ASSESSMENT INTO THE LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FOR WORSHIP INSTITUTIONS TO RESPOND TO TERROR ATTACKS WITHIN NAIROBI CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT

ABDINASIR ABASS GAFOW

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DECLARATION

I declare that this document and the research it describes are my original work and that

they have not been presented in any other university for academic work.

16.06. 2021

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ABDINASIR ABASS GAFOW Date

REG NO: 18S03DMGP012

This research was conducted under our supervision and is submitted with our approval as

university supervisors.

16.06. 2021

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Dr. Martin Ouma Date

16.06. 2021

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Dr. Titus Mwanthi Date

Africa Nazarene University

Nairobi, Kenya

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family for their prayers and support during the time of writing this thesis.

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

Attacks on worship institutions has become frequent and widespread in Nairobi. Occurrences include St. Theresa Catholic Church in 2012 and Dandora phase II church in 2015. Though the safety of worship centres is a concern to security stakeholders, little studies exist on how these institutions are prepared to such attacks in Nairobi, Kenya. The study aimed to assess the level of preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD. The study was directed by the following objectives: to examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks and establish the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The study was based on the theory of citizen participation and the anomie theory. The study used a descriptive research design. The study targeted the 13,642 religious' leaders, worshippers and security agents in Nairobi CBD, where a sample size of 387 was used. The study used stratified random sampling by grouping the respondents into five strata based on the type of respondent. Simple random and purposive sampling techniques were used to select respondents from within strata. The study used questionnaires and key informant interviews as research instruments. The reliability of the study was tested using the Cronbach Alpha test, where an overall reliability coefficient of 0.828 was obtained and was considered acceptable to warrant the usability of the questionnaire. The validity of the questionnaire was ensured by consulting the thesis supervisors, whose suggestions were used to amend the questionnaire accordingly. Raw data was sorted, cleaned and coded into SPSS version 23 for subsequent quantitative analysis. Quantitative data was analyzed and presented using frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations. The results of analyzed data were presented using charts, figures, and tables. The qualitative data from interviews and open-ended questions was analyzed through content analysis relating to specific objectives of the study, and presented using verbatim to corroborate the findings from the questionnaires. The study found that most respondents (43.3%) disagreed that there was training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response as well as reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats (44.3%). In addition, there was lack of important activities in response to terror attacks such as prioritizing of targets, adequate patrol and allocation of resources to counter terrorism in the worship centres. There is also lack of adequate security equipment such as cameras, alarms and screening security systems to respond to terror attacks (45.3%). The study concluded that the strategies used are not effective in response to terror attacks. The study therefore recommends training of security personnel on various aspects related to terror response, such as mechanisms of reporting suspicious terror threats as well as the importance of security checkups in the facility. The study also recommends that the government need to involve the public and conduct adequate patrol to protect people and assets, which were lacking in the worship institutions. The findings are significant to policymakers, the clergy, worshippers and scholars.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS

Challenges   It implies the factors that hinder effective preparedness and response to terrorist activities in worship institutions.

Emergency   A serious, unexpected and dangerous situation arising from a terrorist attack in worship institutions.

Preparedness   A state of readiness for terrorist attacks by worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

Response   The steps taken by worship institutions to stabilize an undesirable event that is already underway or is certain to happen to save lives and reduce adverse damage to property facilitate recovery.

Safety   The condition of worship institutions being protected from the adverse effects of a terrorist attack.

Security   Resilience against potential harm from terrorist attacks in worship institutions.

Security Agent   Those who make sure that the worship institutions are a safe and secure place for worshippers, visitors and the clergy.

Terrorism   Unlawful use of violence and intimidation against worshippers, church workers, and officials by terrorists.

Worship Institutions It implies churches, mosques, and temples in Nairobi City County.

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

CBD - Central Business District

CCTV - Closed Circuit Television

IEDs - Improvised Explosive Devices

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

NACOSTI - National Council of Science and Technology

SPSS - Statistical Package for Social Sciences

UK - United Kingdom

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

USA - United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The study aims to assess the level of preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD. Attacks on worship institutions have become frequent and widespread over the past few decades. This chapter entails the background of the study, presents the statement of the problem which gives an account of the problem and the study gap, objectives and research questions. The significance of the study, the scope of the study, delimitations, limitations, assumptions, theoretical framework, and conceptual framework are also discussed.

1.2 Background of the Study

Globally, places of worship are seen as sanctuaries or safe haven, but the present reality is that places of worship are just as vulnerable to terror attacks as schools, businesses and other public places (Fagel & Hesterman, 2016). As observed by Nason-Clark (2018), many people think of a house of worship as a safe area where violence and emergencies cannot affect them. However, terrorist activities worship centres is now not a new phenomenon and many facilities are developing and updating security and emergency plans and procedures to ensure the safety and security of their congregations, visitors, staff, and facilities.

There has been an increased number of terror attacks in places of worship in the world in the past few decades. The attacks include terrorists' violent acts, such as drive-by shootings, sniper attacks, grenade attacks, suicide attacks and bombs (Sandoval, Brock & Knifton, 2013). On Sunday 21, 2019 the Sri Lanka church attack killed 259 people, including 45 children. Hundreds of others were injured when seven suicide bombers simultaneously detonated explosive-laden vests. On March 15, 2019, during

Friday prayers in Al Noor Mosque in New Zealand, two consecutive terrorist shootings killed 51 people and injured 49 others. Other incidences of attacks on mosques include 1 May 2018 attacks in a mosque and a market in Mubi town in State of Adamawa Nigeria, killing at least 86 people and injuring 58 others as well as the 2016 Molai-Umarari mosque in Maidiguri Nigeria bombing where 22 people died (Neill, Hemmington & Emery 2019).

As observed by Afridi and Gul (2018), in Quetta, South-western Pakistan, two suicide bombers wearing explosives-filled vests attacked a packed Bethel Methodist Church killing at least eight people and wounding up to 45. In Yogyakarta Indonesian, a 22-year-old man armed with machete attacked members of St Lidwina Catholic Church injuring a priest and several worshipers (Harvey, 2018).

As terror attacks have revealed, public gatherings are vulnerable as they serve as attractive targets that may incur mass casualties, have substantial psychological impacts, and draw extensive media coverage (Ahmed & Memish, 2019). In the United States of America (USA) for instance, Wright (2018) argued that churches and other places of worship are potential targets for terror attacks because of the ability to inflict casualties, instill fear and cause political impact. These facilities serve the religious community and assure the presence of a significant number of citizens at certain times of the week. Damage or destruction of a house of worship could inflict mass casualties, primarily on-site; could shut the facility down; and could have widespread psychological impacts (Martin, 2017).

Collins, Kliot, Mansfeld and Sagi (2017) observed that in the United Kingdom (UK), the key to providing a safe environment at a worship institution is to be aware of all the different dangers that can arise and how to handle them. That means learning not

to overlook even the smallest detail, such as a stranger who walks in the front door on Sunday carrying a backpack. Concern about violence has led some institutions especially churches to adopt strict policies banning backpacks. Not every house of worship might want to go that far but members of staff and volunteers such as ushers need to be trained to keep an eye out for things that do not seem right or could present a danger. That includes learning how to deal with agitated visitors and members who might show up in a distraught mood or under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Jonas, Cahaner & Mansfeld, 2019).

Collins *et al.* (2017) argued that safety teams must be responsible volunteers who will learn about first aid and the proper way to respond to a wide variety of situations, from fires and weather emergencies to active shooter scenarios. Other staff members, such as secretaries and ushers, should learn how to confront safety issues that might arise during regular activities. According to Grotenhuis, Scholte, de Graaf and Pelzer (2015), churches in most European countries are required to adopt security checks in their parking as vehicles are used to transport various tools that can be used to commit terror such as bombs. Guest baggage checks and handheld bags need also to be taken to a drop off point away from the lobby and passed through the scanners to detect objects with a high degree of clarity. All church supplies checks are also required to be passed through the scanner. Security personnel posted are to be well trained to detect any explosives (Grotenhuis *et al.*, 2015).

In the African context, Uji (2016) observed that the congregation installed cameras and sturdy locks and called on the authorities to explore ways of living in the 21st-century mindset that embraces both security and hospitality. While the congregation may lament that they have to think about locking their doors or taking

precautions or having training, this is the reality of the day, and have to accept the church safety is becoming vulnerable day by day.

According to Adeloye, Carr and Insch (2019) in Nigeria, some of the strategies that can be used in preparation to tackle terrorism are addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism, community-based approaches, public-private partnerships, and law enforcement and training. Ensuring the safety of members of the congregation, visitors, staff, and volunteers is a priority for all houses of worship. By connecting with local first responders; developing plans for identifying issues and supporting incident response; and training staff, congregants, and visitors in reporting concerns to emergency authorities, many incidents may be mitigated or avoided (Faluyi, Khan & Akinola, 2019).

In Kenya, Tarus (2017) argue that the country is no longer immune to the threats from terrorism including worshiping places such as churches. It is a combination of relatively weak institutions, ethnic and religious diversity that lend the country a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism. While the war-on-terrorism usually relates to internationally linked terrorists, Kenya faces other security threats of equal or greater significance, posing a question of focus for counterterrorism efforts. Churches and other places of worship, therefore, need to devise safety measures such as alarm systems and visitor checkups, that can enhance security (Galgalo, 2017).

The government and churches in Nairobi City County have devised measures to deal with security threats such as armed security and the erection of perimeter walls. The frequency of terror attacks is often, with the efforts being in a place not working properly. Nairobi City County has also experienced most terror attacks related to

worship institutions especially churches like the incident witnessed at St. Theresa Catholic Church grenade in 2012 (Tarus, 2017). The concept of safety and security in worship institutions is, therefore, an important aspect.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Mass attacks and casualty have long been the goal of terrorists. Although attacking soft targets such as worship institutions is not a new phenomenon, they have become all too frequent and widespread over the past few decades. Even though many worship institutions host services and activities that draw hundreds of people each week, statistics show that more than 40% do not have formal safety and security programs in place (Collins *et al.*, 2017). In Kenya, worship institutions have been soft targets even for terrorists. The attacks such as St. Theresa Catholic Church grenade, Dandora phase II church in 2015, a northern Kenya Catholic Church attack and a grenade hurled at Sunday school children at St. Polycarp Anglican Church, Juja road, Nairobi County by the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab fall under this category and confirm the softness of the targets. The safety of worship centres remains a subject of concern to all security stakeholders. What comes to the attention of scholars is the extent to which these centres are prepared to prevent such occurrences in the future.

The study aimed to examine the level of preparedness for response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. These institutions have various security concerns. The concerns include violence, explosives threats, arson threats (e.g. firebombs, accelerants), automatic weapons attack (e.g. indiscriminate shooting of members), other weapons attack (e.g. motors, rocket-propelled grenades, or small arms), biological threats introduced into the worship centre and hostage-taking. Though the safety of worship centres is a concern to security stakeholders, few studies (such as

Dillon, 2014; Harvey, 2018; Neill, Hemmington & Emery, 2019; Omayio, 2015; Uji, 2016) exist on how these institutions are prepared to such attacks. The researcher therefore explored whether worship institutions within Nairobi CBD, had preparedness measures for response to such terrorist threats.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to assess level of preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

1.5.1 General Objective

The overall objective of this study was to assess level of preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

i. Examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

ii. Examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

iii. Assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to by the security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

iv. Establish the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

1.6 Research Questions

This study was guided by the following research questions;

i. What is the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

ii. What are the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

iii. How effective are the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

iv. What is the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

1.7 Significance of the Study

According to Creswell and Creswell (2017), the term significance refers to study findings, including the strengths in adding new knowledge or bridging knowledge gaps and the value of the research findings. The study will be significant to different groups including policymakers, the clergy, worshippers and scholars. To the policymakers, the study will be significant in coming up with important legislation affecting worship institutions and other places of worship. Since there have been continued attacks in the worship institutions, it is important for the policies to be formulated and published guidelines and laws with regard to safety for the worship places. Some of these laws and guidelines must specifically target attacks by terrorists. The study will also help the national government in guarding the places of worship, as security to every citizen is a constitutional right.

To the worship places such as churches, mosques and temples, the study will specifically identify areas of perceived weaknesses with regard to terrorism preparedness in order to provide a better understanding of the safety and security subject that requires improvement. The study will further assist in identifying weaknesses and suggest recommendations to them for improving preparedness for

terror attacks in Nairobi City County, Kenya. The study will further benefit the institutions' management by filling the gap that exists in the formulation, practice, and review of effective terrorism preparedness measures in places of worship in Kenya.

To the academicians, there are a few studies addressing the preparedness levels of worship institutions to terrorist attacks. Therefore, scholars they will benefit by having a source of information in their future studies about the preparedness measures for response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The residents of Nairobi who also use the worship institutions will benefit from this study by being vigilant to terror attacks and also respond in case of attacks.

1.8 Scope of the Study

Scope of a study refers to the geographic area where the study is conducted. It is the description of the boundaries of an area in terms of content, methodology and geographical and theoretical coverage (Onen, 2016). This study assessed the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD, Kenya. The area was targeted because the churches, mosques and temples carry considerable large populations per session and are at risk of terror attacks. The study covered the period from 2010 when terror attacks in worship institutions started being robust. The study did not go beyond October 2020 when data collection ended. A descriptive survey design was used. The study was carried out in Nairobi City County using questionnaires and interviews. The study specifically focused on the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks and the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

1.9 Delimitation of the Study

Delimitation is defined as parts of the study that are relevant to the study but are not covered by the study (Bryman& Bell, 2015). The first delimitation of the study was the scope of the study, where the researcher limited the study to the preparedness measures for response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The variables that were not interesting, not directly relevant, too problematic and not feasible were excluded from the study. The study also delimited the respondents to worshippers, religious leaders and security officers only. The worshippers outside the Nairobi CBD were not taking part in the study, as the information sought could only be obtained from concerned actors and not from those outside the study area.

1.10 Limitations of the Study

Limitation refers to factors that make what is studied difficult or impossible (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The study was limited by reluctance from the respondents to give information as security is a sensitive area; therefore, the respondents were afraid to reveal the true situation. The researcher overcame the above limitations by ensuring that there was an approval from the university to conduct the study and also assured the respondents of anonymity and that the information sought was purely for study purposes. The researcher conducted data collection in a concealed way so that the respondents had a sense of privacy that meant security for them.

Due to the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, the government declared that strict measures were required to prevent the spread of the disease. Therefore, during the time of data collection, the researcher faced challenges accessing the worshippers, as places of worship were completely closed. However, after one month, they were opened, with only a few members allowed per session. The study took advantage of these sessions to collect data. Further, most people were unwilling participate due to

the fear of being transmitted the Covid-19 disease. To address their fears, the study ensured that the respondents sat 2 meters from each other with masks on and hand sanitization done.

1.11 Assumptions of the Study

Assumption refers to the possibility of the study to happen as needed despite other factors that may hinder it (Onen, 2016). The study assumed that there was some level of preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD. The study also assumed that the respondents were confident, transparent and would answer the survey questions truthfully. It further assumed that the worship authorities would allow this study to be carried in their institutions.

1.12 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by the theoretical foundation premised on two theories: citizen participation and the anomie theory. This is important to help identify and examine the key debates on security preparedness against terror attacks on the key public institutions.

1.12.1 Theory of Citizen Participation

The theory of citizen participation is based on research work by Parker (2003). Citizen participation is a process that provides private individuals an opportunity to influence public decisions and has long been a component of the decision-making process. The roots of citizen participation can be traced to ancient Greece and Colonial New England. Before the 1960s, governmental processes and procedures such as security provisions were designed to facilitate external participation. Citizen participation was institutionalized in the mid-1960s with President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs (Caparas & Agrawal, 2016).

Many agencies or individuals choose to exclude or minimize public participation in planning efforts claiming citizen participation is too expensive and time-consuming. Yet, many citizen participation programs are initiated in response to public reaction such as response to terror. However, there are tangible benefits that can be derived from an effective citizen involvement program. Caparas and Agrawal (2016) identified five major benefits of citizen participation to the planning process which include information and ideas on public issues; public support for planning decisions; avoidance of protracted conflicts and costly delays; reservoir of goodwill which can carry over to future decisions; and spirit of cooperation and trust between the agency and the public.

The theory of citizen participation is important to the study in finding out the types of participation techniques such as training, that exist in worship institutions in terms of response to terror attacks, involvement in devising emergency response plans and how government security planners develop safety policies and programs that meet the specific goals, objectives, and circumstances of worship institutions. Participation can be in terms of training and security agents' involvement in usage of modern equipment. This theory will help device preparedness measures for response to terror attacks, emergency response plans to terror attacks and devising of security and safety policies for the response to terror attacks on worship institutions. The theory, however, fails to explain the specific activities that can be undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks, as well as the quality of equipment in response to terror attacks, which necessitated the second theory.

1.12.2 Anomie Theory

Anomie theory expounded by Cohen (1965) provides an explanation of the concentration of crime in society, and how it can be solved. The concept of Anomie

was introduced by Durkheim and denotes a situation in which social norms are ambiguous, nonexistent, weak, or conflicting. This results in people being unsure of what they have to do and making them unable to control their wants and desires (Turner, l981).

According to anomie theory, an urban setting generally experiences high rates of deviance because it has powerful values emphasizing success goals but does not give all population sectors equal opportunities to realize such goals. The insatiable hunger in capitalist economies for more goods, money, and property, stimulated by modern mass advertising and salesmanship, fosters this endemic discontent for more and more personal possessions (Turner, 2003) which fosters anomie for those without means to cope with ever-changing demands for the satisfaction of wants. Many young people in urban areas do not have employment opportunities through which they can realize their goals.

Terrorism is seen as a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draw the attention of the local populace, the government and the world to their cause (Aronson, 2013). Terrorists concentrate their attacks in order to intimidate, cause panic to the alarmed citizenry into demanding that leaders put right the perceived wrongs that affect them, at least to the terrorists themselves, as justifications for their murderous campaigns. The outward aberrations of terrorism include not only the willingness of the terrorists to take innocent lives but, most spectacularly in the case of suicide bombers, their readiness to die for a cause (Lizardo, 2008).

Africa at large is no more immune to the threats from terrorism. Its combination of ethnic and religious diversity and sometimes discrimination, poverty, and in many

places its ungoverned space all lends Africa a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism such as Boko Haram of Nigeria. In East Africa, the Al-Shabaab group has been threatening the security of Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and even Uganda.

In general, geographic, demographic, lifestyle and institutional changes have been conducive to the increase of urban crime. In low-class areas, there is congestion and a high likelihood of incidences of crime, including terrorism. These factors may hence be critical to the breeding of frustrations and hopelessness in life, making some people less likely to shun deviant behaviour. Desperations at not being able to meet day to day needs and wants push people away from conformity, and lead to an increase in cases of deviance (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 2013).

Brantingham *et al.* (2020) noted that due to the increasing number of armed robberies and violent crimes in most places and the nature of violence used in these attacks, it points to a need for improvements to be made to the security measures that are in place. It is recognized that there is a need to maintain a friendly and welcoming atmosphere within security environments and this guide is not intended to create a 'fortress mentality'. There is however a balance to be achieved where security management are informed that there are robust protective security measures available to mitigate against any threat, such as vehicle access controls (Martin, 2016).

Anomie theory was adopted in this study because it can be used to explain activities undertaken by security agents and the quality of equipment used in response to terror attacks as a result of increased deviance in the urban area due to terrorist activities. The theory can also be relied upon to capture a common present society phenomenon where there is an ever-increasing crime activity in congested areas. The

differentiation of crime patterns while being attributed to unequal security deterrents in different sections of an urban setting can also be conceived within the theory of anomie. The theory, however, does not inform objectives on nature of training and quality of equipment on response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

1.13 Conceptual Framework

Figure 1-1 indicates the conceptual framework that guided the study showing the independent and dependent variables of the study. The dependent variable of the study is response to terror attacks while the independent variables are the nature of training offered to security agents, the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks, the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks and quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

The first independent variable of the study is the nature of training of security agencies which has been operationalized as training on terror response, training on involving government agencies and training on reporting of terrorist suspicions. The second independent variable is activities undertaken by security agents operationalized using prioritizing areas of targets, information sharing between security agents and worship institutions and timely patrols. The third independent variable is effectiveness of strategies in place operationalized using enhanced government partnerships, information sharing between government institutions and coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response and crisis management. The final independent variable is the quality of security equipment operationalized using equipment monitoring access to facilities, modern security facilities and modern design of facilities. The dependent variable is response to terror attacks operationalized using increased response to terror attacks and reduced terror attacks while the intervening

variables include community support and laws and policies development. The independent variables were likely to affect the response to terror attacks in worship institutions.

Independent Variable   **Dependent Variable**

Nature of training of security agencies

- Training on terror response
- Training on involving government agencies
- Training on reporting of terrorist suspicions

Activities Undertaken by Security Agents
- Prioritizing areas of targets
- Information sharing between police and worship institutions
- Timely patrols

Effectiveness of Strategies in Place

- Working government partnerships
- Regular information sharing between government institutions
- Improved coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response and crisis

Quality of security equipment

- Equipment monitoring access to facilities
- Modern security facilities
- Modern design of facilities

Response to terror attacks
- Increased response to terror attacks
- Reduced terror attacks

Intervening Variables
- Community support
- Laws and policies

Figure 1-1: Conceptual Framework on Level of Preparedness and Response to Terror Attacks
Source: Author, 2020.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews both theoretical and empirical literature on the preparedness measures for response to terror attacks on worship institutions as earlier offered by various scholars, authors and analysts. The chapter also discusses the empirical literature review based on the objectives of the study, a summary of the literature and provides gaps in the literature.

2.2 Review of Literature.

In this section, empirical review of literature is presented. This is done in line with the specific objectives of the study.

2.2.1 Training of Security Agents and Response to Terror Attacks

McIlhatton *et al.* (2018) identified security training as an important component of preparing to terror attacks, especially in crowded areas such as worship centres. The authors posit that security training is part of the safety program to help workers develop safety awareness and take the correct ways to prevent unsafe practices when performing a task or several tasks, and to counter terror threats. McIlhatton *et al.* (2018) further state that inadequate knowledge has been seen to be a factor in many church accidents and terror-related incidents. In certain situations, lack of proper skill or knowledge for a task can result in errors that can be difficult to manage. The gap in this study is that it is purely qualitative, while the present study combined both the qualitative and quantitative approaches in the analysis and presentation of findings.

Fagel and Hesterman (2016) underscored the importance of including and training all stakeholders in establishing an effective national counterterrorism

framework that clarifies responsibilities for soft target preparedness, prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Ensuring that all relevant entities understand the nature of the threat, how it directly impacts their interests, as well as clearly defining their roles and responsibilities, is critical to effective preparedness. This study is purely qualitative, while the present study combined both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. In addition, the study does not cover quality of equipment used and effectiveness of strategies used in response to terror attacks, which was covered in the current study.

Scheitle and Halligan (2018) noted that outreach, exercises and training should ideally be nationally led, regionally coordinated, and locally delivered. Governments can coordinate and orchestrate specific activities but to be effective, governments should also involve a diverse set of public and private stakeholders. Local officials, including law enforcement, are the most likely to be able to build strong partnerships with the owners and operators of soft targets. These local officials will be first on the scene to either respond to a threat or to make a difference in responding to an attack.

Sylves (2019) postulated that terrorism security training helps policymakers, government officials, and business executives implement decisions about providing safety and security to citizens and property in a dynamic threat environment. Governments should consider aligning the threats with a comprehensive list of potential targets based on analysis of terrorist capabilities, intentions, and past attacks, and conduct risk assessments regularly to keep pace with the evolving nature of the threat and adversary. Governments should also update contingency planning, such as guidance, exercises, and training for law enforcement and industry to keep pace with actual threats, which will help stakeholders adapt to evolving threats.

In Ireland, Dillon (2014) observes that church safety preparedness and training are important, more so for leaders since for any eventuality, everybody goes to the church leaders for direction. For congregations that want to be safer, calling the security agents or sheriff's department is a good first step. Officers can point out security weaknesses, provide training, and help develop protocols and procedures.

Burroni (2018) posited that training officials to know the enemy is a core principle in protecting soft targets. Today's terrorist organizations seek to inspire their followers domestically and abroad to carry out attacks on their behalf. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in particular, has increased the trend toward attacking soft targets. Exhortations disseminated through online magazines such as Dabiq from ISIS and Inspire from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and on social media platforms are designed to attract new supporters and also to identify categories of likely targets, suggested tactics, and instructions to readers in the use of weapons and the construction of explosive devices. Knowing how terrorist groups attack their targets is a major way to respond to these attacks even before they happen.

The security training is part of the safety program to help workers develop safety awareness and take the correct ways to prevent unsafe practices when performing a task or several tasks, and to counter terror threats (Nemeth, 2017). Inadequate knowledge has also been seen to be a factor in many accidents and terror related incidents. In certain situations, lacking the proper skill or knowledge for a task can result to errors that can be managed (Kinney, Davis & Zhang, 2018).

Omayio (2015) noted that worship centre workers need to have access to training resources, and plans should be exercised as appropriate. Training helps to ensure personnel knows what to do during an emergency or business disruption.

Recurring training programs help personnel to remain familiar with security measures and preparedness actions (e.g., evacuation, lockdown). Specialized training is needed for emergency team leaders and members, especially personnel who will take on additional responsibilities, such as administering first aid and using emergency response equipment (such as automated external defibrillators and fire extinguishers). Drills and exercises should be conducted to validate plans and to evaluate the ability of personnel to carry out their assigned roles and responsibilities. Documenting security and emergency preparedness policies, practices and procedures were also identified. Security plans identify protective measures designed to mitigate threats such as criminal activity, active shooters, or improvised explosive devices and vulnerabilities. Emergency preparedness plans detail actions to respond to crises. Facilities may have different names for such plans or incorporate elements of each plan into an overall larger document.

Ellis and Abdi (2017) noted that establishing training on suspicious activity reporting procedures is critical to security and mitigation of a potential incident. Suspicious activity is any observed behavior that could indicate terrorism or terrorism-related crime. This includes, but is not limited to, unusual items or situations, such as unattended packages; individuals asking questions at a level beyond typical curiosity about, for example, a building's security procedures or utilities; and individuals paying unusual attention to facilities or buildings beyond a casual or professional interest. A house of worship should establish reporting procedures; communicate those procedures to employees, volunteers, visitors, and members of the congregation; and train staff on using these procedures.

2.2.2 Activities Undertaken by Security Agents in Response to Terror Attacks

Hesterman (2018) posits that coordination with first responders to familiarize response personnel with the site layout and facility procedures can enhance the assistance first responder agencies provide (vital preparedness planning and response) when an incident occurs. Community security and emergency preparedness organizations that actively prepare for any hazard should also be leveraged. Such engagement will foster information sharing that can substantially enhance the ability of the facility to assess risks and make security and preparedness decisions to address vulnerabilities, hazards, and potential impacts. This study however does not cover quality of equipment used and effectiveness of strategies used in response to terror attacks, which will be covered in the current study.

McDonald (2018) observed that information sharing between the community and the security agents cannot begin during a crisis. Activities such as police patrols can only be enhanced by information, they get from the community involved. Coordination mechanisms and trust should already exist among the community and the security agents before they come together to deal with a threat or attack to avoid wasting precious time. Developing and sustaining relationships between various levels of government, international, national, regional, and local, and between government and industry, are crucial to passing essential information, such as intelligence, indicators of suspicious activity, and/or attack preparation. The government and industry should routinely discuss the threat environment and industry's specific concerns and needs as well as their ideas and suggestions related to soft target protection. The industry should also be encouraged to share information outside of scheduled exchanges. Even information that may seem meaningless or inconsequential at the time may prove useful, either before an attack or after during forensic analysis. In return, relevant

information should be shared by governments with the appropriate stakeholders in a timely manner so that they can be acted upon.

Worship institutions are required to adopt security checks including vehicles that are used to transport various tools that can be used to commit terror such as bombs (Kinney *et al.*, 2018). as it is done in other private areas, guest baggage checks should be taken to a drop off point away from the entrance and passed through the scanners to detect objects with a high degree of clarity.

Miller and Stivachtis (2019) discussed the role of public-private partnerships and noted that along with promoting mutual understanding, public-private partnerships can also lead to joint efforts on terrorist tactics such as the use of rental vehicles, falsified documents, stolen uniforms or explosives. For example, while governments may not be familiar with the rental car business, they can explain to industry the threat and assist industry in tailoring training materials to combat the misuse of their vehicles. Moreover, the industry will have its own ideas about how terrorists might misappropriate its products, services, systems, or facilities and can work with governments to reduce this risk.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 2341 of 2017 cited in Gilmore (2018) on the protection of critical infrastructure against terror attacks in February 2017. In the resolution, governments should coordinate and integrate critical infrastructure and soft target protection efforts to ensure expertise is shared across sectors and consider how the risk environment within their country would help them prioritize both critical infrastructure and soft target risk management efforts. Where resources are limited, this coordination can serve to extend protective measures beyond the sum of the parts. Critical infrastructure protection efforts have also long

included a focus on resiliency. Continuity of operations plans, and quick restoration of normalcy are part of resiliency for critical infrastructure, and when implemented following a soft target attack may go far towards limiting the psychological, economic, and other impacts of the attack.

Abrahams, Ward and Kennedy (2018) explained that prioritizing targets by the security agents might affect those who will assume primary responsibility for security. While soft targets are often privately owned, for some potential soft targets, the government will take direct responsibility for their protection or share responsibilities, offer guidance, or mandate minimum levels of security. Another possibility is hiring private security guards or contractors; cost is always a factor especially here, including who bears the burden of paying for heightened security. Many nations have experience protecting critical infrastructure and thus have a base of expertise and experience that can be applied to soft target protection. Soft targets are not specific and can potentially be any place where large numbers of people congregate or gather. For this reason, the concept of protection should be dynamic, focused, and organized by geographic area instead of a more or less static concept of protection with a focus on a specific object. The dynamic concept of protection should be based on information and risk assessment. In addition, security measures can be visible as well as invisible.

Freilich, Chermak and Hsu (2018) noted prioritizing targets because not all targets are equal as an effective response measure to terror. Therefore, it is essential to identify and prioritize targets according to a risk assessment based on and relevant to local factors. Decision-makers managing risk should make resource decisions. Identifying and prioritizing potential targets will inform governmental decisions on how much and where and sometimes when to allocate resources. Factors will vary from country to country. Some targets and events offer terrorist opportunities for large-scale

massacres of unsuspecting civilians. Successful attacks on certain target categories, schools or certain religious facilities, for example, could have profound psychological consequences, adverse political consequences, or both. In other situations, the affiliation or relationship of a certain target with the government might make it a target, such as hotels used for government conferences, iconic locations with historical significance, and venues frequented by government officials. Governments should both study previous attacks and consider the local context to develop plausible and realistic scenarios that allow them to both prepare and allocate finite resources more effectively.

Alfano and Gorlach (2019) argued that the public in Kenya should be educated on what to look for. The public needs to appreciate the importance of situational awareness and how it contributes to security, even if a terrorist attack on soft targets has not occurred in their country. They need to know how to contact those charged with security and to help reinforce the importance of this, the public should be able to receive some type of acknowledgment or response. The challenge is developing and shaping a centralized, managed program that articulates key indicators and encourages meaningful reporting.

2.2.3 Effectiveness of Strategies to Respond to Terror Attacks

White (2016) observed that security agents' activities can only be effective when they are involving stakeholders such as community leaders and entities with local knowledge. This can have immediate benefit to government efforts to unearth tip-offs and location-specific knowledge for counterterrorism planning and response. Locals are often the first to notice suspicious activities. They are also the first responders and therefore critically important to minimizing the impacts of an attack. Additionally, preparing for soft target attacks can expose gaps in protection and in response duties,

such as confusion as to who leads what. If everyone is responsible, nobody is responsible.

Hesterman (2018) noted that protecting soft targets is complex, and entails balancing security and access, as well as the amount of patrols. If casualties are the paramount terrorist metric for success, then every undefended group of people becomes a lucrative target. While inconveniencing the public is certainly a concern, visibly bolstering security can also be a confidence-building measure. The challenge is how to tailor both visible and invisible security measures and apply resources judiciously, thus decreasing the likelihood and consequences of an attack while reinforcing the confidence of the public. The targets also lack mechanisms on authorized access to facilities and security facilities.

Preparedness to terror attacks entail the strategies or procedures established by institutions to guide in dealing with threats arising from the surrounding environment (Naja & Baytiyeh, 2016). Traditional concepts of security are state centric, involving formal security services such as security agents, military and intelligence. In more recent decades, with the end of the bipolar world order, the concept has been broadened to include a variety of actors and arenas and deepened to cover the security of private places, individuals and human security. Thus, the new security agenda encompasses a variety of new threats which entail political, environmental, economic and social which have been presented but not strictly conceptualized as security matters. These include environmental issues, crime, insurgencies, the war on terror, religion and militias among others.

Security in worship institutions requires these organizations to become better prepared for terrorist attacks through increased use of security technology, additional

emergency preparedness planning, improved liaison/partnering with the law enforcement agencies and personnel training (Martin, 2016). Security measures provided by worship institutions personnel depend on the nature of the threats which vary depending on the location of the area. Whilst there are typical threats, such as terrorism, bomb threats, anti-social behaviour, drug dealing, violence and sexual offences, a risk assessment should involve detailed research to determine the level of risk, which private security can help in (Naja & Baytiyeh, 2016).

Fagel and Hesterman (2016) highlighted how effectiveness in inter-security coordination in national frameworks can be enhanced. The authors argued that coordination entails identifying and organizing stakeholders in soft target protection since organizations will vary from country to country and between the various levels of government, as well as across industry sectors. Therefore, outlining of clear roles, responsibilities, and engagement opportunities is useful. Key relationships include those among law enforcement organizations (national, regional, local), between various government agencies and levels, and between the government and the private sector.

Scheitle and Halligan (2018) argued that for effective security coordination, developing partnerships between industry and government is essential. An effective government outreach program to private owners and operators should include defined stakeholders such as geographic, industry-specific; regular outreach including phone calls, in-person meetings, webinars, relevant activities such as training on active shooter preparedness, and resources that promote improved awareness and preparedness such as identifying and reporting suspicious activities.

As per Hoffman and Shelby (2017), governments and their industry partners can learn a good deal about terrorist tactics by reading terrorists' public material and

listening to their broadcasts. This publicly available information can be analyzed to assess enemy capabilities and intentions, particularly when they advertise so openly about techniques and tactics, they consider successful (or not) and what they exhort their followers to use. Every attack is a learning experience and an unfortunate incentive for the international community, the public and private sector, and security services to learn about terrorist capabilities and review current policies. Governments should fuse different sources of information ranging from law enforcement, intelligence, terrorist communication to network analysis classified and open source to produce a robust analysis and comprehensive assessment of the threat posed to soft targets. Intelligence should be leveraged for this analysis and made available to the people who need it both inside and outside of government, as appropriate. It is important that public information complement intelligence in producing tailored analysis for engagement with owners and operators of industry.

Kaplan (2017) demonstrates that national and local governments, international organizations, and private sectors need to plan and work together to counter the evolving threat to potential soft targets. Governments should develop or expand national policies that address disaster preparedness, emergency response, crisis management, and critical infrastructure protection, security, and resilience. Such policies can be improved by developing and implementing capabilities to create risk-informed priorities among soft targets for government attention, capabilities to protect soft targets from terror attacks before they happen, such as training for staff of likely targets to increase their readiness to confidently know when to report suspicious behavior, and other good practices. To address terror attacks against soft targets, these plans should go beyond national preparedness for addressing natural disasters,

pandemics, and armed attacks, to include a focus on information sharing, risk-based decision making, and public-private partnering.

Hamilton (2018) noted that governments should develop programs that promote awareness of one's surroundings and encourage reporting of suspicious activities and anomalies. Employees involved in large gatherings such as worship institutions, regular commuters on transportation systems, and others can often detect suspicious activity more easily than security agents or security personnel can. Governments should, therefore, put processes in place to receive, review, and respond to public reports and establish continuous education for the public and industry on what constitutes suspicious activity. For example, cautionary signage, billboards, and advertisements on public transportation or in public places can enhance public awareness, and public information campaigns can work if properly focused. Use radio and television to air public service announcements. For those countries without an existing public communications plan, regular face-to-face meetings with trade organizations or owners and operators of locations of particular concern are a good starting point.

Combs (2017 noted that a private sector security clearance program can be effective for granting the proper access to those who need to know, including industry representatives who own and operate critical infrastructure or soft targets. This enables sharing classified information across departments and agencies as well as with cleared industry representatives. A process for downgrading information can also help. Protecting sensitive information is critically important but should not be a barrier to governments providing useful information to the private sector, first responders, and others who can help protect soft targets. This study however does not cover quality of equipment used in response to terror attacks, which will be covered in the current study.

Olsen (2018) studied fighting terrorism in Kenya. The study found that the government's principal on the counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risks to the country. The countries' strategy should have four principal work streams which include Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare also referred to as the four P's. The study further found that terrorism and policy not only emphasize vigorous multilateral diplomacy but also makes use of sanctions by imposing a moral authority and adding to the ignominy attached to terrorism. Churches and other targets of terrorism are expected to coordinate with authorities to deter terrorists which can discourage terrorism.

2.2.4 Quality of Security Equipment and Response to Terror Attacks

Hesterman (2018) posits that perimeter security system that has a three-tier security system should be put in place at the perimeter outside the churches where cars are stopped for a thorough check-up; cars should escort guests at a distance from the church entrance and a closed-circuit TV installed in public areas together with the scanners. Road barriers such as hydraulically operated road barriers or retractable bollards that can stop vehicles coming at high speed can be used. This can highly help in curbing terrorism. Establishing relationships with local first responders was also observed in the study.

According to Scheitle and Halligan (2018), visible security guards, cameras, barriers projects strength and are a common, and often most effective, way to deter church attacks. At the same time, visible physical measures need to be strategically integrated along with training, technology, and other measures. There are also opportunities for further collaboration to consider how to incorporate security by design into new construction and renovations of soft target facilities. No security measure is foolproof, so a layered approach that includes comprehensive preparation and response

planning should continue since some locations - even if hardened will always be attractive to terrorists.

Jacoby (2016) identified the methods for making the terrorists' task more difficult, such as placing barriers in high-profile public events or in crowded places such as worship institutions, centralizing detailed records of suspicious people and vehicles across locations, in order to determine whether a specific person or vehicle is repeatedly identified on different shifts or at different sites by local law enforcement. The study noted the use of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras to monitor activity in public places to some extent and emphasized the importance of using proven mobile technology that is reliable. Insider threats, which are especially challenging to detect, should be considered and should be addressed with a variety of physical and non-physical measures. This can include employee-monitoring technology to access controls to training management and staff on how to spot a potential insider threat.

Rahimi and Graumans (2015) observed that regularly challenging assumptions and revisiting security strategies, including review by experts not directly involved in protecting the facility, is important, and a useful tool for both government authorities and private owners and operators. Frequent testing of the security measures or response to alarms, particularly when un-announced, offer important insight into preparedness and the effectiveness of existing measures. Organization of the efforts should be done to focus on lessons learned and not merely lessons observed, where mistakes are scrutinized, and efforts are directed at identifying and addressing vulnerabilities within one's own organization. Those lessons should be applied on the ground, and then continuing to regularly identify and share lessons learned should be part of the overall effort.

Oanda (2013) observed that lack of alarms is a major challenge while implementing security measures in Kenya. The study however noted that it's convenient to discuss security measures in the context of insecurity and of protecting rooms where computer equipment monitoring security and other assets are kept. Alarms also give a good grounding in the wider problem of service denial attacks.

2.3 Summary of Review of Literature and Research Gap(s)

From the literature reviewed, most countries have adopted a voluntary framework for public-private partnering on preparedness and are building or expanding those plans to cover soft target protection (Miller & Stivachtis, 2019). Information sharing between government and industry can be a challenge, but it is essential to protecting soft targets such as worship institutions (McDonald, 2018).

Understanding the terrorist threat requires training on what terrorists are saying and doing around the world, with a detailed assessment of the threat in a local context (Freilich *et al*., 2018). Local factors such as terrorist capabilities and target vulnerabilities are central to accurately assessing and mitigating the local threat. Governments and worship institutions need to always be most attuned to what is happening in their own countries. Along with a primary focus on the most likely methods of attack, worship institutions need to also be mindful of new technologies and unexpected tactics to anticipate less obvious, less likely threat developments.

As terrorists continue to pursue emerging technologies, governments and worship institutions should devote both attention and effort to assessing these various types of threats (White, 2016). Terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological materials is often cited as the classic high impact, event. This is much less likely than other, simpler attack methods, but proactive risk management should include

consideration of emerging threats, especially those with potentially dire consequences. However, preparing for worst-case scenarios at the expense of more simplistic and likely attacks is counterproductive (Fagel & Hesterman, 2016). Threat assessments should consider the range of risks posed by adversaries, while also remaining accurate about the nature of this threat.

The findings of empirical studies conducted locally and internationally clearly indicate methodological and contextual gaps. In terms of methodologies, other scholars have used different designs, populations as well as data collection and analysis methods (such as Neill, Hemmington & Emery, 2019; Dillon, 2014; Harvey, 2018; Omayio, 2015). Most studies have been purely qualitative, while the current study combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Further, most studies carried out have focused on different contextual environments especially in the developed nations, as opposed to Kenya. This study, however, focused on the existing measures for response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in-depth description of the research design, research site, target population, study sample through study sample size and sampling procedure, data collection through identifying data collection instruments, pilot test on research instruments, understanding instrument reliability and validity and data analysis. This chapter also highlights the legal and ethical considerations to be adhered to in the research. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the nature of training offered to security agents, the activities undertaken by security agents, the effectiveness of the strategies put in place and the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

3.2 Research Design

Meyers, Gamst and Guarino (2016) observe that research design is a blueprint for data collection, measurement, and analysis which ultimately aids in answering the research questions. The study used descriptive research design. According to Klenke (2016), a descriptive survey research design is a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering questionnaires to a sample of individuals to obtain information about people's attitudes, opinions or habits on social issues. Descriptive design was appropriate for this study because it provided a framework for the collection of data based on the research objectives to gauge the opinions of respondents about the existing measures for response to terror attacks in worship institutions. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected using questionnaires and key informant interviews respectively, which also support a descriptive research design.

3.3 Research Site

The study was about the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. In effect, the location of the study was in Nairobi City County, Kenya (Appendix VI). Nairobi is located in southern Kenya on 10 00''N and 300 00''E at an elevation of 1670m above sea level and covers an area of 700 km^2. It is the most populated city in East Africa. Nairobi is the capital and the largest city of Kenya. The city has a population of 4,397,073 as documented in the 2019 national census, showing that Nairobi is a populated city. Nairobi City County consists of 17 Constituencies namely; Mathare, Starehe, Kamukunji, Makadara, Embakasi West, Embakasi East, Embakasi Central, Embakasi North, Embakasi South, Ruaraka, Kasarani, Roysambu, Kibra, Langata, Dagoretti South, Dagoretti North and Westlands.

Although Nairobi has many positive features, like any other large city, it has its fair share of problems and faces enormous challenges that range from congested roads and streets to lack of essential facilities such as water, that lead to most people to be exposed to crime activities orchestrated by the lack of services. The worship institutions targeted (shown in Appendix VII) such as churches, mosques and temples carry considerable large populations per session are at risk of terror attacks, as terrorists target congested areas with less security. Nairobi City County was selected in the study due to the concentration of worship institutions and terror-related attacks in Kenya.

3.4 Target Population

Kumar (2019) defines the target population as all the elements that attain certain set standards of inclusion in any research. The study targeted the 13,642 religious' leaders (Buddhist monks and nuns, imams, pastors, priests, punjaris, and other faith communities' leaders), worshippers and security agents in Nairobi CBD. Religious leaders were drawn from churches, mosques, and temples. Worshippers included

Christian protestants, Christian Catholics, Hindus and Muslims as shown in Table 3-1. The choice of the respondents was based on their knowledge status concerning preparedness for worship institutions to respond to terror attacks within Nairobi CBD.

Table 3-1: Target Population

Population	Size	Source
Church leaders	92	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya offices, 2020
Muslim leaders	22	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya offices, 2020
Hindu leaders	14	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya offices, 2020
Worshippers in CBD	13,416	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya offices, 2020
Security agents	98	Kenya Police Service headquarters
Total	**13,642**	

Source: Field Data, 2021

3.5 Study Sample

3.5.1 Study Sample Size

Meyers *et al.* (2016) describe a sample as a collection of units chosen from the universe to represent it and states it should not be too large or too small. While generally, the larger the sample, the more representative the scores on the variables will be with regard to the population scores. This study used a representative sample across the targeted respondents.

The sample size for this study was calculated using the Yamane (1967) formula. According to the target population, there are 13,642 religious' leaders, worshippers and security agents in Nairobi CBD. The sample size was calculated as follows;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$$

Where,

n= the sample size

N = the size of population

e= the error of 5 percentage points

By using this formula, the precision error was 5% and a confidence coefficient of 95%. The calculation from a population of 13,642 was as follows;

$$n = \frac{13,642}{1 + 13,642 \ (.05)^2} = 387$$

A total of 387 religious leaders, worshippers and security agents in Nairobi CBD were sampled. The sample from each category is shown in Table 3-2, based on proportionate sampling for each category.

Table 3-2: Sampling Framework

Population	Population Size	Proportion	Sample Size
Church leaders	92	0.006744	3
Muslim leaders	22	0.001613	1
Hindu leaders	14	0.001026	1
Worshippers in CBD	13,416	0.983434	379
Security agents	98	0.007184	3
Total	**13,642**	1	**387**

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.5.2 Sampling Procedure

Sampling refers to the procedure of selecting individuals or items from a larger population that is similar in its characteristics where the researcher gathers information about a whole group, then observes a part of the population in which the findings are generalized and extended back to the whole population (Flick, 2015). The researcher used stratified random sampling by grouping the respondents into five strata in Nairobi City County as shown in the sampling framework. The strata were developed based on

the type of respondent. Simple random sampling and purposive sampling techniques were then used to select respondents from within strata, where simple random sampling was used for all the strata, except the security agents where purposive sampling was used. This type of sampling was preferred as it provided an equal chance for every respondent to be included in the study.

3.6 Data Collection

3.6.1 Data Collection Instruments

The researcher developed instruments to use in collecting data before getting to the field to collect data. Data was collected using a questionnaire and key informant interviews (Appendix II and III respectively). The questionnaire is well-structured questions in a definite order and presented to respondents to answer them (Kumar, 2019). A semi-structured questionnaire was used in the study and comprised of closed and open-ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into sub-sections, where the first part collected demographic information of respondents, while the following sub-sections collected data based on the specific objectives of the study. Therefore, the second part was on the nature of training offered to security agents, the third part on the activities undertaken by security agents, the fourth part on the effectiveness of the strategies put in place and the fifth part on the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions while the sixth part was on response to terror attacks on worship institutions. The questionnaire was administered to all respondents of the study.

According to Bryman and Bell (2015), a key informant interview is a research tool used to gather specific qualitative information from respondents who are usually experts and decision-makers about a topic. Key informant interviews were conducted

with three (3) security officers, 3 Church leaders, 1 Muslim leader and 1 Hindu leader and used to corroborate the findings obtained from the questionnaire.

3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments

Pilot testing is also called pre-testing of a particular component such as the questionnaire (Flick, 2015). Pilot testing of the research instrument is important as it establishes practice through which one is able to identify errors and on the same note very useful in mastering the instruments that are appropriately used in the study. The researcher carried out a pilot study using a pilot sample of 37 respondents drawn from worshippers, religious leaders and security officers in Mombasa county. This represents 10% of the sample size. Mombasa County was picked based on its similar characteristics as those of Nairobi County, and the prevalent of terrorist attacks in the County as well. The pilot questionnaires were not included in the final phase of analysis. The results obtained from the pilot study helped shape the final questionnaire in terms of the questions' content validity and duration of administration.

3.6.3 Instrument Reliability

According to Klenke (2016), reliability is the extent to which results are consistent over time. This study used a Cronbach Alpha coefficient to determine the reliability of the instrument using a pilot sample of 37 respondents. The pilot results were subjected to reliability analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) programme version 23 to determine the Cronbach alpha coefficient using the following formula;

$$\alpha = \frac{n}{n-1} \left[1 - \frac{\sum Vi}{V\ test} \right]$$

Where

n = number of questions

Vi = Variance of scores on each question

V test =Total variance of overall scores (not percentages) on the entire test

An overall reliability coefficient of 0.828 was obtained and was considered acceptable to warrant the usability of the questionnaire to collect data, because it was more than 0.7 as recommended by Flick (2015).

3.6.4 Instrument Validity

According to Bryman and Bell (2015), validity determines whether the research instruments truly measure what it is intended to be measured or how truthful the research results are. In the context of the study, the researcher used face validity. Face validity is a subjective decision of whether measures of a certain concept will appear to measure what is intended to measure. In this regard, the researcher gave the data collection instruments to the supervisors and fellow researchers to be able to get their feedback on whether these measures were relevant in measuring what the researcher intended to measure. More importantly, the questionnaire and KIIs were given to the supervisors who ensured that the questionnaire was measuring the study variables, by suggesting areas that needed amendments. The researcher worked on the amendments as suggested by the supervisors.

3.6.5 Data Collection Procedure

For the data collection activity, individual permission for access to the respondents was sought from the relevant authorities. The researcher trained research assistants as soon as the University gave the approval to proceed to the data collection stage. The research assistants were instructed to be flexible on how to distribute and

collect the questionnaires. This ensured that the quality of the data collected was up to the required standards.

3.7 Data Processing and Analysis

Quantitative and qualitative data analysis approaches were applied to this study. Quantitative data was checked for consistency before being fed into the SPSS version 23 computer programme for analysis. All the study variables were coded appropriately and descriptively analyzed to generate frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations. Presentation was in tables, figures and graphs. Qualitative data from the key interviews and open-ended questions was analyzed using content analysis to examine the emerging key themes and trends from the responses, and presented in verbalisms.

3.8 Legal and Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were considered during the entire phase of research, and entail informed consent, voluntary participation, do no harm, confidentiality and anonymity. First, the researcher sought permission from the relevant authorities to be allowed to conduct research on the area, getting an introduction letter from Africa Nazarene University (Appendix IV) introducing the researcher to the authorities as well as informing them of the research and the process of gathering of data and a letter of authority from National Council of Science and Technology (NACOSTI) (Appendix V). Also, the researcher sought consent from the participants as well as informing them that participation in the study was voluntary and hence no coercion was used to have them participate. The participants were also assured of confidentiality and anonymity of their responses, that the responses were purely for academic purposes only.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the outcome of data analysis and findings in line with the objectives of the study. The study sought to assess the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions and establish the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

4.2 The Demographic Characteristics of the Study Respondent

The study sought to determine the general characteristics of the respondents who participated in the study. The demographic information sought in the study was obtained from the Church leaders, Muslim leaders, Hindu leaders and worshippers. The information sought was the religion of respondent, gender of respondent, highest education level attained by respondent, age bracket of respondent and marital status of respondent. The response rate is also included to show the number of questionnaires that were returned and were legibly and completely filled and were therefore adopted for analysis in the study. These findings are presented in sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.6.

4.2.1 Response Rate

A total of 387 Church leaders, Muslim leaders, Hindu leaders, worshippers and security officers were sought in the study. Nonetheless, non-response incidents were encountered during data collection and therefore out of the targeted 387 respondents,

307 gave positive response to the study while 80 did not return their questionnaires. The study therefore achieved an overall response rate of 79% as presented in Figure 4-1. This response was excellent as per Klenke (2016) who recommends that a response rate of 60% or more is considered sufficient for a study. For the interviews, a response rate of 100% was obtained.

Figure 4-1: Response Rate
Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.2 Religious Affiliation of Respondents

The study sought to comprehend the religious affiliation of respondents. As the study was based on worship institutions, obtaining information on the religious affiliation of the respondents was important in making general inferences about response to terror attacks on worship institutions. The findings shown in Figure 4-2, indicates that 69% (n=210) of the respondents were Christian protestants, 14% (n=43) were Muslims, 12% (n=38) were Christian Catholics and 5% (n=16) were Hindu. The findings imply that there are more Christians in worship institutions in Nairobi CBD, as compared to their Muslim and Hindu counterparts, and therefore churches are a bigger target to terrorists as compared to other worship centres.

Figure 4-2: Respondents' Religious Affiliations

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.3 Gender of Respondents

The study sought to determine the gender of the respondents who took part in the study, with the presumption that variation in gender could influence opinions on the preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions. The findings indicated that 58% (n=179) of the those who participated in the study were male while their female counterparts formed 42% (n=128) of the responses. The findings imply more male worshippers male participated in the study than female, as shown in Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-3: Respondents' Gender

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.4 Highest Education Level Attained by Respondent

The education level attained by the respondents was sought in the study in order to determine the ability of the respondents to answer questions postulated to them. As shown in Figure 4-4, indicate that 49% (n=149) of the respondents had attained secondary level education, 22% (n=68) had attained college level education and 26% (n=81) had attained university education while 3% (n=9) had attained primary level education as indicated on Figure 4-4 below. The findings imply that the respondents had an averagely appropriate levels of education, hence did not have problems answering the questions posted to them.

Figure 4-4: Respondents' Highest Education Level
Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.5 Age Bracket of Respondents

The study sought to evaluate the age category of the respondents in order to determine how different age groups perceive preparedness to terrorist activities and also how they are impacted by terror attacks. The findings presented in Figure 4-5, indicate that 43% (n=131) of the respondents are in the age category 26-35 years, 29% (n=90) are in the age category of 18-26 years and 16% (n=48) are in age category of 36-64 years. There was only one respondent aged above 55 years, which can be attributed to

the government directive that those aged 57 years or more should not attend worship sessions as a method/precaution of keeping themselves safe from the Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) pandemic. This is an age group that has been identified to be among the most vulnerable to the disease.

Figure 4-5: Respondents' Age
Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.6 Marital Status of Respondents

The study further sought to assess the marital status of the respondents in order to determine among other things, how the issue under investigation has impacted on the marriage institution, the findings presented in Figure 4-6, indicate that 56% (n=172) of the respondents were married, while 44% (n=135) were single. The findings imply that both married and single individuals attended worship centres in Nairobi CBD, and therefore response to terrorist activities requires efforts of everyone, whether married or not.

Figure 4-6: Respondents' Marital Status
Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3 Presentation of Research Analysis and Findings

The study sought to assess the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions and establish the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions. The findings of the study are presented in four sections (4.3.1 to 4.3.4), each sub-section based on one specific objective of the study.

4.3.1 Nature of Training Offered in Response to Terror Attacks

The first objective of the study was to examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD, in order to determine what people were trained on. The findings obtained indicate that most respondents (43.3%) disagreed that there has been training for the security

personnel and worshippers on terrorism response and 43.3% strongly disagreed while 6.5% strongly agreed. Most respondents (44.3%) strongly disagreed that there is appropriate training on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats and 42% agreed while 4.2% agreed. In addition, 44.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is training on security checkups at all times in required areas, 41.7% disagreed while 7.5% agreed.

The findings also indicate that 44% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is training on risk management and audits in the premises, 42.3% disagreed while 4.2% agreed. Most respondents (44.3%) strongly disagreed that training about fast response is given by experts in the facility, 42.3% disagreed while 3.6% agreed. Finally, 46.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that people are trained on how to give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks, 43% disagreed while 6.2% strongly agreed.

On average, the respondents disagreed that there is training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response ($M = 1.83$, $SD = 1.049$); training on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats ($M = 1.80$, $SD = 0.965$); training on security checkups at all times in required areas ($M = 1.82$, $SD = 0.993$); training on risk management and audits in the premises ($M = 1.81$, $SD = 0.979$); training about fast response is given by experts in the facility ($M = 1.78$, $SD = 0.920$); and training on how to give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks ($M = 1.78$, $SD = 1.030$). The findings are presented in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: Nature of Training in Response to Terror Attacks

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD
There is training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response	f	133	137	12	5	20	1.83	1.049
	%	43.3%	44.6%	3.9%	1.6%	6.5%		
There is appropriate training on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats	f	136	129	19	13	10	1.80	.965
	%	44.3%	42.0%	6.2%	4.2%	3.3%		
There is training on security checkups at all times in required areas	f	137	128	11	23	8	1.82	.993
	%	44.6%	41.7%	3.6%	7.5%	2.6%		
There is training on risk management and audits in the premises	f	135	130	18	13	11	1.81	.979
	%	44.0%	42.3%	5.9%	4.2%	3.6%		
Training about fast response is given by experts in the facility	f	136	130	22	11	8	1.78	.920
	%	44.3%	42.3%	7.2%	3.6%	2.6%		
People are trained on how to give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks	f	142	132	10	4	19	1.78	1.030
	%	46.3%	43.0%	3.3%	1.3%	6.2%		

Source: Research Data (2020).

From the open ended questions and key informant interviews, it was found that there was training on security agents; however, the training is only done on security officers such as the police, while those offering security in the worship centres such as security guards receive minimal to no training on response to terror attacks. The responses obtained to corroborate the study findings were as follows;

There is training for government security officers, but minimal training on those placed on churches and other worship institutions. The security officers are trained on situation analysis and keeping high alertness in response to apprehending suspicious persons or elements that are gaining access to worship institutions. They are also trained on seeking quick reinforcement in case of terror attacks. They are trained on crowd management and casualty evacuation (Source: Security officer1).

Security agents do undertake collective training on terror attacks in social places that include worship institutions, shopping malls, schools and colleges inter-alia. The nature of training is aimed at intelligence collection to pre-empt possible attacks, and response procedures to minimize fatalities/injuries, and arrest the situation (Source: Security officer3).

Our security guards and worshippers do not receive intensive training on how to deal with terror attacks, in case they occur. Therefore, trainings on dealing with indoctrination and building a counter narrative to deal with the faulty understanding may help curb the problem of terror even before it occurs (Source: Religious leader1).

Worshippers and security guards are not essentially given training on response to terror attacks. However, security officers do receive training through bomb disposal courses, counter terrorism courses, post-blast investigation courses and counterintelligence courses (Source: Security officer2).

4.3.2 Activities Undertaken in Response to Terror Attacks

The second objective of the study was to examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The findings obtained indicate that39.1% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas, 36.2% disagreed while 7.2% disagreed. Most respondents (39.7%) strongly disagreed that there is prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers, 38.1% disagreed while 9.1% agreed. Also, 40.1% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is adequate patrol to protect people and assets, 37.1% disagreed while 7.2% agreed.

The findings also indicate that 41.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed to the fact that there are patrols to identify new vulnerabilities and risks, 36.5% disagreed

while 5.2% agreed. 52.8% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there are counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centre, 37.5% disagreed while 3.9% agreed. In addition, 58.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts, 22.1% disagreed while 7.2% agreed.

On average, the respondents disagreed to all statements that there is involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas ($M = 2.07$, $SD = 1.194$); there is prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers ($M = 2.02$, $SD = 1.146$); there is adequate patrol to protect people and assets ($M = 2.01$, $SD = 1.136$); there are patrols to identify new vulnerabilities and risks ($M = 1.97$, $SD = 1.124$); there are counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centre ($M = 1.61$, $SD = 0.769$); and there is allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 1.144$). The findings are presented in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2: Activities in Response to Terror Attacks

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD
There is involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas	f	120	111	32	22	22	2.07	1.194
	%	39.1%	36.2%	10.4%	7.2%	7.2%		
There is prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers	f	122	117	24	28	16	2.02	1.146
	%	39.7%	38.1%	7.8%	9.1%	5.2%		
There is adequate patrol to protect people and assets	f	123	114	31	22	17	2.01	1.136
	%	40.1%	37.1%	10.1%	7.2%	5.5%		
There are patrols to identify new vulnerabilities and risks	f	128	112	33	16	18	1.97	1.124
	%	41.7%	36.5%	10.7%	5.2%	5.9%		
There are counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centre	f	162	115	18	12	0	1.61	.769
	%	52.8%	37.5%	5.9%	3.9%	0.0%		
There is allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts	f	180	68	23	22	14	1.77	1.144
	%	58.6%	22.1%	7.5%	7.2%	4.6%		

Source: Research Data (2020).

From the key informants, the study also postulated that in response to response to terror attacks, it was the responsibility of the security officers to neutralize the attacking elements, protect worshippers from any attack and do intelligence gathering among others. The following responses were obtained from the key informants.

The activities undertaken by security agents in case of terror attack on worship institution is to neutralize the attacking elements. In addition, protect worshipers from any threat and instructing them to stay calm (Source: Security officer3).

The activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks include but not limited to the following: Cordon/Isolation of the scene of the attack to prevent new entrants and possible exit of the attackers, identification of bombs/ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), terror suspects and critical points, render safe of the bombs/IEDs that might have been laid and armed to explode, procedures on elimination of terrorist and information and intelligence gathering from the worshippers (Source: Security officer1).

Security officers are charged with responsibilities such as respond to the scene, attack the adversary in case of retaliation, seal off the area to avoid interference of the scene, assist injured where possible – first aid and collect samples of the explosive materials used in case of explosion/bomb/ IEDs among others (Source: Religious leader4).

4.3.3 Effectiveness of the Strategies Put in Place in Response to Terror Attacks

The third objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The findings indicate that 31.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there are effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned, 18.9% disagreed while 15.6% agreed. 47.2% strongly disagreed that there is effective information sharing between government and other institutions to improve response to any kind of threat, 36.2% disagreed while 5.5% agreed.

In addition, 55% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there exists effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response, crisis management to the worship centres, 35.5% disagreed while 3.9% agreed. Further, 58% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the security agencies work together in ensuring proper checkups throughout worship institutions, 26.1% disagreed while 7.2% agreed. The findings are shown in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Effectiveness of the Strategies in Response to Terror Attacks

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD
There are effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned	f	97	58	81	48	23	2.49	1.284
	%	31.6%	18.9%	26.4%	15.6%	7.5%		
There is effective information sharing between government and other institutions to improve response to any kind of threat	f	145	111	34	17	0	1.75	.863
	%	47.2%	36.2%	11.1%	5.5%	0.0%		
There exists effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response, crisis management to the worship centres	f	169	109	17	12	0	1.58	.768
	%	55.0%	35.5%	5.5%	3.9%	0.0%		
The security agencies work together in ensuring proper checkups throughout worship institutions	f	178	80	19	22	8	1.70	1.039
	%	58.0%	26.1%	6.2%	7.2%	2.6%		

Source: Research Data (2020).

On average, the respondents disagreed to all statements that there are effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 1.1284$); there is effective information sharing between government and other institutions to improve response to any kind of threat ($M = 1.75$,

SD = 0.863); there exists effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response, crisis management to the worship centres (*M* = 1.58, *SD* = 0.768); and the security agencies work together in ensuring proper checkups throughout worship institutions (*M* = 1.70, *SD* = 1.039).

From the key informants, the study found that there are strategies adopted by security officers to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. However, some respondents identified the strategies to be effective, while others observed that they are ineffective. The following responses were obtained;

> Depending on the measures put in place such as security guards with metal detectors, these guards do not really know what they are looking for, making this process hard (Source: Religious leader3).

> Our church has done well in terms of monitoring of the facility, with CCTV cameras installed in almost every place. This usually helps detect/deter crime- as it captures sequence of events and can identify the adversary. Guards can report any suspicious characters/vehicles within the premises (Source: Religious leader5).

> The strategies put in place are indeed effective in that they have been able to deter the terrorist, thus, minimal reported incidences. On several occasions, intelligence leads have made pre-emptive arrest of the attackers and confiscation of explosives items and arms. Worshippers have also been able to volunteer information on the terrorist sympathizers and recruits. Further, the specialized terror attack response teams have been strategically positioned countrywide and with specific focus on suspected hotspots (Source: Security officer2).

> The strategies in place to protect worship areas include deployment of security officers in worship areas and doing patrols with threat areas as opposed to staying at fixed location, installation of security walls around worship places, installation of access controls and manning of gates of worship places by armed and unarmed guardianship and enhanced intelligence gathering against vulnerable worship institution and proactively protection them. Despite the diverse strategies some security agents despite their level of training are caught unawares by terrorist as they are busy with their phones chatting as in the case of 2012 Catholic Church attack in Nairobi where officers and worshippers lost their lives (Source: Security officer1).

4.3.4 Quality of Security Equipment in Response to Terror Attacks

The final objective of the study was to establish the quality of security equipment being used in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The findings of the study showed that 45.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is adequate security equipment, 23.1% disagreed while 11.7% agreed. 52.4% strongly disagreed that the security perimeters available are in good condition and in use, 32.9% disagreed while 4.6% agreed. Additionally, 53.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the placement of physical features, activities and people is in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat, 36.8% disagreed while 3.9% agreed.

The findings also indicate that 59.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is good design for the facilities in worship institutions, 24.8% disagreed while 5.9% agreed. 45.9% strongly disagreed that the existing security facilities such as cameras and alarms work properly, 21.2% disagreed while 11.7% agreed. 47.9% strongly disagreed that the screening security systems are existent and work properly, 32.6% disagreed while 4.9% agreed. Also, 52.4% strongly disagreed on the fact that the design of facilities in worship institutions is good, 35.4% disagreed while 5.2% agreed. Finally, 63.8% strongly disagreed that there are adequate detectors and alarms, 20.2% disagreed while 7.8% agreed.

On average, the respondents disagreed to all statements that there are adequate security equipment ($M = 2.05$, $SD = 1.176$); the security perimeters available are in good condition and in use ($M = 1.67$, $SD = 0.836$); the placement of physical features, activities and people is in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat ($M = 1.60$, $SD = 0.767$); there is good design of facilities in worship institutions ($M = 1.70$, $SD = 1.062$); the existing security facilities such as cameras and alarms work properly

(M = 2.07, SD = 1.206); the screening security systems are existent and work properly

(M = 1.80, SD = 0.971); the design of facilities in worship institutions is good (M =

1.65, SD = 0.824); and there are adequate detectors and alarms (M = 1.65, SD = 1.060),

showing that major equipment were not working properly. The findings are presented

in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4: Quality of Security Equipment

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD
There are adequate security equipment	f	139	71	51	36	10	2.05	1.176
	%	45.3%	23.1%	16.6%	11.7%	3.3%		
The security perimeters available are in good condition and in use	f	161	101	31	14	0	1.67	.836
	%	52.4%	32.9%	10.1%	4.6%	0.0%		
The placement of physical features, activities and people is in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat	f	165	113	17	12	0	1.60	.767
	%	53.7%	36.8%	5.5%	3.9%	0.0%		
There is good design of facilities in worship institutions	f	182	76	20	18	11	1.70	1.062
	%	59.3%	24.8%	6.5%	5.9%	3.6%		
The existing security facilities such as cameras and alarms work properly	f	141	65	53	36	12	2.07	1.206
	%	45.9%	21.2%	17.3%	11.7%	3.9%		
The screening security systems are existent and work properly	f	147	100	39	15	6	1.80	.971
	%	47.9%	32.6%	12.7%	4.9%	2.0%		
The design of facilities in worship institutions is good	f	161	109	21	16	0	1.65	.824
	%	52.4%	35.5%	6.8%	5.2%	0.0%		
There are adequate detectors and alarms	f	196	62	17	24	8	1.65	1.060
	%	63.8%	20.2%	5.5%	7.8%	2.6%		

Source: Research Data (2020).

From key informant interviews, the study found that for security officers, the quality of equipment was good. However, for worship institutions, the quality of equipment was not as good, as compared to the security officers who thought they were of good quality. The following responses were obtained;

> The quality of the security equipment is above board. These equipment range from explosive detectors, sniffer dogs, explosive disposal kits among others. However, it is important to note that the best security equipment in response to terror attack in worship places are the worshippers in volunteering information. This is because in almost all terror incidents, there has been some aid of the local person (Source: Security officer2).

> The quality of equipment is inadequate in response to terror attack on worship places and response time by security agents has been long. This makes casualties high whenever there are incident targeting worship places (Source: Religious leader2).

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings, summary of findings, conclusion based on the interpretation of the results and recommendations for the study. The recommendations are based on practice and policy implication as well as areas for further research.

5.2 Discussion

This section discusses the results on the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. The section is guided by the specific objectives of the study which are to examine the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, examine the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, assess the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions and establish the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

A total of 307 out of 387 questionnaires had all questions completely responded to and were found suitable and eligible for analysis giving an overall response rate of 79%. This response was excellent as per Klenke (2016) who recommends that a response rate of 60% or more. The findings show that 81% of the respondents are Christians. The findings imply that there are more Christian worshippers in Nairobi CBD than other religious groups. This is consistent with the findings by Tarus (2017) who found that Christians constitute the majority of religious group in Nairobi, Kenya.

The findings indicated that 58% of the those who participated in the study were male while their female counterparts formed 42% of the responses. This is good representation of both gender in worship institutions, with males being higher than females. The findings align with those of Galgalo (2017), who observed that worship institutions, especially leadership positions are dominated by males. The findings also indicate that 49% of the respondents had attained secondary level of education, 22% had attained college level education and 26% had attained university education. These are appropriate levels of education capable of providing well thought out responses for the study. In accordance to Alfano and Gorlach (2019), education is an important factor in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, good education levels could minimize chances of worshipers being lured into terrorist groups.

The findings also indicate that 43% of the respondents are in the age category 26-35 years. The findings are different from the findings documented by Scheitle and Halligan (2018) who found that most worshippers are young and are aged less than 25 years. The findings also indicate that 56% of the respondents were married, also inconsistent with Scheitle and Halligan (2018) findings that single people are the majority in worship institutions. The findings are different because this study was done during the COVID-19 pandemic, where certain ages, especially those less than 13 years and those that are above 57 years are not required to attend worship institutions. Children aged less than 18 years were also excluded from this study, as they could not provide any meaningful information on response to terror attacks in worship institutions.

5.2.1 Nature of Training Offered in Response to Terror Attacks

The study found that most respondents (43.3%) disagreed that there is training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response (Table 4-1). These

findings were supported by those from the key informants that training was lacking for worshippers on terrorism response. The findings of the study are supported by the findings of Kinney *et al*. (2018) who also found that inadequate knowledge has been seen to be a factor in many accidents and terror related incidents. Most worshippers are not taken through training programs in most worship centres, which leave them vulnerable to attacks. The study posited that in most situations, lacking the proper skill or knowledge for terrorism response can result into errors that could have been managed earlier. Nemeth, 2017) also agrees that the security training is part of the safety program to help workers and worshippers develop safety awareness and take the correct ways to prevent unsafe practices when performing a task or several tasks, and to counter terror threats. However, training is only given to security officers, as opposed to worshippers who use the premises every now and then.

Most respondents (44.3%) strongly disagreed that there is appropriate awareness on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats (Table 4-1). These findings are similar to those of Ellis and Abdi (2017) who noted that there is low training for worshippers on establishing suspicious activity reporting procedures which is very critical to security and mitigation of a potential incidents. Ellis and Abdi (2017) also posit that training on suspicious activities such as unusual items or situations, unattended packages and individuals paying unusual attention to facilities need to be attended with care. However, most houses of worship lack these important components.

Most respondents (44.6%) strongly disagreed that there is training on security check-ups at all times in required areas (Table 4-1). In agreement with the findings of the study, Kinney *et al.* (2018) found that worship institutions lack important security checks including vehicles that are used to transport various tools that can be used to commit terror such as bombs. This was however contrary to other private places, such

as big hotels where guest baggage checks were taken to a drop off point away from the entrance and passed through the scanners to detect objects with a high degree of clarity. However, Hesterman (2018) disagrees with the findings when the study found that some worship places had perimeter security system that was put in place at the perimeter outside the churches where cars are stopped for a thorough check-up.

The findings indicate that 44% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is training on risk management and audits in the premises (Table 4-1). The findings of the study are similar with those of Martin (2016) who also found that security measures provided by worship institutions personnel are insufficient with risk assessment done in very few areas. Naja and Baytiyeh (2016) also found that training on risk management has been missing, and thereby recommends a risk assessment in worship institutions to determine the level of risk, which private security can help in. The findings are also supported by Gilmore (2018) who found risk managements to be missing in worship institutions, and therefore recommends that governments needed to coordinate and integrate critical infrastructure and soft target protection efforts to ensure expertise is shared across sectors and ensure soft target risk management efforts are met.

Most respondents (44.3%) strongly disagreed on the fact that training about fast response is given by experts in the facility (Table 4-1). These findings were supported by those from the key informants that training on fast response was lacking for worshippers on terrorism response. In line with these findings, White (2016) also observed that security agents and worshippers lacked enough training response activities. As locals are often the first to notice suspicious activities, training them can have a significant effect on fast response and therefore critically important to minimizing the impacts of an attack. Training is also important in avoiding such things

as confusion as to who leads what activity. If everyone is responsible, nobody is responsible.

The study determined that 46.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that people are trained on how to give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks (Table 4-1). The findings disagree with those of McDonald (2018), who observed that information sharing between the community and the security agents was little but there, and usually began during a crisis. It was therefore essential that activities such as police patrols can only be enhanced by information, they get from the community involved.

5.2.2 Activities Undertaken in Response to Terror Attacks

The findings indicated that 39.1% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas (Table 4-2). These findings were supported by those from the key informants that involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas was lacking. In support of the study findings, Alfano and Gorlach (2019) also argued that the public in Kenya lacked information on how to contact those charged with security. to help reinforce the importance of this, the public should be able to receive some type of acknowledgment or response. The challenge is developing and shaping a centralized, managed program that articulates key indicators and encourages meaningful reporting. In addition, Hamilton (2018) noted that governments lacked programs that promote awareness of one's surroundings and encourage reporting of suspicious activities and anomalies. Employees involved in large gatherings such as worship institutions can often detect suspicious activity more easily than security agents or security personnel can. Hamilton (2018) recommends processes for receiving, reviewing, and responding to public reports and establishing continuous education for the public and industry on what constitutes suspicious activity.

Most respondents (39.7%) strongly disagreed that there is prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers (Table 4-2). Abrahms, Ward and Kennedy (2018) agree with the study findings when their study found that there was minimal prioritizing of targets by the security agents which affected those who assumed primary responsibility for security. Freilich *et al.* (2018) also noted that prioritizing targets was low in response measure to terror. Therefore, it was essential to identify and prioritize targets according to a risk assessment based on and relevant to local factors.

Most respondents (40.1%) strongly disagreed that there is adequate patrol to protect people and assets (Table 4-2). McDonald (2018) agrees with the findings of the study when the study observed that there were inadequate patrols on worship institutions and that information sharing between the community and the security agents only began during a crisis. Activities such as police patrols can only be enhanced by information they get from the community involved. Coordination mechanisms and trust should be in existence among the community and the security agents before they come together to deal with a threat or in order to save time. In addition, Hesterman (2018) also noted that protecting soft targets is complex, and entails balancing security and access, as well as the amount of patrols.

The findings indicate that 41.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there are patrols to identify new vulnerabilities and risks (Table 4-2). In agreement with the findings of the study, Sylves (2019) postulated that soft target areas usually failed to conduct risk assessments regularly to keep pace with the evolving nature of the threat and adversary. The study recommended that governments needed to update training for law enforcement and industry to keep pace with actual threats, which would help stakeholders adapt to evolving threats. Most respondents (52.8%) also strongly

disagreed that there counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centre. These findings are supported by Freilich *et al*. (2018) who also noted that prioritizing targets was missing, and thereby, it was essential to identify and prioritize targets according to a risk assessment based on relevant local factors.

The study found that 58.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts (Table 4-2). As Freilich *et al*. (2018) also noted, since there was lack of prioritizing targets such as worship centres, decisions on how much and when to allocate resources to these places was also missing. The challenge is how to tailor both visible and invisible security measures and apply resources judiciously, thus decreasing the likelihood and consequences of an attack while reinforcing the confidence of the public.

5.2.3 Effectiveness of the Strategies Put in Place in Response to Terror Attacks

The findings indicate that 31.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there are effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned (Table 4-3). Information sharing problem was also identified by the key informants, which derailed the efforts of terrorism response and fighting in the country at large. In line with the findings of the study, Scheitle and Halligan (2018) argued that there lacked effective security coordination, and thereby developing partnerships between industry and government is essential. In addition, Miller and Stivachtis (2019) also agree that the role of public-private partnerships need promoting mutual understanding, which would lead to joint efforts on terrorist tactics such as the use of rental vehicles.

It was determined that 47.2% strongly disagreed that there is effective information sharing between government and other institutions to improve response to any kind of threat (Table 4-3). Information sharing between government and worship institutions is a challenge, but it is essential to protecting soft targets such as worship institutions. Hesterman (2018) agrees that fostering information sharing that can substantially enhance the ability of the facility to assess risks and make security and preparedness decisions to address vulnerabilities, hazards, and potential impacts.

The findings also indicate that 55% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there exists effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response and crisis management to the worship centres (Table 4-3). In support of the findings of the study, Fagel and Hesterman (2016) highlighted how effectiveness in inter-security coordination in national frameworks was lacking and could be enhanced. The authors argued that coordination entails identifying and organizing, outlining of clear roles, responsibilities, and engagement opportunities. Key relationships include those among law enforcement organizations and between the government and the private sector. Coordination can therefore serve to extend protective measures beyond institutions.

The study found that 58% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the security agencies work together in ensuring proper check-ups throughout worship institutions (Table 4-3). Kaplan (2017) also found that the relationship was lacking, and demonstrated how governments, and private sectors need to plan and work together to counter the evolving threat to potential soft ta Hesterman (2018) further posits that working together for security check-ups was crucial, where in applicable cases, cars should escort guests at a distance from the church entrance and a closed-circuit TV installed in public areas together with the scanners.

5.2.4 Quality of Security Equipment in Response to Terror Attacks

The findings of the study showed that 45.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is adequate security equipment (Table 4-4). A lack of security equipment is also identified by some key informants, with the security agents feeling that the equipment was not a major problem. Omayio (2015) disagrees with the findings of the study when the study noted that worship centre had few equipment on response to terror attacks, in case they happened. However, specialized training was needed for emergency team leaders and members, especially personnel who will take on additional responsibilities, such as emergency response equipment. The security perimeters were also not good condition. This study found that 52.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the security perimeters available are in good condition and in use.

Additionally, 53.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the placement of physical features, activities and people is in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat (Table 4-4). The findings are in line with those of Hesterman (2018) who posits that response activities were not practiced with first responder agencies, in order to provide vital preparedness planning and response if an incident occurs. Freilich *et al*. (2018) also recommend proper arrangement of physical features and people to minimize causalities in case of terror attacks in soft areas.

The findings also indicate that 59.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is good design of facilities in worship institutions (Table 4-4). Scheitle and Halligan (2018) however disagrees that there are opportunities for further collaboration to consider how to incorporate security design into new construction and renovations of soft target facilities. No security measure is fool proof, so a layered approach that includes comprehensive preparation and response planning should continue since some locations, even if hardened will always be attractive to terrorists.

Most respondents (45.9%) strongly disagreed that the existing security facilities such as cameras and alarms work properly (Table 4-4). Further, most respondents strongly disagreed that the screening security systems are existent and work properly. Martin (2016) recommends security in worship institutions requires these organizations to become better prepared for terrorist attacks through increased use of security technology, additional emergency preparedness planning, improved liaison/partnering with the law enforcement agencies and personnel training. Also, 52.4% of the respondents in this study strongly disagreed that the design of facilities in worship institutions is good.

Finally, 63.8% strongly disagreed that there are adequate detectors and alarms (Table 4-4). In line with the findings of the study, Oanda (2013) observed that lack of alarms is a major challenge while implementing security measures in Kenya. The study however noted that it's convenient to discuss security measures in the context of insecurity and of protecting rooms where computer equipment monitoring security and other assets are kept. Alarms also give a good grounding in the wider problem of service denial attacks. In addition, Rahimi and Graumans (2015) observed that frequent testing of the security measures or response to alarms, particularly when un-announced, offer important insight into preparedness and the effectiveness of existing measures.

5.3 Summary of Findings

The study sought to assess the level of preparedness to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD. Specifically, the study examined the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, examined the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, assessed the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions and

established the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions.

On the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study found that there was no training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response. There lacked appropriate training on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats as well as training on security checkups at all times in required areas. The findings also indicate that there was lack of training on risk management and audits in the premises, fast and on how the people would give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks.

On the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study found that there was no involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas and there was lack of prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers. Also, there was lack of adequate patrol to protect people and assets and identify new vulnerabilities and risks. There also lacked counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centres and allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts was lacking.

On the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions, the findings indicate that there was lack of effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned. In addition, there was no effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response and crisis management to the worship centres and the security agencies do not work together in ensuring proper checkups throughout worship institutions.

On the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the findings of the study showed that there was lack of adequate security equipment and that the security perimeters available were not in very good condition. Additionally, the placement of physical features, activities and people was not in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat, with the design of facilities in worship institutions not being good in relation to terror attacks. The cameras and alarms were in existence, but did not work properly, as well as the screening security systems.

5.4 Conclusion

On the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study concluded that there lacked important training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response as well as reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats. Hence, the worship centres are easy targets for terrorist groups and fatalities can be major as people do not know how to respond to such situations.

On the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study concluded that there was lack of important activities in response to terror attacks such as prioritizing of targets, adequate patrol and allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres. Therefore, worship institutions are exposed to terrorist activities, and can easily be penetrated if urgent actions such as securing and allocating resources to the institutions are not undertaken.

On the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study concluded that the strategies used were not effective in response to terror attacks, as they lacked involvement of all

actors. Therefore, strategies such as information sharing were paralyzed dur to lack of involvement in decision making.

On the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study concluded that there was lack of adequate security equipment such as cameras, alarms and screening security systems to respond to terror attacks, making worship institutions an easy target for terrorists. Overall, the level of preparedness was poor, as major preparedness measures such as training, equipment quality, security agent activities and strategy effectiveness were missing.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the discussion and the conclusion made, the study makes the following recommendations:

On the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study recommends training of security personnel and worshippers on various aspects related to terrorism response, such as mechanisms of reporting suspicious terror threats as well as the importance of security checkups in the facility. These aspects were found to be missing in the worship institutions studied.

On the activities undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study recommends that the government needs to involve the public, conduct adequate patrol to protect people and assets and allocate resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres, which were lacking in the worship institutions.

On the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study recommends that the government should partner with worship institutions in the prevention of terror attacks,

as effective partnership can prepare worship institutions for disaster preparedness, emergency response and crisis management.

On the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions, the study recommends installment of security equipment to monitor activities and people in worship institutions by the church, mosque or temple managements. The cameras, screening security systems and alarms were in existence in some institutions but did not work properly in most cases they were installed.

5.6 Suggestion for Further Research

This study was only conducted in worship institutions in Nairobi CBD, Nairobi County. This limited the scope of the study in coverage. The study therefore recommends that other studies be conducted on the same subject in other soft target areas such as markets, schools and supermarkets among others for comparative results in the future. This will help devise whether all soft targets are the same, or there are some areas where security has been enhanced.

Based on specific objectives of the study, the study recommends future studies on how training can be done for worshippers, which was lacking, to respond to terror attacks in an effective way. In addition, studies on how to improve and enact a functional preparedness capacity are needed. The study further recommends future studies on whether security equipment used in other soft target facilities is different from the one in worship institutions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introduction Letter

I am a master's student of Africa Nazarene University undertaking a degree programme on Governance, Peace and Conflict Studies. As a requirement for postgraduate studies, am undertaking graduate research study on the **ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS IN RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS IN WORSHIP INSTITUTIONS WITHIN NAIROBI CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT.**

Kindly, allow me to engage with you on the mentioned topic. If you chose to be my study participants, information you share as well as your identity will not be disclosed to anyone whatsoever and confidentiality remains utmost. You also have the right to withdraw from the study wherever you feel like. Thank you for your cooperation and timely response.

Yours,

ABDINASIR ABASS GAFOW

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Consent given:

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

This questionnaire is aimed at facilitating the research on the **ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS IN RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS IN WORSHIP INSTITUTIONS WITHIN NAIROBI CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT**. Your response will be highly appreciated.

Instructions:

Please read each item in this questionnaire and fill in or tick in the spaces provided where appropriate.

SECTION A: Demographic information

1. Religion of respondent

Christian protestant   [ ]

Christian Catholic   [ ]

Hindu   [ ]

Muslim   [ ]

Other   [ ]

2. Gender of respondent

Male [ ]

Female [ ]

Other   [ ]

3. Highest education level attained by respondent

Non- formal education [ ]

Primary education   [ ]

Secondary Level   [ ]

College Level   [ ]

University Level   [ ]

4. Age bracket of respondent

18-25 years   [ ]

26-35 years   [ ]

36-45 years   [ ]

46-55 years   [ ]

More than 55   [ ]

5. Marital status of respondent

Single/ Never Married [   ]

Married   [ ]

Other   [ ]

SECTION B: TRAINING OF SECURITY AGENTS IN RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS

This section asks questions on training of security agents in response to terror attacks. On the scale of 5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5
There is training of security personnel and worshippers on terrorism response					
There is appropriate training on reporting mechanisms of suspicious terror threats					

There is training on security checkups at all times in required areas					
There is training on how to manage dangers and checks in the premises					
Training about fast response is given by experts in the facility					
People are trained on how to give their suggestions on how to mitigate possible risks					

What other training measures apply?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION C: SECURITY AGENTS ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS

This section asks questions about security agents activities and response to terror attacks. On the scale of 5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5
There is involvement of the public in making decisions concerning security in key areas					
There is prioritizing of targets by identifying the most vulnerable areas and areas that pose threats to the worshippers					
There is adequate patrol to protect people and assets					
There are patrols to identify new vulnerabilities and risks					
There are counter-terrorism patrols made specifically for the worship centre					

There is allocation of resources to counterterrorism in the worship centres to support security agents patrol efforts					

What other activities apply?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION D: EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES IN PLACE

This section asks questions about the effectiveness of strategies in place. On the scale of 5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5
There are effective government partnerships as far as the security of the premises and those who use them is concerned					
There is effective information sharing between government and other institutions to improve response to any kind of threat					
There exists effective coordination on disaster preparedness, emergency response, crisis management to the worship centres					
The security agencies work together in ensuring proper checkups throughout worship institutions					

What people have you worked with in case of terrorist threats?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION E: QUALITY OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS

This section asks questions about quality of security equipment and response to terror attacks. On the scale of 5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5
There are adequate security equipment					
The security perimeters available are in good condition and in use					
The placement of physical features, activities and people is in a way that maximizes response to any kind of threat					
There is good design of facilities in worship institutions					
The existing security facilities such as cameras and alarms work properly					
The screening security systems are existent and work properly					
The design of facilities in worship institutions is good					
There are detectors and alarms present					

What other quality and modern security equipment apply?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION F: RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS

In the scale of 5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5
There have been reduced terrorist threats to the worship centres					
The premise is always prepared attacks that may arise					

Thank You.

Appendix III: Key Informant Interview Guide for Security Officers

i.   What is the nature of training offered to security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

_____

_____

_____

ii. What activities are undertaken by security agents in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

_____

_____

_____

iii. How effective are the strategies put in place to prepare security agents to respond to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

_____

_____

_____

iv. What is the quality of security equipment in use in response to terror attacks on worship institutions within Nairobi CBD?

_____

_____

_____

Appendix IV: Introduction Letter from Africa Nazarene University

11th June 2020

RE: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Abdinasir Abass Gafow **(18S03DMGP012)** is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University. He has finished his course work and has defended his thesis proposal entitled: - *"Assessment of the Level of Preparedness in Response to Terror Attacks in Worship Institutions within Nairobi Central Business District, Nairobi City County, Kenya".*

Any assistance accorded to him to facilitate data collection and finish his thesis is highly welcomed.

Rodney Reed, PhD.
DVC Academic & Student Affairs.

Appendix V: NACOSTI Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **201874**

Date of Issue: **24/June/2020**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. Abdinasir Abass Gafow of Africa Nazarene University, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS IN RESPONSE TO TERROR ATTACKS IN WORSHIP INSTITUTIONS IN NAIROBI CITY COUNTY. for the period ending : 24/June/2021.

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
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Appendix VI: Map of Study Area

STUDY AREA – Nairobi City County

Source: IEBC

Appendix VII: List of worship institutions within CBD

1) Nairobi Chapel CBD
2) Life Church International
3) Miracle Life Assembly CBD
4) The Holy Family Minor Basilica
5) Faith Impation Ministries
6) Deliverance Church House of Bread
7) Maximum Miracle Church
8) Christian Foundation Fellowship - CBD
9) Fountain Gate Church
10) Nairobi Central SDA Church - Maxwell
11) PEFA Church City Center
12) Nairobi Happy Church
13) St. Andrews PCEA Church
14) AIC Milimani, Nairobi KE
15) Nairobi Lighthouse Church
16) All Saints Cathedral, Nairobi
17) St. Paul's Catholic Chapel, University of Nairobi
18) Mamlaka Hill Chapel
19) Lutheran Church
20) Neno Evangelism Center
21) Jamia Mosque
22) Bohra Mosque
23) Khoja Mosque
24) Siri Guru Singh Sabha
25) Cutchi Gujarati Hindu Union Shiv Temple (CGHU)
26) S.S.D.S Temple
27) Shree Kutch Satsang Swaminarayan Temple