ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN KAMUKUNJI SUB-COUNTY, NAIROBI COUNTY, KENYA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES OF AFRICA NAZARENE UNIVERSITY

JULY 2020
DECLARATION

I declare that this document and the research it describes are my original work and that they have not been presented in any other university for academic work.

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REG NO: 18M03EMGP028

This research was conducted under our supervision and is submitted with our approval as the university supervisors.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late father Hussein Jirte and my mother Amina Adan and my family who have always supported me in my studies.

Thank you all for the support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give glory to Allah for giving me the opportunity to write this thesis. I wish to acknowledge my supervisors whose contribution facilitates the progress of this thesis.

I deeply appreciate Dr. Emily Okuto, Dr. Duncan Ochieng, Mr. Joseph Mutungi and Dr. Simon Muthomi, from the Department of Governance, Peace and Security Studies at Africa Nazarene University, for their support and dedication in ensuring that this thesis becomes successful. Without their encouragement and patience, it would have been difficult to bring it this far. I also wish to appreciate my family, friends and colleagues, for the support and encouragement they have given me to soldier on despite the challenges and obstacles met along the way.
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ABSTRACT

The study aimed at determining the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism, evaluate the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism and assess the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya. This study was anchored on the tenets of the Cognitive Dissonance Theory and the Schema Theory. The study adopted an exploratory research design, and the study population of 763 comprised of religious leaders, Public Benefit Organization (PBO) representatives, security leaders and community leaders. The sample was calculated using 10% of the population and 76 respondents was statistically significant. Quota sampling method was used to obtain the population strata and thereafter purposive sampling was used to obtain the sample from each strata. A questionnaire was administered to the religious leaders and PBO representatives and face to face interviews carried out with heads of the community and security to corroborate the responses from the questionnaire. The reliability of the study was tested and Cronbach Alpha value of 0.86 obtained. The validity of the findings was ensured by consulting supervisors. A total of 67 questionnaires was finally analysed achieving a response rate of 88% and quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented in figures and tables. Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic analysis and presented in verbatim. The study found that skills and vocational training on countering terrorism was the most used education and re-education strategy. There were also global partnerships for educations, career guidance initiatives, demobilization and reintegration programs and counter-terrorism studies in schools. Public involvement was done through public barazas, community dialogues, Nyumba Kumi meetings, making of local laws, information sharing concerning youths in the area and self-help groups meetings. The study concluded that non-state actors perceived counter-radicalization strategies to be successful and recommends that since the duration and impact of programs employed were cited to be too short and not efficient enough respectively, non-state actors should extend their methods and strategies to enough length of time required to reach all targeted areas.
### OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenges:</strong></td>
<td>It implies the factors that hinder effective countering of radicalization and therefore hinder the efforts against terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-Radicalization Programs:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it implies the plans to prevent members from the non-radicalized population from being radicalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficacy</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it implies the ability to produce a desired or intended result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fight Against Terrorism:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it entails the practice, techniques, and methods that non state actors use to combat or prevent terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non State Actors:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, they entail groups that hold influence and which are wholly or partly independent of Kenya, and include religious leaders and PBO representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it refers to deliberate system of principles to guide decisions and reduce radicalization and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalization:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it implies a practice of increasing extremism of somebody or a group, in which the inclination to use violence to strive for or support radical changes of society or the democratic legal system grow or convince others to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism:</strong></td>
<td>In the study, it refers to the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.</td>
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## ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODI</td>
<td>Community Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>National Identity Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEBC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCCP</td>
<td>Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>KACペン</td>
<td>Kamukunji Community Peace Network</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNBS</td>
<td>Kenya National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPI</td>
<td>Life and Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYC</td>
<td>Muslim Youth Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACOSTI</td>
<td>National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACT</td>
<td>National Agency for Combating Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYS</td>
<td>National Youth Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBO</td>
<td>Public Benefit Organization</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Psychological Reactance Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Religious Rehabilitation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United States Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Scofield Associations Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOWED</td>
<td>Social Welfare Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>YCD</td>
<td>Yemeni Committee for Dialogue</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study sought to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. This chapter entails the background on counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism. Further, the chapter presents the statement of the problem purpose of the study, objectives and research questions. The significance of the study, scope of the study, delimitations, limitations, assumptions, theoretical framework and conceptual framework are also discussed.

1.2 Background to the Study

The current wave of what are perceived to be counter-radicalization programmes which target ideology as a primary cause of terrorism, intensely began when Yemen commenced its own initiatives, following al Qaeda attacks on United States of America (USA) and French interests in the country. Fearing western intervention after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Yemeni government felt it had to adjust from its failing and unpopular policy of hard line suppression of al Qaeda, to include re-education of captured militants. This led to the birth of the Yemeni Committee for Dialogue (YCD) (Gunaratna & Hussin, 2018).

Non-state actors have been working with the government to counter-radicalization. In Indonesia, Fenton and Price (2016) noted that in ensuring that counter-radicalization is effective, National Agency for Combating Terrorism (NACT) has incorporated non-state actors such as media organizations and businesses to provide coaching programs, which are personality mentoring, independency
mentoring, and continuous mentoring in the country. The government established the NACT through presidential decree no. 46 of 2010. According to Abubakar (2016), this agency has three main duties which include establishing national policies, strategies, and counterterrorism programs; coordinating related government agencies in the field of counterterrorism and implementing the policy by forming the task forces consisting of elements of relevant government agencies.

In Malaysia, the major counter-radicalization initiative by non-state actors such as religious groups and aid agencies is done by introducing the Religious Rehabilitation Program (RRP). Most of the programs are based on re-education and rehabilitation (Suratman, 2017). Re-education focuses on correcting the political and religious misconceptions of the militants, while the strategy of rehabilitation is adopted for monitoring of the militants after their release (Aslam, 2018).

In the USA, radicalization has gained attention since the 9/11 attacks. This has aroused the interest amongst political world leaders, non-state actors such as the media fraternity and scholars, and security agents across the globe. As a result of the increasing cases of radicalization, non-state actors from countries like Singapore, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, Denmark, and others have come up with a robust program to counter or de-radicalize their youths which has helped in mitigating the power of the radicalism (Aslam, 2018).

Cooperation between non-state actors and the government through introducing community oriented policing had been successful in countering radicalization in Britain (Harder, 2018). Martin (2018) mentioned that the Channel Project, a community outreach program that was founded under the counter-terrorism strategy aimed at preventing radicalization in the nation had proven effective in motivating the police as well as other representatives of Muslim societies in detecting persons who
were susceptible to radicalization besides developing the necessary interventions. Due to the importance of counter-radicalization, the European Union (EU) in Brussels on the 9th of February 2015 provided 10 Million Euros to counter radicalization in the Sahel-Maghreb and steam the flow of foreign fighters from North Africa, the Middle East and Western Balkana (Paul & Virgili, 2019).

In Nigeria, some preferred solutions by non-state actors to mitigate radicalism include focus on the root cause of extremism, creation of a counter-radicalization program, opening renunciation and amnesty to radicalized youths who are willing to change and job creation for idle youths as they are easily radicalized (Dim, 2017). Other solutions are provided by the government, and include, investigating, prosecuting and jailing politicians who provide funds for the youth to purchase arms and ammunition, civil education for Nigerian students and a national rehabilitation centre for youth (Umeanolue & Nwadialor, 2016).

In Egypt, a new anti-terror law was established which shields law enforcement personnel from accountability for use of force, restricts non-state actors such as journalists from reporting on counter terror operations that contradict official government statements and provides authorities and security officials with much discretionary power (Varvelli, 2016). The law has been criticized by various non-state actors such as PBOs; indeed, the law says that enforcers of the provisions are not held criminally accountable for the use of force to perform their duties when the use of this right is necessary and adequate to avert the risk.

In Kenya, most strategies are enhanced by collaboration between the government and non-state actors and include diplomatic approach which constitute multilateral and bilateral initiatives aimed at building partnerships with nations that have suffered from such threats within the region and beyond and enhancing
intelligence operations and shutting down of terror cells through the National Intelligence Service (Finn, Momani, Opatowski & Opondo, 2016). There is also the role of the Judicial System through security laws, community outreach projects and interagency collaboration (Beckett, 2017).

In the recent past and mainly after Kenya deployed its forces in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in flushing out Al-Shabaab militants, there has been a marked increase in the number of youths drawn to extremism as evidenced by rising recruitments and terrorist attacks in different places in Kenya, including Kamukunji sub-county. There has been rising groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) also known as the Al Qaeda along with many others with the same agendas geared towards radicalization (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). Non-state actors such as Peace and Development Network, Kenya Voluntary Development Association and Social Welfare Development Programme (SOWED) have intensively tried to counter the rising radicalization activities in Kenya, including Kamukunji sub-county.

Kamukunji Sub-county is among the areas in Kenya that have been beset by radicalization and high unemployment. Botha (2016), reports that the high number of unemployed youths without National Identity Numbers (ID) cards had fallen in to the trap of radical groups. While annual GDP growth of more than 5% has been regularly recorded, Kenya’s youth unemployment rate has shown little to no positive development, and stands at a staggering 22% (Mwai, 2019). In assessing the vulnerability of radicalization in Kenya, Mkutu, and Opondo (2019) point out that besides the attacks and killings, radical groups majorly the Al Shabaab, were investing in the process of radicalizing the youths in the country. This is done by capitalizing on long-standing grievances against the central government and religious
teachings. Kamukunji sub-county has a lot of youths who are subject to radicalization, and therefore the study was important in the location to determine non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The government counter radicalization strategies have been attributed as a reason that has led to the youth join terror groups (Botha & Abdile, 2014). Botha (2016) also concurs that the Kenyan government's policy of barring and deceiving the Muslim populace is exacerbating matters. The role of other actors such as non-state actors cannot therefore be ignored. Non-state actors are playing an important role in the fight against terrorism through counter-radicalization approaches, which are aimed at reducing the rampant attacks on citizens in Kenya. Due to widespread terror activities brought about radicalization especially of the youth, there have been various approaches or strategies applied in countering radicalization by non-state actors. Some of the counter-radicalization strategies by non-state actors such as Peace and Development Network and Kenya Voluntary Development Association include building public-private partnerships, education programmes and rehabilitations. However, terrorism activities are still on the high in the country.

Counter-radicalization approach is gaining widespread acceptance. For instance, aid agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with support from the Government of Japan implemented the strengthening community’s resilience against radicalization and violent extremism project between March 2016 and June 2017 (Cherney & Belton, 2019). The outreach meetings, partnerships and education programmes held were aimed at enhancing the community’s consciousness, knowledge and comprehension of radicalization and
violent extremism. Other non-state actors such as SOWED Kenya has launched Jiongoze project which aims at reducing vulnerability to radicalization violent extremism amongst youths, by enhancing their sense of purpose and improving their life opportunities. However, the role such programs have played in countering radicalization is yet to be studied, which necessitates this study. The study therefore aimed to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Kenya. The methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs, non-state actors’ perception of the success of the programs and the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization was also examined.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

Non-state actors have been putting strategies to counter the rising radicalization activities in Kenya, including Kamukunji sub-county. The purpose of this study was to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. To be able to determine the effectives, the study examined the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs, non-state actors’ perception of the success of the programs and the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization.
1.5 Objectives of the Study

1.5.1 General Objective

The overall objective of this study was to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

i. Examine the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

ii. Evaluate the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

iii. Assess the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

1.6 Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study;

i. What are the methods and processes used in counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors’ in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?
ii. What is the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

iii. What is the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

1.7 Significance of the Study

According to Creswell and Clark (2017), the term significance refers to study findings, including the strengths in adding new knowledge or bridging knowledge gaps and the value of the research findings. The study is of significance to the national government, policy makers, community and scholars. To the government, this study would become a tool through which the government would devise strategies towards countering radicalization, and understanding of the strategies that are successful and those that do not work. This would also help identify the target groups with ease and therefore combat radicalization within these groups.

To the policy makers, the study would be helpful in developing appropriate strategies that are crucial in countering radicalization. In addition, the study would be significant to the residents of Kamukunji sub-county who work, reside or have businesses. The residents of Kamukunji sub-county would be enlightened about improved security in their environment. Academicians would also benefit by having a source of information in their future studies about counter-radicalization programs, and how to fight the terrorism menace especially in developing countries.
1.8 Scope of the Study

The scope of study defines the parameters in which the research operates (Bryman & Bell (2015). In this study, collection of data was limited to the concerned non-state actors including community leaders, security leaders, religious leaders, and PBO representatives. The study was conducted in Kamukunji sub-county in Nairobi, Kenya using an exploratory research design. The study also used a semi-structured questionnaire.

1.9 Delimitation of the Study

According to Creswell and Clark (2017), delimitation is an aspect that can be controlled by the researcher but can also affect the results of a research. Based on the scope of study, the researcher delimited the study to the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Kenya. The study also delimited the respondents to community leaders, security leaders, religious leaders, and PBO representatives only. The residents of Kamukunji sub-county were not part of the study, as information sought could only be obtained from the concerned non-state actors.

1.10 Limitation of the Study

Bryman and Bell (2015) noted that limitation aspect of a study is not under the control of the researcher. It cannot be manipulated by a researcher to make the study easier. One limitation of this study was the unwillingness of the respondents to give information. Due to the nature of the study, the researcher was treated with suspicion by the respondents. Some tried to hide some aspects of what they knew. The researcher overcame this by ensuring there was approval from the university to
conduct the study and also assured respondents of anonymity and that the information was for study purposes only.

The study was limited by the respondents’ unavailability due to work schedules. The researcher overcame this limitation by booking appointments with the respondents. The study also collected confidential information, which limited the study. In order to ensure confidentiality, the participants were, among other measures, given an introductory letter and were assured that information given was singularly used for the purposes intended only.

1.11 Assumptions of the Study

As per Bell, Bryman and Harley (2018), for the research problem to exist the researcher must assume some aspects of the study. Without assumptions, the research problem then does not exist. This study assumed that there were non-state actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya and that the study respondents would be honest in their responses to determine their role. The study also assumed that the security in Kamukunji sub-county would be conducive for the study. In addition, the study assumed that all respondents would be accessible and willing to share information.

1.12 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework is an examination of the existing or self-formulated theories in relation to the research objectives. It refers to a set of interrelated variables, definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of a phenomenon by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining a phenomenon. In setting to do a study, a researcher usually assumes that the independent variable has some influence on the dependent variable of the study. It is this assumption that a
researcher tries to justify in the theoretical framework by explaining how and why one would expect the independent variable to influence the dependent variable. This study was informed by the Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) and the Schema Theory.

1.12.1 Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Cognitive Dissonance Theory is based on the work of Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999). The theory postulates that individuals seek consistency among their cognitions. Cognitions can be thought of as elements of knowledge about behaviours, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and feelings (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). When two or more cognitions that are relevant to each other are inconsistent, individuals will experience an unpleasant mental tension or discomfort, called cognitive dissonance. CDT asserts that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance, as well as a tendency to avoid situations and information which are likely to increase it.

When dissonance reaches a sufficient level, people will engage in dissonance-reduction work. The amount of dissonance is determined by the number of dissonant and consonant elements, and the importance of those elements. To reduce dissonance individuals can change one of the dissonant cognitions, add consonant or remove dissonant cognitions to reduce the overall level of inconsistency, or decrease the importance of the elements involved in the inconsistency (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995). Typically, dissonance reduction efforts focus on the cognitions that are less resistant to change.

Individuals often experience dissonance when they do something that conflicts with their prior attitudes or beliefs. When there is no obvious external cause for that behaviour, people have the tendency to adjust their attitudes and beliefs to correspond more closely with their behaviour. Even when they know this behaviour is wrong.
This is because knowledge about behaviour is usually quite resistant to change (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Applying this to counter-radicalization, the more often people make statements that are more extreme than their actual views, the more they start to believe in those statements (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

De Wolf and Doosje (2010) explain that this process is often leveraged by radical groups when grooming new recruits. New members are encouraged to voluntarily and publicly make ‘moderate’ statements and promises in support of the radical group and its ideology. When these requests are honoured, they align their attitudes and beliefs with their actions, which make them more amendable for future, more significant requests. This mechanism has been referred to as the ‘foot-in-the-door-principle’.

CDT suggests that people will generally be motivated to resist influence attempts when they lead to incongruent or conflicting cognitions (Tormala, 2008). Arguably, this may hold especially for those that have committed themselves to the extremist groups and ideology, because the actions of those individuals and their investments in justification and rationalization will significantly increase the cognitive dissonance costs of deviation from the group and their way of thinking (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Importantly, arousing cognitive dissonance, for instance through counter-radicalization efforts, can be a strategy to get people to reconsider their positions. If the efforts are working, they can be included by policymakers and decision makers as their strategies to fight radicalization and terrorism. However, it should be noted that it may be quite difficult to effectively expose committed extremists to such dissonance arousing information.
One should be careful, as the outcome of such dissonance arousing efforts may well lead to results that were not intended. Messaging efforts that aim to influence attitudes by introducing dissonance arousing information, can instigate a process that actually reduces the cognitive dissonance. If the information presented in the message manages to trigger sufficient cognitive dissonance, but is not persuasive or convincing enough to change a person’s views or attitudes, this may lead the person to intensify his original attitudes and behaviour - a phenomenon also referred to as a ‘boomerang effect’ (Tormala, 2008).

This theory therefore informed all objectives of the study first on the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism. The theory also informs the second objective on non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs employed in the fight against terrorism. The theory further informs the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

The theory has a weakness, where it suggests that those undertaking counter-radicalization efforts are not likely to influence the efforts of extremists’ groups and ideology. Not only will they be reluctant to expose themselves to information that may arouse dissonance, they will be highly resistant to embark on fundamental cognitive revisions. Ultimately, according to this cognitive dissonance perspective, such efforts may even back-fire as they may serve to strengthen the original beliefs and attitudes.
1.12.2 Schema Theory

Schema theory was developed by Jeffrey Young in 1982. It is considered an integrative approach; meaning, it links together several psychological theories. It derives mainly out of cognitive-behavioural theory, but also includes elements of attachment theory, and object relations theory. Unlike conventional cognitive-behavioural theory, schema theory takes into account the origins of distorted thinking. The therapy associated with this theory employs not only traditional cognitive techniques, but places a heavy emphasis on experiential-emotional techniques to correct damaged personality structures (Kellogg & Young, 2006).

In the counter-radicalization study, schemas are considered an organizing framework of the mind. Schemas represent patterns of internal experience. This includes beliefs, emotions, memories, and thoughts. Maladaptive schemas form when a person’s core needs are not met. These core needs may include such things as: safety, respect, autonomy, guidance, security, nurturance, acceptance, direction, love, attention, approval, self-expression, joy, pleasure and relaxation (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003). Schema theory maintains that based on our experiences, certain patterns or themes emerge (Young, 1982). These later get played out in all our future relationships. Thus, the way in which we behave in the world is driven by our schemas.

In countering radicalization, it is important to identify the schemas that have led to the individuals to get radicalized. This is because counter-radicalization will entirely depend on how problematic relationship patterns are developed and then repeated throughout one’s lifetime. In addition, the concept of schemas readily accounts for the thematic, chronic, and inflexible nature of interpersonal problems the radicalized individuals have.
The schema theory was important in explaining the methods and processes of counter-radicalization programs, especially use of dialogues which are taken from typical daily life situations. It is generally believed that in these typical situations, the relationship between interlocutors and ways of conversing are comparatively fixed. This common knowledge when absorbed and stored in people’s memory are called schemata by cognitive psychologists and are applied in everyday life. The theory however does not explain the policies when undertaking counter-radicalization methods.

1.13 Conceptual Framework

Kumar (2019) assert that conceptual framework is a concise description of the phenomenon under research accompanied by a graphic or visual depiction of the major variables of the study. Figure 1.1 indicates the conceptual framework that guided the study showing the independent and dependent variables of the study.

As shown in Figure 1.1, the dependent variable of the study was fight against terrorism which is theoretically influenced by the independent variable which include methods and processes in counter-radicalization programs, actors’ perception of the performance of counter-radicalization programs and efficacy of existing government policies in counter-radicalization.

The methods and processes in counter-radicalization programs variable was measured using re-education, rehabilitation, coaching programs and mentoring and job creation. Actors’ perception on success of counter-radicalization programs was measured using reduced radicalized individuals, increased enrolment of radicalized individuals, increased public-private partnerships and improved interagency collaboration.
Efficacy of existing government policies in counter-radicalization was measured using anti-terror (security) laws, prosecution and jailing of radicalization contributors and community oriented policing. The dependent variable, fight against terrorism, was measured using reduced terror activities, increased reporting of terror networks and increased arresting of terror suspects.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter reviews interrelated literature on the topic studied as earlier offered by various scholars, authors and analysts. There is a huge and rising body of works on counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism. The researcher also discusses the empirical literature review based on the specific objectives of the study, summary of the literature and identify gaps in knowledge.

2.2 Theoretical Literature Review

This section reviews the concepts related to counter radicalization and terrorism. Precisely, counter radicalization, various methods of counter radicalization, key scholars of counter radicalization, the concept of terrorism, different forms of terrorism and key scholars of terrorism are discussed.

Counter-radicalization is a stage where individuals or groups are prevented from taking up the social, political and religious principles that are aimed at undermining the status quo and ideals that are already set in place (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Salihu (2018) on the other hand views counter-radicalization as a process of instilling the status quo and democratic ideals: adopting an extreme political, social, or religious ideology; and condoning violence as a means to achieving ideological goals. Counter-radicalization seeks to prevent members from the non-radicalized population from being radicalized, and it comprises three ways namely, counter-grievance, counter-ideology, and counter-mobilization (Suratman, 2017; Haggerty & Buceri, 2018).
The countries of Europe have been so far exceptionally immune in front of radical terrorist attacks, though they have not been spared from the proliferation of criminal networks (Haggerty & Buceri, 2018). Hence, a deeper focus on the dynamics of radicalization and on the current discourse around counter-radicalization is needed. The threats evoked by jihadi propaganda and by the nexus between terrorism and migration flows across the Mediterranean have recently raised much concern in terms of national securities, despite the more modest presence of Muslims in comparison to other countries in the world.

In the aftermath of 9/11, countries like Italy launched counter-terrorism and counter radicalization policies which managed to crack down on the majority of radical movements foreign networks. A first failed terrorist plot happened in Agrigento in 2001, where a sort of improvised explosive device realized from a gas camping stove exploded on the stairs of the Tempio della Concordia (Gaudino, 2013). The same kind of bomb wrought havoc in the Duomo station of Milan seven months later. The National Police found that Domenico Quaranta, was behind the two episodes. The Sicilian man was deemed to be afflicted by psychological problems and to have embraced radical Islam in the prison of Trapani.

The establishment of counter radicalization and rehabilitation programs has increased the risk of terrorist attacks in some areas. Therefore, programs such as rehabilitation should happen through ad hoc seminars which aim at deconstructing the sectarian ideology and switching it with the critical consciousness of a normal citizen who respect the rule of law (Eerten et al., 2017). Conversely, the path will not include a sort of counter-religious propaganda to detach the individual from faith, as the European Court of Human Rights underlined.
Premising that the previous strategies cope with whatever sort of radicalism, it’s unquestionable that Islamism represents the direst topic on the radar of national security agencies (Eerten et al., 2017). Therefore, every attempt to counter radicalization cannot disregard the opportunity to design a new bilateral relation between Muslim communities and states. Firstly, by promoting greater strides towards a juridical agreement, which would be the framework for the recognition of Islam among the official religions of the state.

Kenya is experiencing Muslim oriented terrorism emanating from radicalism and radicalization and therefore utmost care should be taken when trending on these footpaths to prevent Kenya from descending into a community of ideological intolerance which will culminate into violence and more serious terrorist activities as it is the case of Egypt (Nyokwoyo, 2016). Some preferred solution to mitigate the radicalism include focused on the root cause of extremism, create a counter radicalization program, open renunciation and amnesty to radicalized youths who are willing to change, job creation for idle youths as they are easily radicalized, stiff sanctions on clergy, religious homes, elders that preach extremism and encourage radicalization and investigate prosecute and jailed politicians that provide funds for the youth to purchase arms and ammunition.

Terrorism refers to the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims (Kassa, 2013). Contemporary and historical scholars on terrorism in Africa, particularly since the early post-colonial years, have highlighted themes of international terrorism (which emerged most prominently during the 1970s) as well as domestic incidents where terrorism was employed (Adebayo, 2014). Africa has played a role in several high profile terrorist
events and movements that originated in other parts of the world such as Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi.

According to Botha and Abdile (2014), the Kenyan counterterrorism strategy was a reason that led to the youth joining the Al-Shabaab. Botha (2016) concurs that the Kenyan government’s policy of barring and deceiving the Muslim populace is exacerbating matters, which will probably draw out Al-Shabaab capacity to attack Kenya, regardless of the decrease in the number of the recruits which they can also turn to the Somalis from the diaspora. Therefore, there is no reason for repudiating that counter-terrorism is solely meant to protect the state and her citizens from the threat and effects of a terrorist attack in case the plan is not interdicted. This requires greatest vigilance in safety measures, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, interagency collaborations and finally the use of force should be a last resort.

2.3 Review of Empirical Literature

2.3.1 Methods and Processes in Non-State Actors’ Counter-Radicalization Programs

El Difraoui and Uhlmann (2015) studied de-radicalization and the prevention of radicalization in Great Britain, Germany and Denmark and found use of preventive measures by non-state actors in countering radicalization. The methods and processes used in counter-radicalization by non-state actors were mainly preventive in nature. As it was noted, the preventive measures can serve by providing valuable individuals with tools to deconstruct harmful propaganda while strengthening their self-identities. For already-radicalized individuals, the invalidation of those propaganda can help to guide the person to question them. From de-radicalization of those already
radicalized, they can also prevent radicalization by sowing the seeds of doubt among audiences who are at risk and are potentially being exposed to or seeking out the content of radical and extremist groups. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Eerten, Doosje, Konijn, Graaf and Goede (2017) observed that counter-radicalization by non-state actors may be useful if the messenger has religious authority in the target community. Tactical counter-radicalization are those that emphasize that violence in the long run is often less effective when compared to more peaceful methods, and not useful to an organizations’ overall reputation and objectives. Other counter radicalization programs include peace, inter-faith and interethnic approaches, Islam as peaceful and non-violent, factual counter radicalization and emotional and psychological counter-radicalization. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, which were covered in the current study.

Venter (2018) argues that counter-radicalization requires multiple efforts from various actors from other countries. For instance, France had dispatched over 5,000 military personnel for operations throughout the world in the year 2014. Of these, 3,500 military personnel were sent to the Sahel region in Africa for Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorism effort headquartered in Chad and launched in July 2014. France also dispatched 350 military personnel to the Gulf of Guinea, while 1,000 French military personnel were engaged in Iraq and 900 in Lebanon. When coalition forces evacuated Afghanistan, 150 French military personnel were among them. Less than 500 military personnel had been deployed to the Indian Ocean. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as well as
the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Ahmed, Belanger and Szmania (2018) examined community-focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects by non-state actors. The authors argued that following the launch of the global war on terror, western nations have commissioned multiple community focused projects aimed at preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. With an understanding that a comprehensive approach entails both proactive counter-radicalization measures and rehabilitation initiatives, these community-based projects typically aim to build resilience and enhance prevention capacity within specific communities. The efforts can therefore be used to counter-radicalization in Kenya. However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

De Silva (2017) studied the role of education by all concerned actors in the prevention of terrorism and argued that tackling Violent Extremism (VE) as a part of education interventions is reflective of a broader international shift toward prevention of terrorism, and toward efforts to address the environment conducive for extremists to spread their ideologies and recruit supporters. Education has been leveraged to both radicalize and to de-radicalize young people and increasingly, governments in conflict-affected countries are interested in financing measures that counter violent extremism as part of education programs. The programs can be equally used to counter-radicalization in Kenya. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization which were covered in the current study.

Cherney and Belton (2019) observed that one common approach that has emerged is use of interventions that adopt a case management approach, which
typically are concerned with secondary and tertiary prevention by targeting individuals identified as at risk of radicalization or those convicted of terrorist offenses. These case management approaches to counter radicalization have been adopted in such countries as Australia which uses state-based diversion initiatives implemented by the police, the United Kingdom (UK) which uses the Channel program, and the Netherlands which uses exit intervention. Unlike approaches that target a broad population group by tackling social cohesion and a sense of belonging among ethnic or religious minorities, Cherney and Belton (2019) found that case-managed programs by non-state actors involve the referral of individuals to assessment teams and the development of individually tailored intervention plans, which are used to counter-radicalization. However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSC) (2014) found that there has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism in African countries such as Nigeria, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some participating states are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Through collaborations by all stakeholders, radicalization can be countered in affected areas in Kenya as well. However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as
well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Glazzard (2017) argued that counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors in East African Countries such as Kenya include building grassroots Muslim responses which challenge the Jihadi storyline with simple competing and clear messages which are equally forthright and scripturally based. As a result, the appeal of violent extremism among what is termed ‘vulnerable’ groups and individuals will decrease, and fewer people will be radicalized into violent extremism or terrorism.

Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey (2016) observed that Counter-Insurgency (CI) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) tactics have been used to respond to radicalization in Kenya. Such strategies according to these authors mostly involve military/police actions against groups identified as radical or even violent extremists. Over time, and as the Kenyan experience exemplifies, CI and CT methods often prove to be ineffective or counterproductive for a multitude of reasons. This has led to increased recognition of the need for nuanced and holistic conflict-sensitive security strategies that address the root causes of radicalization, and balance security and developmental challenges. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

2.3.2 Non-State Actors’ Perception of Performance of the Counter-Radicalization Programs

Horgan, Altier, Shortland and Taylor (2017) suggested that fear appeals by non-state actors proved to be an effective strategy for certain counter radicalization purposes by concerned actors. For instance, in order to explain the reality why
individuals should be afraid to engage in violent activities, the study argued that raising fear may deter those that want to engage in suicide attacks. However, given the outlined sentiments and the specific target group, it could be concluded that the approach of fear appeals might not be a very effective strategy for designing counter-radicalization in the context of (violent) radicalization. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization which were covered in the current study.

Hardee (2016) assessed responses to international terrorism. The study argued that although the strategy of anticipated regret in the domain of prevention of radicalization had not yet been studied, it could potentially be useful by encouraging those who feel attracted to radical groups to consider the possible negative emotional consequences of their decisions. Thus, the study argued that messages in terms of counter-radicalization had the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people. In addition, double-sided messages, coupled with a strong emotional appeal had persuasive advantages. However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization which were covered in the current study.

Pemberton and Aarten (2018) explored the victimization and de-radicalization where key security experts were interviewed. These experts noted that radicalization was linked to negative emotions such as feelings of anger, hatred, dissatisfaction and humiliation. The experts underscored the significance of scrutinizing how a person’s emotion led them to evaluating a circumstance or experience that consequently resulted to a radical action. According to the study, the most appropriate way of succeeding in countering these emotionally laden circumstances was for the experts and other stakeholders to present other emotions that could result to a renewed assessment of the circumstances. The experts argued that counter-radicalization
measures ought to not only be founded on a rational style but also emphasis on and integrate affect. In this way, the study noted that security experts and other stakeholders can be able to unravel the diverse emotions and also the order in which they impact radicalization and de-radicalization. However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization which were covered in the current study.

Cherney and Belton (2019) found that there are challenges which arise during the non-state actors’ self-evaluation period in trying to determine whether the measures or programs introduced could be considered successful. As with any program evaluation, it is common for those closely involved in program delivery to declare a program or measure to be a success when a dispassionate evaluation of the evidence by objective third parties may show different results.

Jacoby (2016) noted that de-radicalization programs have two important goals. One is to obtain intelligence on extremist organizations and the second is to discredit the extremist ideology. An important indicator of success is convincing rehabilitated militants to speak out against extremist groups and ideology. Hemmingsen and Castro (2017) however noted that there was lack of variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors which are required to successfully counter the message of radical groups. The study recommended involvement of multiple actors, which can help to deconstruct the facts, values, and storylines perpetuated by radical groups, but instead to create new perspectives and possibilities around acting on those beliefs that instead favour dialogue and acceptance. These initiatives can enable people to feel empowered and dignified in responding to their grievances through non-violent ways.

Countering radicalization is routinely suggested as a response to increased propaganda available online, from groups such as al-Qaeda; and their use to prevent
radicalization is gaining momentum. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, which were covered in the current study.

Mirahmadi (2016) noted that the African countries needed early prevention and engagement approaches to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), but needed to consist of multiple programs. Instead, it’s composed of the following interlocking set of programs; volunteering; Islamic training for law enforcement; community education to detect the signs of radicalization to violent extremism; enforcement, multicultural programming; and developing cooperation among community, law and social service organizations. The main take away from this research is that prevention and engagement programming is effective. The study found that the volunteer-service and multicultural programming generated the intended positive effects on 12 of 14 outcomes relevant to countering violent extremism. There were no discernible unintended effects. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, which were covered in the current study.

Nyokwoyo (2016) argued that there was a need for non-state actors to use of the ideological state apparatuses, mobilized through educational institutions, religious organizations, and the media in Kenya. The survey highlighted the importance of promoting religious tolerance through open dialogue and economic integration. According to the survey, interreligious dialogue forums for open deliberation between leaders of different religious communities and civil society actors were needed to strengthen mutual respect and also to address negative stereotypes/attitudes that led to stigmatization and marginalization. The study recommended constructive dialogue between Muslim and Christian communities through knowledge exchange and the preaching of peace and unity rather than division in promoting religious tolerance.
However, the study did not cover the existing policies to counter-radicalization, which were covered in the current study, in the following sub-section.

2.3.3 Efficacy of Existing Government Policies in Countering-Radicalization

Rieker (2017) studied counter-terrorism in France and noted that France launched its “Stop-Djihadisme” (Stop Jihadism) campaign in late January 2015, to counter the threat of Islamic extremism throughout French society. As the campaign’s government-run website boasts, France has instituted counter-jihadism measures to its education and prison systems, allocated additional resources to its counterterrorism agencies, and enforced the country’s November 2014 anti-terror law. The country’s Stop-Djihadisme campaign gave French citizens the tools to spot and prevent radicalization. The government-run website promoting this campaign hold a number of resources and info-graphic which are geared to help citizens spot and prevent jihadism. The gap in this study is that it did not cover the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

France has a broad range of crimes as terrorism-related offenses, in a network of non-jury courts. Since 1986, France escalated its counterterrorism efforts through legal means, enacting more than a dozen bills to improve its counterterrorism infrastructure. In November 2014, French parliament passed the French ‘Patriot Act,’ which authorizes a travel ban on suspected terrorists, criminalizing attempts to leave France to commit “terrorist activities, war crimes or crimes against humanity” abroad, and authorizing the government to block websites that “glorify terrorism” (Rieker, 2017). The gap in this study is that it did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.
Kaplan (2017) studied the counter-terrorism puzzle as a guide for decision makers. According to the study, advocacy and communication were important tools in tackling radicalization and extremism. With increased access to social media and the global problem of misinformation, there needed to be a concerted effort and policy to promote and disseminate actual information. This was essential in order to counter those that encouraged division, exclusion or demonization of the ‘other,’ to the point where violence was somehow justified and pursued. The lack of objectivity in reporting be it through ‘fake news’, mendacious, and/or non-lying half-truth news, was a crucial issue for journalism to address if the devastating processes that led to radicalization and terrorism were to be countered. However, the study did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Wittendorp, Bont, Bakker and Roy (2017) studied the measures against Jihadist foreign fighters in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the USA and determined that elements of the Patriot Act have been enforced in the countries. Most of these countries have suspended the passports of the would-be jihadists. Some websites were censored by the governments. Since then, the countries have continued to censor websites that apologize for terrorism. The countries have used social media to both advertise their online counter-jihad efforts, and appeal to the public for help in reporting suspicious websites. However, the study did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Beutel et al. (2016) studied the guiding principles for countering and displacing extremist radicalization and determined that counter-radicalization are vital to preventing radicalization from radical groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), who use online propaganda to convince young people to join and sympathize with their cause. However, presently, there is a challenge in quality of counter-radicalization programs, which is not even close to what terror groups produce. The study found that the key obstacle to increasing the quality of counter-radicalization is governments, civil society practitioners and private sector companies failing to work together in productive, long-term partnership. Many potential partners, in fact, tend to be skeptical of the government’s actions and refuse to cooperate or, in some cases, they actively undermine counter-radicalization initiatives. However, the study did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Abubakar (2016) discussed strategic communication in counter-terrorism in developing countries. The discussion pointed out the tangible threat from terror organizations has deterred the country. The solution in this instance came jointly from the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Defense policies, who agreed to provide the amplification of the condemnation of the message and the security. The gap in this study is that it did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Colaert (2017) studied counter-radicalization focusing on scientific insights for policy in both developed countries and Africa. The author pointed out that a challenge in designing and delivering effective counter-radicalization campaigns in an online environment was that at times, the post source could be diluted. The study gave an example of a challenge in finding out the source of terror activities initially posted by organizations. According to the study, these numerous points of origin/sources
confused the readers and complicating matters even further. This, according to Colaert (2017), changed the meaning of the counter-radicalization. The study therefore, emphasized the need to integrate online counter-radicalization campaigns with face-to-face campaigns.

Kim (2016) studied the effects of collective anger and fear on policy support in response to terrorist attacks in Kenya. The author asserted that through challenges noted in policy, policies needed to attempt to transform the minds through different information, the aim ought to invigorate a person’s sense of emotional engagement and self-worth that allowed participants to sympathize and relate to their wider society over insulated extremists. The study underscored the importance of elevating the voices of regular citizens aiming to address grievances through peaceful and constructive means. In addition, the study emphasized that security agencies could work with the media advance widely held dialogue that encouraged association and empathy. The study emphasized that it was crucial to intensify messages filled with emotions, which highlighted the value and potential of individuals, instead of framing targets of radicalization as marginalized or victims. The gap in this study is that it did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.

Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) in Kenya determined that though early detection of radicalization may be possible, there is a lack of counter mechanisms other than law enforcement measures, a situation could occur where the criminal law becomes stretched or misapplied in an effort to deal with the issue. This in turn could lead to resentment among communities that may already feel targeted, perhaps even launching individuals into radicalization or empowering those already in the process
of radicalizing. Ultimately the risk to themselves and to society will then have increased. However, the study did not cover counter-radicalization programs by non-state actors, as well as the performance of counter-radicalization programs, which were covered in the current study.


2.4 Summary

From literature reviewed, scholars have indicated that there are various programs that have been used to counter-radicalization in various parts of the world. For instance, there is sowing the seeds of doubt among audiences who are at risk and are potentially being exposed to or seeking out the content of radical and extremist groups (El Difraoui & Uhlmann, 2015), obtain intelligence on extremist organizations and to discredit the extremist ideology (Jacoby, 2016), emphasize that a variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors are required to successfully counter the message of radical groups (Hemmingsen & Castro, 2017), community-focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects (Ahmed et al., 2018) education (De Silva, 2017) and case management approaches (Cherney & Belton, 2019) among
others. However, studies are missing in Kamukunji sub-county, which necessitates this study.

The performance of counter-radicalization has been felt in some countries while they have not been successful in some areas. Use of early prevention and engagement approach to countering violent extremism has been successful (Mirahmadi, 2016), as well as fear appeals (Horgan et al., 2017). Hardee (2016) found that the strategy of anticipated regret in the domain of prevention of radicalization could be useful by encouraging those who feel attracted to radical groups to consider the possible negative emotional consequences of their decisions.

There have been polices guiding counter-radicalization such as laws outlining anti-terror responses, counter-jihadism measures, and allocating additional resources to counterterrorism agencies (Rieker, 2017). Advocacy and communication have also been identified as important tools in tackling radicalization and extremism (Kaplan, 2017). Media laws and involvement of all concerned parties has also been identified as an important policy step to countering radicalization (Kim, 2016).

In addition, even when de-radicalization measures achieve their desired objectives, they still present challenges. They are resource intensive, positive results may only become apparent much later, and when they do it may be difficult to accurately evaluate or quantify them. There is also a risk of recidivism, whereby individuals who appear to be disengaged or even de-radicalized become re-engaged with radicalized or terrorist groups.

2.5 Research Gap

Regardless of the role counter-radicalization programs have played, minimal studies have been done to institute the degree to which they contribute to fight against terrorism, especially in Kenya. Further, there also exists a gap in the efficacy of
policies used in countering radicalization and the challenges faced in Kenya. The concentration of most studies has been on cross border, paying little attention to role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kenya, therefore prompting this study.

In addition, from the findings of empirical studies conducted clearly indicate conceptual, contextual and methodological gaps. From a methodological point, most of the studies have purely qualitative. The study combined both the quantitative and qualitative data techniques to come up with the findings.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in-depth description of the research design, research site, target population, study sample through study sample size and sampling procedure, data collection through identifying data collection instruments, pilot test on research instruments, understanding instrument reliability and validity and data analysis. This chapter, also highlights on the legal and ethical considerations to be adhered to in the research.

3.2 Research Design

Creswell and Clark (2017) describe a research design as a plan, structure and strategy of investigation to obtain answers to research questions and control variance. The study adopted an exploratory research design. Exploratory study is taken when not much is known about the situation at hand, or no information is available on how similar problems or research issues have been solved in the past. Extensive preliminary work needs to be done to understand what is occurring, assess the magnitude of the problem, and or gain familiarity with the phenomena in the situation (Maxwell, 2016). Exploratory studies are also necessary when some facts are known, but more information is needed for developing a viable theoretical framework. For this study, information on different parameters affecting counter-radicalization programs, success of counter-radicalization programs and efficacy of existing policies in counter-radicalization was collected.
3.3 Research Site

The research site can be defined as the selected physical boundaries where the target population of study thrives (Kumar, 2019). The study site for the study was Kamukunji sub-county in Nairobi County, Kenya (Appendix V). Kamukunji sub-county is among seventeen constituencies which make Nairobi County. It has five wards namely, Eastleigh North, Eastleigh South, Pumwani/Shauri Moyo, California and Airbase. It has 9 locations and 18 Sub-Locations.

According to the Kenya population and housing census (2019) the sub-county had a population 268,276 residents (KNBS, 2019). Among the constituencies which boarder Kamukunji Sub-County includes Mathare in the North, Starehe in the South, Embakasi West in the East, and Makadara in the South East boarders (Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), 2012). Kamukunji sub-county was chosen in the study since it has a lot of youths who are unemployment, and are subjected to radicalization. The area is also among the leading sub-counties in terms of radicalization activities in Kenya. There are also numerous activities of non-state actors such as Peace and Development Network, Kenya Voluntary Development Association and SOWED Kenya.

3.4 Target Population

According to Kerlinger (2008), a target population refers to the set of people, events or objects to which one wishes to generalize the results of the research. The study targeted religious leaders (Church leaders, Imams, Kadhis and Hindu religious leaders), PBO representatives, community leaders (chiefs, sub-chiefs, community policing leaders) and security officers (police leaders) in Kamukunji sub-county in Nairobi, Kenya. These groups were targeted as they possess first-hand information on the subject matter of the study, especially on counter radicalization programs. The
total target population for the study from which the samples were derived was 956, as shown in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Target Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Target Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>State Department for Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders (major mosques, churches and temples)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Kenya International Religious Freedom Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>State Department for Internal Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security leaders</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Kenya Police Service offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>956</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.5 Study Sample**

Wan (2019) describes a sample as a collection of units chosen from the universe to represent it, and, it should not be too large or too small. While generally, the larger the sample, the more representative the scores are. This study used a representative sample across the targeted respondents, who included community leaders, PBO representatives, security officers and religious leaders from each of the wards in the sub-county.

**3.5.1 Study Sample Size**

In this study, it was recognized that the population for the study was 763 PBO representatives and religious leaders from major mosques, churches and temples. Since the population was small, the researcher adopted Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) method of sample size determination from populations of less than 10,000. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) recommend a sample size of 10% for populations that are small.
Therefore, the study sampled 10% of the respondents, giving a statistically significant sample size of 76. Therefore, a sample of 76 respondents was chosen from religious leaders and PBO representatives. Based on the population of the study, Table 3.2 presents the sample distribution used in the study in the study.

**Table 3.2: Sampling Size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Target Population</th>
<th>Sample Size (10%)</th>
<th>Data Collection Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>763</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3.5.2 Sampling Procedure

Sampling forms a crucial part of each and every inquiry and is majorly applied since it assists in collecting information in a cheaper manner from a sample rather than the whole universe particularly in cases where the population is very large. This includes deliberately choosing a number of units so as to give the required information from where conclusions regarding the entire population can be made (Bryman & Bell, 2015).

Quota sampling was used in this study. This is because this type of sampling reduces sampling error by grouping population into strata. The study stratified the population into three strata based on the wards in the sub-county. The study sampled the PBO representatives and religious leaders in Kamukunji sub-county. Thereafter, from each stratum, purposive sampling was used to obtain the sample.
Table 3.3: Sampling Size based on Wards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Type of Population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample Size (10%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastleigh North</td>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastleigh South</td>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumwani/Shauri Moyo</td>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbase</td>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>763</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher (2020).

3.6 Data Collection

This section entails data collection instruments, pilot testing of research instruments, instrument reliability and instrument validity. Each sub-section is discussed in the subsequent subheadings.

3.6.1 Data Collection Instruments

The study used primary data collected from the field. Primary data was collected using questionnaires and KII containing semi-structured and unstructured questions respectively.

3.6.1.1 Questionnaire

Cooper and Schindler (2014) argued that the questionnaire is definite, concrete and already determined questions, which are presented with exactly the same phrasing or language and also in the same order to all the respondents. This type of
questionnaire is simple to administer and relatively inexpensive to analyze as opposed to unstructured questionnaire. Additionally, questionnaires are unbiased since responses are in respondents’ own words and respondents have enough time to offer proper responses. Questionnaires used for the study contained structured and unstructured questions. The questionnaire was administered directly to the respondents, who were required to fill in the information as the researcher waited to reduce the instances of non-response.

3.6.1.2 Key Informant Interview (KII)

According to Bryman and Bell (2015), a KII is a research tool used to gather specific qualitative information from respondents who are usually experts and decision-makers about a topic. KIIs were used to corroborate the findings obtained from the questionnaire, and contained unstructured questions. Specifically, the key informants were administered to heads of the community (chiefs, sub-chiefs, community policing leaders and village elders), and security officers (the police).

3.6.2 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments

The researcher conducted a pilot study in Starehe sub-county using a pilot sample of 8 respondents (10% of the sample size) drawn from the religious leaders and PBO representatives. This represents a neighbouring sub-county in Nairobi County which shares similar conditions as far as radicalization is concerned in Kamukunji sub-county (Botha, 2016). The results obtained from the pilot study helped shape the final questionnaire in terms of the content validity, the questions and duration of administration of questionnaires.
3.6.3 Instrument Reliability

Reliability is the extent to which the instrument can yield similar results in repeated trials (Creswell & Clark 2017). After the pilot study, the questionnaires were subjected to reliability analysis. Internal consistency technique was used to determine the reliability of the data collection instruments. Since the pilot study involved a single test treatment, the reliability of the test instruments was determined using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient to test for the internal consistency of the items. An overall Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.86 was obtained, and considered reliable for data collection, and therefore the researcher proceeded to collect data.

3.6.4 Instrument Validity

Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to measure (Smith, 2015). In order to determine the extent to which the measurement reflect the specific intended domain and the contents of the research questions, content validity in the research instruments was done. Validity of the instruments was ascertained by giving the research instruments to the experts in the department of governance peace and security studies. Through content validity, the instruments were also given to peers and adjusted in consultation with the university supervisors. The pilot study findings also informed on aspects of construct validity. The suggestions of university supervisors and pilot study findings were used to revise the instruments to remove any form of ambiguity in the items.

3.6.5 Data Collection Procedure

For the data collection activity, individual permission for access to the respondents was sought from the relevant authorities. The study employed
questionnaires and KII to collect data from all the respondents. The researcher trained research assistants for purposes of data collection. The research assistants were instructed to be flexible on how to distribute and collect the questionnaires. This ensured that the quality of the data collected was up to the required standards.

3.7 Data Analysis

The questionnaires were adequately checked for data quality. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics which was conducted through frequency counts and percentages, means and standard deviations to capture the distribution of responses on the key issues addressed in the study specific objectives. The findings from quantitative data were presented using figures and tables. Qualitative data on the other hand was analyzed by use of thematic analysis. This was done by developing verbatim, which were arranged in relation to the objectives of the study. The qualitative findings were presented in narrative form according to the study objectives.

3.8 Legal and Ethical Considerations

As a legal prerequisite, the researcher sought an introductory letter from Africa Nazarene University, then obtained a research permit from the Ministry of Education, County Government of Nairobi and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). Since the research involved human subjects and touched on sensitive issues, the rights to confidentiality and privacy were utmost to the respondents. The researcher used an informed consent by explaining the purpose of the research and guaranteed the confidentiality through the preamble of the questionnaires and before and during interviews.
Ethically, the predominant principle of ethics in research on informed consent of the respondent were upheld. Recorded data was treated with anonymity in the study, to uphold the principle of anonymity. The study emphasized respect to participants with; freedom to refusal or acceptance to be interviewed and withdrawal from interview at any stage. Exceptional attention to building cooperation was observed, with giving of clarity on information to outline assurances.
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. To be able to determine the effectives, the study examined the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs, non-state actors’ perception of the success of the programs and the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization. The chapter therefore presents the outcome of data analysis in line with the specific objectives addressed by the study. The first part of this chapter is on the response rate attained, the second part presents the demographic information while the third part examines the issues as per the specific objectives. A total of 76 questionnaires were administered to potential participants in the study and all responded. Analyses were done using SPSS version 25.0. The findings are presented in tables and figures and discussed. The implications of the findings are interpreted and discussed including other important details such as response rate and the various characteristics of the participants. Thematic analysis was used for qualitative data and reported in verbatim to corroborate the findings from the questionnaires.

4.2 Presentation of Demographic Information Results

The study sought to determine the demographic information of the respondents who took part in the study. The demographic information sought was the gender of the respondents, type of respondent, highest level of education attained, their age, marital status and religion. The response rate was also given to show the
number of questionnaires which were positively returned from the field. The demographics findings are presented in sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.7.

4.2.1 Response Rate

The study targeted to collect data from 76 religious leaders and PBO representatives using a questionnaire. Questionnaires were distributed to the sample and the return rate was 100%, however, after careful review of the answers provided by the respondents, from the angle of legibility, completeness, consistency and homogeneity, 67 questionnaires responded to all questions completely and were found suitable and eligible for analysis giving a response rate of 88%, as shown in Table 4.1. This response was excellent as per Creswell and Clark (2017) since it was more than 70%, and therefore considered excellent in the study.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBO representatives</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>60 (87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67 (88%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.2.2 Gender of Respondents

The study sought to understand the gender distribution of respondents because gender determines the type of workforce in PBOs and religious centres and the findings presented in Figure 4.1, show that 55% of the respondents are male while 45% are female. The findings imply that there are more male PBO representatives and religious leaders than females in Kamukunji sub-county. This can be attributed to the prevalence of male religious leaders in the Christian and Muslim religions.
4.2.3 Type of Respondent

The study sought to understand the types of respondents in order to understand the respondents who contributed most responses to the study and the findings presented in Figure 4.2 indicate that 90% of the respondents are PBO representatives, while 10% are religious leaders. This can be attributed to the sampling framework of the study.
4.2.4 Education/Academic Background Level

The level of education or academic background of the respondents was sought in order to determine capability of respondents to answer questions posited and the study findings presented in Figure 4.3, indicate that 36% of the respondents had attained college level education, 29% had attained secondary school education, and 24% had attained university education while 11% had primary education as the highest level of education. The findings imply that the respondents had at least attained secondary education hence didn’t have problems answering the questions.

![Figure 4.3: Respondents’ Education Level](source: Research Data (2020)).

4.2.5 Age of Respondents

The study sought to assess the age category of the respondents in order to determine the type of workforce in religious centres and PBOs and the findings presented in Figure 4.4, indicate that 58% of the respondents are in the age category 18-34 years, 40% are in the age category of 36-55 years while 2% were in age category of 55 years or more. The findings show a youthful workforce in religious leaders and PBO representatives in Kamukunji sub-county.
4.2.6 Marital Status of Respondents

The study further sought to assess the marital status of the respondents in order to determine whether the respondents were married or not and the findings presented in Figure 4.5, indicate that 49% of the respondents were married, 43% were single/never married, 3% were separated, and 3% were divorced, while 2% were widowed. The findings imply married and single people dominated workforce in religious leaders and PBO representatives in Kamukunji sub-county.

Figure 4.4: Respondents’ Age
Source: Research Data (2020).

Figure 4.5: Respondents’ Marital Status
Source: Research Data (2020).
4.2.7 Religion of Respondents

The study sought to assess the religion of the respondents in order to determine the major religion of the respondents and the findings presented in Figure 4.6 indicate that 72% of those who took part in the study were Christians, 24% were Muslims while 4% were traditionalists. The findings imply a majority (72%) of the respondents are Christians.

Figure 4.6: Respondents’ Religion, n = 67
Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3 Presentation of Research Analysis and Findings

This study sought to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunjì sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. More precisely, the study sought to examine the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism, evaluate the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism and assess the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunjì Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya. The
findings of the study are presented in three sections from section 4.3.1 to section 4.3.3, each sub-section based on specific objectives of the study.

4.3.1 Methods and Processes of the Counter-Radicalization Programs

The first specific objective of the study was to examine the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

4.3.1.1 Education and re-education methods

The study first sought to determine the education and re-education methods used in countering radicalization. The multiple response findings indicate that skills and vocational training on countering terrorism was the most used education and re-education strategy, as identified by 56.7% of the respondents. 43.3% of the respondents identified global partnerships for educations, 38.8% identified career guidance initiatives, and 29.9% identified demobilization and reintegration programs while 23.9% identified counter-terrorism studies in schools. The findings are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Education and Re-education Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism studies in schools</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization and reintegration programs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills and vocational training on countering terrorism</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global partnership for educations</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career guidance initiatives</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.1.2 Whether there were rehabilitation centres in the sub-county

The study sought to determine whether there were rehabilitation centres in the sub-county, and the study findings presented in Table 4.3 indicate that 83.6% of the respondents indicated there existed rehabilitation centres in the sub-county while 16.4% indicated they were not there.

Table 4.3: Existence of Rehabilitation Centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.1.3 Location of the centres

For those who identified the existence of rehabilitation centres, the study sought to identify the location of the centres. The study found that Bahati area hosted most of the rehabilitation centres with 46.4% of the responses, Kamukunji had 26.8% of the responses, while California, Eastleigh North and Pumwani were identified by 7.1% of the respondents. The findings are presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Location of Rehabilitation Centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahati</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastleigh North</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastleigh South</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamukunji</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthurwa/Shauri Moyo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumwani</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.1.4 Mental (psychosocial) rehabilitation methods

The researcher sought to know the kind of mental (psychosocial) rehabilitation methods used in countering radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county. The findings indicated that trauma informed resilience, trauma healing, peer to peer mentorship, self-awareness education, reversing of myths and misinterpretations and guidance and counselling were used. Some of the responses obtained were as follows;

There is trauma informed resilience trainings for families either directly or indirectly affected by violent extremism. This is achieved by making use of community –security relations programs to build trust between the police and the community. There are also psychological support programs for most at risk youths (Source: Religious leader).

Most programs adopted are geared towards guidance and counselling. Through these programs, those affected by violent extremism can be guided and return to their normal lives before extremism happened (Source: PBO representative).

We usually have career guidance initiatives and mentorship. The most preferred scenario is using previously radicalized individuals who have been guided through successful careers to mentor the radicalized individuals. This has proved to be very successful (Source: PBO representative).

4.3.1.5 Other rehabilitation methods

On other rehabilitation methods used in countering radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county, the study found there existed religious education, employment creation for radicalized individuals, vocational training and sports exhibitions. From the key informants, the following responses were obtained:

There are usually community mobilization programs. Organizations like SOWED Kenya bring youths together and teach them on the dangers and effects of being radicalized (Source: Community leader).

De-radicalized individuals are offered job opportunities by organizations such as JCCP since unemployment is a major contributor to radicalization, there is vocational training to equip one with technical skills for economic opportunities. There is also sports and
talent exhibitions that create awareness on violent extremism (Source: Security leader).

### 4.3.1.6 Use of mentors in countering radicalization

The researcher sought to know the respondents’ views on use of mentors in countering radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county. The findings indicated that 85.1% of the respondents identified use of mentors in counter-radicalization while 14.9% did not as shown in Table 4.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.5: Existence of Mentors in Counter-Radicalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

### 4.3.1.7 Type and instances where mentors have been used

For those who identified the use of mentors in counter-radicalization, they were asked to state the type and instances where mentors have been used in Kamukunji sub-county. The results showed that youth mentors, religious leaders, peer educators, civic educators, community facilitators and trainer of trainees have been used. The following responses from the key informants reflect the study findings;

- Youth mentors are used to mentor other youths to desist from joining radicalized groups (Source: Religious leader).
- Trainers of trainees, religious leaders, and peer educators are all used to mentor radicalized individuals (Source: PBO representative).
- There are civic educators, religious leaders and peer educators in counter-radicalization (Source: PBO representative).
- Mentors are drawn from the existing wards, recruit youths who would then be taken through life skills training (Source: PBO representative).
4.3.1.8 How the organizations ensured intelligence collection

The study also sought to determine how the organizations ensured intelligence collection in countering radicalization in the sub-county. From the findings, it was clear that information was given to the authorities, transparency and community meetings with the security officers were used. From the key informants, the following responses were obtained:

Offering the correct and helpful information asked by the authorities such as National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) is the most commonly used technique in intelligence sharing (Source: Security leader).

Intelligence collection is done by being transparent and ensuring confidentiality in any information given. We also use community policing approaches such as Nyumba Kumi initiative and through local administration involving chiefs among others (Source: Community leader).

We bring a group of youths together and gather information from them and we know where the problem is (Source: PBO representative).

By conducting meetings involving key security agents and the community so that they could share their grievances. This is a strategy of bridging the existing gap between the community and security shareholders so that in an event of any insecurity treats, one could easily report (Source: PBO representative).

4.3.1.9 Whether the rehabilitated (reformed) individuals are given jobs

On whether the rehabilitated (reformed) individuals are given jobs in Kamukunji sub-county, the study determined that 47.8% of the respondents said they were given jobs in the sub-county, while 52.2% said they were not offered jobs, as presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Jobs to Rehabilitated Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.1.10 Kind of jobs given

For those who were given jobs within the sub-county, the kind of jobs given included National Youth Service (NYS) cleaning programs, Youth Enterprise Fund, UWEZO Fund and County government clean-up/environment program. Others are trained to be drivers, others conductors and the rest to do car washing. There are also technical courses offered and then offered employed deepening on the technical course done.

4.3.1.11 Type of partners the respondents had worked with in the sub-county

The study also wanted to find out the type of actors/partners the respondents had worked with in the fight against terrorism in the sub-county. The multiple response findings indicated that local partners formed 71.6% of the responses, regional partners formed 46.3% while international partners formed 22.4% of the responses, as shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Type of Actors/Partners in the Fight Against Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local partners</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Partners</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional partners</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.1.12 Existence of community counter-radicalization projects

On whether there were community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in Kamukunji sub-county, the study found that 89.6% of the respondents identified existence of community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in the area, while 10.4% did not identify with the projects, as shown in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Existence of Community Counter-Radicalization Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.1.13 Community counter radicalization and counter-terrorism processes

On community focused counter radicalization and counter-terrorism processes in Kamukunji sub-county, the study found from multiple responses that 59.7% of the respondents identified public seminars and rallies, 58.2% of the respondents identified community policing, Jiongoze project was identified by 50.7% of the respondents, while Operation Usalama Watch was identified by 14.9% of the respondents. The findings are presented in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Community Counter-Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiongoze project</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Usalama Watch</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mapping of terror activities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public seminars and rallies</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Searches</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.1.14 Involvement of concerned actors in countering radicalization

The study sought to find the involvement of concerned actors in countering radicalization in the area, and the findings, shown in Table 4.10, shows that 44.8% of the respondents involved multiple actors while 55.2% do not involve multiple actors.

Table 4.10: Involvement of Multiple Actors in Countering Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.1.15 The actors involved

On the actors involved, the study found a number of actors in countering radicalization in the sub-county as follows; Community Development Initiative (CODI), Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP), US state department, Kamukunji Community Peace Network (KACPEN), YADEN East Africa, Life and Peace Institute (LPI), Royal United States Institute (RUSI), Scofield Associations Limited (SAL), United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Ni-Wetu Program, National Police Service (NPS), National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), National Administration, Community Media, and SOWED.

4.3.2 Non-State Actors’ Perception of the Performance of Counter-Radicalization Programs

The second specific objective of the study was to evaluate the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.
4.3.2.1 Perception of the respondents on the number of radicalized individuals

The study first sought to examine the perception of the respondents on the number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji sub-county. The findings indicated that most respondents had views that the number had decreased (70%) while others felt like the number had gone up (30%) as indicated in Figure 4.11.

![Figure 4.7: Perception on the Number of Radicalized Individuals](image)

Source: Research Data (2020).

The following are some of the responses from the key informants that support the findings:

The number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji has significantly reduced due to sustained interventions by both state and non-state actors (Source: Religious leader).

In terms of terrorism, the number is decreasing but according to other factors especially the police the number is increasing (Source: PBO representative).

It has reduced over time due to the level of engagement with both government and non-state actors and from attending community barazas and getting positive feedback from the community (Source: Security representative).

There are a huge number of them but not as compared to the previous years, especially two years ago (Source: PBO representative).

The numbers have one up due to the fact that most youths engage in radicalized activities due to push factors like poverty and money (Source: PBO representative).
4.3.2.2 Factors contributing to numbers of radicalized individuals

On the factors contributing to a reduced/increased number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji sub-county, it was determined that more awareness, sensitization programs, community forums, collaboration with the police, and anti-radicalization programs helped reduce the number of radicalized individuals. However, factors such as poverty, unemployment and lack of support from close relatives and authorities contributed to an increase in the number of radicalized individuals. The following responses were obtained from the key informants:

There is more awareness and sensitization programs, community forums between the police and the community as well as more coordinated and multi-sectoral approach by stakeholders (Source: Religious leader).

Some agencies especially the police are the ones contributing to an increase especially due to police brutality (Source: PBO representative).

There are anti-radicalization programs deployed in the sub-county, more knowledge on the subject of radicalization through groups training and workshop training on parenting as well the engagement of the administration, community leaders, religious leaders and the public forums (Source: PBO representative).

Factors such as poverty, lack of support from parents and other relatives, unemployment and peer pressure have all contributed to an increase in the causes of radicalization in the sub-county (Source: Community representative).

Government and non-governmental actors have worked hard in preventing and countering radicalization and also engaging the community in CVE initiatives (Source: Religious leader).

4.3.2.3 Enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres

The study sought to determine the enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres, and found that 77.6% of the respondents said there is reduced enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres while
22.4% of the respondents said the enrolment had increased. The findings are presented in Table 4.11.

**Table 4.11: Enrolment of Radicalized Individuals into De-Radicalization Centres**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased enrolment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced enrolment</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

**4.3.2.4 Existence of public-private partnerships**

On the existence of public-private partnerships in the sub-county aimed at countering radicalization, the study found that 57% of the respondents said there existed public-private partnerships in the sub-county while 43% of the respondents said there were no such partnerships, as shown in Figure 4.8.

![Figure 4.8: Existence of Public-Private Partnerships](image)

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.2.5 Examples of such partnerships

On the examples of such partnerships, the study determined that they included community-security relation programs such as Nyumba Kumi Initiative and PBOs partnering with government institutions such as NCIC. There were also partnerships such as United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) partnering with schools, county government and SOWED Kenya. Further, SOWED Kenya was partnering with the Ministry of Interior, private schools and community, as well as with USAID, JCCP, Kenya Ni Wajibu Wetu, and KACPEN. The study found that these partnerships work through sharing early warning information, trainings and education, as depicted in the following responses from the key informants.

PBOs partnering with government institutions usually go around educating people on radicalization. In addition, there is sharing of ideas and plans on how to stop radicalization. Involving NCIC in the activities meant to counter and counter radicalization, and merging work plans in order to meet similar targets under similar activities are very essential (Source: PBO representative).

There are consultations in work planning, implementing joint programs and monitoring progress and research. Partnerships also work through collaborating and donating different things for a particular purpose or activity (Source: PBO representative).

There are trainings of community leaders, religious leaders and marginalized groups especially women. There is also sharing early warning information to security agencies to avert terror related incidences (Source: Religious leader).

4.3.2.6 Inter-agency collaboration

The study also found that 61% of the respondents said there was improved inter-agency collaboration in the sub-county, while 39% of the respondents said inter-agency collaboration had not improved, as shown in Figure 4.9.
4.3.2.7 Reasons on why inter-agency had or had not improved

On the reasons on why inter-agency had or had not improved, the study findings as presented in Figure 4.10, found that commitment (30%), reduced number of radicalized individuals (22%), personal involvement (20%), and unfriendly police (28%) were cited.

Figure 4.9: Inter-Agency Collaboration
Source: Research Data (2020).

Figure 4.10: Reasons for Inter-Agency Improvement/Non-improvement
Source: Research Data (2020).
The following are some responses obtained from the key informants that support the findings from the respondents:

The police are usually very unfriendly. I have never seen them being friendly, and I do not expect them to be friendly any time soon. Inter-agency collaboration with the police can never work (Source: Religious leader).

We have facilitated key and critical government agencies and community agencies to work together, consult one another and adapt a common platform (Source: PBO representative).

The fact is that there are reduced young people getting into radicalized groups. This can be attributed to sub-county security and intelligence which is committed and which incorporates local administration, police and national intelligence service which has been instrumental in detecting and curbing terrorism incidences (Source: PBO representative).

### 4.3.2.8 Early prevention and engagement approaches

The study found that early prevention and engagement approaches had been used in the sub-county. The approaches as presented in Figure 4.11, included youth empowerment (15%), using sports and fashion shows (10%), early education (20%), enlightenment (11%), and talking to individuals when they show unusual signs (44%) were used.

![Figure 4.11: Early Prevention and Engagement Approaches](source: Research Data (2020)).
The following responses were obtained from the key informants:

Early education and enlightenment as enriched the community with knowledge and have resilience capability now. This is done to empower youth and parents about early warning signs to radicalization and violent extremism so that they do not fall into the trap but instead be vigilant (Source: Religious leader).

This is done through going life skills training to enhance their sense of purpose in life. There is also conducting theme shows, fashion shows, competitions such as football and sports tournament that address prevention of violent extremism (Source: Community representative).

We have gone to schools to teach young teenagers who would have not been abused by violent extremism. There is also a practice of talking to individuals who show sudden change of behaviour (Source: PBO representative).

### 4.3.2.9 Use of fear appeals

On the use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals, the study found 51% of the respondents said there was use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals, while 49% of the respondents said there was no usage of fear appeals, as shown in Figure 4.12.

![Figure 4.12: Use of Fear Appeals](image)

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.2.10 Effectiveness of the use of fear appeals

On the effectiveness of the use of fear appeals, the study found that the use of fear appeals had not been effective (66%), as the use of hard approaches caused rebellion from the youth, while others (34%) said they were effective as they made the youth to fear wrong doing (Figure 4.13).

![Figure 4.13: Effectiveness of the Use of Fear Appeals](image)

Source: Research Data (2020).

The following responses were obtained;

Most are effective as they make people to fear doing the wrong things but extreme fear appeals also lead to radicalization (Source: PBO representative).

It has not been effective because hard approaches by security agencies tend to make the youth to rebel against the state and thus join radicalized groups (Source: Security leader).

4.3.2.11 How successful the enrolment of radicalized individuals had been

The findings on how successful the enrolment of radicalized individuals had been in the sub-county indicated that 41.8% of the respondents identified enrolment to
be successful, 23.9% did not know, 16.4% said it was not successful while 17.9% said it was very successful, as shown in Table 4.12.

**Table 4.12: Success of the Enrolment of Radicalized Individuals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very successful</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not successful</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

### 4.3.2.12 Ways of protecting the youths

For those who said it was not successful, the respondents recommended ways of protecting the youths through amnesty and more friendly government to the radicalized individuals so that they can open up. Further, the study sought to determine the success of partnerships in countering radicalization in the sub-county. The findings indicated that 61.2% of the respondents identified partnerships to be successful, 13.4% of the respondents identified them to be very successful while 19.4% of the respondents did not know, as shown in Table 4.13.

**Table 4.13: Success of Partnerships in Countering Radicalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very successful</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not successful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.2.13 Approaches used for early prevention of radicalization

The study sought to determine the approaches used for early prevention of radicalization. From multiple responses, the study also found that public involvement was the major approach used for early prevention of radicalization as given by 91% of the respondents, 25.4% of the respondents identified risk assessment while 11.9% of the respondents identified international experts’ engagement, as presented in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14: Approaches Used for Early Prevention of Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public involvement</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Experts Engagement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.3 Efficacy of Existing Government Policies in Countering-Radicalization

The third specific objective of the study was to assess the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

4.3.3.1 Anti-terror laws and policies

The study first sought to examine the anti-terror laws and policies that had proven important towards countering radicalization. From multiple responses, the study determined that the constitution was the most commonly law known for countering radicalization in the sub-county as given by 71% of the respondents, Prevention of Terrorism Act formed 44.8% of the responses, while Cyber Security
and Protection Bill formed 34.3% of the responses. The findings are presented in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15: Anti-Terror Laws and Policies in Countering Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Security and Protection Bill</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Constitution</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.3.2 Existence of media laws for reporting of terrorism

On existence of media laws for reporting of terrorism, the study found that 58.2% of the respondents did not know of existence of media laws, while 41.8% of the respondents knew of their existence, as shown in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: Media Laws on Reporting of Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.3.3 Knowledge on existence of counter-jihadism measures

For those who knew of existence of media laws, the respondents identified laws on media reporting and use of technological and social platforms, such as social media and laws on privacy to information. In addition, on knowledge on existence of counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization, the study found that 58% of the respondents knew of existence of counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization while 42% of the respondents did not know of the measures, as presented in Figure 4.14.
The findings on counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization showed that education on jihadism, team work in counter-jihadism processes, teachings through madrassas, community education and religious leaders were used. The following responses reflect the study findings:

Religious leaders give the correct interpretation of Quran during community forums so that community members from both faiths can understand the concept of Jihad (Source: Security leader).

Nowadays, we have centres apart from Madrassas where the older individuals are taught on Jihadism and on the meaning of holy war (Source: Religious leader).

Public members are being educated on Jihadism. This usually helps foster team work in Counter-Jihadism process. In addition, through Imams in the community who help young people not to get radicalized (Source: PBO representative).

Educating the community on the correct meanings of terms in the Islamic religion and also educating the community on violent extremism and ideologies that radicals use to radicalize individuals (Source: PBO representative).
4.3.3.4 Public involvement measures

On whether there were public involvement measures used for countering radicalization, the study found that 69% of the respondents knew of existence of public involvement measures for countering radicalization while 31% of the respondents did not know of the measures, as presented in Figure 4.15.

![Diagram showing percentages of respondents who knew and did not know of public involvement measures.]

Figure 4.15: Public Involvement Measures Used for Countering Radicalization

Source: Research Data (2020).

The multiple responses of the study also determined that public involvement was done through public barazas (49%), community dialogues (44%), Nyumba Kumi meetings (39%), making of local laws (17%), information sharing concerning youths in the area (32%), self-help groups meetings (11%), networking (11%), and during women chamas (7%) (Table 4.17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Involvement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public barazas</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community dialogues</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyumba Kumi meetings</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making of local laws</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing concerning youths in the area</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help groups meetings</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women chamas</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).
4.3.3.5 Prosecution and jailing of radicalized individuals

The study also found that 72% of the respondents said prosecution and jailing of radicalized individuals was not based on justice, while 28% of the respondents said it was based on justice, as presented in Figure 4.16.

![Figure 4.16: Prosecution based on Justice](image)

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.3.6 How community policing was done

On how community policing was done, the study further determined that community policing was practiced in Kamukunji sub-county using Nyumba Kumi initiative, peace committees, clustering areas, through platforms such as t-shirts, Barazas, and chief meetings.

4.3.3.7 Major international laws

In addition, the study sought to determine the major international laws adopted locally in the fight against terrorism. From multiple responses, it was found that the UN global counter-terrorism strategy and the United Nations Action to Counter-
Terrorism were the major international laws adopted locally in the fight against terrorism, each forming 50.7% of the responses, while the international humanitarian law formed 31.3% of the responses. The findings are shown in Table 4.18.

**Table 4.18: International Laws Adopted Locally in the Fight Against Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN global counter-terrorism strategy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2020).

4.3.3.8 Challenges faced in countering radicalization programs

There were also challenges faced in countering radicalization programs employed in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County which included as follows:

Poverty, unemployment leading to idleness, high population, lack of education, low numbers of rehabilitation centres, and poor relationship with the government, especially the police exist. There are also duration and impact of programs employed, since some were too short and not efficient enough, and poor funding on counter-radicalization programs.
CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings, summary of findings after the analysis of the research, conclusion after interpreting the results and recommendations for practical and policy implication as well as areas for further research.

5.2 Discussion

This section explains the results on the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunj sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. The presentation of this section is guided by specific study objectives. Finally, the chapter presents discussions on how the findings relate to existing studies and findings from empirical studies.

A total of 67 respondents answered all questions correctly and were analysed giving a response rate of 88%. In terms of gender distribution, majority of the respondents were males. The findings are consistent to a study by Ahmed et al. (2018) in which males are employed in the community programmes than females and this is inconsistent with the KNBS (2019) in which women comprises 51% of the national population. On the type of respondents, the study found that most respondents are PBO representatives and this is consistent with a study by De Silva (2017) which portray that PBOs are major parties in fight against terrorism.

The study findings found that majority of the respondents are educated to secondary levels and this is consistent with a study by Umeanolue and Nwadialor (2016), in which the education attainment was found to have a bearing on secondary education level and the respondents are in the age category 18-34 years which is
consistent with a study by Finn et al. (2016) in which age 18-35 dominated the responses. 49% of the respondents are married and the findings are consistent with a study by Suratman (2017) in which married people formed the majority of the responses. 72% of the respondents are of Christianity religious background which is inconsistent with a study by Nyokwoyo (2016).

5.2.1 Methods and Processes of the Counter-Radicalization Programs

The study sought to determine the education and re-education methods in countering radicalization and 56.5% of the respondents indicated that skills and vocational training in countering tensions was the most used education and re-education strategy. The study findings are consistent with a study by De Silva (2017) in which education has been leveraged to both radicalize and de-radicalize young people. The findings indicated that skills and vocational training on countering terrorism was the most used education and re-education strategy. In support of the study findings, De Silva (2017) also found that education has been leveraged to both radicalize and to de-radicalize young people. Nyokwoyo (2016) also recognized that there was a need for non-state actors to use of the ideological state apparatuses, mobilized through educational institutions in Kenya. The key informants were also in general agreement that re-education strategies through career guidance initiatives and mentorship was the most preferred strategy by using previously radicalized individuals who have been guided through successful careers to mentor the radicalized individuals.

The study also sought to determine the education and re-education methods in countering radicalization and 43.3% of the respondents identified global partnerships for educations, 38.8% identified career guidance initiatives, 29.9% identified demobilization and reintegration programs while 23.9% identified counter-terrorism
studies in schools. In support of the study findings, OSC (2014) found similar results to the study, where recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism was important, including schools. Organizations are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. OSC (2014) support these approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations and education centres. Key informants were also in general agreement through collaborations by all stakeholders, radicalization can be countered in affected areas.

The study sought to determine the existence of rehabilitation centres in the sub-county and 83.6% of the respondents said there existed rehabilitation centres in the sub-county, with Bahati area hosting most of the rehabilitation centres with 46.4% of the responses. In support of the study findings, Ahmed et al. (2018) that a comprehensive approach entails both proactive counter-radicalization measures and rehabilitation initiatives, these community-based projects typically aim to build resilience and enhance prevention capacity within specific communities. The key informants were also in general agreement that mental (psychosocial) rehabilitation methods are used in countering radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county such as trauma informed resilience, trauma healing and religious education.

The researcher sought to know the respondents’ views on use of mentors in countering radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county and findings indicated that 85.1% of the respondents identified use of mentors in counter-radicalization. In support of the findings, Eerten et al. (2017) found that counter-radicalization by non-state actors
may be useful if the messenger has religious authority and mentors to look up to in the target community. Other counter radicalization programs identified by Eerten et al. (2017) include peace, factual counter radicalization and psychological counter-radicalization. The key informants were also in general agreement that that reversing of myths and misinterpretations, religious education, civic educators, community facilitators and trainer of trainees can be used. In addition, youth mentors are used to mentor other youths to desist from join radicalized groups.

The study also sought to determine how the organizations ensured intelligence collection in countering radicalization in the sub-county from key informants. It was clear that information was given to the authorities, transparency and community meetings with the security officers were used. In support of the findings, Kaplan (2017) found that communication and information sharing were important tools in tackling radicalization and extremism. Abubakar (2016) also determined that strategic communication and information sharing in counter terrorism was a key feature in the fight against violent extremism and radicalization. Information sharing between various ministries and other concerned parties could provide the details needed to fight terrorism.

The study wanted to find out the type of actors/partners the respondents had worked with in the fight against terrorism in the sub-county and findings indicated that local partners formed 71.6% of the responses, regional partners formed 46.3% while international partners formed 22.4% of the responses. In support of the findings, Beutel et al. (2016) also determined that many potential partners were locally based, and could support the government’s actions and actively support counter-radicalization initiatives.
The study wanted to find out whether there were community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in Kamukunji sub-county, and found that 89.6% of the respondents identified existence of community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in the area. Glazzard (2017) agrees that building grassroots Muslim responses which challenge the Jihadi storyline with simple competing and clear messages is needed for countering radicalization. As a result, the appeal of violent extremism among vulnerable groups and individuals will decrease, and fewer people will be radicalized into violent extremism or terrorism. The main projects identified by key informants were in form of public seminars and rallies, community policing, Jiongoze project and Operation Usalama Watch.

The study sought to find the involvement of concerned actors in countering radicalization in the area, and found that 44.8% of the respondents involved multiple actors. The study found a number of actors in countering radicalization such as CODI, JCCP, KACPEN, LPI, RUSI, NCTC, and SOWED among others. Venter (2018) agrees that counter-radicalization requires multiple efforts from various actors. Cherney and Belton (2019) found that case-managed programs by non-state actors involve the referral of individuals to assessment teams and the development of individually tailored intervention plans, which are used to counter-radicalization. Hemmingsen and Castro (2017) however disagreed that there was lack of variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors which are required to successfully counter the message of radical groups.
5.2.2 Non-State Actors’ Perception of the Performance of Counter-Radicalization Programs

The study sought to examine the perception of the respondents on the number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji sub-county and found that most respondents had views that the number of radicalized individuals had decreased (70%) while others felt (30%) like the number had gone up. In support of the findings, Mirahmadi (2016) noted that the number of radicalized individuals had decreased due to community forums and education to detect the signs of radicalization to violent extremism, and developing cooperation among community, law and social service organizations was important in countering radicalization. In addition, Ahmed et al. (2018) while examining community-focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects by non-state actors agreed that following the launch of the global war on terror, most nations have commissioned multiple community focused projects aimed at preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. With an understanding that a comprehensive approach entails both proactive counter-radicalization measures and rehabilitation initiatives, these community-based projects typically aim to build resilience and enhance prevention capacity within specific communities. The key informants were also in general agreement that more awareness, sensitization programs, community forums, collaboration with the police, and anti-radicalization programs helped reduce the number of radicalized individuals.

The study sought to determine the enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres, and found that 77.6% of the respondents said there is reduced enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres. Factors such as poverty, unemployment and lack of support from close relatives and authorities contributed to an increase in the number of radicalized individuals. Botha
(2016) agrees with the study findings that the high number of unemployed youths without ID cards had fallen in to the trap of radical groups. In addition, Kenya’s youth unemployment rate has shown little to no positive development, contributing to numerous cases of radicalization. The key informants were also in general agreement that factors such as poverty, lack of support from parents and other relatives, unemployment and peer pressure have all contributed to an increase in the causes of radicalization in the sub-county.

The study wanted to find out the existence of public-private partnerships in the sub-county aimed at countering radicalization and that 57% of the respondents said there existed public-private partnerships in the sub-county. Such partnerships were found to be successful. In support of the findings, Nyokwoyo (2016) highlighted the importance of promoting partnerships through open dialogue and economic integration. Inter-organizational forums for open deliberation between leaders of different security offices and religious communities as well as civil society actors were needed to strengthen mutual respect and also to address negative stereotypes/attitudes that led to stigmatization and marginalization. The key informants indicated such partnerships included community-security relation programs such as Nyumba Kumi Initiative and PBOs partnering with government institutions such as NCIC. There were also partnerships such as UNICEF partnering with schools, county government and SOWED Kenya. Further, SOWED Kenya was partnering with the Ministry of Interior, private schools and community, as well as with USAID, JCCP, Kenya Ni Wajibu Wetu, and KACPEN.

The study wanted to find out whether inter-agency collaboration had improved, and found that 61% of the respondents said there was improved inter-agency collaboration in the sub-county. El Difraoui and Uhlmann (2015) support the
findings of the study that the early detection measures can serve as de-radicalizing measures, for example by providing vulnerable individuals with tools to deconstruct harmful propaganda while strengthening their self-identities. For already-radicalized individuals, the invalidation of those propaganda can help to guide the person to question them.

The key informants indicated that partnerships worked through sharing early warning information, trainings and education. Commitment and personal involvement were also cited. Cherney and Belton (2019) agreed that one common approach that has emerged is use of personal interventions that adopt a case management approach, which typically is concerned with individuals identified as at risk of radicalization. These case management approaches to counter radicalization target a broad population group by tackling social cohesion and a sense of belonging among ethnic or religious minorities.

The key informants also indicated that prevention and engagement approaches had been used in the sub-county. The approaches included youth empowerment, using sports and fashion shows, early education, enlightenment, and talking to individuals when they show unusual signs. Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) supports the findings of the study that early detection of radicalization may be possible, through empowering those who are at risk of the process of radicalization.

The study sought to determine the use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals, and found that 51% of the respondents said there was use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals. The study found that the use of fear appeals had not been effective (61.2%) as the use of hard approaches caused rebellion from the youth. Horgan et al. (2017) disagrees that fear appeals by non-state actors proved to be an
effective strategy for certain counter radicalization purposes by concerned actors. The study argued that raising fear may deter those that want to engage in suicide attacks. However, Hardee (2016) agreed that the approach of fear appeals might not be a very effective strategy for designing counter-radicalization in the context of violent radicalization. The key informants were also in general agreement that it has not been effective because hard approaches by security agencies tend to make the youth to rebel against the state and thus join radicalized groups.

5.2.3 Efficacy of Existing Government Policies in Countering Radicalization

The study sought to examine the anti-terror laws and policies that had proven important towards countering radicalization and determined that the constitution was the most commonly law known for countering radicalization in the sub-county as given by 71% of the respondents, supported by Prevention of Terrorism Act and Cyber Security and Protection Bill. As supported by Rieker (2017), apart from the constitution, the anti-terror law helps give citizens the tools to spot and prevent radicalization. The government through the law can also help citizens spot and prevent jihadism.

In addition, the study found that most respondents did not know of existence of media laws (58.2%). Laws on media reporting and use of technological and social platforms, such as social media and laws on privacy to information, however, were reported. In support of the findings, Kaplan (2017) found that with increased access to social media and the global problem of misinformation, there needed to be a concerted effort and policy to promote and disseminate actual information. This was essential in order to counter those that encouraged division, exclusion or demonization of the ‘other,’ to the point where violence was somehow justified and pursued. The lack of objectivity in reporting be it through fake news, mendacious,
and/or non-lying half-truth news, was a crucial issue for journalism to address if the devastating processes that led to radicalization and terrorism were to be countered.

On knowledge on existence of counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization, the study found that 58% of the respondents knew of existence of counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization. Rieker (2017) agrees that Stop Jihadism campaign has been used to counter the threat of Islamic extremism throughout the society. As the campaign’s government-run website boasts, countries such as France have instituted counter-jihadism measures to its education and prison systems and allocated additional resources to its counterterrorism agencies. The key informants were also in general agreement that counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization such as education on jihadism, team work in counter-jihadism processes, teachings through madrassas, community education and religious leaders were used.

On whether there were public involvement measures used for countering radicalization, the study found that 69% of the respondents knew of existence of public involvement measures for countering radicalization. In support of the findings, Kim (2016) underscored the importance of elevating the voices of regular citizens aiming to address grievances through peaceful and constructive means. In addition, the study emphasized that security agencies could work with the citizens and the media to advance widely held dialogue that encouraged association and empathy. The key informants were also in general agreement that public involvement was done through public barazas, community dialogues, Nyumba Kumi meetings, making of local laws, information sharing concerning youths in the area, self-help groups meetings, networking, and during women chamas.
The key informants posited that community policing was practiced in Kamukunji sub-county using Nyumba Kumi initiative, peace committees, clustering areas, through platforms such as t-shirts, Barazas, and chief meetings. Supporting these findings, Harder (2018) highlighted that cooperation between non-state actors and the government through introducing community oriented policing had been successful in countering radicalization. Martin (2018) mentioned that community outreach programs aimed at preventing radicalization and had proven effective in motivating the police as well as other representatives of Muslim societies in detecting persons who were susceptible to radicalization.

It was found that the UN global counter-terrorism strategy and the United Nations Action to Counter-Terrorism were the major international laws adopted locally in the fight against terrorism, each forming 50.7% of the responses, while the international humanitarian law formed 31.3% of the responses. In support of the findings, Villa-Vicencio, et al. (2016) observed that counter-terrorism policies and tactics have been used to respond to radicalization in Kenya. Such strategies mostly involve military/police actions against groups identified as radical or even violent extremists, as outlined in most international counter-terrorism doctrines.

5.3 Summary of Findings

This study sought to determine the role of non-state actors’ counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county, Nairobi County, Kenya. More precisely, the study sought to examine the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism, evaluate the non-state actors’ perception of the performance of the counter-radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism and
assess the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya.

The findings indicated that skills and vocational training on countering terrorism was the most used education and re-education strategy. There were also global partnerships for educations, career guidance initiatives, demobilization and reintegration programs and counter-terrorism studies in schools. The findings indicated that trauma informed resilience, trauma healing, peer to peer mentorship, self-awareness education, reversing of myths and misinterpretations and guidance and counselling were also used. In addition, youth mentors, religious leaders, peer educators, civic educators, community facilitators and trainer of trainees were used. Local partners were mainly used, supported by regional partners and international partners. Community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in the area were in form of public seminars and rallies, community policing, Jiongoze project and Operation Usalama Watch.

It was determined that more awareness, sensitization programs, community forums, collaboration with the police, and anti-radicalization programs helped reduce the number of radicalized individuals. However, factors such as poverty, unemployment and lack of support from close relatives and authorities contributed to an increase in the number of radicalized individuals. There existed public-private partnerships in the sub-county, which included community-security relation programs such as Nyumba Kumi Initiative and PBOs partnering with government institutions such as NCIC. There were also partnerships such as UNICEF partnering with schools, county government and SOWED Kenya. The study found that partnerships worked through sharing early warning information, trainings and education.
The study determined that the constitution was the most commonly law known for countering radicalization, supported by Prevention of Terrorism Act and Cyber Security and Protection Bill. The study found that most respondents did not know of existence of media laws, however, laws on media reporting and use of technological and social platforms, such as social media and laws on privacy to information were reported. Counter-jihadism measures for countering radicalization showed that education on jihadism, team work in counter-jihadism processes, teachings through madrassas, community education and religious leaders were used. Public involvement was done through public barazas, community dialogues, Nyumba Kumi meetings, making of local laws, information sharing concerning youths in the area, self-help groups meetings, networking, and during women chamas. Community policing was practiced in Kamukunji sub-county using Nyumba Kumi initiative, peace committees, clustering areas, through platforms such as t-shirts, Barazas, and chief meetings.

5.4 Conclusion

On the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs, the study concluded that vocational training, education, career guidance and counter-terrorism studies in schools were used to counter terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county. There were also other methods and strategies used that included trauma informed resilience, trauma healing, peer to peer mentorship, self-awareness education, reversing of myths and misinterpretations and guidance and counselling using youth mentors, religious leaders, peer educators, civic educators, community facilitators and trainer of trainees.

On non-state actors’ perception of the performance of counter-radicalization programs, the study also concluded that non-state actors perceived counter-radicalization strategies to be successful, which was accomplished through awareness,
sensitization programs, community forums, collaboration with the police, public-private partnership programs such as Nyumba Kumi Initiative and sharing early warning information.

On the existing government policies in countering-radicalization, the study concluded that that there were laws on media reporting and use of technological and social platforms, such as social media and laws on privacy. Public involvement was also done, through public barazas, community dialogues and Nyumba Kumi meetings.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the discussion and the conclusion made, the study makes the following recommendations:

5.5.1 Policy Recommendations

On the methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs, the study recommends that since the duration and impact of programs employed were cited to be too short and not efficient enough respectively, non-state actors should extend their methods and strategies to enough length of time required to reach all targeted areas in the community. The methods should also be diversified in all areas within the sub-county to accommodate all sorts of individuals, from young children to old members of the community.

On non-state actors’ perception of the performance of counter-radicalization programs, the study recommends support from close relatives and authorities to radicalized individuals, in order to reduce the number of radicalized individuals. Lack of support was a major factor in radicalization, and employment whether in the formal or informal sectors to the radicalized individuals can help them escape the radicalization trap.
On the efficacy of existing government policies in countering-radicalization, the study recommends more awareness creation on existing laws concerning radicalization. Since the respondents were not very much aware of these laws, information on them will be a necessary step to countering radicalization.

5.5.2 Suggestion for Further Research

This study was only conducted in Kamukunji sub-county. This limited the study in coverage. The study also measured the viewpoints of religious leaders and PBO representatives only; therefore, the views of residents and those affected by radicalization, were not taken into account. The study recommends that other studies be conducted on the same subject area using views of residents for comparative results in the future.

Based on specific objectives of the study, the study recommends future studies on community focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects role. In addition, the perception of residents can also be measured on counter radicalization programs. The study further recommends future studies on how policies can be used to lower radicalization in Kenya.
REFERENCES


Cherney, A., & Belton, E. (2019). Evaluating Case-Managed Approaches to Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism: An Example of the Proactive


Appendix I: Introduction Letter

I am an Africa Nazarene University student currently undertaking graduate research study on the ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN KAMUKUNJI SUB-COUNTY, NAIROBI COUNTY, KENYA. I have selected you as one of my study respondents.

Kindly, if you chose to be my study participant, information you share during the data collection process as well as your identity will not be disclosed to anyone whatsoever and confidentiality remains utmost.

Yours Sincerely,

IKRAN HUSSEIN JIRTE
Appendix II: Questionnaire

Self-Introduction done and confidentiality of the information given: YES…..or NO……...(Tick)

This questionnaire is aimed at facilitating the research on ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN KAMUKUNJI SUB-COUNTY, NAIROBI COUNTY, KENYA. Your response will be highly appreciated.

SECTION A: Demographic information

1. What is your gender?
   Male [ ]    Female [ ]

2. Type of Respondent
   PBO representative [ ]    Religious leader [ ]

3. What is your academic/education background level?
   No formal education [ ] Primary education [ ] Secondary Level [ ] College Level [ ]
   University Level [ ]

4. What is your age?
   18-35 years [ ] 36-55 years [ ] 55 and above [ ]

5. Marital Status
   Single/ Never Married [ ] Married [ ] Separated [ ] Divorced [ ] Widowed [ ]

6. Religion: -
   Traditional [ ] Christian [ ] Islam [ ] Others (Specify) ________________

Section B: Methods and processes of the counter-radicalization programs employed by various non-state actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County

7. What education and re-education methods are used in counter-radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county? (Choose all that apply)
   Counter-terrorism studies in schools [ ]
   Demobilization and Reintegration Programs [ ]
   Skills and vocational training on countering terrorism [ ]
   Global Partnership for Educations [ ]
Career guidance initiatives [ ]
Other (Mention them)

8. Are there rehabilitation centres in the sub-county?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]
9. If your answer in question 5 above is yes, where are these centres located?
   (Choose all that apply)
   Bahati [ ]
   California [ ]
   Eastleigh North [ ]
   Eastleigh South [ ]
   Kamukunji [ ]
   Kimathi [ ]
   Muthurwa/Shauri Moyo [ ]
   Pumwani [ ]
   Uhuru [ ]
10. What mental rehabilitation methods are used in counter-radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county?

11. What other rehabilitation methods are used in counter-radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county?

12. Are there mentors used in counter-radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county?
    Yes [ ] No [ ]
13. If yes, what type of mentors and instances have been used in counter-radicalization in Kamukunji sub-county in the past?

14. How do you ensure intelligence collection is used in countering radicalization in the area?

15. Are the rehabilitated individuals given jobs in Kamukunji sub-county?
    Yes [ ] No [ ]
16. If yes, what kind of jobs have they been given?
17. What type of actors/partners have you worked with in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji sub-county? (Choose all that apply)
   Local partners [ ] International Partners [ ] Regional partners [ ]

18. Are there community-focused counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism projects in the area?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

19. Which of the following are the community focused counter radicalization and counter-terrorism processes in Kamukunji Sub-county? (choose all that apply)
   Community policing [ ]
   Jiongoze project [ ]
   Operation Usalama Watch [ ]
   Community mapping of terror activities [ ]
   Public seminars and rallies [ ]
   Random Searches [ ]
   Others (Mention them)

20. Do you involve multiple actors especially the concerned actors in countering radicalization in the area?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

21. If yes, which actors have you involved in countering-radicalization?

Section C: Non-state actors’ perception of performance of the counter-radicalization programs employed in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya

22. What is your perception on the number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji sub-county?

23. If there is a reduced/increased number of radicalized individuals in Kamukunji sub-county, what factors can you attribute to be contributing to the increase/decrease?
24. What can you say about the enrolment of radicalized individuals into de-radicalization centres?
   Increased enrolment [ ]
   Reduced enrolment [ ]

25. Are there public-private partnerships in the sub-county aimed at countering radicalization?
   Yes [ ]  No [ ]

26. If yes, what are the examples of these partnerships?

27. How do these partnerships work?

28. Is there improved inter-agency collaboration in the sub-county?
   Yes [ ]  No [ ]

29. What is your justification for the choice above?

30. How have early prevention and engagement approaches used in the sub-county?

31. Are there use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals?
   Yes [ ]  No [ ]

32. How effective has the use of fear appeals to the radicalized individuals been?

33. How successful has the enrolment of radicalized individual been in the sub-county?
   Very successful [ ]
   Successful [ ]
   Not successful [ ]
   I don’t know [ ]

34. If not successful, how can the enrolment of radicalized individuals improved in the sub-county?

35. What can you say about the success of partnerships in countering radicalization in the sub-county?
   Very successful [ ]
Successful [ ]
Not successful [ ]
I don’t know [ ]

36. What are the approaches used for early prevention of radicalization? (Choose all that apply)
   Public involvement [ ]
   Risk assessment [ ]
   International Experts Engagement [ ]
   Others (Mention them)

Section D: Efficacy of existing policies in countering radicalization
37. Which of the following anti-terror laws and policies have proven important towards countering radicalization? (Choose all that apply)
   Prevention of Terrorism Act [ ]
   Cyber Security and Protection Bill [ ]
   The Constitution [ ]
   Others (please specify)…………………………

38. Are there media laws on reporting of terrorism widely adopted in the sub-county?
   Yes [ ]  No [ ]

39. What are the media laws on reporting of terrorism widely adopted in the sub-county?

40. Are there counter-jihadism measures used for countering radicalization?
    Yes [ ]  No [ ]

41. What are the counter-jihadism measures used in effort to tame radicalization and terrorism in the area?

42. Are there public involvement measures used for countering radicalization?
    Yes [ ]  No [ ]

43. If yes, how is the public involved in making decisions concerning security in the area?__________________________________________________________
44. If yes, is the prosecution and jailing of radicalized individuals based on justice?

____________________________________________________

45. How is community policing practiced in Kamukunji sub-county?

____________________________________________________

46. Which of the following international laws have been adopted locally in the fight against terrorism? (Choose all that apply)

UN global counter-terrorism strategy [ ]
International humanitarian law [ ]
The 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism [ ]
United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism [ ]
Others (please specify)

____________________________________________________

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSES.
Appendix III: Key Informant Interview Guide

i. What are the counter-radicalization programs employed by various actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________

ii. How successful are the counter-radicalization programs employed by non-state actors in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________

iii. What is the efficacy of existing policies in countering radicalization in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________

iv. What are the challenges faced in countering radicalization programs employed in the fight against terrorism in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya?

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Appendix IV: NACOSTI Research Permits
Appendix V: University Research Approval Letter

12th February 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: IKRAN HUSSEIN JIRTE (18M03EMGP028)

The above named person is a bonafide student at Africa Nazarene University. She has finished her course work and has defended her thesis proposal entitled: "Effectiveness of non-state actors counter radicalization programs in the fight against terrorism in Kaukunjji Sub County, Nairobi County, Kenya".

Any assistance accorded to her to facilitate data collection and finish her thesis is highly welcomed.

[Signature]

Prof. Rodney Reed
DVC, Academic & Student Affairs.
Appendix VI: Map of the Study Area

Map of Kamukunji Sub-county