflict management in Somalia. The study's specific objectives were to; identify the causes of internal conflicts, analyze AMISOM's mandate in managing internal conflicts, determine the challenges AMISOM face in managing internal conflicts, and evaluate strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Three theories were adopted in the research which were conflict transformation theory, liberal theory, and systems theory. In order to investigate the research questions, the study adopted descriptive survey design. The study's target population was 22970 AMISOM soldiers who included foreigners and Somalis, internally displaced people, religious leaders, clan members, international organizations, and business leaders. The study utilized stratified sampling technique to bring together people of the same category together. Purposive sampling was used to select individual respondents from clan elders and internally displaced persons who were interviewed. The study used an actual sample size of 377 respondents for data collection. This was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan 1970 formula. The key data collection tool was the questionnaire, whose validity and reliability were checked and calculated using a coefficient of such measures that was greater than 1.5. anything greater than this meant that the data collection instruments were accurate. Data was quantitatively evaluated using social science statistical kit (SPSS to generate descriptive and inferential statistics that were used for analysis and the findings presented using frequency tables and graphs, while the content of qualitative data was organized into themes for analysis and presented using narratives. The study found out that causes of internal conflict in Somalia both internal and external included lack of clear policies, uncoordinated government structures, interest from greedy individuals from inside and outside of Somalia government. The study also found out that AMISOM had played a big role in managing internal conflict in Somalia via training of Somalia soldiers, providing food aid to Somalia people. Among the challenges faced by the AMISOM team included resource constraints, lack of political goodwill from the Somalia leadership to end the conflict, weaknesses of African Union political leadership in terms of holding the Somalia leadership to account as well as the lack of an exit strategy by the AMISOM forces. The study recommends that the federal government of Somalia and its development partners should create an enabling environment in which the AMISOM soldiers can accomplish their mandate of stabilizing the country. This should be through the provision of the necessary financial and military resources and political support to defeat Al Shabaab. An exit strategy should also be developed so that there is no void created when the AMISOM forces exit that can cause the increasingly disjointed Al Shabaab group to recapture

the liberated areas.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter- Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ARS-A	Alliance for Re- Liberation of Somalia- Asmara
ARS-D	Alliance for Re- Liberation of Somalia- Djibouti
ASF	Africa Security Force
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRD	Centre for Research and Dialogue
CVDF	Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East Africa Community
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of African State
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF)
EU	European Union
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
G8	Group of Eight
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IR	International Relations
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non -governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia Eritrea
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PSC	Peace and Security Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RECS	Regional Economic Community
SADC	South Africa Development Community
SC	Security Council
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UK	United Kingdom
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN PKO	United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
UN	United Nations
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations support Office for
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
US	United States
USA	United States of America

OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS

- Challenge:** Is an objection to something which seems to be untrue or incorrect. In conflict management, the term is used to refer to difficult tasks or problems intergovernmental organizations go through
- Conflict Management:** It is the process where disputes are resolved, this includes mitigation of negative results in favor of positive especially during interparty crisis
- Mandate:** It is an authoritative command in form of a formal order from a superior office to a lower one. In this case this act is given to conflict management representative accepted by the people
- Strategies Initiatives:** These are the means organizations translates its goals as well as vision into practice. In this study, initiatives include identification of causes of conflicts so as to manage them.
- Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO):** Refers to a legal body formed by a treaty that brings together two or more countries to collaborate in good faith on issues of mutual concern. In the legal sense, an IGO does not exist unless there is a contract in effect. AU, for example, is an association of 55 African countries that holds annual economic and political summits. Treaty-based IGOs have an advantage over non-treaty-based IGOs in that they are subject to international law

and have the right to enter into enforceable agreements with one another or with states.

Internal Conflict Management:

is a way of reducing the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects. The goal of conflict management is to improve learning and group outcomes. Conflict that is properly handled will help a community achieve better results.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the background of the study, problem statement, and purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions and significance of the study. The chapter also presents the scope of the study, delimitations and limitations, assumptions, theoretical as well as conceptual frameworks.

1.2 Background of the Study

As from the 1990s there has been a wide range of peace keeping as well as conflict management missions that have been overseen by the United Nations as well as other regional bodies such as the AU and EAC. These bodies have spent significant efforts in ensuring that there is peace in countries especially those in Africa (Angerbrand, 2017). Internal conflict is a struggle which occurs in people's minds and can be character views held by people internally. The dilemma posed by internal conflict is reflected in the ethical or emotional question, and these include people's character hesitation. (Arriola, 2013 It can also be seen as a decision-making issue, which describes a military conflict within a nation. According to Kraus and Mitchell (2015) internal conflict is a non-international conflict and can be aggravated by political, religious as well as economic causes and if not carefully managed can cause instability within and outside the country.

Arriola (2013) says that the major causes of internal conflict especially in Africa over a long period of time have been seen to be due to culture and practice of violence, absence of democratic structure, unstructured political systems, growing populations, lack of security as well as failure in the administration of justice and poor

democratic space to mention but a few. Byiers and Desmudt (2016) posit those countries especially those in the African continent experience internal conflicts and these include Kenya, Nigeria Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, South Sudan, Central Africa among others. The effects of internal conflicts among affected countries are sometimes huge on the socio-economic development plus the chain of its impacts. Internal conflicts destroy lives, wealth and infrastructure in such countries. And this damages the existing social bonds as well as institutions of governance (Angebrandt, 2017).

Yang & Zhang (2013) observed that since the end of the cold war, the world has changed its foreign strategy today. Countries have seen a spike in the number of wars within the States that have disastrous implications on certain countries which could have given peace dividends since the end of the cold war. The majority of these conflicts are rooted in the disputes over the allocation of wealth-based resources among different communities in these countries and in the consequent battle to reform their economic structures in order to ensure a fair distribution of economic power (Minyori, 2018). The internal management of war today has many contemporary military conflicts with frequently anticipated army campaigns, both against critics and to impose their laws with a view to preserving or restoring national stability, legislation and order (Tusmo, 2016).

Spread migration, the disappearance of millions of lives and a large number of abuses of human rights, has marked Africa (Nizibi, 2018). Conflicts often occur when thoughts, attitudes, actions, responsibilities, desires, wishes and values are incompatible (Yang, Ryan, & Zhang, 2013). In the sub-Saharan African countries including South Sudan, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, about 70% of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations were carried out. In conflict prevention, mitigation

and settlement, UN peacekeeping missions play an important part (Angerbrandt, 2017).

Often in the areas of conflict prevention, mitigation and management in sub-Saharan Africa Regional authorities including the Intergovernmental Authority for Development IGAD, the Western African Economic Group (ECOWAS), the Eastern African Community, and the South Africa Development Community (SADC) (Brookings, 2016).

As a result, regional bodies such as the Africa Union (AU) and EAC have spent significant efforts in peacekeeping missions in countries like Somalia, Central Africa Republic and South Sudan. The Establishment of the EAC Treaty in 2002 provided the regional body with the mandate (under article five) to develop policies and programs aimed at enhancing peace and conflict management. Additionally, the EAC's mandate extends to the exploration of sundry cooperation benefits particularly in political arena, economic partnerships, social-cultural exchanges and defense training for collaborative peace and security (Arriola, 2013).

Somalia sits between the Aden Gulf and the Indian Ocean in the horn of Africa. It is situated west of Ethiopia, northwest of Djibouti and southwest of Kenya. Somalia has been undergoing a civil war focused on ethnic groups since January 1991 in the aftermath of the overthrow of President Mohammed Ziyad Bare's dictatorship rule. The country had no functional or central government in those years. The Civil War in the country has gone through multiple stages and phases from clan clashes to religious abuses led by the prominent militant group Al-Shabaab, which has a direct connection to Al Qaeda (Kalyvas, 2015).

Somalia's security situation has been compounded by a lack of central government, which could jeopardize the country's and the world's national security.

The election of a new president and the creation a new transitional parliament in 2004 signaled optimism that the civil war in Somalia could come to an end. As a result, Somalia's transitional federal government won international recognition in August 2012 (Eriksson, 2013). However, this optimism was short lived as Al-Shabaab initiated a military campaign in 2006 to take control of the state and establish sharia law in Somalia. This saw the intervention of the AU, EU, UN, United States of America (USA), and regional powers like Ethiopia and Kenya on the side of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) (Conflict Barometer, 2015).

According to Civins (2010), the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) invaded Somalia in 2006 with US diplomatic support. The mission's aim was to help the Transitional Federal Government battle the Islamic Tribunal Union, which was extremely strong (TFG). The intervention was ineffective in 2009, with disappointing results. As a result, another initiative was started in 2007 and is still ongoing, and which is the subject of this study. It is led by international community with the aim of achieving Somalia's military and civilian security. However, a stable Somalia remains a distant dream, as a proposed abrogation of the African Union's mandate in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2021 poses a challenge to any further stability programs in the region. The AU mission, known as the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), operates in concert with UN and EU efforts. AMISOM is characterized by a robust use of military force against the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the method of which some in academic circles have been described as falling somewhere between peace enforcement and war (Gelot, 2012).

AMISOM is the third African Union mission in Somalia, and it has been approved by the UN. The mission, which began on January 19, 2007, and was deployed by the African Union's Peacekeeping Council on February 21, 2007, was

originally planned to last six months (Amisom-AU, 2014). Since Somalia's insecurity has a negative effect on neighboring countries, the security situation has become a regional issue that has piqued international interest. AMISOM is thought to have helped the Somali government in restoring large strategic regions formerly controlled by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, in a way that is distinct from other foreign interventions. Aside from advances in the country's security, Al Shabaab's bombardment and the AMISOM forces' response has destroyed civilians on a daily basis. The insurgents are fighting the intervention with ferocity. It's also important to depict and portray the overall impact of AMISOM's intervention in Somalia. Therefore, it is appropriate to assess the role played by Intergovernmental organizations' peace initiatives especially AMISOM in conflict management in the context of Somalia because little has been written about active involvement of such military missions in the resolution of the ongoing conflict in Somalia.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have grown in importance in promoting dispute resolution between countries as well as resolving intractable internal conflicts. They perform a variety of basic functions that increase the probability of peace. However, in spite of comprehensive and repeated international efforts over the past three decades, Somalia's stability is still elusive.

The transitional government based in Mogadishu is supported by many international community actors. The government has increasingly of late been proven to be unstable, vulnerable to ongoing clans as well as political conflicts. It is unable to provide even a rudimentary level of governance when confronted by strong military opponents. While Islamic groups have repeatedly expanded their presence in Somalia, they have imposed sharia laws and pursued an often anti-Western and divisive

regional agenda, foreign retaliation, including direct and indirect military intervention have been consistent (Vanda, 2018).

Anarchy, violence, and poverty have resulted in the displacement of many Somalis, the influx of refugees, and the loss of thousands of lives. The effects of general instability in Somalia have affected not only the Somali people, but also the Horn of Africa and the international community as a whole resulting into refugee crisis, small arms and light weapons trade, jihadist spread, and radicalization threats (Kidist, 2009). In various ways, the international community has attempted to restore peace and prosperity to Somalia. In 1992, for example, the UN Security Council (UNSC) allowed a unilateral UN military intervention in Somalia (Harper, 2012, p. 60).

Similarly, the African Union (AU) has launched fifteen peace efforts in Somalia with the assistance of the international community. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) worked together to resolve the Somali conflict through a negotiated process (Mulugetta, 2009). Somalia's neighbors have also made individual efforts to end the conflict in the country. However, a variety of challenges have thwarted these efforts, including external actors with varying roles, internal spoilers, and financial difficulties (Harper, 2012). AMISOM is the latest Intergovernmental organizations' conflict management initiative in Somalia.

AMISOM is thought to have helped the Somali government in restoring large strategic regions formerly controlled by Al-Shabaab. Aside from advances in the country's security, Al Shabaab's bombardment and the AMISOM forces' response has destroyed civilians on a daily basis. It is therefore appropriate to assess the role played by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia.

1.4 The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the contribution of intergovernmental organizations in conflict management in Somalia an examination of AMISOM operations in Somalia

1.5 General Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to examine the contribution of intergovernmental organizations on internal conflict management in Somalia.

1.5.1 Specific objectives of the Study

- i. To identify the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia necessitating intervention by AMISOM
- ii. To examine the role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia.
- iii. To determine the challenges faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflict in Somalia.
- iv. To assess the strategies AMISOM use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia

1.6 Research Questions

- i. What are the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia that necessitated the intervention of AMISOM?
- ii. How does the mandate of AMISOM support the management of internal conflicts in Somalia?
- iii. What are the challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia?

- iv. What are the strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia?

1.7 Hypothesis

H₀: The contribution of AMISOM has no statistical significance on the management of internal conflicts in Somalia

1.8 Significance of the Study

The aim of the study was to examine the role played by AMISON in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The findings of the study contribute to the body of knowledge building utilized by scholars, policy makers, governments, diplomats, the AU members and INGOs as well as the general public to evaluate AMISOM's efforts in conflict management in Somalia and the entire region.

The study findings may inform policy makers to assess levels of political activity in order to make informed and sound judgment. The study provides information be used by policy makers to come up with mechanism for resolving conflicts in the region.

The study provides new insights to the existing body of knowledge relating to the role of intergovernmental bodies in conflict management. It provides useful information for law enforcement and policy makers to come up with strategic mechanism for resolving conflict in the region.

1.9 Scope of the Study

The study focused on the situation within the territorial bounds of Somalia, taking a brief look at the Somali state and why it is considered a failed state despite several attempts to restore peace in the country by examining the contribution of intergovernmental organizations especially AU in Somalia over the last 11 years 2009

to 2020. Somalia state was most preferred for the study because it is one of the Horn of Africa country that had been plagued with internal conflicts for many years. The study covered four objectives which were: to identify the causes of internal conflicts, to examine intergovernmental organizations' role in managing internal conflicts, to determine the challenges facing intergovernmental organizations in internal conflict management and to assess the strategies intergovernmental organizations uses in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study only utilized an accessible population of 1762 people and a sample size of 326 respondents.

1.10 Delimitations of the Study

Delimitations describe the boundaries of a study (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). This research was restricted to the contribution of AMISOM to internal conflict management in Somalia. It did not cover nongovernmental activities as well as the traditional approaches to conflict management on their own. Any works by AMISOM in the year 2021 was not covered because it fell out of the operational boundaries of the study.

1.11 Limitations of the Study

According to Orodho, (2005), limitation is a feature of study that the researcher feels it had an adverse effect on the results of the general study, but over which he or she had no direct control. The following are the limitations of the study. A mitigating measure shall, therefore, be drawn up for each restriction to mitigate harm to the accuracy of the study results.

External variables were outside the researcher's control. This included respondent honesty, personal preconditions, and uncontrolled study conditions. The effects of these spoilers are mitigated by competent involvement of respondents who adhere to ethical research standards like confidentiality guarantee and the use of the

most appropriate words. With the research instruments used, AMISOM's contribution to conflict management in Somalia was generic. Before and after data collection, error analyses were conducted in order to achieve accurate results on the study variables. This was through triangulation of data collected using the various research tools.

Another challenge was the unanticipated travels of respondents who had committed to participate in the study but were deployed or went out of research area when the research was already underway. Thus, they were requested to appoint representatives who had information similar to the one the study sought.

1.12 Assumptions of the Study

Leedy and Ormrod (2010) suggest that the assumptions of science are so central that the issue of analysis itself does not exist without them. This research assumes that participants responded honestly, and hence the obtaining conclusions and recommendations are a product of the data collected. Moreover, the study assumed that AMISOM had a role to play in the management of internal conflicts in Somalia, challenges thereto notwithstanding. Finally, the study assumed that the theoretical foundations upon which the study has been build were robust enough while leaving space for the study to make its own contribution.

1.13 Theoretical Framework

Much has been written on the subject of the conflict in Somalia, intervention, state sovereignty and human rights protection in Africa. The most of these writings were in form of official documents, reports, journals and conference reports. The research was underpinned by the following three theories: Theory of Conflict Transformation, Liberal Theory and Systems Theory.

1.13.1 Theory of Conflict Transformation

As an alternative to the dominant paradigms of the conflict transition, the philosophy of conflict transformation appeared. Conflict transition, as advocated by Lederach (1995), provides a holistic mechanism for conflict resolution in the phases of the conflict from early stages to complete conflict resolution. Conflict transition attempts to discuss the frequently forgotten aspects of conflict resolution, the role played in the reduction of conflict severity and length through systemic aggression and cultural identities.

Conflict transformation theory is of the view that the development of conflict resolution in relation to people's culture highlights ways in which conflicts can be transformed. According to Hugh (2004), conflict transformation model assists in the analysis and understanding the nature of conflict at hand. Hugh is also persuaded that the philosophy takes the view that the handling of disputes is both optimistic and constructive in coping with disagreement and difference. Instead of promoting dispute settlement approaches. This allows for conflict managers to consider what may be appropriate measures and at what point in the development of the conflict. Hugh (2004) how conflicts may be understood and what form of interventions are made possible will ensure lasting peace in many states.

According to Lederach (1985), as much as conflict transformation theory is able to assist conflict managers resolve conflicts, in one way or the other, some theorists have rejected its power political view of conflict where they argue that in communal and identify conflicts, people cannot compromise on their fundamental needs, they see the possibility of transcending conflicts if parties to conflict can be helped to explore analyze question as well as reframing their positions as well as interests. Conflict transformation theory therefore only emphasizes interventions by

skilled but powerless third parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships meaning these parties may lack official mandate to assist in the peace-making process.

1.13.2 Liberal Theory

Liberal philosophy is one of contemporary society's positive components. This hypothesis formed the basis for liberal political theories against the backdrop of the fall of the feudal social order and the rise of the economy-based culture. According to Pateman (1989), liberal theory was first started by Locke (1689) the theory believed that international institutions play a fundamental role in bring peace among a country's citizens

The principle claims that promoting the development of democracy is the right approach for stability and for creating lasting peace. In liberal philosophy, peace operations are intended to establish lasting peace by allowing democratic markets and free market economies to be developed. Though liberal theory is the overarching theory underlying modern peace operations, its implementation is still contentious (Jeffrey, 2018).

Jeffery (2018) also attests that liberal theory defines the sphere of individual actions defined and characterized in a political as well as economic activity. The theory takes care of individual liberty from interference from the State or external regulations. However as much as the classical liberalism asserts that principles of equality as well as freedom should be limited to the public realm, this has led many researchers to think that the transformation of power within governments is concentrated in private households in many of the countries especially those in the African continent. Hence, the drawback of liberal theory is that it can be traced back to the social; contract inalienable natural rights to life and property of individual

people are not addressed by this theory.

1.13.3 Systems Theory

This study has adopted the systems theory. The study is situated within the framework of the systems theory formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 20th Century (Biswaro, 2013). A system can simply be defined as those which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its different components. It can also be seen as a relationship between various units (Angerbrandt, 2017). Based on this, the system theory can be conceptualized as series of statements on interactions among independent and dependent variables, so that a change in one or more variables is followed by a change in other variables or group of variables (Biswaro, 2013). The system theory was formulated to explain the interaction and functionality phenomena between living organisms, machines, as well as organizations and their interactive operations.

This study adopted systems theory as formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 20th Century (Biswaro, 2013), he beliefs that a system can be defined by the interdependence of its different components. It can also be seen as a relationship between various units (Angerbrandt, 2017). Based on this, the system theory can be conceptualized as series of statements on interactions among dependent and independent variables, so that a change in one or more variables is followed by a change in other variables or group of variables (Biswaro, 2013).

The importance of system theory is that it explains the interaction and functionality phenomena between living organisms, machines, as well as organizations and their interactive operations. Organizations do function as an interactive system and not as stand-alone units. This theory assumes that within the international systems, different countries are held together by a complex network of

relationships/interactions that make them interdependent in facilitating their core functions including various economic activities, transfer of technology, communications and diplomatic relations.

According to Angerbrandt (2017) system's perspective require each and every system to try as much as possible to maintain its equilibrium and that any disturbance offsets the balance. In order to avoid potential disturbances, countries are obliged to cooperate with one another. The conflict resolution mechanism employed by the regional bodies is informed by the states' willingness to reduce or minimize any disturbance to the system. Hence, conflict management mechanisms adopted by Intergovernmental Organisation in Somalia falls within this framework. Like a structure, the AU refers to a diverse series of interlinked agencies and organizations, as well as structures at regional and domestic levels in terms of internal conflict management in Somalia.

1.14 Conceptual Framework

A graphical presentation of variables and their interactions is the conceptual structure in this analysis (Kothari, 2014). The conceptual structure for this analysis is presented in Figure 1.1. It provides diagrammatically illustration of the relationship between the research variables. The main relationship was the apparent effect of the dependent variable. Key independent variables included the Intergovernmental Organisation role and strategies used; key challenges faced and initiatives implemented effects of refugee and the dependent variable is the state construction and peace restoration in Somalia. The variable relationship depicted in the conceptual framework implied that a change in the independent variable leads to a change in the dependent variable. This meant that if there was decrease in capacity capabilities of

Intergovernmental Organisation peacekeeping missions and the number of casualties and insecurity adversely affected the Somalia state restoration.

Independent Variables




Figure 1. 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher (2021)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The study discussed empirical review on the concept of Intergovernmental Organization's mandate, strategies being implemented, challenges and initiative undertaken to manage the Somalia conflict, summary and research gap.

2.2 Empirical Review

Internal conflicts within countries pose a challenge on a country's economic development. Conflict cause discomfort, displacement and sometimes cause loss of lives as well as property. Given the nature of conflicts in Somalia, it is important for the country and African Union to seek for ways of strengthening peace in the country through responding to conflicts (Bouslikhane (2015). Countries such as Somalia need to manage its internal conflict through empowering AMISON as a tool for its internal conflict management. This chapter will ensure this is a success by reviewing past empirical literature following the study objectives.

2.2.1 Causes of Internal Conflicts necessitating intervention by AMISOM

The world today has people who do their daily business or work together as a group conflict and this becomes one of the most predictable outcomes. Conflict managers generally spend most of their time handling issues from peoples who are sharing common aspects. According to Human Right Watch (2015), internal conflicts if not properly managed can lead to lack of development. According to Tajima (2013), conflict behaviors whether violent or nonviolent are known to manifest in a series of sub phases based on the balancing of power.

Contemporary tensions are usually insurgencies or civil wars. A much larger proportion of disputes between states have arisen in the past. This phenomenon has been explained by various factors, including the growth of the world economy, changing international standards of conduct and United States preeminence in the international State system. Although the conflict patterns have been modified in many conflicting explains, the shift in trend is evident (Human Right Watch, 2015)

In the west for instance, the Serbian- Australian conflict in 1914 which started because of scramble for resources escalated and resulted into the First World War. According to Gibbson (2014), the German - British conflict of 1939 was because of control of resources also resulted into the Second World War. Quite a number of cases exist which are not directly caused by conflicts within the states. According to the emergence of terrorism which has escalated into global crisis where currently the whole world battles with this scourge is evident enough in the fight against such conflicts (Gibbons, 2014).

Internal conflict is defined in terms of human needs as well as wants or the obligation of the parties involved and that it takes place between two conscious, though not necessarily rational, beings Cate (2013). Internal conflict normally refers to the kind of conflicts that happens within a country or state; this involves the people of that country. According to it is only normal to experience conflict locally due to the human nature. In the coming years, crises as well as threats are bound to grow more numerously, and this is a recipe for threats to the internal peace as well as security of countries also known as nations (Aning & Atta-Asamoah, 2015).

Hoeffler (2012), posit those threats which are also known as conflicts are normally known to be as a result of a combination of some reasons which include political as well as institutional factors such as weak state institutions, elite power

struggles as well as political exclusion. There is also the breakdown in social; contract and corruption and not forgetting political identity. According to Hannah (2012), there is also the issue of resource as well as environmental factors and this includes greed, scarcity of national resources as a result of population growth which leads to environmental insecurity, which also includes unjust resource exploitation. There is also the issue of socio-economic factors such as inequality, exclusion as well as marginalization plus the absence of social cohesion and not forgetting poverty levels.

The political institutions within countries that cannot peacefully handle various party interests so as to effectively ensure the security of the same group, as well as to satisfy their increasing demands, including political participation, will contribute to internal conflicts. It is important that countries are realistic about the risks of fostering democratization in the unsuitable circumstances, according to Aning and Atta-Asamoah (2014). This is because if the advent of mass electoral politics already struggles to create political institutions, the likelihood of violence would increase.

The dominance of the elite as well as political isolation has left many legates, including divisive and military politics, in conjunction with fierce struggles for power and territory, particularly during the colonial and independence struggles in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. President Henry Conan Bedie won the 1995 elections in Côte d'Ivoire and pressed for policies which supported Ivorian nationalism, where Parliament passed a law barring anyone whose parents were not born on Côte d'Ivoire from taking office. The goal was to deter Alasane Quttara from coming from Burkina Faso when one of his parents arrived.

According to the domination and access to state structures as well as resources by any leader, political party, group to the exclusion of other community members

results into conflicts. The ability of post-colonial states especially in sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability of their ruling political parties intended in overcoming the historical legacy where there was social fragmentation has been the cause of conflicts in most parts of Africa. This clearly indicates that domination and access to state struggles by a few individuals makes the rest of the group uneasy and there creates some tension.

Luiala (2014), argues that the breakdown of social contract as well as corruption within a country is known to be good promoters of internal conflicts. The outbreak of military for instance has been caused by the failure of institutions as well as organizations by countries to that there is no violation of the social contract especially in African countries. According to hoe states are managed makes fundamental as this dictates the extent to which internal conflicts can or cannot occur. It is therefore important for states to ensure that public resources are carefully and properly utilized for the people to maintain peace.

According to the issue of identity politics when mobilized in terms of religion, culture as well as ethnicity may result into a system of beliefs as well as practices that either unite adherents within a community or alter the perception of others (Tajima, 2015). This can encourage them to alter collective action in the name of their group. This section is important to this study

2.2.2 Role AMISOM Play in Managing Internal Conflicts

The settlement of conflict is a term, according to Assis (2012), that is more fundamental and that addresses peaceful cohabitation in general. The dispute parties pledge to support one another and to be able to cooperate with the laws that control each other, not only in the sense of an end to aggression and the war but also, as written by Wallenstein. However, once a disagreement is settled, we enter an instance

of harmony by resolving the root factors of the potential coexistence of the various parties engaged in the dispute (Tajima, 2013).

De Juan (2017) is related to the dynamics of human society between the management of disputes within humankind. This has resulted in the continuing conflict to a degree that new approaches are required, specifically wars and the emergence of new technology in the fear and use of new mass destruction weapons, to resolve new challenges. According to Harane (2012), the various definitions attitudes relating to conflicts as well as images of its roles sometimes become varied. According to AMISOM Press Release (2015), conflict is difficult to define as it occurs in different settings. The essence of the conflict seems to be the disagreements as well as contradictions existing between various parties. Having peace management missions that ensure peaceful co-existence among the citizens of a country is a fundamental to economic stability as well as development of that country.

AMISOM was deployed by AU as a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, with UN endorsement. The first six months of its tenure were defined by the PSC of the AU on 19 January 2007. In order to establish conditions for humanitarian operations and for the UN to take over immediately, AMISOM is tasked with performing PSOs in Somalia and stabilizing the situation in the region. The goal of the mission was to promote consultation, conciliation and protect key resources and TFIs through the work of all relevant stakeholders. The mission also sought to help Somalia enforce its NSSP, provide security and aid (AU Communiqué, 2007).

AMISOM was never a conventional activity for peacekeeping. Rather, its mandated duties provide a combination of the security and compliance of government officials and agencies from antigovernment actors, primarily al-Shabaab. The police portion of the mission shall assist the Somali Police Force to educate, mentor, and

provide guidance, even though the Established Police Units of AMISOM have an additional role in regulating the public order. The mission is also commissioned to promote assistance and civil-military operations (Nduwimana, 2013).

According to London (2017), ensuring that the public knows and understands the mission of the AMISON powers is a key factor in ensuring that any action is accompanied by public assistance. This encourages reasonable aspirations and provides the basis for receiving the approval of society. While in Somalia people are generally aware that the mandate of AMISOM is to tackle Al-Shabaab, in addition, the public awareness about the other part of the mandate and way of doing the task (De Juan, 2017).

According to London (2017), ensuring that the public knows and understands the mission of the AMISON powers is a key factor in ensuring that any action is accompanied by public assistance. This encourages reasonable aspirations and provides the basis for receiving the approval of society. While in Somalia people are generally aware that the mandate of AMISOM is to tackle Al-Shabaab, in addition, the public awareness about the other part of the mandate and way of doing the task (De Juan, 2017). Somalis' opinion overall that combating Al-Shabaab and providing assistance to the Somali government is the main focus of the operation's mandate

The AMISON recruits, equipment and reforms the Somali National Army and the police in order to assume responsibility for the provision of protection from the Amisom army (Harane, 2012), ensures ample participation of security services, international human rights and humanitarian law training for all powers and the development of proper accountable structures for them. The challenge is continuing to establish Somalia's institutions (including facilities in areas retaken by AMISOM and the security forces) and (re)establish state authority. Enhance successful mediation

and attempts to foster good governance in all national agencies in local disputes.

It guarantees, in line with the demands of the African Union, that military levels are retained at the current pace. Provide suitable resources and preparation for peacekeeping forces, which covers international human rights and humanitarian law, civil defense and community relations (Human Right Watch, 2015). Ensure that impartial inquiries into reports of their powers' abuses take place. Suspend suspect criminals and ensure that those cases are forwarded to the national prosecutor and/or judicial authorities, where necessary.

Amadi (2012) argues that capability growth for various security system industries and through the involvement in a political dialog with the government in Somalia. This included the need for the powers to be multicultural and responsible. To improve further the mandate vocabulary for the growth of the security sector and participate in political dialog on the need for political support from the next Somali Government and international partners for the reform process while building on the London conference (Harane, 2012).

2.2.3 Challenges AMISOM Face in Managing Internal Conflicts

The PCS has, according to Marangio (2013), contributed to the creation of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in order to stabilize and foster a dialog in the region, encourage humanitarian aid, and build conditions for permanent peace, together with civil wars in the ethnically uniform country of Somalia. In 2007, the AU exposed the vulnerability of its peacekeeping mission to Somalia and its lack of adequacy with respect to the difficulty of the situation. The mission took no confidence-building steps (Amadi, 2012).

The task of seeking legal authority in the country was, according to Amadi (2014), at each point of the war in Somalia, the key challenge of reconciliation for

peace. The lack of a constitutional government weakened Somalia's peace efforts (Menkhaus & Ortmayer, 2000). Moreover, Somalia's government control is marked by the absence of a pause to combat Mogadishu power seat. It is a violent, fractured, and heterogeneous form of formal and informal institutions controlled by clan militants (2005).

AMISOM faced a huge obstacle with the proximity to influence and wealth that became a big motivation for the clan. In addition to arguments, the country's desirability and existence are contested. The central government's intervention in its affairs was assumed and nomadic by many Somalis, an idea created by the encounter with the dictatorship of Barre. The key clans advocate a federal government structure that will autonomously administer various regions of the state and thus permit control over a State area (Frazer, 2012).

Therefore, the effectiveness of AMISOM is contingent on the authority of central government structures within the population of Somalia. This can be shown, for example, by the effective and prompt supply of goods and services and the securing of places freed. The legitimacy dispute also leads to the competition between clan militias. The problem for AMISOM's success in stabilizing Somalia has always been clan rivalry (Boon 2012).

Apart from the AU troops, most of the Somalia National Army is mainly an alliance clan militia united only by their rivalry against Al-Shabaab. There have been cases of infighting between the government troops. Due to the strong clan militia tension in Somalia, it has been very difficult for the whole clans to unite under one umbrella as to provide sufficient assistance to AMISOM. The clan rivalry has been a dire challenge to AMISOM in deploying troops outside Mogadishu (Tres, 2014).

Obinwa (2015) states that AMISOM faces a major problem in terms of its

mandated duties and its resource restrictions and capabilities. These limits on capital existed in different dimensions. The number of soldiers on the field and allowed numbers were enormously split. In less hostile areas Somalia needs between five and ten troops every 1,000 civilians in terms of the number of soldiers required for a secure operation, while in hostile areas it takes 20 soldiers for every 1,000 people. It is estimated that the total population of Somalia is about nine million, suggesting that for the country's different security circumstances, a total of 100,000 intervention troops is needed.

African soldiers contributing States were unable to send AMISOM forces. To change the task mandate, the present number of forces on the ground is not adequate. The inadequate troops limited the mission in Mogadishu to some areas (Obinwa, 2015 & Kromah, 2010). The task troops are currently 22,126 in number and insufficient for operations in all regions of Somalia. This restricted AMISOM deployment in Mogadishu to key strategic areas, including seaports, airports, government buildings and mission facilities (Boon, 2012).

The lack of combat vehicles and supplies is another problem associated with manpower limitations. In order to support the mission with attack helicopters and transport, the international community is unable to address AMISOM requests. This lack of equipment, particularly in the air, prevents AMISOM from conducting offensive activities and restricts the efficiency of the mission. This kind of supply would enable the effective and secure transportation of AMISOM troops (Tres, 2014).

AMISOM external players also have a divergent interest in addition to the lack of funding for the mission. The countries sending mission troops have already had conflicts of interest. AMISOM is met with a significant challenge from the President

of the AU, the Chairman of the AU Committee and the PSC Chairman (Boom, 2012). The location of the Nairobi and not Somalia task headquarters led to the successive powers' commanders contending as the key diplomatic interlocutor between the TFG and AU. This also ensures that the participating countries of the mission's troops will gain considerable sovereignty, which has resulted in contra productive results (AU 2013a).

Owing to the multi-faceted existence of the AU mission, internal coherence and communication were missing. The main components of the mission are geographically separated. For example, in Addis Ababa there were political and strategic missions, whereas in Mogadishu the mission and military unit was formed, while in Nairobi, Obinwa, it was headquarters of the mission (2015). The dilemma was not alleviated by the fact that most of AMISOM's stabilization preparation resources for Somalia were divided through Djibouti, Uganda and Ethiopia. This separate role undermines the performance, especially tactical and organizational problems, of internal coherence and coordination. Since its headquarters in Nairobi until the end of 2012, both the Somalis and the outside world had got a poor political symbol (Tres, 2014).

As chief political leaders of the mission the AMISOM commanders were authorized to serve. The administration of the AMISOM mission's role compromised Somalia's hopes for peace (Paul, 2013). It has been a significant obstacle for the mission to accomplish its mission that civilian staff often fly from Nairobi to Mogadishu for long stretches of time to perform their responsibilities. The daily transportation from Nairobi to Kenya is essential for the successful operation of the member's mandates from logistics, finance and psychology.

For e.g., any time people are traveling from the protected area, military escorts

must guard them and this impacts the military portion, decreasing their resource constraints (Kromah 2010). The second component of the teamwork challenge faced by AMISOM consists of the fact that it is very difficult to patrol the entire dangerous area and the coordination of patrol teams between taskforces is inadequate. The mission cannot sue or even apprehend all those guilty of piracy because there is no single State in the Horns of Africa. The lack of unambiguous authority and protection in Somalia contributed to many acts of piracy.

AMISOM is facing a huge obstacle because of the difficult disposition of Al-Shabaab (Youth). Established in 2003 to dominate Greater Somalia, where the Ethiopic troops were practically eradicated in 2007, the militant group is now a dominant player in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa as a whole (Dagne 2011). AMISOM would turn into a UNPO, which was rejected by UN Member States that depended to contribute their soldiers to the task, and the debate on whether to enter into dialog with al-Shabaab, are the key mechanisms to reinforce this community the contradictory regional and Western policies (Marchal 2011).

The capacity to coordinate the party with ideological and economic tools, according to Wise (2011), is challenged by the unlawful existence of contestants in Somalia and the unilateral interference from Ethiopia raising money largely by abduction, smuggling, state funding and diaspora. The party was willing to afford its followers' wages. Another weapon for Al-power Shabaab's is to forward ICT, which gives the organization the means to provide intelligence and support from foreign militant organizations the other way forward (Wise, 2011).

Paul (2013) claims that the Al Shabaab military arm consists of both domestic and international combat fighters, and that this divergent section constitutes a major challenge for AMISOM because a single scene of gravity cannot be identified and

centered. The party warrior is a combination of local guerrillas and the militant group al-Qaeda (Marchal, 2011). Therefore, it is very hard for AMISOM to classify who Al-Shabaab is. The strategic tactics of Al-Shabaab, such as hits and bombings, suicide bombing and ambushes, are AMISOM's significant problem.

Furthermore, AMISOM was faced with a big threat by Al-provisional Shabaab's coalition with Somalia's national armed force. In a war against Kenya, the party merged with the Somali national army. It was alleged that weapons were being sent to Somalia's army, suggesting that the organization and the Somalia government had a high degree of corruption and complicity (Sheeham & Porter 2014). The TFG troops, which were funded, disrupted, unruly and badly inspired, were untrustworthy among AMISOM. TFG and security units engaged in the illegal plundering and blockade. They provided Al-Shabaab with intelligence on AMISOM's activities. The TFG troops took part in numerous criminal activities, including the ambush of AMISOM soldiers. All of these confronted AMISOM with a significant challenge and reduced the mission results (Paul, 2013).

There are no simple demarcations or beacons to direct the escape plan according to Sheeham and Porter (2014). Conventionally, timetables and operations contribute to the potential retirement and closure of all operations by cutting down combat resources and the whole task in general are an essential component of every activity. In particular in a foreign setting, activities cannot be carried out indefinitely. AMISOM has no timetable or specifies the stage at which the mandate is granted to the local actors or other agencies (Sheeham & Porter, 2014).

It can be a source of resentment on the part of local players that the task may be turned into an invading force and the local agents will act against it and combat it. The end of the escape plan then appeared to remain too long a bridge. In the one hand,

the project was envisaged to become a full UN mission (Wise, 2011). The UNSC adopted Resolution 1863, which only articulated the intention of creating AMISOM as a UN peacekeeping operation. It has no schedule or funding for supplies. In its report of 16 April 2009, Ban Ki-moon outlined four options for helping the UN achieve its goal.

The high-risk Alternative A was to replace the Chapter VII mandate for AMISOM with a UN peacekeeping operation of 22 500. "Pragmatic" Alternative B was planned by the UN to establish an AMISOM support program before Mogadishu was safeguarded by the Somali National Security Force on its own. Act on option B plus a UN Somalian Political Office and a UN AMISOM support office inside Mogadishu, the "prudent" option C says Sheeham and Porter (2014). In case of deliberate or forced withdrawal of AMISOM, choice D, "Engagement without an international presence in security," was intended as a contingency measure. If this strategy is accepted and, if so, whether it would succeed remains to be seen. In the area of exit strategy, the UN mission in Somalia is already in high order.

2.2.4 Strategies Adopted by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflicts

Strategic attacks involve a sense of human terrain, according to Ligawa, (2017). In order to provide a better knowledge of the environment, developing nations have adopted teaching in human field programs. The world in which AMISOM works should be worthy of comprehension. The mission does not understand the Somalis' demographic and cultural views. This would also help to encourage the troops' acceptance among the host. Unintelligent of this main idea, the troops and locals have been at odds.

Since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007 to date, the mission has gradually transformed and increased the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) which

has expanded from Uganda and Burundi to include Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (Sheeham & Porter, 2014). Further, the transformation from the TFG to a legitimately elected government has changed the dynamics on negotiations of AMISOM with the newly established government a situation which did not exist beforehand. The swearing in of Mr. Hassan Sheikh as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on 10th September 2012 has increased the international optimism of recovery of Somalia, but more importantly has increased the opportunity for the civilian component of AMISOM.

A number of foreign and Somali academics have researched stability and war in Somalia. According to William (2017) since Somalia has become a failed state, the dominant task among most foreign academics is to establish how the state can be rebuilt into a democratic and developmental state. These requested peace assistances to introduce order and laws into the state controlled by the militia. Multidimensional powers are assisted by PSOs. In order to ensure the conclusion of hostilities, the military exercise use of coercive power.

Despite disparities between them, the world's military cultures (and particularly in alliances such as NATO) have strong communalities that encourage cooperation. These commonalities are not properly utilized in less established armies (Ligawa, 2017). Different doctrines and instruction are responsible for this. These features concentrate on group violence that needs tight teamwork, solid hierarchies, direct command channels, troops being able to jeopardize life and bodies and the value of moral obligation and solidarity. These are the most critical features. A variety of regulatory steps to promote inter-organizations have thus been placed in place.

The notion of cultural wisdom, according to Kobi and Eyal (2011), cannot be overlooked in contemporary military operations. For several army forces to develop

this form of awareness, the shift towards cultural intelligence based on knowledge of the culture of opponents is simply not an organizational course. Aspects of cultural awareness for example are now incorporated into the army, intelligence networks and modern organizing structures, also called the HoogenBoom Human Land (2006) and are part of what HoogenBoom terms grey intelligence or the growing mix of public and private information collection, and the structured growth. In one case, the Pentagon introduced a program whereby social scientists are incorporated in Brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to support their commanders as cultural advisors.

Simulation and workshops to introduce security actors to the importance of religious and cultural matters in their missions should commence at AMISOM. This can be achieved during pre-deployment trainings. In considering how important cultural intelligence to PSOs is, it has been argued that the development of such information primarily responds to the militarization of intelligence in these missions (William, 2017). The difference between the two Triggers of Cultural Intelligence is that first of all the environmental and cognitive and behavioral abilities are required to adjust them to the context. The first level of intelligence is the qualification needed for the second type, which plays an important role in designing plans and assigning resources within PSOs.

Cultural intelligence manipulation plays a crucial role in information processing in particular. To date, AMISOM troops have been viewed as attackers by most people. The principle of securitization further emphasizes that the viewer is expected to help the efforts of war. It is purely the responsibility of AMISOM to pursue local people's approval. The value of cultural intelligence should have toned down this kind of thought. Soldiers should improve what is appropriate with the use of the Somalis' cultural traditions. This should be balanced and its position as peace

promoters should not be overlooked (Amadi, 2012).

Hyphenated military positions are increasingly common. Military forces are qualified to achieve multiple objectives, blended activities and multiple PSO performers. However, the soldier-diplomat, soldier-statesman and troop-scholar were introduced to the first formulation of the post-war soldier-police officer. His rationale was that such military officers could assume such hyphenated positions in contemporary circumstances effectively (Michael, 2006).

AMISOM therefore seeks to sell its workers short courses, such as mediation ties and negotiating skills. This gives soldiers and other workers the expertise required to succeed the mission. The soldiers must take short courses in order to be able to carry out the task with the skills required. For example, a soldier engaged in relief work or media duties requires a military starting point. The military position of the PSOs seems to have been explosive to allow the use of soldier-consultants, soldier-relief staff and soldier-alderman, soldier-social scientist, soldier-society workers, soldier-state builder and a soldier-infrastructure restorer (a little unhandled), easily added (Michael, 2006). However, it is another function incorporated in the military in all these situations.

Civil and military (CIMIC) authorities integrate multiple systems and modes of operation in hierarchical combinations into a single frame. Organizational hybrids, including hyphenated positions, have the advantage of being the manner in which the military adapts itself to dynamic situations in order to put elements of chaos along with elements of order and thus to satisfy the complex objectives of many PSOs. Hybrid organizations are thus often mechanisms used by the military to maintain interactions with political societies whose values, interests and personalities may be contradictory with their own. CIMIC, a military formation governed by military

concerns, notwithstanding its name. These organizations, led by military officers, have the aim of achieving mission goals by connecting the armed forces' members to civilian communities including local residents, NGOs or AMISOM civil officials.

The CIMIC officials are in charge of all or most of the following tasks: preparation, coordination, and exchange of information, shared support and joint review with the stakeholders, between the elements of a PSO, operations centers focused on human rights, political and civil relations and the public information sector. The accelerated impacts may have a significant effect on local people. Yet most districts do not have technical, medical and even recreational services.

Such requirements can be met by the mission through quick impacts projects to enhance the interaction between the soldiers and the locals. CIMIC officers are not doing much due to lack of funds. However, the project should be on a need basis. Prior assessment should be conducted before initiating such activities. This view corresponds with Patrick (2011). It should take care of the needs of locals. The officers are not given funds to run these projects. Such funds should be availed. Quick impact projects have a positive influence on the society.

AMISOM is also undertaking counterinsurgency operations against the armed insurgent groups according to Emma (2015). Many towns and centers were released from counter-offensive operations. Africa's troops managed to shoot al-Shabaab out of Somali Capital; Mogadishu with TFG forces in August 2011. More military contributions from Kenya and Djibouti have also been accomplished by better cooperation of the AMISOM and TFG forces and the Central Intelligence Agency has announced training in Somali intelligence operations.

For several reasons, troops are evidently handing Al-Shabaab more land. Owing to the shortage of night vision systems, the soldiers lack the requisite resources

to carry out night-time counterinsurgency operations. Militants usually travel under the cover of darkness at night, so ambushes should be set in the evening to trap them. There are minimal air strikes or no air strikes; the lack of air assets allows the rebels plenty of space to take action. The defenses ought to be aggressive.

Meleagrou and Hussein gained a lot in mid-2012 (2012). Kenyan Security Forces (KDF) has contributed immensely to the achievements against Al-Shabaab by including the Navy and Air Force. In addition, Ethiopia has reshipped Beledwyne and pushed to the central regions of Hiraan and Galgadud and into the Shabelle river valley further. Gedo, Juba and Kismayo were freed from the KDF while Mogadishu was forced out of Mogadishu. Coordinated effort has been reduced in the number of rebellion escapes from several areas of Somalia in Kenya, AMISOM, Ethiopia and Somalia.

2.3 Summary and Research Gap

The literature review reveals that the decision remains on the efficacy of the intergovernmental organizations' interventions in the internal relations of other sovereign nation-states, in particular on their position and their capacity and their ability to behave in the best interests of a country, rather than on their own. The role of regional organizations, which needs to be investigated, is also very critical.

A key factor in guaranteeing public approval for any action is ensuring that the people are aware of and appreciate the power's mandate. This fosters rational aspirations and lays the basis for mutual support. In Somalia, people have a broad understanding that the mission of AMISOM is to combat al-Shabaab, but it needs further effort to explain what it entails. The general public is still completely unaware of the other facets of the role and modus operandi of the Mission.

Therefore, building confidence among the warring parties is one of the major

pre-requisites for constructive conflict management by regional bodies (Brookings, 2015). It should be noted that confidence building is not an easy fete for mediators or peace negotiators. This is due to historical disagreements and other misconceptions that percolate into group identities.

Various empirical studies show that well-organized people to people meetings do provide opportunities for conflicting groups to examine root cause and explore mitigation mechanisms together, which leads to reduction in conflict management resolution constraints (Montville, 1990; Azar, 1990; Yilmaz, 2005). Yang, Ryan and Zhang (2013) contend that regional bodies experience various constrains in their quest to manage regional conflict. Some of these constraints include: the question of sovereignty, lack of political good-will, lack of institutional capacity and poor funding. Unfortunately, these studies are outdated and this therefore requires up to date studies in this area.

Mechanisms for the organization of operations with military, police and civil elements have not yet been established by AMISOM. AMISOM Lack of touch points means that each part is self-employed. The operation must be coordinated, unlike cog in the system case. Each nation that contributes troops operates separately. The Force Leader has very little or no contingent power since he only gets orders from his country of origin. Al Shabaab can leverage this void quickly. Therefore, the contribution of AMISOM to dispute settlement in Somalia needs to be studied.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The approaches used to provide answers to the research questions in the first chapter of this thesis were mentioned in the chapter. Study design, target population sampling technique, data collection tools, validity and reliability, data processing protocol, data analysis and ethical considerations were discussed.

3.2 Research Design

The research adopted descriptive research design. this design was suitable as it allowed data collection at one point and it allowed the researcher to assess the socio-demographic variables at the data collection point. Descriptive research design is a scientific method of investigation in which data is collected and analyzed to describe the current conditions, terms or relationships concerning the problem (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012). This type of approach was favored because encouraged respondents to have a comprehensive understanding of the role of intergovernmental organizations which included AMISOM in resolving internal conflict in Somalia.

3.3 Location of the Study

The research looked into the contribution of intergovernmental organizations, specifically AMISOM, in resolving the conflict in Somalia. The analysis took place at AMISOM's headquarters in Somalia, and included all parties interested in conflict resolution. The federal republic of Somalia is being studied because it is one of the Horn of Africa countries that has been embroiled in a prolonged intra-state conflict for the past three decades.

3.4 Target Population

A population in any sample, according to Cooper and Schindler (2014), is the total number of elements on which the researcher wishes to draw conclusions. All AU soldiers deployed under AMISOM with the mandate to ensure that internal strife in Somalia was efficiently managed, as well as all police officers and civilians participating in the process were used as target population. According to a report by Somalia's federal government, AMISOM has 20,000 African Union troops, 350 government officials, 1400 internally displaced persons, 350 religious' leaders, 250 clan members, 120 foreign organizations, and 500 business representatives. As a result, these figures make up the target population, which was 22, 620 people who were directly participating in Somalia's dispute resolution (federal government of Somalia Report, 2020).

Table 3. 1: Target Population

Population	Frequency	Percent (%)
AMISOM Soldiers	20,000	87.1
Government Officials	350	1.5
Internally displaced people	1400	6.1
Religious Leaders	350	1.5
Clan Elders	250	1.1
International Organizations	120	0.5
Business Community Rep.	500	2.2
Total	22,970	100

Source: Field data (2020)

3.5 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

3.5.1 Sampling Technique

To choose interviewees for the study, stratified random sampling was used. The main goal was to achieve the sample representation of the target population that was required. This method guaranteed a high level of representativeness (Sekaran & Bouge, 2013). As shown in table 3.1, the approach used to pick respondents from the strata representing all conflict management stakeholders in Somalia. Since stratified random sampling is cost-effective and provides reliable results, it was then used (Cooper & Schindler, 2016). AMISOM personnel were randomly sampled to participate as general respondents and filled out questionnaires. Representatives from faith leaders, clan members, international organizations, and business communities were purposively sampled. This sampling technique was suitable because it provided the researcher an opportunity to go for specific persons who had a central role in the management of internal conflicts and who from time to time interacted with the AMISOM leadership to review progress.

3.5.2 Sample size

According to Babbie (2016), a survey is a subset of a larger population that reflects the characteristics of the entire population. The accuracy of the results determines how generalized the population is and how accurately it describes the whole target population (Babbie, 2016). This study's sample size primarily consisted of AU soldiers under AMISOM, government officials, internally displaced persons, religious leaders, clan members and business representatives. This was because these groups had the most attractive populations. The sample size was then determined using Krejcie and Morgan (1970) population and equivalent sample size table, which is appropriate for studies with a target population of 10,000 or more.

For this particular study Krejcie and Morgan's table provide a sample size of 377 respondents a sample size of 22, 970. This was the number used in the study as sample size as shown in the Table 3.2.

Table 3. 2: Sample Size

Level	Population	Sample Size	Percent (%)
AU (AMISOM)	Soldiers 20,008	328	87.1
Government Officials	348	6	1.5
Internally Displaced People	1402	23	6.1
Religious Leaders	349	6	1.5
Clan Elders	250	4	1.1
International Organizations	120	2	0.5
Business Community Rep	493	8	2.2
Total	22,970	377	100

Source: Researcher (2020)

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

3.6.1 Questionnaire

Kothari (2014) describes the questionnaire as the strongest option, since it can gather detailed information over a very short period of time. It ensures the data source's secrecy through anonymity and standardization (Orodho 2000). The questionnaire was picked as a fitting tool for data collection for the reasons above.

The questionnaire comprised of open and closed ended questions. The open-ended questions were intended to invite the respondents to share their thoughts with regard to the question raised while the closed questions allowed for the generation of

statistical data that could allow for analysis. Section A of the questionnaire provided general characteristics; Section B provides information on causes of internal conflict; Section C provides information on the role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia; Section D provides information on challenges AMISOM face in in managing internal conflicts; Section E provides information on strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Respondents were required to go through the instructions for them to understand how to respond to the questions contained in the questionnaire. The researcher with the help of three research assistants administered the questionnaires to the respondents, who had the option of filling in and returning them on the spot or mailing them back in cases where they couldn't respond immediately for data analysis.

3.6.2 Pre-Testing of Research Instruments

The research instrument will be structured in accordance with the research questions. The drafted research instrument will be pre-tested for the questions included before it is distributed to respondents. Those who do not participate in the analysis are subjected to a 5% pre-test. The number of respondents from the same place ($5/100 \times 377 = 19$) would assist in the identification of design flaws. According to Copper & Schindler, a few of the respondents will be pre-tested to determine the device's accuracy (2010).

3.6.3 Instrument Validity

Validity refers to the test instrument's accuracy in relation to the Kothari testing findings (2014). It refers to the extent to which research results are extracted from existing documents. To ensure authenticity, the researcher followed generally accepted sampling protocols and employ suitable data management techniques. To ensure its validity, the research instrument was subjected to appropriate modifications

to ensure that everybody agrees on the results. This implied that the research tool followed a logical structure, with only the right answers provided.

3.6.4. Instrument Reliability

Chen (2014) defines reliability as a measure of the degree to which a measuring instrument produces consistent results after repeated experiments. Before the field trial, data collection instruments were pre-tested in a small sample to ensure their soundness and accuracy. For the final survey process, necessary adjustments were made to ensure greater data reliability. Only actual study participants received questionnaires. The same questionnaires were sent to the same people a week later to establish whether the responses from the two pilots were consistent. The computed outcomes gave a reliability score of 0.82 which was considered great in line with Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) recommendation of 0.7 and above.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data analysis is a method of storing, modeling, and transforming data in order to obtain useful information. Data evaluation is important because it promotes decision-making. This necessitates the careful preparation of raw data into interpretable designs (Chen, 2014). Since this was a descriptive study, data collected in nature was also descriptive. Descriptive statistical methods were used to ensure that vast quantities of numerical data obtained were well interpreted.

Completed and returned questionnaires were checked for completeness and accuracy a day before storage at the end of field data collection. The details from the questionnaire and any additional information were coded and grouped together. The coding took into account all aspects of the questionnaire. The data from the completed questionnaires was cleaned up, recoded, and entered into SPSS version 26 for quantitative analysis through both descriptive and inferential statistics, specifically

regression analysis that helped in testing the hypothesis. The output was then presented in the form of tables and charts. Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis and presented in the form of narratives.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

The researcher sought for permission from the relevant authorities before collecting data in the areas of jurisdiction. Since the study covered several relevant and private concerns, the researcher also asked prospective participants for their permission. Individual participants were treated with the utmost regard and privacy for any information they provided for this analysis. The names or identifications of the respondents were kept secret, and the information gathered from them was kept in strict confidence. The researcher correctly attributed sources of information in order to classify the work of previous scholars.

The respondents were assured of the privacy of the information given before carrying out the study to enhance response giving. Anonymity was ensured by not including spaces where one could write their name on the questionnaire. The researcher ensured that the respondents were reminded not to include their personal details which could identify them.

The respondents were also made aware of the fact that there were no direct monetary benefits from the study. However, the study hopes to enlighten the stakeholders on the causes of conflict, how intergovernmental organizations are helping to resolve conflict in Somalia and the challenges experienced in conflict management. This encouraged the implementation of various mitigation strategies for example conflict assessment and preventive measures

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents research findings on examine the contribution of intergovernmental organizations on internal conflict management in Somalia. These findings were organized according to study objectives. Section one of the research presentation covered the demographic characteristics o the respondent which included gender, highest academic qualification, age and length of service. Section two of the findings covered results on the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia, section three of the study findings covered results on the role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia; section four of the study findings covered results on the challenges faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflict in Somalia and section five of the research findings covered results on the strategies AMISOM uses managing internal conflicts in Somalia.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The section encompasses the research findings of the demographic characteristics of the study respondents as provided by the study. These characteristics included sex, highest academic qualification, age and length of service.

4.2.1 Response Rate

Out of a sample size of 377 respondents who participated in the study, 350 of them were issued with questionnaires. The remaining 27 took part in scheduled interviews that were conducted by the researcher. Out of the 350 distributed questionnaires to the respondents for data collection, only 301 of them were dully filled and returned for analysis 49 of the respondents did not return the questionnaires.

Response rate in this part was as presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4. 1: Response Rate

Responses	Frequency	Percent (%)
Returned questionnaires	301	86.0
Not returned	49	14.0
Total	350	100

Source: Researcher (2021)

From the study results as presented in table 4.1, it apparent that the number of duly filled and returned questionnaires for analysis accounted for 86.0% response rate. These responses rate was enough for the conduct of this study as supported by Mugenda and Mugenda (2009) who argues that a response rate of 60% is good enough for a study. Thus, an 86% response rate was considered excellent for this particular study.

4.2.2 Gender of Respondent

This part required respondents to indicate their gender. This was in the presumption that variations in gender had an influence on the outcome of the study. The findings of the section were as presented in figure 4.1

From the findings as demonstrated in figure 4.1, out of the 301 respondents who took part in this study, 55.8% of them were male, 44.2% were female. The study did not interview any transgender as none indicated they belonged to that category. From the findings of this study, it is apparent that the study was balanced as the number of male participants were only 35 more than that of women meaning women were also recognized in the society when it comes conflict resolution.




Figure 4. 1: Gender of Respondent

Source: Researcher (2021)

4.2.3 Highest Academic Qualification

The study sought to find out the highest academic qualification of respondent. This was in the presumption that that having qualified academically is a measure one's skills as well as competencies person possess and which enable them to perform their work diligently. The outcome of academic qualification is as presented in figure 4.2.

From the research findings as presented in figure 4.2, it was apparent that majority of the respondents had secondary level of education with (35.5%). Those with diploma level of education had (32.6%), undergraduate level of education was next with 21.6%, post graduate degree had 8.0% and lastly primary which had 2.3%. from the findings in this section, it apparent that majority of the respondents had diploma level of education with more than 60% of the total respondents, an indication that AMISOM has people who are educated and ingredient for conflict management.




Figure 4. 2: Highest Academic Qualification

Source: Researcher (2021)

4.2.4 Age of Respondent

The researcher in this section sought to determine the age of respondents who took part in this study. This was in presumption that age exposes one to enhanced knowledge over a period of time lived. The finding of this part is as presented in figure 4.3.

From the research findings, as shown in figure 4.2, majority of the respondents who took part in the study were between 26 and 35 years old with (34.2%), this was followed by those with 36-45 years of age with 31.6%, those with 46-55 years old had (15.0%), 18-25 years of age had (11.6%) and lastly above 56 years of age had (7.6%). From these findings, it is apparent that majority of those who participated in conflict management by AMISOM in Somalia had 45 years and below representing more than 80% of the total respondents an indication that those managing conflicts in Somalia were active and energetic people who have the energy to handle conflicts in the country.




Figure 4. 3: Age of Respondent

Source: Researcher (2021)

4.2.5 Duration Worked

The study required respondents to ascertain the period they have been in their current positions within AMISOM. This was important as duration worked reflects the amount of information one has gathered in terms of conflict management. The findings of the section are as presented in figure 4.4.

From study findings, results on period worked current position under AMISOM as presented in figure 4.4 indicates majority of the respondents had been in their current position for less than a year with (28.3%), this was closely followed by those who been there for 1-2 years who had (24.3%), 3-4 years had 20.3%, 5-6 years had 13.5%. From these findings, it is apparent that majority of AMISOM participants on conflict management in Somalia had been there for 4 years and below representing more than 70% of the total respondents an indication that AMISOM soldiers in Somalia do not stay for long, hence there is regular exchange of soldiers to allow efficiency.




Figure 4. 4: Duration Worked

Source: researcher (2021)

4.3 Descriptive Results

This part comprises a presentation of findings as per the specific objectives of the study. These include: identifying the causes of internal conflicts, examining the role AMISOM play, determining the challenges faced by AMISOM and assessing the strategies AMISOM uses in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study findings are as presented in the following subsections.

4.3.1 Causes of Internal Conflicts in Somalia

In this part, respondents were required to identify the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. According to Angerbran (2017), internal conflict is a struggle which occurs in people's minds and can be character views held by people internally. The dilemma posed by internal conflict is reflected in the ethical or emotional question, and these include people's character hesitation such as those experienced in Somalia. Specifically, the study focused on five causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. Results were rated using a scale of 5-1 where 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree. Respondents to place an x in the box

that best described the causes of conflicts. Results were presented as shown in table 4.2

Table 4. 2: Causes of Internal Conflicts

Causes of Internal Conflicts in Somalia	SA		A		N		D		SD		Me	Std.	(N)
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	an	Dev.	
Existence of security threats in Somali	116	38.5	97	32.2	49	16.3	30	10.0	9	3.0	1.74	1.83	301
Unstable political institutions	121	40.2	99	32.9	46	15.3	31	10.3	4	1.3	1.26	0.44	301
There are unstable government structures	114	37.9	105	34.9	39	13.0	41	13.6	6	2.0	2.75	1.85	301
Somalia government has broken social contract with her citizens	109	36.2	119	39.5	42	14.0	31	10.3	0	0	2.82	1.51	301
Any other comment	112	37.2	115	38.2	36	12.0	23	7.6	15	5.0	2.92	1.35	301
Aggregate Score											2.30	1.39	301

Source: Researcher (2021).

The findings as presented in table 4.2 indicate means of 1.26-2.92 and a standard deviation of 0.438= 1.846 registered. Generally, the research findings reveal that majority of those interviewed were in agreement with statements on causes of internal conflicts in Somalia as shown by means of 2.30 and standard deviation of 1.396.

Specifically, results of the study reveal that internal conflict in Somalia is caused by unstable political institutions with a mean of 1.26 and a standard deviation of 0.438; there is continuous security threats in Somalia with a mean 1.74 and a standard deviation of 1.831; there are unstable government structures in Somalia with a mean of 2.75 and a standard deviation of 1.846; Somalia government has broken social contract with her citizens with a mean of 2.82 and a standard deviation of 1.512; and those who had other reasons other the ones captured by the research tool had a mean of 2.92 and a standard deviation of 1.352. From the results as presented in table 4.2, it is apparent that conflict in Somalia is caused by diverse factors which include unstable government, poor governance structures as well as broken social contracts between the people and the government to mention but a few.

From those interviewed on whether there were causes of internal conflicts in Somali; majority of them 20 of the interviewees agreed that that were causes of internal conflicts. They agreed that due the existence of unstable transition government, there is no clear policies as well as rules and regulations governing the country. This has resulted to communities scrambling for resources, hence leading to conflicts are currently experienced in the country. Less than half of those interviewed felt that the conflicts experiences in Somalia were externally motivated. They felt that some countries have interests in natural resources such as oil reserves has made international investors collaborate with some communities and corrida with others. This has resulted into a divided the country. In support of this, one of the interviewees said,

I have a feeling that the conflicts experienced in Somalia have been motivated externally. In this case, some countries having interests in natural resources such as oil reserves has fueled the conflicts between the communities so as to take advantage and exploit the existing natural resources (Source: Interviewee 1).

Moreover, out those interviewed on the causes responsible for the internal conflicts in Somalia. 23 of them agreed that there were causes behind the internal conflict being experienced in the country. They to enumerated some of these causes as unstable political institutions, unstable government structures, threats from foreign states, breakdown of social contracts, unstable government structures. Five of the interviewees again mention the scramble for resources among communities in the country as some of the forces responsible for internal conflicts. In addition, one of the interviewees supported the above findings by saying:

The causes responsible for the internal conflicts in Somalia include unstable government structures, unstable political institutions, failure to enforce the law, threats from foreign states, unstable government structures and the scramble for resources among communities in the country (Source: Interviewee 15).

4.3.2 Role AMISOM Play in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

In this part, respondents were required to examine role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. According to AU communique (2007), AMISOM was deployed by AU as a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, with UN endorsement. The first six months of its tenure were defined by the PSC of the AU on 19 January 2007. AMISOM was tasked in performing PSOs in Somalia and stabilizing the situation in the region. The goal of the mission was to promote consultation, conciliation and protect key resources through the work of all relevant stakeholders. Specifically, the study focused on six roles of AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Results were rated using a scale of 5-1 where 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree. Respondents to place an x in the box that best described the causes of conflicts. Results were presented as shown in table 4.3.

Table 4. 3: Role AMISOM Play in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

Role AMISON Play in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia	SA		A		N		D		SD		Mean	Std. Dev.	(N)
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Train the Somali security forces	120	39.9	95	31.6	34	11.3	42	14.0	10	3.3	2.60	1.366	301
Delivery of humanitarian aid	125	41.5	99	32.9	32	10.6	39	13.0	6	2.0	1.98	1.208	301
Assist in implementing a national security plan	103	34.2	88	29.3	29	9.6	41	13.6	40	13.3	2.81	1.835	301
Supporting transitional governmental structures	131	43.5	97	32.2	25	8.3	32	10.6	16	5.3	2.83	1.327	301
Building Capacity	135	44.9	89	29.6	33	11.0	38	12.6	6	2.0	2.62	1.367	301
Any other comment	114	37.9	79	26.2	49	16.3	46	15.3	13	4.3	1.60	0.812	301
Aggregate Score											2.41	1.319	301

Source: Researcher (2021).

The findings as presented in table 4.3 indicate means of 1.60-2.83 and a standard deviation of 0.812 - 1.835 registered. Generally, the research findings reveal that majority of those interviewed were in agreement with statements on role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia as shown by means of 2.41 and standard deviation of 1.319.

Specifically, results of the study reveal that there were other roles AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia other than the ones covered by this part with a mean of 1.60 and a standard deviation of 0.812 registered; delivery of humanitarian aid was another role with a mean 1.98 and a standard deviation of 1.208 registered; training of Somalia security forces had a mean of 2.60 and a standard deviation of 1.366 registered; building capacity had a mean of 2.62 and a standard deviation of 1.367 registered; assist in implementing a national security plan had a mean of 2.81 and a standard deviation of 1.385 registered and supporting transitional governmental structures had a mean of 2.83 and a standard deviation of 1.327 registered.

From the results as presented in table 4.3, it can be concluded that the role AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia are many and range from delivering humanitarian aid, training of Somalia security forces, building capacity of Somalia government as well as assist in implementing a national security plan

From those interviewed on whether AMISOM had a role to play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Majority of them 22 agreed that AMISOM had played a big role in managing internal conflicts in the country. Interviews agreed that due to the existence of unstable government structures, unstable political policies, the country was prone to internal as well as external interest from greed individuals both internal and external to loot its natural resources. AMISOM came in in handy to ensure that the country's resources are protected from such characters. In support of the above assertions, one of the interviewees said,

AMISOM have been playing a major role in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. On top of helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out of much of southern Somalia including most major towns and cities, AMISOM have been helping build the

capacity of Somalia's security institutions to be in a position to prevent and resolve the internal conflicts in Somalia (Source: Interviewee 9).

In addition, another interviewee said

AMISOM helped in making sure that the natural resources in the country are protected from being exploited by greedy politicians since Somalia did not have stable government structures, stable political policies making the natural resources susceptible to looting (Source: Interviewee 7).

Further, majority of the interviewees again said that AMISOM has played a big role in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The interviewees that these roles included protection from greed individuals ready to loot the country's resources such as oil and charcoal business. 12 of the interviewees mentioned humanitarian aid as one of the roles AMISOM has performed; where food rations as well as other basic necessities have been equally distributed to all the Somalia people in need these commodities. 13 of the interviewees identified training of the transition government of Somalia's security personnel. This was to enable them have the necessary skills and knowledge of protecting the country's resources in the absence of AMISOM security forces. In support of this, one of the interviewees said,

The role that AMISOM have played in managing internal conflicts in Somalia are not limited to conducting humanitarian activities, providing security to enable Somalia's political process and efforts at reconciliation, helping the Somali security personal maintain peace in the country and also preparing the Somali security forces for gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to them (Source: Interviewee 6).

4.3.3 Challenges Faced by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflict in Somalia

In this part, respondents were required to find out the challenges faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Specifically, the study focused on six challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia by looking at Conflict of Legitimate Government, resource constraints, Weakness of AU Political Leadership, Challenging Nature of Al-Shabaab, Lack of Exit Strategy and

some other challenges not included in this section. Results were rated using a scale of 5-1 where 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree. Results were presented as shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4. 4: Challenges Faced by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflict in Somalia

<i>Challenges Faced by AMISON in Managing Internal Conflict in Somalia.</i>	SA		A		N		D		SD		Me	Std. Dev	(N)
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Conflict with Legitimate Government	97	32.2	116	38.5	41	13.6	37	12.3	10	3.3	1.91	1.035	301
Resources Constraints	127	42.2	103	34.2	32	10.6	35	11.6	4	1.3	1.89	1.128	301
Weakness of AU Political Leadership	121	40.2	99	32.9	39	13.0	42	14.0	0	0	2.61	1.122	301
Challenging Nature of Al-Shabaab	132	43.9	87	28.9	30	10.0	42	14.0	10	3.3	2.20	1.327	301
Lack of Exit Strategy	119	39.5	101	33.6	35	11.6	37	12.3	9	3.0	3.10	1.447	
Any other comment	109	36.2	97	32.2	42	14.0	40	13.3	13	4.3	1.91	1.035	301
Aggregate Score											2.27	1.213	301

Source: Researcher (2021)

The findings as presented in table 4.4 indicate means of 1.89-3.10 and a standard deviation of 1.035 - 1.447 registered. Generally, the research findings reveal that majority of those interviewed respondents were in agreement with statements on the Challenges Faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia as shown by means of 2.27 and standard deviation of 1.213.

Specifically, results of the study reveal that there were resource constraints which had a mean of 1.89 and a standard deviation of 1.128 registered; there were other challenges faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia other than the ones covered by this part with a mean of 1.91 and a standard deviation of 1.035 registered; there was also conflict with legitimate government which had a mean 1.91 and a standard deviation of 1.035 registered; challenging nature of Al-Shabaab which had a mean of 2.20 and a standard deviation of 1.327 registered; weakness of AU political leadership had a mean of 2.61 and a standard deviation of 1.122 registered; lack of exit strategy which had a mean of 3.10 and a standard deviation of 1.447 registered.

From the results as presented in table 4.4, it is apparent that there were challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study identified conflict with legitimate government, resource constraints, weaknesses of au political leadership, challenging nature of Al Shabab as well as lack of exit strategy were some of the challenges AMISOM faced in managing internal conflicts in Somalia.

Those interviewed on whether there were challenges AMISOM face when carrying out their duties in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Majority of them 17 of them said that there were challenges that hinder AMISOM from effectively managing internal conflicts in Somalia. They agreed that some of these challenges encountered were both internal as well as external. These have held back AMISOM when it comes to effecting their mandate. These included lack of clear government policies, political good will as well as social understanding of each other. The remaining interviewees said that as far as they were concerned, there were no

challenges that meant to restrain AMISOM from carrying their mandate of managing internal conflicts in Somalia. In support of this, one of the interviewees said

There are many challenges that AMISOM have faced when carrying out their duties in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These include failure by Somalia's federal and regional leaders to implement a decisive strategy prioritizing on defeating al-Shabaab, lack of unified command, lack of a reliable local partner with which to wage a counter- insurgency campaign and inadequate funding (Source: Interviewee 7).

On whether they were aware of the challenges AMISON face in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Majority of the interviewees felt that there was a conflict of legitimate government as there were more than one faction claiming legitimacy in the country. They also identified resource constraint as another challenge as concerned governments were only willing to offer human security minus financial as well as equipment. Another group of interviewees said the au political leadership was weak which provided poor leadership which trickled down to AMISOM's way of doing things in the country. The threat of Al- Shabaab was again not left behind as ten of the interviewees again attested that Al- Shabaab is another group which works against the existence of AMISON in the country. Almost all interviewees said that AMISOM in Somalia had a challenge of lack of exit strategy as existing policies has no provision on how to exit after completion of their mission. In support of the above assertions, one of the interviewees said,

I am aware that of the challenges AMISON face in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. AMISOM have lacked an exit strategy, the financial resources to continue with the mission have been diminishing and the political leadership has been weak and this have hampered the efforts of AMISOM to manage internal conflicts (Source: Interviewee 2).

4.3.4 Strategies Adopted by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

In this part, respondents were required to examine the strategies adopted by

AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Specifically, the study focused on five strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These include military formations, having in place cultural intelligence, putting in place organizational hybridity and organizing counter offensive and defensive measures plus many other strategies not covered by the study. Results were rated using a scale of 5-1 where 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree. Respondents to place an x in the box that best described the causes of conflicts. Results were presented as shown in table 4.5.

Table 4. 5: Strategies Adopted by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

Strategies Adopted by AMISOM in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia	SA		A		N		D		SD		Me an	Std. Dev	(N)
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Military formations	117	38.9	91	30.2	41	13.6	30	10.0	22	7.3	1.50	0.764	301
Cultural intelligence	103	34.2	99	33.0	45	15.0	27	9.0	27	9.0	1.33	1.375	301
Organizational hybridity	96	32.0	107	35.5	43	14.3	33	11.0	22	7.3	1.83	0.899	301
Counter offensive and defensive measures	121	40.2	101	33.6	32	10.6	28	9.3	19	6.3	2.50	0.928	301
Any other comment	109	36.2	95	31.6	39	13.0	34	11.2	24	8.0	2.84	1.464	301
Aggregate Score											2.00	1.086	301

Source: Researcher (2021)

The findings as presented in table 4.5 indicate means of 1.33 - 2.84 and a standard deviation of 0.764 - 1.464 registered. Generally, the research findings reveal that majority of those interviewed were in agreement with statements on strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. as shown by means of 2.00 and standard deviation of 1.086.

Specifically, results of the study reveal that cultural intelligence had a mean of 1.33 and a standard deviation of 1.375 registered; military formations was another strategy meant to manage internal conflicts in Somalia with a mean of 1.50 and a standard deviation of 0.764 registered; organizational hybridity was another strategy with a mean 1.83 and a standard deviation of 1.899 registered; counter offensive and defensive measures had a mean of 2.50 and a standard deviation of 0.928 registered; some other strategies other than the ones captured in this section were mentioned and had a mean of 2.84 and a standard deviation of 1.464 registered.

From these findings as presented in table 4.5, it is apparent that there were strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. And these include military formations, cultural intelligence, organizational hybridity as well as counter offensive and defensive measures to mention but a few.

From the interviewees that were conducted to identify strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Majority of them said that AMISOM has adopted strategies to enable them manage internal conflicts in Somalia. Interviewees felt that AMISOM adopted strategies has helped bring together conflicting communities in the country. This in turn is witnessing a turn in earlier events where communities were scrambling for resources as a result of unstructured government, with no clear policies on resource allocation.

In support of the above arguments, one of the interviewees said

There are various strategies that AMISOM have adopted in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These include community capacity building on conflict management, facilitating access for humanitarian relief, strengthening community cohesion, strengthening political institutions in the country and establishing internal peace building frameworks (Source: Interviewee 16).

In addition, another interviewee added,

In a bid to manage internal conflicts in Somalia, some of the strategies AMISOM have adopted include training Somali security forces on conflict

resolution approaches, facilitating mediation between conflicting communities and initiating state building Initiatives (Source: Interviewee 11)

Majority of the interviewees who responded to existence of measures that improves management of internal conflicts in Somalia enumerated them as having local military formation by Somalia people and for Somalia was one of the strategies that will help restore a working Somalia government. They said AMISOM has also come up with organizational hybridity among its structures which ensures that there is equal representation.

In support of the above arguments, one of the interviewees said

There is existence of measures that improves management of internal conflicts in Somalia including training of locals in cultural intelligence by AMISOM, training counter offensive tactics to Somalia security personnel so as protect their government from possible external attacks, unifying the command-and-control mechanisms of AMISOM to ensure the troops to act in a unified manner and strengthening the Federal Government of Somalia ((Source: Interviewee 8).

4.3.5 Regression Analysis

This section conducted multiple regression analysis which was used to model the relationship between causes, role AMISON play, challenges faced by AMISON and strategies AMISON use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia.

The coefficients of determination (R) and its correlation coefficient (R²) demonstrate the degree of association between contribution of intergovernmental organizations and internal conflict management as presented in table 4.6.

Table 4. 6: Regression Analysis

Model	R.	R Square	Adjusted R. Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.982	.964	.961	.166

Source: Researcher (2021)

The study findings indicated a positive relationship ($r = 0.982$) between the variables. From these findings, it is apparent that at 95% confidence level, the variables produced statistically significant values and can therefore be relied upon to explain internal conflict management.

4.3.6 ANOVA Test

For the study to examine the contribution of intergovernmental organizations on internal conflict management in Somalia, an ANNOVA test was conducted. These involved the independent variables causes, role AMISOM play, challenges faced by AMISOM and strategies adopted by AMISON in relation to internal conflict management in Somalia.

Table 4. 7: ANOVA Test

Model Sig.		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean of Squares	F.
	Regression	175.249	5	35.050	146.398
.000	Residual	0.000	295	.27	
	Total	175.249	300		

a) Dependent variable internal conflict management

b) (predictor (constant); causes of internal conflict, role AMISOM play, challenges facing AMISOM and strategies adopted by AMISOM and their contribution in internal conflict management in Somalia. As per the information as presented in table 4.7, distribution of data was given as $f(5,295) = 146.398$; where $P = 0.000$. this means that there was a significant relation between the four objectives of the study and the dependent variable.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter presents a summary of the findings, discusses and provides conclusions as well as recommendations of the contribution of intergovernmental organizations in conflict management in Somalia based on AMISOM operations in Somalia.

5.2 Summary of Major Findings

The general objective of the study was to examine the influence of intergovernmental organizations in conflict management based on AMISOM operations in Somalia. The study found out that the study was balanced as the number of male participants were only 35 more than that of women meaning women were also recognized in the society when it comes conflict resolution. On highest academic qualification, majority of the respondents had diploma level of education with more than 60% of the total respondents, an indication that AMISOM has people who are

educated which is an ingredient for conflict management.

On the age of the respondent, majority of those who participated in conflict management by AMISOM in Somalia had 45 years and below representing more than 80% of the total respondents. This was an indication that those managing conflicts in Somalia were active and energetic people who can handle conflicts energetically. On duration worked with AMISOM, majority of AMISOM members managing conflict in Somalia had been there for 4 years and below representing more than 70% of the total respondents. This is an indication that AMISOM soldiers in Somalia do not stay for long, hence there is regular exchange of soldiers to allow efficiency.

Concerning results of objectives of the study, the general objective was to examine the contribution of intergovernmental organizations in conflict management an examination of AMISOM operations in Somalia. The study generally found out that all the study variable had a significant relationship between operations of AMISOM and conflict management in Somalia.

Specifically, the first objective was to identify the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. The study generally reveals that majority of the respondents were in agreement with on causes of internal conflicts in Somalia with a mean of 2.30 and a standard deviation of 1.396 registered. Specifically, the study identified the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. The findings indicate that existence of security threats, unstable political institutions, unstable government structures, broken social contract by Somalia government were some of the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia with means of 1.26 and standard deviation of 0.438 to 2.92 and standard deviation of 1.352 registered.

The second objective was to examine the role AMISOM play in managing

internal conflicts in Somalia. Generally, the study found out that AMISOM had a role to play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. With a mean of 2.41 and a standard deviation of 1.319 registered. Specifically, the study assessed training of Somalia security forces, delivery of humanitarian aid, implementation of national security plan, supporting transitional government, building capacity of the Somalia security as some of the roles AMISOM play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia with means of between 1.60 and standard deviation of 0.812 to 2,83 and standard deviation of 1.327 registered.

The third objective was to determine the challenges faced by AMISON in managing internal conflict in Somalia. Generally, the research findings reveal that majority of those interviewed respondents were in agreement with statements on the challenges faced by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia as shown by means of 2.27 and standard deviation of 1. 213.. Specifically, the study found out that there were challenges facing AMISOM in managing conflicts in Somalia. The study identified conflict with legitimate government, resource constraints, weaknesses of au political leadership, challenging nature of Al Shabab as well as lack of exit strategy were some of the challenges AMISOM faced in managing internal conflicts in Somalia with means of between 1,89 and standard deviation of 1.128 to 3.10 and standard deviation of 1,447 registered.

The fourth objective was to assess the strategies AMISOM use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Generally, the study found out that AMISOM had adopted strategies for managing internal conflicts in Somalia with a mean of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.086 registered. Specifically, the study identified military formations, cultural intelligence, organizational hybridity, counter offensive as some of the strategies adopted to manage internal conflicts in Somalia with means of

between 1,33 and standard deviation of 1.375 to 2.84 and standard deviation of 1.464 registered.

5.3 Discussion of Research Findings

5.3.1 Causes of Internal Conflicts

The 1st objective was to identify the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. The study found out that there were causes of internal conflicts in Somalia. These included existence of security threats, unstable political institutions, unstable government structures, broken social contract by Somalia government to mention but a few. These findings agree with research by Hoeffler (2012) who posit that threats that are known as conflicts are normally known to be as a result of a combination of some reasons which include political as well as institutional factors such as weak state institutions, elite power struggles as well as political exclusion. He goes on to see a breakdown of the social; contract and corruption plus political identity as causes of internal conflicts.

The findings also concur with that of Hannah (2012) who feels that there is the issue of resource sharing as well as other environmental factors which include greed, scarcity of national resources as a result of population growth leading to environmental insecurity, the unjust resource exploitation is also another cause plus the issue of socio-economic factors which includes inequality, exclusion as well as marginalization and the absence of social cohesion and not forgetting poverty levels.

This outcome is also in agreement with the findings of Aning and Atta-Asamoah (2014) who agrees that the political institutions within countries that cannot peacefully handle various party interests so as to effectively ensure the security of the same group, as well as to satisfy their increasing demands, including political

participation, this contributes to internal conflicts. Countries are realistic about the risks of fostering democratization in the unsuitable circumstances because if the advent of mass electoral politics already struggles to create political institutions, the likelihood of violence would increase.

The study again concurs with a study by Luiala (2014) who argues that the breakdown of social contract as well as corruption within a country is known to be good promoters of internal conflicts. The outbreak of military for instance has been caused by the failure of institutions as well as organizations by countries so that there is no violation of the social contract especially in African countries. Luiala goes to state that states that are managed well makes fundamental as this dictates the extent to which internal conflicts can or cannot occur.

The study conducted an interview on the causes of internal conflicts in Somalia where it was found out that there were causes of internal conflicts in Somali, as majority of the interviewees agreed to the existence of causes of internal conflicts. They agreed that due the existence of unstable transition government, there is no clear policies as well as rules and regulations governing the country. This has resulted to communities scrambling for resources, hence leading to conflicts are currently experienced in the country. Less than half of those interviewed felt that the conflicts experiences in Somalia were externally motivated. The study also found out that some countries have interests in natural resources which include oil as well as charcoal business which has made international investors collaborate with some communities as well as differ with others. These results are in line with a study by Hoeffler (2012) who posit those threats which are also known as conflicts are normally known to be as a result of a combination of some reasons which include political as well as

institutional factors such as weak state institutions, elite power struggles as well as political exclusion. There is also the breakdown in social; contract and corruption and not forgetting political identity.

The study again found out that Interviewees were again aware of some of the forces which were responsible for the internal conflicts in Somalia. They all agreed that there were forces which were behind the internal conflict experienced in the country. These forces were unstable political institutions, unstable government structures, threats from foreign states, breakdown of social contracts, unstable government structures. A few of them mentioned the scramble for resources among communities in the country as some of the forces responsible for internal conflicts. These findings are also in line with a study by Hannah (2012) who posit that there is also the issue of resource as well as environmental factors which included includes greed, scarcity of national resources as a result of population growth which leads to environmental insecurity, which also includes unjust resource exploitation. There is also the issue of socio-economic factors such as inequality, exclusion as well as marginalization plus the absence of social cohesion and not forgetting poverty levels.

5.3.2 Role AMISOM Play in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

The 2nd objective was to examine the role AMISON play in managing internal conflict in Somalia. The study found out that AMISOM played a big role in managing conflicts in Somalia. AMISOM was engaged in such roles as training of Somalia security forces, delivery of humanitarian aid, implementation of national security plan, supporting transitional government, building capacity of the Somalia security. these findings concur with that of au communique (2007) who agrees that AMISOM was deployed by AU as a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, with UN endorsement. to

establish conditions for humanitarian operations and for the UN to take over immediately, it was tasked with performing PSOs in Somalia and stabilizing the situation in the region. The goal of the mission was to promote consultation, conciliation and protect key resources and TFIs through the work of all relevant stakeholders. The mission also sought to help Somalia enforce its NSSP, provide security and aid.

These findings are again in tandem with a study by Nduwimana (2013) who argues that AMISOM was never a conventional activity for peacekeeping. Rather, it was mandated to provide a combination of the security and compliance of government officials and agencies from antigovernment actors, primarily al-Shabaab. The police portion of the mission was meant to assist the Somali Police Force to educate, mentor, and provide guidance, even though the Established Police Units of AMISOM have an additional role in regulating the public order. The mission was also commissioned to promote assistance and civil-military operations.

This was also in agreement with the findings of London (2017) who posit that ensuring that the public knows and understands the mission of the AMISON powers was a key factor in ensuring that any action was accompanied by public assistance. This encouraged reasonable aspirations and provides the basis for receiving the approval of society. While in Somalia people were generally aware that the mandate of AMISOM was to tackle Al-Shabaab, in addition, the public awareness about the other part of the mandate and way of doing the task.

The study was also in agreement with a study by Harane (2012) who argues that AMISOM recruits, equips and reforms the Somali National Army and the police in order to assume responsibility for the provision of protection from the AMISOM

army. They ensure that ample participation of security services, international human rights and humanitarian law training for all powers and the development of proper accountable structures for them was fundamental.

From the findings on whether AMISOM had a role to play in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. It was found out that they had had played a big role in managing internal conflicts in the country. It was found out that due to the existence of unstable government structures, unstable political policies, Somalia as a country was prone to internal as well as external interest from greed individuals to loot its resources. AMISOM came in in handy to ensure that the country's resources are protected from such characters. These findings are in agreement with a study by Assis (2012) who posit that the settlement of conflict is to address peaceful cohabitation in general. The dispute parties pledge to support one another and to be able to cooperate with the laws that control each other, not only in the sense of an end to aggression and the war but also, as written by Wallenstein. However, once a disagreement is settled, we enter an instance of harmony by resolving the root factors of the potential coexistence of the various parties engaged in the dispute.

The study also found out that AMISOM has played a big role in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These roles included protection from greed individuals ready to loot existing resources such as oil fields and charcoal business. The study also found out that humanitarian aid is one of the roles AMISOM has performed; where food rations as well as other basic necessities have been equally distributed to all the Somalia people. It was also found out that training of the transition government of Somalia's security personnel has enabled the country's security have the necessary skills and knowledge of protecting the its resources in the absence of AMISOM

security forces.

These findings are in tandem with a study by Nduwimana (2013) who agrees that AMISOM security function was never a conventional activity for peacekeeping. Rather, its mandated duties were to provide a combination of the security and compliance of government officials and agencies from antigovernment actors, primarily al-Shabaab. The police portion of the mission shall assist the Somali Police Force to educate, mentor, and provide guidance, even though the Established Police Units of AMISOM have an additional role in regulating the public order. The mission is also commissioned to promote assistance and civil-military operations.

From those interviewed, the study found that AMISOM has played a big role in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. Those roles included protection from greed individuals ready to loot the country's resources such as oil and charcoal business. AMISOM also provided humanitarian aid through distribution of food rations as well as other basic necessities equally to all the Somalia people who are in need. They also identified training of the transition government of Somalia's security personnel. This is to enable them have the necessary skills and knowledge of protecting the country's resources in the absence of AMISOM security forces

5.3.3 Challenges Faced by AMISON in Managing Internal Conflict in Somalia

The third objective was to determine the challenges faced by AMISON in managing internal conflict in Somalia. The study found out that. there were challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study identified conflict with legitimate government, resource constraints, weaknesses of au political leadership, challenging nature of Al Shabab as well as lack of exit strategy as some of the challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. these

findings are in tandem with a study by Amadi (2014) who feels that the task of seeking legal authority in the country at each point of the war in Somalia was the key challenge of reconciliation for peace. The lack of a constitutional government weakened Somalia's peace efforts.

These findings again agree with the findings of Frazer (2012) who posit that AMISOM faced a huge obstacle with the proximity to influence and wealth that became a big motivation for the clan. In addition to these the country's desirability and existence are contested. The central government's intervention in its affairs was assumed and nomadic by many Somalis, an idea that created by the encounter with the dictatorship of Barre. The key clans advocate a federal government structure that will autonomously administer various regions of the state and thus permit control over a State region.

These findings also agree with a study by Tres (2014) who states that apart from the AU troops, most of the Somalia National Army is mainly an alliance clan militia united only by their rivalry against Al-Shabaab. There have been cases of infighting between the government troops. Due to the strong clan militia tension in Somalia, it has been very difficult for the whole clans to unite under one umbrella as to provide sufficient assistance to AMISOM. The clan rivalry has been a dire challenge to AMISOM in deploying troops outside Mogadishu.

The findings again concur with that of Obinwa (2015) who argues that AMISOM faces a major problem in terms of its mandated duties and its resource restrictions and capabilities. These limits on capital existed in different dimensions. The number of soldiers on the field and allowed numbers were enormously split. In less hostile areas Somalia needs between five and ten troops every 1,000 civilians in

terms of the number of soldiers required for a secure operation, while in hostile areas it takes 20 soldiers for every 1,000 people. It is estimated that the total population of Somalia is about nine million, suggesting that for the country's different security circumstances, a total of 100,000 intervention troops is needed.

From the interviews conducted on whether there were challenges which AMISOM face when carrying on their duties to manage internal conflicts in Somalia. From the discussions it was found out that there were challenges which hinder AMISOM from effectively managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These findings concur with a study by Frazer (2012) which posit that AMISOM face a huge obstacle with the proximity to influence wealth distribution that is a big motivation for concerned clans within the region and in addition to these, Somali's desirability and existence is contested. The central government's intervention in its affairs was assumed by nomadic Somalis, an idea created by the encounter with the dictatorship of Barre. The key clans advocate a federal government structure that will autonomously administer various regions of the state and thus permit control over a state.

Specifically, majority of interviewees said these challenges which were internal as well as external held back AMISOM in effecting their mandate of managing internal conflicts. It was again found out that there were challenges such as unclear government policies, lack of political good will as well as lack of social understanding amongst communities. It was found out that majority of interviewees were aware of the challenges AMISON were facing in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. They said these challenges included conflict of legitimate government as there were more than one faction claiming legitimacy in the country. resource

allocation was another constraint as this was a concern of individual governments where human as well as other resources for fighting internal conflicts in Somalia was left to external Countries. Some of the external countries were only willing to assist human resource as experts but were reluctant in terms of finances as well as equipment. African union's political leadership was weak and therefore provided poor leadership which trickled down to AMISOM's way of managing internal conflicts, the threat from Al- Shabaab as well as lack of exit strategy as existing policies had no provision on how to exit after completion of their mission.

This agrees with a study by Obinwa (2015) who found out that AMISOM faces a major problem in terms of its mandated duties and its resource restrictions and capabilities. These limits on capital existed in different dimensions. The number of soldiers on the field and allowed numbers were enormously split. In less hostile areas Somalia needs between five and ten troops every 1,000 civilians in terms of the number of soldiers required for a secure operation, while in hostile areas it takes 20 soldiers for every 1,000 people. It is estimated that the total population of Somalia is about nine million, suggesting that for the country's different security circumstances, a total of 100,000 intervention troops is needed. Only a few of the interviewees did not feel that there were challenges but instead they insisted that AMISOM should pursue further their mission of ensuring peaceful coexistence among the people of Somalia.

5.3.4 Strategies AMISON Use in Managing Internal Conflicts in Somalia

The 4th objective of the study was to assess the strategies AMISON use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study found out that there were strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These included military formations, cultural intelligence, organizational hybridity as well as counter

offensive and defensive measures to mention but a few. The findings of this study are in tandem with a study by Sheeham and Porter (2014) who argues that since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007 to date, the mission has gradually transformed and increased the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) which has expanded from Uganda and Burundi to include Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia have seen further the transformation from the TFG to a legitimately elected government. This has changed the dynamics on negotiations of AMISOM with the newly established government a situation which did not exist beforehand.

The findings also agree with a study by William (2017) who posit that a number of foreign and Somali academics have researched stability and war in Somalia. The country has become a failed state, the dominant task among most foreign academics is to rebuild Somalia in a democratic and developmental state. These requires peace assistance to introduce order and laws into the state controlled by the militia. Multidimensional powers are assisted by PSOs. In order to ensure the conclusion of hostilities, the military exercise use of coercive power.

The findings of this study also concur with the results of Ligawa (2017) who feels that despite the disparities between them, the world's military cultures in specific alliances such as (NATO) have strong communalities that encourage cooperation. These commonalities are not properly utilized in less established armies. Different doctrines and instruction are responsible for this. These features concentrate on group violence that needs tight teamwork, solid hierarchies, direct command channels, troops being able to jeopardize life and bodies and the value of moral obligation and solidarity. A variety of regulatory steps to promote inter-organizations have thus been placed in place.

The findings also concur with that of Kobi and Eyal (2011) who feels that the notion of cultural wisdom cannot be overlooked in contemporary military operations. For several army forces to develop this form of awareness, the shift towards cultural intelligence based on knowledge of the culture of opponents is simply not an organizational course. Aspects of cultural awareness for example are now incorporated into the army, intelligence networks and modern organizing structures, also called the grey intelligence or the growing mix of public and private information collection, and the structured growth.

The researcher again conducted an interviewed a number of respondents to identify strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. From these findings, majority of them agreed that AMISOM had adopted strategies to enable them manage internal conflicts in Somalia. Some of the strategies that AMISOM had adopted s helped bring together conflicting communities in the country and this had changed earlier events where communities were scrambling for resources as a result of unstructured government, with no clear policies on resource allocation. These findings are in agreement with a study by Sheeham and Porter (2014) who found out that since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007, the mission has gradually transformed and increased the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) which has expanded from Uganda and Burundi to include Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Sheeham and Porter further feels the transformation from the TFG to a legitimately elected government has changed the dynamics on negotiations of AMISOM with the newly established government a situation which did not exist beforehand. The swearing in of Mr. Hassan Sheikh as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on 10th September 2012 has increased the international optimism of recovery of Somalia, but more importantly has increased the opportunity

for the civilian component of AMISOM

The study also found out that strategies adopted by AMISOM had improved management of internal conflicts in Somalia. These included enumerated having local military formation by Somalia people and for Somalia helped restore a working Somalia government. This said was made possible through AMISOM's training of locals in cultural intelligence, as well as counter offensive tactics where Somalia security personnel are trained on ways of protecting their government from possible external attacks. It was also found out that AMISOM had an organizational hybridity among its structures which ensures that there is equal representation. This was in agreement with a study by Ligawa (2017) who feels that strategic attacks involve a sense of human terrain. He goes on to say that in order to provide a better knowledge of the environment, developing nations have to adopt teaching in human field programs. The world in which AMISOM works should be worthy of comprehension. The mission needs to understand the Somalis' demographic and cultural views. This would also help to encourage the troops' acceptance among the host.

5.4 Conclusions

From the study findings, it was generally concluded that the four variables which are causes of internal conflict, role AMISON play in managing internal conflict, challenges faced by AMISON in managing internal conflict and strategies AMISON use in managing internal conflicts directly or indirectly affected internal conflict management in Somalia.

Specifically, the study findings concluded that majority of the respondents agreed that there were causes of internal conflicts in Somalia and that these conflicts are caused by diverse factors which include unstable government, poor governance

structures as well as broken social contracts between the people and the government.

The study findings concluded that majority of the respondents were in agreement with the fact that AMISOM played a big role in managing conflicts in Somalia. AMISOM was engaged in such roles as training of Somalia security forces, delivery of humanitarian aid, implementation of national security plan, supporting transitional government, building capacity of the Somalia security.

The study again conclude that majority of the respondents agreed to the existence of challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. The study identified conflict with legitimate government, resource constraints, weaknesses of au political leadership, challenging nature of Al Shabab as well as lack of exit strategy as some of the challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia.

The study found out that that there were strategies adopted by AMISOM in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. These included military formations, cultural intelligence, organizational hybridity as well as counter offensive and defensive measures.

5.5 Recommendations

The study recommends that those institutions mandated to support AMISOM in its quest to manage internal conflict in Somalia have to come with effective techniques that can enable detect as well as identify causes of conflicts such as existence of security threats, unstable political institutions, unstable government structures, broken social contract by Somalia government early for effective management.

Somalia government as well as other security partners have to ensure that the

roles, they assign to AMISOM are effective and that they should be able to enable manage internal conflicts roles such as training of Somalia security forces, delivery of humanitarian aid, implementation of national security plan, supporting transitional government, building capacity of the Somalia security need to emphasized more

On challenges faced by AMISON in managing internal conflict in Somalia. The federal government of Somalia in conjunction with other international security organsms such as the AU and other development countries should endeavor to ensure that AMISOM is free from challenges such as conflict with legitimate government, resource constraints, weaknesses of au political leadership, challenging nature of Al Shabab as well as lack of exit strategy if they are to succeed in managing internal conflict in the country.

On strategies AMISON use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia, the federal government of Somalia in conjunction with other development partners should ensure that they have adopted effective and current strategies such as having military formations that are neutral, having effective cultural intelligence, adoption of organizational hybridity as well as counter offensive and defensive measures to allow for successful internal conflict management.

5.6 Areas of Further Research

This research was only focused on examining the contribution of intergovernmental organizations on internal conflict management in Somalia. This was examined using four objectives namely; causes of internal conflicts, role AMISON play in managing internal conflict, challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts and strategies AMISON use in managing internal conflicts in Somalia. However, there are other objectives which could be investigated by future

researchers to ascertain their outcome. The study again recommends that future researchers endeavor to explore other countries experiencing internal conflicts other than Somalia. They should again try to adopt methodologies that have not been captured by this study.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introduction Letter

Dear Respondents.

Greetings

My name is Liban Yahya Mohamed and I am an African Nazarene University student. As part of my degree requirements, I am currently conducting research on Intergovernmental Organisation's contribution to internal conflict management in Somalia. If you agree to fill out this questionnaire/interview, it will be extremely helpful to me, the university, and the Somali federal government in general. Please keep in mind that the questionnaire/interview is just looking for your thoughts. As a result, you will not be asked to identify yourself, and the information you provide will be used exclusively for academic purposes and will not be made available to any unauthorized individuals.

Thank you in advance

Yours faithfully

Liban Yahya Mohamed

Appendix II: Questionnaire

This questionnaire seeks to collect data from identified respondents on contribution of AMISON on internal conflict management in Somalia

Section A. General Information

1. Kindly indicate your
 Male Female Intersex
2. Please indicate the highest level of education you have achieved?
 a. Primary level b. Secondary level c. Diploma level
 d. undergraduate level e. Postgraduate degree level
3. What is your age in years?
 18 – 25 26 – 35
 36 – 45 46 – 55
 56 – 59
3. How long have you worked in your current position?
 Less than 1year 1-2 years 3-4 years 5.6 years
 7.8 years 9-10 years over ten years

Section B Causes of Internal Conflicts

5. Please indicate by a (√) your opinion on each statement

Tick as appropriate as: 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree

SCALE

Statement		5	4	3	2	1
1	There are security threats in Somali					
2	There are unstable political institutions					
3	There are unstable government structures					

4	Somalia government has broken social contract to her citizens					
---	---	--	--	--	--	--

11. What is your general comment on the causes of internal conflict in Somalia?

.....

Section C: Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Managing Internal Conflicts

12. Has AMISOM established clear mandates for its operations in Somalia?

Yes () No ()

If no, give

reasons

Please indicate by a (√) your opinion on each statement

Tick as appropriate as: 5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree

SCALE

Statement		5	4	3	2	1
1	Train the Somali security forces					
2	Delivery of humanitarian aid					
3	Implement a national security plan					
4	Support transitional governmental structures					
5	Building Capacity					

19. Do you think AMISOM Mission has achieved its objectives?

Yes () No ()

Appendix III: Interview Guide

1. In your opinion what are the causes of internal conflicts in Somali?

.....
.....
.....

2. a. Do you think that the internal conflicts in Somalia are as a result of external forces?

.....
.....

b. If yes, which are these forces?

.....
.....

3. Does AMISOM have a role in managing internal conflicts in Somalia?

.....
.....

b. If yes, which role do they play?

.....
.....

4. Are there challenges facing AMISOM in managing internal conflicts?

Yes () No ()

b. If yes, which ones are they?

.....
.....

5. Do you think there are measures adopted by AMISOM to improve management of internal conflicts?

.....
.....

b If yes, what are some of the measures that improves management of internal conflicts in Somalia?

.....

Thank you.

Appendix IV: Letter from Africa Nazarene University



15th April, 2021

RE: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Liban Yahya Mohamed (**18M03DMGP041**) is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University, in the Governance, Peace and Conflict Studies Department. He has finished his course work and has defended his thesis proposal entitled: - *“The Contribution of Regional Security Mission to Internal Management: Case Study of The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)”*.

Any assistance accorded to him to facilitate data collection and finish his thesis is highly welcomed.

Regards,



Dr. Titus Mwanthi.

Ag. Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academics.

Appendix IV: Somalia's Education Ministry Research Permit

Dowlad Goboleedka Koonfur Galbeed
Soomaaliya
Wasaaradda Waxbarashada, Hidaha & Tacliinta Sare
Xafiiska Agaasimaha Guud



ولاية جنوب غرب الصومال
وزارة التربية والثقافة والتعليم العالي
مكتب مدير العام

South West State of Somalia
Ministry of Education, Culture & Higher Education
Office of the Director General

Ref: MOE/OD/72/2021

Date: 25th -Apr-2021

This is to certify that Mr. **Liban Yahya Mohamed** of Africa Nazarene University has been licensed to conduct research in South West State of Somalia on the topic: **THE CONTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY MISSION TO INTERNAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION TO SOMALIA (AMISOM)**. For a period of one year.

Mr. Fadal Abdullahi Mursal

Director General




Tell: +252615951132

Email: dg@moe.sw.so

Baidoa-Somalia

Appendix V: Map OF Somalia

AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM), JANUARY 2015



Officially given its mandate by the U.N. Security Council nine years ago, AMISOM is a multi-lateral peacekeeping force.

Sector 1 Uganda 6,700 troops	Sector 2 Kenya 3,664 troops
Sector 3 Ethiopia 4,395 troops	Sector 4 Djibouti 960 troops
Sector 5 Burundi 5,432 troops	Sector 6 Ethiopia 1,000 troops

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